Professional and Consulting Services Panel
Request for Quotation – PIEC0003935
Statement of Requirement
A.A.1 KEY DETAILS
RFQ Dates and Times
Issue date:
23 February 2024
Closing date and time:
Refer to closing date and time detailed in the VendorPanel Request.
Question closing time:
Refer to closing date for questions detailed in the VendorPanel Request.
Work Order Dates
Expected Start date:
5 August 2024
Contract Term:
Three months
Contract Extension Option:
Extension of Two Period(s) each of One month
A.A.2 THRESHOLD ASSESSMENT CRITERIA
Threshold criteria
Not applicable
A.A.3 THE REQUIREMENT
Background (if required for context)
Refer to detailed requirements in Attachment A
Required Services
Refer to detailed requirements in Attachment A
A.A.3 (a) Standards
Standards
Not applicable
Environmental Considerations
Not applicable
Key Performance Indicators (KPI)
Not applicable
A.A.3 (b) Security
Personnel employed by the Supplier must provide evidence of completion of a criminal history background
check (National y Coordinated Criminal History Check) and must sign a declaration of confidentiality and
political neutrality prior to the engagement.
A.A.3 (c) Workplace Health and Safety
Contractor must be aware of, and when required, comply with the Work Health and Safety Act 2011.
A.A.3 (d) Key Deliverables
Details of milestone instructions are as follows:
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Professional and Consulting Services Panel
Request for Quotation – PIEC0003935
• A rehearsal of the ballot paper scanning assurance process will be required to be held in
approximately August 2024. The rehearsal will involve a small number of ballot papers that have
been scanned, digital y captured with preferences verified. The supplier will then undertake a
rehearsal of the assurance process. This is likely to consume approximately ½ day.
• ‘Production’ delivery of the bal ot paper scanning assurance process. Conducted between
22 October and 26 October 2024 on premises at the office of Elections ACT. Each day of bal ot
paper assurance wil commence at 9am and conclude at 5pm, with the potential to run up until
7pm if al selected batches have not been ful y processed by the auditors.
A.A.3 (e) Meetings and Reporting
Meeting Requirements
The suppliers are required to attend the fol owing meetings:
Type
Attendees
Frequency / When
Method
Rehearsal
Supplier and Elections
August 2024
On premises – Elections
ACT staff
ACT
Progress
Supplier and Elections
As required
Mutually agreed
ACT staff
Reporting Requirements
Description
Indicative date for delivery
Final audit report
Friday 8 November 2024
A.A.3 (f) Territory Information
• Australian Bureau of Statistics – Sample size for a Ballot Paper Scanning Assurance Plan for ACT
Legislative Assembly elections
• Elections ACT ballot paper assurance plan
• Bal ot paper scanned images
• Digital preference data
A.A.3 (g) Pricing
Potential Suppliers are required to provide detailed pricing showing how the total Contract price in the
proposal has been calculated under the Suppliers Panel Deed’s capped rates, including allocation of
proposed staff against the Suppliers Panel Deed’s classification level.
A.A.4 REQUEST FOR QUOTATION (RFQ) DISTRIBUTION
This RFQ and any updates wil be distributed by via VendorPanel. Potential Suppliers may refer to
VendorPanel article for
How Suppliers View/Download a Request for more information.
Any questions relating to this RFQ must be directed through the VendorPanel Ask a Question function.
Potential Suppliers may refer to VendorPanel article for
How Suppliers ask the buyer a Question against a
Request for more information.
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Professional and Consulting Services Panel
Request for Quotation – PIEC0003935
A.A.5 LODGEMENT METHOD
Proposals should be lodged via VendorPanel by the closing date and time specified in the VendorPanel
Request. Refer to VendorPanel articles for more information
Responding to Requests for more information.
A.A.6 CUSTOMER’S CONTACT OFFICER
Refer to the contact details provided on the VendorPanel request.
