Document 1 - Page 1 of 2
Official: Sensitive 
s 22 irrelevant to scope of request
4. s 46(a)
 initiated proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia against Judge Vasta, the Commonwealth and
the State of Queensland. s 46(a)
 originating application and statement of claim filed on 7 December 2020
outline that he is seeking damages for false imprisonment from all respondents, and exemplary damages from
Judge Vasta.
s 22 irrelevant to scope of request
Official: Sensitive 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 1 of 288

---

Document 1 - Page 2 of 2
Official: Sensitive 
s 22 irrelevant to scope of request
6. s 42(1)
 s 22 irrelevant to scope of request
s 22 irrelevant to scope of request
Official: Sensitive 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 2 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 1 of 225
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
File number: 
ACD 57 of 2020 
 
 
Judgment of: 
WIGNEY J 
 
 
Date of judgment: 
30 August 2023 
 
 
Catchwords: 
TORTS – false imprisonment – where applicant 
imprisoned for contempt in matrimonial proceeding in 
Federal Circuit Court of Australia for purported non-
compliance with disclosure orders – where judge’s 
contempt declaration and imprisonment orders were set 
aside for invalidity – consideration of whether 
imprisonment order was valid until set aside and provided 
lawful justification for imprisonment – consideration of 
whether the judge exercised superior court powers to 
punish for contempt which meant orders remained valid 
until set aside – found that judge’s orders, being of an 
inferior court and vitiated by jurisdictional error, were void 
ab initio and of no legal effect – found that no lawful 
justification for imprisonment    
 
TORTS – collateral abuse of process – whether the judge 
had an improper purpose or motive to coerce settlement of 
matrimonial proceeding – found it was not established that 
the judge’s purpose in making the contempt declaration and 
imprisonment order was other than to punish for non-
compliance with court order – found that it was not 
established that the judge’s predominant purpose was 
“improper” – found that tort not made out 
 
TORTS – judicial immunity – whether common law 
judicial immunity protected inferior court judge from 
liability for tort of false imprisonment – consideration of 
scope of common law judicial immunity afforded to 
inferior court judges – consideration of circumstances 
where inferior court judges may lose that immunity – 
consideration of whether common law distinction between 
immunity of superior and inferior court judges remains in 
place – where judge made orders for which there was no 
proper foundation in law and was guilty of a gross 
irregularity of procedure and denial of procedural fairness – 
found that the judge lost the protection of judicial immunity 
afforded to inferior court judges because he acted without 
or in excess of jurisdiction 
 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 64 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 2 of 225
TORTS – justification defence – whether security, police 
and prison officers protected from liability in tort by 
common law justification defence when acting pursuant to 
an order or warrant made by an inferior court judge which 
was void ab initio but appeared regular on its face when 
executed – held that no such defence available at common 
law in respect of orders or warrants issued by inferior court 
judges – found that defence is only available to officers of 
the court or “ministerial officers” who are bound by a duty 
to the court to obey a warrant issued by the court which 
appeared regular on its face  
 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – whether s 249 of 
the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) applies in the case of 
warrants issued by a federal court – whether Federal Circuit 
Court of Australia is “any court” under s 249 of the 
Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) – whether s 35 of the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) applies to the interpretation 
of s 249 of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) – found that s 
35 does apply and the Federal Circuit Court of Australia is 
not a court “in and for” or “in and of” Queensland – found 
that defence not available 
  
DAMAGES – claim for general, aggravated and exemplary 
damages for false imprisonment and deprivation of liberty – 
imprisonment of seven days in watch house and prison – 
consideration of principles that apply in assessing general, 
aggravated and exemplary damages for false imprisonment 
and deprivation of liberty – found that unlawful 
imprisonment of applicant warranted award of general 
damages – found that duration, nature and circumstances of  
imprisonment and hurt to feelings suffered by applicant 
warranted award of aggravated damages – found that 
judge’s reckless disregard of applicant’s rights and the rule 
of law warranted award of exemplary damages 
 
DAMAGES – claim for general damages for personal 
injury – where applicant suffered post-traumatic stress 
disorder as a result of false imprisonment – award of 
damages assessed pursuant to Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) 
and Civil Liability Regulation 2014 (Qld) which require 
consideration of impairment caused by psychiatric injury – 
consideration of expert evidence regarding impairment – 
consideration of material non-disclosures by applicant 
regarding pre-existing conditions – found that award of 
general damages for a moderate mental disorder was 
warranted 
  
DAMAGES – claim for damages for loss of earning 
capacity – consideration of principles applicable to 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 65 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 3 of 225
compensation for loss of earning capacity – found that 
some diminuation to earning capacity resulted from 
psychiatric injury – found that no substantial financial loss 
established but that psychiatric injury may cause future 
financial loss – found that modest award of damages for 
loss of earning capacity warranted 
 
 
Legislation: 
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia ss 80, 118,  
120 
Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) 
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140(2)(c) 
Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) 
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pts XIIIA, XIIIB, ss 4(3)(e)-(f), 
35, 39(1A), 75(2), 79, 112AA, 112AB, 112AD, 112AE, 
112AP, 121 
Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) rr 1.10(1), 13.04 
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) ss 
10(1)(a), 17 
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) rr 1.06, 14.04, 
19.02, 24.03 
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 51A 
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 24, 35 
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) ss 4, 35 
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) sch 2, ss 52, 61-62 
Civil Liability Regulation 2014 (Qld) schs 4-7, regs 7-8 
Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) s 276 
Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) ss 119A, 249, 359A, 729(3) 
District Court of Western Australia Act 1969 (WA) 
Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 12(1) 
Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW) s 44B 
Land and Income Tax Assessment Act 1895 (NSW) 
Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) s 796 
24 Geo II, c 44 (Constables Protection Act) 1750 (Imp) s 6 
31 Car II, c 2 (Habeas Corpus Act) 1679 (Imp) 
1 & 2 Vict, c 74 (Small Tenements Recovery Act) 1838 
(Imp) 
Magistrates’ Courts (Northern Ireland) Act 1964 (NI) s 15 
 
 
Cases cited: 
Agnew v Jobson (1877) 13 Cox CC 625 
Allen v Sharp (1848) 12 JP 693; 2 Exch 352 
Andrews v Marris (1841) 1 QB 3; 113 ER 1030 
Attorney-General (NSW) v Agarsky (1986) 6 NSWLR 38 
Attorney-General (NSW) v Mayas Pty Ltd (1988) 14 
NSWLR 342 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 66 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 4 of 225
Australian Iron & Steel Ltd v Greenwood (1962) 107 CLR 
308; [1962] HCA 42 
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] HCA 
34 
Broome v Cassell & Co Ltd [1972] AC 1027; 1 All ER 801 
Bulsey v The State of Queensland [2015] QCA 187 
Butler v Simmonds Crowley & Galvin [2000] 2 Qd R 252; 
[1999] QCA 475 
Butt v Newman (1819) 171 ER 850 
Calder v Halket (1840) 3 Moo PC 28; 13 ER 12 
Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571; [1944] HCA 5 
Coffey v State of Queensland [2010] QCA 291 
Coleman v Watson [2017] QSC 343 
Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Cavanough (1935) 53 
CLR 220; [1935] HCA 45 
Corbett v The King (1932) 47 CLR 317; [1932] HCA 36 
Crawford Adjusters (Cayman) Ltd v Sagicor General 
Insurance (Cayman) Ltd [2014] AC 366; [2013] 4 All ER 8 
DAI v DAA (2005) 191 FLR 360; [2005] FamCA 88 
Davis v Capper (1829) 10 B & C 28; 109 ER 362 
Day v The Queen (1984) 153 CLR 475; [1984] HCA 3 
Demer v Cook (1903) 88 LT 629; 20 Cox CC 
Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Kmetyk (2018) 85 
MVR 25; [2018] NSWCA 156 
Dr Drury’s Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 141; 77 ER 688 
DRJ v Commissioner of Victims Rights (No 2) (2020) 103 
NSWLR 692; [2020] NSWCA 242 
Eaves v Donnelly [2011] QDC 207 
Ex parte Taylor; Re Butler (1924) 41 WN (NSW) 81 
FAI Allianz Insurance Ltd v Lang (2004) 42 MVR 482; 
[2004] NSWCA 413 
Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 
CLR 89; [2007] HCA 22 
Feather v Rogers (1909) 9 SR (NSW) 192 
Fingleton v The Queen (2005) 227 CLR 166; [2005] HCA 
34 
Firth v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2018] 
NSWCA 78 
Fleet v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals [2005] NSWSC 926 
Gallo v Dawson (1988) 63 ALJR 121; (1988) 82 ALR 401 
Garthwaite v Garthwaite [1964] P 356; 2 All ER 233 
Gerard v Hope [1965] Tas SR 15 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 67 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 5 of 225
Girginis v Kastrati (1988) 49 SASR 371 
Goldie v The Commonwealth (No 2) (2004) 81 ALD 422; 
[2004] FCA 156 
Graham v Baker (1961) 106 CLR 340; [1961] HCA 48 
Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1; 
[1998] HCA 70 
Groome v Forrester (1816) 5 M & S 314; 105 ER 1066 
Gwinne v Poole (1692) 2 Lutw 935; 125 ER 522 
Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] P 285; 2 All ER 567 
Haines v Bendall (1991) 172 CLR 60; [1991] HCA 15 
Haskins v The Commonwealth (2011) 244 CLR 22; [2011] 
HCA 28 
Harrington v Lowe (1996) 190 CLR 311; [1996] HCA 8 
Hazelton v Potter (1907) 5 CLR 445; [1907] HCA 63 
Hemelaar v Walsh [2017] QDC 157 
Henderson v Preston (1888) 21 QBD 362 
Ho v Loneragan [2013] WASCA 20 
Houlden v Smith (1850) 14 QB 841; 117 ER 323 
In re McC (A Minor) [1985] 1 AC 528; [1984] 3 All ER 
908 
In the Marriage of Tate (No 3) (2003) 30 Fam LR 427; 
[2003] FamCA 112 
In the Marriage of Schwarzkopff (1992) 106 FLR 274 
Isaacs v Robertson [1985] AC 97; [1984] 3 All ER 140 
Jones v Chapman (1845) 14 M & W 124; 153 ER 416 
Kable v New South Wales (2012) 268 FLR 1; [2012] 
NSWCA 243 
Keighly v Bell (1866) 4 F & F 763; 176 ER 781 
Kuddas v Chief Constable of Leicestershire [2002] 2 AC 
122; [2001] 3 All ER 193 
Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573; 
[2011] HCA 10  
Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1; [1987] HCA 47 
Lewis v Australian Capital Territory (2020) 271 CLR 192; 
[2020] HCA 26 
Lindsay v Leigh (1848) 11 QB 455; 116 ER 547 
London v Cox (1867) LR 2 HL 239 
Love v Attorney-General (NSW) (1990) 169 CLR 307; 
[1990] HCA 4 
Luck v University of Southern Queensland (2014) 145 ALD 
1; [2014] FCAFC 135 
M’Creadie v Thomson 1907 SC 1176 
Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638; [1990] 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 68 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 6 of 225
HCA 20 
Maxwell-Smith v S & E Hall Pty Ltd (2014) 86 NSWLR 
481; [2014] NSWCA 146 
McFadzean v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy 
Union [2004] VSC 289 
Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission (1995) 
182 CLR 1; [1995] HCA 5 
Mills v Stanway Coaches Ltd [1940] 2 KB 334; 2 All ER 
586 
Minchin v Public Curator of Queensland [1965] ALR 91 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia 
Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507; [2001] HCA 17 
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services 
and Multicultural Affairs v AAM17 (2021) 272 CLR 329; 
[2021] HCA 6 
Moll v Butler (1985) 4 NSWLR 231 
Mooney v Commissioners of Taxation (NSW) (1905) 3 CLR 
221; [1905] HCA 61 
Moravia v Sloper (1737) Willes 30; 125 ER 1039 
Morrell v Martin (1841) 3 Man & G 581; 133 ER 1273 
Morse v James (1738) Willes 122; 125 ER 1089 
Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 
Nakhla v McCarthy [1978] 1 NZLR 291 
New South Wales v Ibbett (2005) 65 NSWLR 168; [2005] 
NSWCA 445 
New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; [2006] 
HCA 57 
New South Wales v Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118; [2013] 
HCA 26 
New South Wales v Moss (2000) 54 NSWLR 536; [2000] 
NSWCA 133 
New South Wales v Williamson (2012) 248 CLR 417; 
[2012] HCA 57 
Nicholas v Walker and Carter (1634) Cro Car 394; 79 ER 
944 
O’Connor v Isaacs [1956] 2 QB 288; 2 All ER 417 
O’Shane v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd (2013) 85 NSWLR 69; 
[2013] NSWCA 315 
Oakey Coal Action Alliance Inc v New Acland Coal Pty Ltd 
(2021) 272 CLR 33; [2021] HCA 2 
Obeid v Lockly (2018) 98 NSWLR 258; [2018] NSWCA 71 
Oldham Justices; Ex parte Cawley (1996) 2 WLR 681; 1 
All ER 464 
Olliet v Bessey (1682) T Jones Rep 214; 84 ER 1223 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 69 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 7 of 225
Owners of the Ship “Shin Kobe Maru” v Empire Shipping 
Company Inc (1994) 181 CLR 404; [1994] HCA 54 
Paff v Speed (1961) 105 CLR 549; [1961] HCA 14 
Paul v Rendell (1981) 55 ALJR 371 
Pelechowski v Registrar, Court of Appeal (NSW) (1999) 
198 CLR 435; [1999] HCA 19 
Perkin v Proctor and Green (1768) 2 Wils KB 382; 95 ER 
874 
Permanent Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd v Finlayson (1968) 
122 CLR 338; [1968] HCA 85 
Placer (Granny Smith) Pty Ltd v Thiess Contractors Pty 
Ltd (2003) 196 ALR 257; [2003] HCA 10 
Polley v Fordham (No 2) (1904) 91 LT 525 
Posner v Collector for Interstate Destitute Persons (Vic) 
(1946) 74 CLR 461; [1946] HCA 50 
Price v Messenger (1800) 2 Bos & P 158; 126 ER 1213 
R v Armstrong [1996] 1 Qd R 316 
R v Deemal [2010] 2 Qd R 70; [2009] QCA 131 
R v HBZ (2020) 4 QR 171; [2020] QCA 73 
R v JAA [2019] 3 Qd R 242; [2018] QCA 365 
R v Manchester City Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte Davies 
[1988] 1 WLR 667; 1 All ER 930 
R v Manchester City Magistrates’ Court Ex parte Davies 
[1988] 3 WLR 1357; [1989] 1 All ER 90 
R v Metal Trades Employers’ Association; Ex parte 
Amalgamated Engineering Union (Australian Section) 
(1951) 82 CLR 208; [1951] HCA 3 
R v Paz [2018] 3 Qd R 50; [2017] QCA 263 
R v Shetty [2005] 2 Qd R 540; QCA 225 
R v Turnbull; Ex parte Taylor (1968) 123 CLR 28; [1968] 
HCA 88 
Raad v New South Wales [2017] NSWDC 63 
Rajski v Powell (1987) 11 NSWLR 522 
Raven v Burnett (1895) 6 QLJ 166 
Re Bolton; Ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514; [1987] 
HCA 12 
Re Colina; Ex parte Torney (1999) 200 CLR 386; [1999] 
HCA 57 
Re East; Ex parte Nguyen (1998) 196 CLR 354; [1998] 
HCA 73 
Read v Wilmot (1672) 1 Vent 220; 86 ER 148 
Robertson v The Queen (1997) 92 A Crim R 115 
Romig v Tabcorp Holdings Ltd [2014] QSC 249 
Ruddock v Taylor (2003) 58 NSWLR 269; [2003] NSWCA 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 70 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 8 of 225
262 
Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612; [2005] HCA 48 
Rutherford v Marshal of Family Court of Australia (1999) 
152 FLR 299; [1999] FamCA 1299 
Seaegg v The King (1932) 48 CLR 251; [1932] HCA 47 
Scavage v Tateham (1600) Cro Eliz 829; 78 ER 1056 
Shergold v Holloway (1734) Sess Cas KB 154; 93 ER 156 
Shergold v Holloway (1734) 2 Str 1002; 93 ER 995 
Sirros v Moore [1975] 1 QB 118; [1974] 3 All ER 776 
Skouvakis v Skouvakis (1976) 11 ALR 204; [1976] 2 
NSWLR 29 
Smith v Bouchier (1734) 2 Str 993; 93 ER 989 
Smith v Collis (1910) SR (NSW) 800 
Solomons v District Court of New South Wales (2002) 211 
CLR 119; [2002] HCA 47 
Spautz v Butterworth (1996) 41 NSWLR 1 
Spirits International BV v Federal Treasury (FKP) 
Sojuzplodoimport [2013] FCAFC 106 
State of New South Wales v Riley (2003) 57 NSWLR 496; 
[2003] NSWCA 208 
Stradford v Stradford (2019) 59 FamLR 194; [2019] 
FamCAFC 25 
Survival & Industrial Equipment (Newcastle) Pty Ltd v 
Owners of the Vessel “Alley Cat” (1992) 36 FCR 129; 
[1992] FCA 319 
The Case of the Marshalsea (1612) 10 Co Rep 68b; 77 ER 
1027 
Triggell v Pheeney (1951) 82 CLR 497; [1951] HCA 23 
Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118; 
[1996] HCA 40 
Varawa v Howard Smith Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 35; [1911] 
HCA 46 
Vignoli v Sydney Harbour Casino (2000) Aust Torts 
Reports 81-451; [1999] NSWSC 1113 
von Arnim v Federal Republic of Germany (No 2) [2005] 
FCA 662 
Ward v Murphy (1937) 38 SR (NSW) 85 
Wentworth v Wentworth (2001) 52 NSWLR 602; [2000] 
NSWCA 350 
Whitfield v De Lauret and Co Ltd (1920) 29 CLR 71; 
[1920] HCA 75 
Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; [1992] HCA 34. 
Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278; [1986] HCA 
88 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 71 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 9 of 225
Willis v Maclachlan (1876) 1 Ex D 376 
Winters v Fogarty [2017] FCA 51 
Wood v Fetherston (1901) 27 VLR 492 
Yammine v Kalwy [1979] 2 NSWLR 151 
Yeldham v Rajski (1989) 18 NSWLR 48 
 