COMPLAINTS HANDLING
A Tenderer who wishes to make a complaint about a procurement activity must fol ow the process outlined
in the ACT Government Supplier Complaints Management Procedure. This procedure can be accessed from
the ACT Procurement website at Supplier and Tenderer Complaints - Procurement ACT
Any complaints relating to this procurement should, in the first instance, be referred to the Customer's
Contact Officer.
A.A.7 DRAFT ADDITIONAL CONTRACT TERMS
Not applicable
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Attachment A – Detailed Specifications – PIEC0003935
Attachment A – Detailed Specifications
Procurement Unique Identifier: PIEC0003935
RFQ Title: Bal ot paper scanning assurance
Background
The ACT Electoral Commission (the Commission) uses a ballot paper scanning system (BPSS) to scan
and digital y capture voter preferences from paper ballots including postal votes, declaration votes
and ordinary votes issued at a pol ing place. The BPSS was established at the 2008 ACT Legislative
Assembly election.
At the central scrutiny centre, starting on the Sunday after pol ing day, formal bal ot papers for each
polling place are batched into batches of 100 papers. Each batch is al ocated a batch header with a
unique batch number related to that pol ing place. Each batch is then scanned and imaged, and the
image read by intelligent character recognition (ICR) software.
The ICR software interprets the preferences shown, and the Robson rotation version number
printed, on each bal ot paper. The scanning system uses a range of strategies to ensure that
preferences are captured with 100% accuracy. After each batch of ballot papers is scanned, Elections
ACT operators are presented with an ‘out of context’ image of each preference number on each
bal ot paper, and conduct an initial validation check on the accuracy of the scanned results (for
example, by checking every “1” on every bal ot paper, every “2” on every bal ot paper, and so on).
After this initial check, the ICR software applies a set of business rules to each ballot paper. Those
bal ot papers that the ICR software interprets with a high degree of certainty pass the business rules
check and are automatical y admitted for counting. Any bal ot papers which have unclear numbers
or numbers in dispute, or do not pass the business rule check (for example having a break in the
sequence of numbers, or appearing to be informal), are flagged as requiring the verification of an
Elections ACT officer.
The Elections ACT officer investigates each ballot paper requiring verification by comparing the on-
screen image of the bal ot paper with the ICR interpretation of the preferences on the original bal ot
paper to determine whether there has been any error in scanning, interpretation, or validation.
The Elections ACT officer corrects any identified errors in scanning, interpretation, or validation on
the computer system. If necessary, the officer views the physical bal ot paper if the scanned image is
not sufficient to resolve any doubt.
If an Elections ACT officer changes a record of a vote on-screen, that change must be verified by a
second Elections ACT officer.
Scrutineers are entitled to observe the scanning, validation, and verification processes, and where a
scrutineer believes that a ballot paper has been incorrectly interpreted, the interpretation can be
chal enged. Chal enged bal ot papers are re-examined by a senior electoral official.
The above process continues until al formal paper bal ots have been scanned and al bal ot papers
verified.
Once all scanned ballot papers are verified, the preference data from those ballot papers is
transferred to the electronic voting and counting system (eVACS), where the data is combined with
the results of the electronic voting, and the computer program distributes preferences under the
ACT's Hare-Clark electoral system.
All ballot papers identified at the manual count at the polling place as informal are manually
rechecked at the central scrutiny centre. Any papers ruled at that stage to be formal are added to a
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Attachment A – Detailed Specifications – PIEC0003935
new batch and scanned as formal. Bal ot papers confirmed as informal are also scanned but their
markings are not recorded in the system.
Bal ot paper scanning assurance
Historically, Elections ACT has always conducted an assurance process that examines the accuracy of
the scanning process by comparing the digital image with the preferences exported to the eVACS
system. This is general y done post-election using a random sample of 3,000 bal ot paper images
(600 per electorate). This process has not found an error in the last three ACT Legislative Assembly
Elections.
As a further transparency measure, Elections ACT intends to deploy the bal ot paper scanning
assurance process live during the 2024 bal ot paper scrutiny. The live scrutiny will occur in the same
location and at the same time as the bal ot paper scanning process; comparing the physical bal ot
papers, with the digital image of the bal ot paper and the digital preferences to be exported to the
eVACS system.