Abimbola Olowofoyeku, Suing Judges: A Study of Judicial 
Immunity (Oxford University Press, 1993) 
Edward Lutwyche and William Nelson, The Reports and 
Entries of Sir Edward Lutwyche (Nutt and Gosling, 1718) 
Enid Campbell, ‘Inferior and Superior Courts and Courts of 
Record’ (1997) 6 Journal of Judicial Administration 249 
Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed)  
Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages (15th ed, 1988) 
Mark Aronson and Harry Whitmore, Public Torts and 
Contacts Law (Law Book Co, 1982) 
Sir Frederick Pollock, The Law of Torts (1st ed, 1887) 
William Henry Watson, A Practical Treatise on the Office 
of Sheriff (Sweet, Maxwell, Stevens & Norton, 1848) 
William Lambard, Larmbard’s Eirenarcha (1614) Cap 4 
370 
 
 
Division: General 
Division 
 
 
Registry: 
Australian Capital Territory 
 
 
National Practice Area: 
Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights 
 
 
Number of paragraphs: 
852 
 
 
Date of hearing: 
6 to 15 December 2021, 24 May 2022  
 
 
Counsel for the applicant: 
Mr P Herzfeld SC with Mr D Reynolds 
 
 
Solicitor for the applicant: 
Ken Cush & Associates 
 
 
Counsel for the first 
Mr J Kirk SC with Ms P Bindon 
respondent: 
 
 
Solicitor for the first 
King & Wood Mallesons 
respondent: 
 
 
Counsel for the second 
Mr T Howe QC with Mr D Hume 
respondent: 
 
 
Solicitor for the second 
Australian Government Solicitor 
respondent: 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 72 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 10 of 225
 
 
Counsel for the third 
Mr J Horton QC with Mr D Favell 
respondent: 
 
 
Solicitor for the third 
Crown Law 
respondent: 
 
 
 
 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 73 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 11 of 225
 
ORDERS 
 
ACD 57 of 2020 
  
BETWEEN: MR 
STRADFORD 
Applicant 
 
AND: 
JUDGE SALVATORE PAUL VASTA 
First Respondent 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 
Second Respondent 
 
STATE OF QUEENSLAND 
Third Respondent 
 
 
ORDER MADE BY:  WIGNEY J 
DATE OF ORDER:  30 AUGUST 2023 
 
 
THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 
 
1. 
Until further order, the applicant in this proceeding be given, for the purposes of this 
proceeding, the pseudonym Mr Stradford and the applicant’s former wife be given the 
pseudonym Mrs Stradford. 
2. 
Judgment be entered in favour of the applicant against the first, second and third 
respondents jointly and severally for personal injury and loss of earning capacity in the 
amount of $59,450. 
3. 
Judgment be entered in favour of the applicant against the first and second respondents 
jointly for general and aggravated damages for false imprisonment and deprivation of 
liberty in the amount of $35,000 plus interest under s 51A of the Federal Court of 
Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) from 6 December 2018 to the date of judgment at 
the pre-judgment rates specified in the Interest on Judgments Practice Note (GPN-INT).  
4. 
Judgment be entered in favour of the applicant against the first and third respondents 
jointly for general and aggravated damages for false imprisonment and deprivation of 
liberty in the amount of $165,000 plus interest under s 51A of the FCA Act from 6 
December 2018 to the date of judgment at the pre-judgment rates specified in the 
Interest on Judgments Practice Note (GPN-INT). 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
i 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 74 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 12 of 225
 
5. 
Judgment be entered in favour of the applicant against the first respondent for 
exemplary damages for false imprisonment and deprivation of liberty in the amount of 
$50,000. 
6. 
The parties are to confer with a view to reaching agreement in respect of the appropriate 
order as to costs and in the event that no agreement is reached within two weeks from 
the date of judgment, the parties are to arrange to have the matter relisted for the 
purposes of hearing further submissions in respect of costs.   
 
 
Note:  Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. 
 
 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
ii 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 75 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 13 of 225
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
FACTS RELEVANT TO LIABILITY         
[18] 
ERRORS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY THE JUDGE 
[67] 
Alleged error 1: failure to make any finding that there had been a breach of the 
orders 
[76] 
Alleged error 2: failure to comply with Pts XIIIA and XIIIB of the Family Law 
Act 
[83] 
Alleged error 3: failure to follow r 19.02 of the FCC Rules 
[106] 
Alleged error 4: denial of procedural fairness 
[117] 
Alleged error 5: pre-judgment 
[119] 
Alleged error 6: improper purpose 
[137] 
THE TORTS ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY THE JUDGE 
[150] 
False imprisonment 
[151] 
Collateral abuse of process 
[159] 
LIABILITY OF THE JUDGE FOR COLLATERAL ABUSE OF PROCESS 
[165] 
THE LIABILITY OF THE JUDGE FOR FALSE IMPRISONMENT 
[171] 
Lawful justification 
[173] 
Are orders made by an inferior court valid until set aside? [177] 
Was the imprisonment order nevertheless valid until it was set aside?    [185] 
Conclusion concerning the elements of the tort of false imprisonment 
[196] 
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY 
[199] 
The scope of judicial immunity of inferior court judges 
[206] 
Authorities dealing with the civil liability of inferior court judges [213] 
Cases relied on by the Judge concerning the notion of jurisdiction in the 
context of judicial immunity [261] 
Conclusion as to the meaning of “jurisdiction” in the context of judicial 
immunity  [311] 
Abolition of the distinction between superior and inferior courts in respect of 
judicial immunity [318] 
Additional cases relied on by the Commonwealth [333] 
Conclusion as to the scope of judicial immunity of inferior court judges  
[340] 
Was the Judge entitled to the immunity of a superior court judge in the 
circumstances? [349] 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
iii 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 76 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 14 of 225
 
Is the Judge immune from liability arising from his imprisonment of Mr 
Stradford? [358] 
CONCLUSION – LIABILITY OF THE JUDGE 
[373] 
THE TORTS FOR WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH AND QUEENSLAND 
ARE ALLEGEDLY LIABLE 
[376] 
A pleading point? 
[387] 
Were the MSS guards officers of the Circuit Court? 
[400] 
Were the officers of the Queensland Police and Queensland Corrective Services 
officers of the Circuit Court?  
[409] 
LIABILITY AT COMMON LAW OF CONSTABLES AND “GAOLERS” 
ACTING ON ORDERS OF AN INFERIOR COURT  
[413] 
Cases relied on by Mr Stradford 
[418] 
Cases relied on by the Commonwealth (and Queensland) 
[444] 
Conclusion as to the availability of any relevant common law defence? 
[510] 
A STATUTORY DEFENCE? 
[525] 
Does s 35 of the Interpretation Act apply? 
[531] 
The Circuit Court was not a court “in and for” or “in and of” Queensland  
[536] 
CONCLUSION – LIABILITY OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
[549] 
CONCLUSION – LIABILITY OF QUEENSLAND 
[554] 
DAMAGES – OVERVIEW   
[559] 
Mr Stradford’s credibility and the reliability of his evidence relevant to damages 
[567] 
DAMAGES FOR DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY 
[575] 
Overview [576] 
Relevant principles – damages for deprivation of liberty 
[578] 
General damages [582] 
Aggravated damages [583] 
Exemplary damages [586] 
Relevant evidence and factual findings 
[588] 
Detention by the MSS guards [591] 
Detention and imprisonment by Queensland officers [596] 
Aggravated damages? 
[633] 
Exemplary damages against the Judge? 
[643] 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
iv 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 77 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 15 of 225
 