The bal ot paper scanning assurance process may be inspected by scrutineers at the counting centre
where the scrutiny is being conducted. The assurance process will use an external Contractor to
conduct the assurance process using an ICT system developed by Elections ACT.
The assurance process wil examine formal bal ot papers only and is intended as a publicly viewable
process to ensure the preferences captured by the BPSS and imported into EVACS for counting are
accurate. A sample of scanned ballot papers will be audited in accordance with statistical advice on
sampling from the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Audit preparation
Elections ACT will perform the following tasks:
1. On day one of scanning, bal ot papers wil be batched, scanned, verified and at the end of
the day preference data for committed batches will be extracted by the BPSS vendor and
provided to an Elections ACT officer.
2. At the same time, an export of ballot paper images for committed batches will also be
exported by the BPSS vendor and provided to Elections ACT.
3. On the morning of the second day of scanning, an Elections ACT officer wil upload the
preference data and images into Election ACT’s election management system (EMS) – ballot
paper auditing module.
4. Immediately after the upload, the Elections ACT officer will be prompted to enter a random
seed into the system. This seed will be generated outside the EMS by Elections ACT staff
using a randomisation device (this process is publicly viewable). A new seed is generated
daily with each upload.
5. Elections ACT will use the ballot paper auditing system to open a new daily audit for each
electorate. The Elections ACT officer will select the number of batches to be audited that day
and enter the seed to be applied for that day. The randomisation algorithm will identify
random batches and the random starting paper in each batch. Each randomly selected batch
will have five papers audited from it starting from the randomly selected starting paper and
progressing sequential y for the next four papers. The total number of batches to be selected
depends on a daily target, which in turn is based on the statistical advice provided by the ABS
on the overal sample number for each electorate.
6. The system then generates electorate-based reports listing the batches selected for auditing
for that day and lists the starting paper bal ot paper in each batch. Elections ACT staff wil
use that report to physical y identify the batches to be audited, isolate them, and flag the
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Attachment A – Detailed Specifications – PIEC0003935
starting paper in each batch. For convenience, batches will be physically grouped by
electorate.
Auditing
The Contractor will perform the fol owing tasks:
1. The Contractor will verify that all batches have been provided by Elections ACT in accordance
with the reports.
2. The Contractor will then log in to the EMS-bal ot paper auditing module and navigate to the
open audits section.
3. The Contractor will then select a relevant daily electorate audit and navigate to all unaudited
batches and select the first batch they will audit.
4. The Contractor wil then bring up the starting paper in that batch and compare the physical
paper with the scanned image. Once it is confirmed that the paper and the image are
replicas, the auditor wil then compare the preferences written on the digital image with the
digitally recorded preferences that have been derived following the verification process (the
digital preferences are listed in a panel to the left of the ballot paper’s digital image on the
EMS screen for easy comparison).
5. The Contractor will then confirm that no errors are present by marking the paper as
successful y audited via a tick button. Alternatively, if an error is identified, marking the
paper as including an error, selecting from a pre-defined set of reasons for the error and
recording further details as necessary.
6. For errors identified, the Contractor wil be required to physical y flag the bal ot paper and
batch to enable the Deputy Commissioner to physically review these ballot papers at the end
of each day. The Deputy Commissioner wil conduct the confirmation review logging into a
personal EMS account, assessing the error paper and confirming or rejecting the finding, in
the presence of Contractor personnel.
7. Al changes in the bal ot paper auditing module are logged and auditable. Once the
Contractor has reviewed one ballot paper, they wil navigate to the next paper and finish
reviewing all five papers in that batch before proceeding to the next batch in turn.
8. The Contractor will review all papers allocated for completion for each electorate on each
day.
The above tasks wil be repeated each day until the final day of scanning, which is typical y the
Saturday fol owing Election Day.
On that final day, the Contractor may be required to perform an ad-hoc audit to achieve an
overall statistical target for bal ot papers to be audited for a given electorate.
An ad-hoc batch audit selects batches and starting papers randomly from the entire pool of
electorate ballot papers (which have not already been audited).
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