Assessment of damages for deprivation of liberty    
[647] 
GENERAL DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY 
[667] 
Summary of issues concerning the assessment of damages for personal injury   
[668] 
Applicable statutory provisions 
[674] 
Issues arising from the evidence of the psychiatrists 
[684] 
Material non-disclosures to the psychiatrists? 
[693] 
Appropriate PIRS ratings in the disputed domains   
[715] 
Self-care and personal hygiene [717] 
Social and recreational activities [722] 
Concentration, persistence and pace   [727] 
A pre-existing injury? [732] 
Findings concerning impairment 
[735] 
Assessment of general damages for personal injury 
[743] 
Ongoing medical expenses 
[744] 
Prognosis [753] 
DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY 
[761] 
Applicable legal principles 
[772] 
Did Mr Stradford suffer a diminution of earning capacity? 
[781] 
Did any diminution of earning capacity result in any financial loss? 
[796] 
What is the appropriate assessment of damages for loss of earning capacity? 
[816] 
Conclusion in respect of damages for loss of earning capacity 
[838] 
Causation – is the Commonwealth liable for damages arising from Mr 
Stradford’s injury? 
[839] 
SUMMARY – ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES 
[843] 
DISPOSITION 
[848] 
 
 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
v 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 78 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 16 of 225
 
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 
WIGNEY J 
1 
The applicant in this proceeding was the victim of a gross miscarriage of justice.  He was 
detained and imprisoned for contempt following what could fairly be described as little more 
than a parody of a court hearing.  He spent seven days in prison before being released.  The 
order that resulted in his incarceration was subsequently set aside.  The central issue in this 
proceeding is whether he is entitled to a remedy to compensate him for the injury and loss 
suffered by him as a consequence of that lamentable incident. 
2 
The applicant will be referred to as Mr Stradford in these reasons for judgment.  That is not 
his real name.  It is a pseudonym that was used in the proceedings that resulted in his 
imprisonment.  It is appropriate to continue to use that pseudonym.   
3 
The person primarily responsible for Mr Stradford’s imprisonment was the first respondent, a 
judge of the then Federal Circuit Court of Australia (the Judge).  Mr Stradford and his former 
wife came to appear before the Judge in a matrimonial cause pursuant to the Family Law Act 
1975 (Cth).  The Judge believed that Mr Stradford had not disclosed his true financial position 
to his former wife and ordered him to disclose certain documents.  When the matter came back 
before the Judge on a later occasion, the Judge declared that Mr Stradford had not complied 
with those orders and was in contempt of court.  He ordered that Mr Stradford be imprisoned 
for twelve months and issued a warrant to give effect to that order.   
4 
Private security guards contracted by the second respondent, the Commonwealth of Australia, 
detained Mr Stradford pursuant to the warrant and took him to a holding cell in the court 
complex.  A short time later, Queensland Police officers, also acting pursuant to the warrant, 
took custody of Mr Stradford.  He spent five miserable days in a police watch house in Brisbane 
before being transported to a correctional facility operated by the third respondent, the State of 
Queensland.  He spent another two difficult days in that facility before he was released on bail 
pending an appeal.  
5 
There could be no real dispute that the Judge made a number of fundamental and egregious 
errors in the purported exercise of his power to punish Mr Stradford for contempt.  He 
sentenced Mr Stradford to imprisonment for contempt without first finding that Mr Stradford 
had in fact failed to comply with the orders in question.  He erroneously believed that another 
judge had made that finding, though exactly how he could sensibly have arrived at that position 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
1 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 79 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 17 of 225
 
in the circumstances somewhat beggars belief.  He also failed to follow any of the procedures 
that he was required to follow when dealing with contempt allegations and otherwise failed to 
afford Mr Stradford any procedural fairness.  He effectively pre-judged the outcome.  
Imprisonment was a fait accompli.  
6 
It perhaps came as no surprise, then, that on 15 February 2019, the Full Court of the Family 
Court of Australia (as it then was) (FamCA Full Court) set aside both the contempt declaration 
and the imprisonment order made by the Judge.  It concluded that “to permit the declaration 
and order for imprisonment to stand would be an affront to justice” and that what had occurred 
to Mr Stradford constituted a “gross miscarriage of justice”: Stradford v Stradford (2019) 59 
FamLR 194; [2019] FamCAFC 25 at [9] and [73].  
7 
Mr Stradford’s detention and the deprivations and indignities that he had to endure while 
imprisoned exacted a significant toll on him.  There was no dispute that he continues to suffer 
from post-traumatic stress disorder and a major depressive disorder as a result of the incident. 
8 
Mr Stradford commenced this proceeding alleging that the Judge had committed the torts of 
false imprisonment and collateral abuse of process.  He also alleged that the Commonwealth 
and Queensland were vicariously liable for the actions of their officers in falsely imprisoning 
him.  He claimed damages for deprivation of liberty, personal injury and loss of earning 
capacity.  The Judge, the Commonwealth and Queensland all denied liability. 
9 
The question whether the Judge, the Commonwealth and Queensland are liable as alleged by 
Mr Stradford raises a number of issues, some of which involve complex and difficult questions 
of fact and law.   
10 
The first issue concerns the precise nature of the errors made by the Judge in imprisoning 
Mr Stradford for contempt.  The Judge admitted that he made a number of errors, though he 
disputed some of the other errors that were alleged against him.  In particular, he disputed that, 
in instigating or pursuing the contempt allegation against Mr Stradford, he was motivated by 
an improper or collateral purpose.  He therefore disputed that he committed the tort of collateral 
abuse of process.  He also disputed that he pre-judged the outcome of the contempt allegation 
against Mr Stradford. 
11 
The second issue, which relates to the tort of false imprisonment, is whether the imprisonment 
order made by the Judge remained valid until set aside by the FamCA Full Court.  If the order 
remained valid until set aside, it provided lawful justification for Mr Stradford’s imprisonment.  
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
2 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 80 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 18 of 225
 
If, however, the order was invalid from the outset because it was infected by jurisdictional 
error, it provided no lawful justification.        
12 
The third issue, which is perhaps the most fundamental issue insofar as the Judge’s liability is 
concerned, is whether, even if it were to be found that Mr Stradford was falsely imprisoned, 
the Judge is nevertheless immune from any liability because he made the imprisonment order 
in his capacity as a judge.  That issue is by no means straightforward.  The Judge was a judge 
of an inferior court, not a superior court, and was not protected by any statutory immunity.   
The difficulty arises because the common law principles concerning judicial immunity that 
apply in respect of inferior court judges, at least in Australia, are somewhat unsettled.  It is 
therefore necessary to embark on an excursion through a long line of cases, stretching back 
hundreds of years, which deal with the circumstances in which an inferior court judge may lose 
the protection of judicial immunity.   
13 
The question whether the Judge is protected by judicial immunity in the circumstances of this 
case raises four key questions: first, whether at common law inferior court judges lose their 
immunity from suit in respect of their judicial acts if they acted without, or in excess of, 
jurisdiction; second, if that is the case, what precisely does acting without, or in excess of, 
jurisdiction mean or entail in that context; third, did the Judge act without, or in excess of, 
jurisdiction in that sense when making the imprisonment order; and fourth, whether, despite 
being an inferior court judge, the Judge was nevertheless entitled to the immunity of a superior 
court judge in the circumstances of this case because he was exercising the Circuit Court’s 
contempt powers.    
14 
The fourth issue, which concerns the liability of the Commonwealth and Queensland, is 
whether police and prison officers have available to them a common law defence to an action 
for false imprisonment if they did no more than act in accordance with an order or warrant 
issued by an inferior court judge which appeared valid on its face.  This is another contentious 
issue.  In order to resolve it, it is again necessary to trawl through another long line of somewhat 
obscure cases, again stretching back hundreds of years, concerning the liability of police and 
prison officers in such circumstances.   
15 
The fifth issue concerns whether Queensland has available to it a statutory defence based on s 
249 of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld).  The issue is, in essence, whether that provision, 
properly construed, can apply to a warrant issued by a federal court, in this case the Circuit 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
3 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 81 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 19 of 225
 
Court, simply because that court was sitting in Queensland when the warrant was issued and 
the warrant was therefore to be enforced in Queensland by officers located in Queensland.      
16 
The issues in this case are not, however, entirely limited to liability.  If liability is established, 
significant issues also arise in relation to the assessment and quantification of damages.  Those 
issues include: whether Mr Stradford is entitled to aggravated and exemplary damages for 
deprivation of liberty; the quantification of damages referrable to the psychiatric injury suffered 
by Mr Stradford as a result of his imprisonment; and the quantification for any loss of earning 
capacity suffered by Mr Stradford as a result of his psychiatric injury.  
17 
For the reasons that follow, most of the liability issues are resolved in favour of Mr Stradford.  
The Judge, the Commonwealth and Queensland are liable to Mr Stradford for the tort of false 
imprisonment.  There was no lawful justification for Mr Stradford’s detention.  The Judge is 
not protected by judicial immunity because he relevantly acted without, or in excess of, his 
jurisdiction.  The Commonwealth and Queensland do not have available to them, at least in the 
circumstances of this case, any defence based on the fact that their officers acted pursuant to a 
warrant which appeared regular on its face.  Mr Stradford is accordingly entitled to an award 
of damages.  As will be seen, however, those damages, properly assessed, are not nearly as 
large as Mr Stradford would have it.    
FACTS RELEVANT TO LIABILITY         
18 
On 7 April 2017, Mr Stradford filed an initiating application in the Circuit Court (the matter) 
seeking property adjustment orders under s 79 of the Family Law Act in respect of the 
matrimonial assets owned by him and his then wife.  As adverted to earlier, both Mr Stradford 
and his then wife were identified in the proceedings in the Circuit Court, and on appeal in the 
FamCA Full Court, by pseudonyms.  The identities of parties to matrimonial disputes are 
generally protected: see s 121 of the Family Law Act.  A pseudonym order will be made in this 
proceeding to maintain that protection.    
19 
The Circuit Court had jurisdiction in relation to the matter because it had jurisdiction to 
determine “matrimonial causes” of the kind referred to in the Family Law Act (subject to two 
presently irrelevant exceptions): s 39(1A) of the Family Law Act; s 10(1) of the Federal Circuit 
Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) (FCC Act).  The matter between Mr Stradford and his then 
wife was undoubtedly a matrimonial cause.  
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
4 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 82 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 20 of 225
 
20 
Following a number of earlier interlocutory hearings, on 19 June 2018 the matter was listed 
before Judge Spelleken for directions.  Mr Stradford appeared unrepresented and Mrs Stradford 
did not appear.  Judge Spelleken listed the matter for final hearing at 9.45 am on 10 August 
2018 and made various procedural orders, including orders that each party file a case outline 
setting out a minute of the orders sought, a chronology, a list of affidavits to be relied on and a 
statement setting out the evidence applicable to the principles in ss 79(4) and 75(2) of the 
Family Law Act. 
21 
On 10 August 2018, the matter came before the Judge for final hearing.  Mr Stradford and 
Mrs Stradford each appeared unrepresented. 
22 
The hearing did not progress smoothly.  To begin with, Mr Stradford appears not to have fully 
complied with the orders made by Judge Spelleken on 19 June 2018.  To make matters worse, 
Mrs Stradford alleged, and the Judge readily accepted, that Mr Stradford had not properly or 
adequately disclosed his financial circumstances.  Mr Stradford’s failure to properly disclose 
his financial circumstances plainly raised the Judge’s ire.  His Honour made his displeasure 
known to Mr Stradford and told him that he would have no hesitation in gaoling him in the 
event that he did not comply with any further disclosure orders.  His Honour said: 
… And, you know, believe me, if there isn’t the full disclosure there will be 
consequences, because that’s what I do. If people don’t comply with my orders 
there’s only [one] place they go. Okay. And I don’t have any hesitation in jailing 
people for not complying with my orders … 
(Emphasis added)  
23 
The following exchange, which occurred while Mr Stradford attempted to explain why he 
hadn’t produced statements relating to one of his gambling accounts, rather typifies the tenor 
of the hearing: 
[MR STRADFORD]: From my – from my enquiries with UBET, because I couldn’t 
find it on my transaction statement, that’s what they had told me. 
HIS HONOUR: Rubbish. 
[MR STRADFORD]: So - - - 
HIS HONOUR: Rubbish. 
[MR STRADFORD]: Okay. 
HIS HONOUR: Rubbish – rubbish. Do not accept that for one second, one iota of a 
second. 
[MR STRADFORD]: Okay. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
5 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 83 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 21 of 225
 
HIS HONOUR: That is absolute rubbish. So do you understand what - - - 
[MR STRADFORD]: I just – a letter from the court would have helped. 
HIS HONOUR: Do not ever talk over the top of me. 
[MR STRADFORD]: Sorry. 
HIS HONOUR: I have told you, I will put you in jail in contempt of this court if you 
talk over the top of me. Do you understand? I am not happy at all with you, but I am 
happy for you to think about this, because your disclosure at this point has been 
absolutely abysmal. And if it is that I order this and you do not disclose your 
superannuation, your current bank accounts, all the accounts that you say have now 
been closed, and when they were closed and what the balance was when they were 
closed – all of those matters need to be given to [Mrs Stradford] by a certain time, and 
I would think it would be within two months. And if that isn’t given to her – if it is 
that she comes here, and she complains that she has asked for things and you have 
not given them to her, bring your toothbrush. Okay. So you have a think about it. 
(Emphasis added)           
24 
The end result was that the Judge effectively adjourned the hearing of the matter and made a 
number of orders concerning the future progress of the matter.  The orders included an order 
that Mr Stradford “make full and frank disclosure”, including disclosure of certain categories 
of documents comprising bank statements, gambling account statements, personal tax returns 
and company tax returns and financial statements (the disclosure orders).  Mr Stradford was 
also required to file an affidavit concerning his disclosure in accordance with the order.  The 
matter was adjourned for mention on 26 November 2018.  The orders made by the Judge 
included the following notations: 
A.  
If on the adjourned date the Court is of the opinion that the Applicant has not 
made full and frank disclosure in accordance with today’s orders, he is to be 
dealt with for contempt of those orders. 
B.  
If a contempt hearing has to take place before [the Judge], it will be heard 
10.00am 5 December 2018. 
C.  
If the Court is satisfied that [there] has been full and frank disclosure by the 
Applicant husband, the matter be set down for a final hearing, allocating one 
(1) day.      
25 
On 2 November 2018, Mr Stradford filed an affidavit which included his evidence regarding 
his disclosure of certain records to Mrs Stradford in compliance, or purported compliance, with 
the orders made by the Judge on 10 August 2018.   
26 
On 12 November 2018, Mrs Stradford filed an affidavit which included her evidence about the 
extent to which she said that Mr Stradford had complied with the orders made by the Judge on 
10 August 2018.  The effect of Mrs Stradford’s evidence was that Mr Stradford had failed to 
disclose a number of categories of documents that he was required to disclose. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
6 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 84 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 22 of 225
 
27 
On 26 November 2018, the matter came before Judge Turner for directions.  Mr Stradford and 
Mrs Stradford each appeared unrepresented.  Judge Turner asked the parties to address her on 
compliance with the orders of the Judge of 10 August 2018.  Her Honour made handwritten 
annotations on a copy of the orders, circling those categories of documents that Mrs Stradford 
claimed Mr Stradford had failed to disclose.  The general effect of what Mr Stradford told 
Judge Turner was that he had produced all that he was physically capable of producing. 
28 
Judge Turner did not attempt to finally resolve the dispute between Mr Stradford and Mrs 
Stradford concerning disclosure.  Rather, her Honour ordered that the matter be adjourned to 6 
December 2018 “for hearing of the contempt application”.  It is important to emphasise that 
Judge Turner did not find that Mr Stradford had failed to comply with any of the disclosure 
orders, or that he had not made full and frank disclosure, or conclude that Mr Stradford was in 
contempt of the orders made by the Judge.  Nor had any “contempt application” been filed. 
29 
On 6 December 2018, the matter came before the Judge.  The hearing commenced shortly after 
10.00 am.  As before, both Mr Stradford and Mrs Stradford appeared unrepresented.   
30 
This is what the Judge said at the very commencement of the hearing: 
HIS HONOUR:  All right. You’re [Mr Stradford] and you’re [Mrs Stradford]. All right. 
Okay. So when we were last together on 10 August, we had quite a talk about what the 
assets were that the two of you had. And I made a number of orders that needed to 
occur. And that has gone back into what Judge Turner has. But with regard to the 
matter that went back before her on 26 November, I noted that if on the adjourned 
date the court, that is Judge Turner, was of the opinion that you, [Mr Stradford], 
had not made full and frank disclosure in accordance with the others, that you 
were to be dealt with for contempt of those orders, and that that would take place 
before me.  So that’s that.  So the matter can’t go anywhere at this point in time, 
because Judge Turner has determined that you are in contempt of the orders that 
I made on 10 August. So that’s where we are, it seems. So what do you want to say 
about that? 
(Emphasis added)   
31 
Mr Stradford then told the Judge that he had tried to provide full and frank disclosure, but that 
he was unable to produce some of the categories of documents.  He endeavoured to explain 
why.  His explanations included that he did not know anything about some of the bank accounts 
specified in the orders, that to the best of his knowledge some of the accounts did not exist and 
that he had produced all that he was able to produce.  Mrs Stradford maintained that 
Mr Stradford’s disclosure was deficient.  She did not, however, file a contempt application, or 
even submit that Mr Stradford should be found to be in contempt.  
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
7 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 85 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 23 of 225
 
32 
It is worth pausing at this point to note that it would appear from the transcript that the Judge 
was proceeding under the misapprehension that Judge Turner had already found that 
Mr Stradford had not complied with the disclosure orders and was therefore in contempt.  That 
had not occurred.  It is also tolerably clear that Mr Stradford was maintaining that he had done 
all that he could do to comply with the disclosure orders.  It is equally clear that the Judge did 
not believe Mr Stradford.   
33 
At that point, the Judge indicated that he was prepared to deal with Mr Stradford for contempt 
and asked Mrs Stradford what her attitude to that was.  Mrs Stradford made it abundantly clear 
that she did not want Mr Stradford to go to gaol unnecessarily.  She just wanted proper 
disclosure from him so they could arrive at a property settlement.  His Honour indicated that 
he would adjourn the proceeding briefly to allow the parties to discuss whether they could 
reach an amicable settlement, failing which he would proceed to deal with Mr Stradford for 
contempt. 
34 
When the hearing resumed after the short adjournment, Mrs Stradford indicated that she had 
failed to reach any agreement with Mr Stradford concerning the property settlement.  The 
following exchange then occurred: 
HIS HONOUR:  So that’s that. So, okay, well, it just means that we will have to go 
ahead with the contempt hearing. I’ve got something on at 11, so I will come back 
at quarter at 12. Okay. And we will sort this out. All right. So I hope you brought 
your toothbrush, [Mr Stradford]. 
[MRS STRADFORD]: Sorry. No. 
HIS HONOUR: What’s - - - 
[MRS STRADFORD]: Sorry, I said I don’t want him to go to - - - 
HIS HONOUR: I don’t care 
[MRS STRADFORD]: Okay. 
HIS HONOUR: This is - - - 
[MRS STRADFORD]: It’s your decision. 
HIS HONOUR: This is my order. 
[MRS STRADFORD]: Okay 
HIS HONOUR: Not your order. You can’t come to a conclusion, so therefore it means 
that this is still on foot. If this matter is still on foot, he is in contempt. The only way 
he gets out of contempt is if this matter is not on foot any more. You said that it 
cannot be settled, that he will not give you what you think is just and equitable. 
Therefore, it’s still on foot. Therefore, he is in contempt. Therefore, I am going to 
deal with him for contempt. Okay. I’ve made that very, very clear. It’s not your 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
8 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 86 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 24 of 225
 
decision; it’s my decision. You’re not the one that’s sending him to jail; I am. These 
are court orders and court orders need to be obeyed. Otherwise, what’s the use of 
making the court orders. I made it very clear in August 2018 exactly what would 
happen if there was no compliance with these orders. Now, it’s not your fault. You’re 
not the one who’s sentencing him to jail; I am. But he won’t settle justly and 
equitably with you, the matter is on foot. You understand it. This is not anyone’s fault 
but your own. 
(Emphasis added) 
35 
When the hearing resumed just before midday, the Judge repeated what he had said earlier 
about Judge Turner having found that Mr Stradford was in contempt and asked what it was that 
Mr Stradford wanted to say.  Mr Stradford again endeavoured to tell the Judge that he had 
disclosed all that he was able to disclose, but his Honour summarily dismissed those 
protestations.  There is no indication that the Judge had read or considered Mr Stradford’s 
affidavit.  The contents of that affidavit were certainly not the subject of any questioning, by 
either the Judge or Mrs Stradford.  Mr Stradford’s affidavit was certainly not formally read and 
Mr Stradford was not sworn-in or cross-examined on oath.    
36 
His Honour delivered an ex tempore judgment in which he found that Mr Stradford was in 
contempt of the orders made on 10 August 2018: Stradford & Stradford [2018] FCCA 3890 
(contempt judgment or CJ).  His Honour ordered that Mr Stradford be sentenced to 
imprisonment for a period of 12 months, to be served immediately, with Mr Stradford to be 
released from prison on 6 May 2019 and the balance of the sentence to be suspended for a 
period of 2 years. 
37 
In his judgment, the Judge outlined the history of the matter.  That history included, according 
to his Honour, that Judge Turner had already found that Mr Stradford was in contempt for non-
compliance with the orders made on 10 August 2018.  His Honour noted that, having regard to 
that finding, it was up to him to assess “the criminality of that contempt”: CJ at [21].  His 
Honour continued (at [22]-[28]): 
As I have stated both in the preamble to these remarks and in the course of the 
submissions that have been made in this Court, the gravamen of this contempt is that 
this matter that was supposed to be ready to proceed cannot proceed. The gravamen is 
that the wife is not cognisant of the true financial position of the Applicant, so that she 
can mount a meaningful case before this Court for a just and equitable property 
adjustment. 
I am of the view that these matters were matters where the Applicant, if he truly 
wanted, could have made proper disclosure. I am of the view that the Applicant was 
able to get those items and the Applicant was able to simply tell the wife exactly what 
sort of amount of money he was getting, how he was getting it, how it was being used 
or funnelled through different companies, what that meant for him “in the hand” and 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
9 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 87 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 25 of 225
 
where that money has been dissipated. 
He has chosen not to. There can be no other inference available other than this is 
deliberate conduct so that the wife is kept in the dark and cannot make a proper, just 
and equitable submission to this Court as to what the property adjustment should be. 
It would leave the Court, as it was at 10 August 2018, looking at a negative property 
pool so that the Applicant husband did not have to in any way account for what it is 
that he has been doing with money that he has come into possession of, especially from 
the years 2014 to the present. 
The mere fact that it seems that at least a million or something close to a million dollars 
has gone through gambling accounts shows that this is a proper inference to draw. That 
makes this contempt an extremely serious one. 
The Court has very few weapons at its disposal to ensure that its orders are complied 
with. The Court must show to all litigants and to the whole of the community that when 
it makes orders, those orders must be complied with or there will be serious 
consequences and condign punishment to those who flout the orders of the Court. 
In what I consider to be a very merciful submission, the wife has asked, even though 
she is not really a party to this part of the contempt proceeding, to say that she did not 
want the husband to be jailed because they have children together. It was obvious to 
me that she felt that she would be somehow responsible for this. Nothing could be 
further from the truth. 
This is a matter where the responsibility lies wholly and solely with the husband. If it 
was that he had complied with these orders or shown to this Court that he had genuinely 
attempted to comply, then there would be no contempt. But there has been a contempt 
and notwithstanding how it is that the wife feels, it leads the Court only to one 
conclusion; that there must be an appropriate punishment for this contempt.     
38 
Following the delivery of his ex tempore judgment, the Judge made the following declaration 
and order:  
THE COURT DECLARES: 
A.  
That [MR STRADFORD] is in contempt of Order 3(a), (h), (j), (k), (l), (m), 
(n), and (o) of Orders made by [the Judge] on 10 August 2018 in that [MR 
STRADFORD] has failed to make full and frank financial disclosure. 
THE COURT ORDERS: 
1.  
That the Applicant [MR STRADFORD] be sentenced to a period of 
imprisonment in the Arthur Gorrie Correctional Centre for a period of twelve 
(12) months, to be served immediately with the Applicant to be released from 
prison on 6 May 2019, with the balance of the sentence to be suspended for a 
period of two (2) years from today’s date.   
39 
At 12.25 pm on 6 December 2018, the Judge signed a document entitled “Warrant of 
Commitment”.  The body of the document was in the following terms: 
WARRANT OF COMMITMENT 
Family Law Act 1975 
To: The 
Marshal 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
10 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 88 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 26 of 225
 
All Officers of the Australian Federal Police 
All Officers of the State and Territory police forces 
The Commissioner of Queensland Corrective Services 
 
WHEREAS: [MR STRADFORD] of [redacted],  in the State of Queensland 
appeared before this Court on 6 December 2018. 
AND WHEREAS the Court made an order, a copy of which is attached to this warrant, 
that the said person be imprisoned. 
YOU, the said Marshal, all officers of the Australian Federal Police and all officers of 
the Police Forces of all the States and Territories of the Commonwealth of Australia 
are hereby directed to take and deliver the said person to the Commissioner of 
Queensland Corrective Services, together with this warrant. 
AND YOU, the Commissioner of the Queensland Corrective Services are hereby 
directed to receive the said person into your custody, and to keep that person in 
accordance with the said order, a copy of which is attached to this warrant.  
(Emphasis in original) 
40 
Shortly thereafter, two guards took custody of Mr Stradford.  Those guards were employed by 
MSS Security Pty Ltd.  At that time, MSS Security provided guarding services at the court 
complex occupied by the Circuit Court in Brisbane pursuant to a contract between it and the 
Commonwealth dated 28 November 2014.   
41 
One of the MSS guards had been called to the Judge’s courtroom shortly before midday and 
was present in the courtroom from at least 12.05 pm during the delivery of the Judge’s ex 
tempore judgment.   
42 
The two MSS guards escorted Mr Stradford to the door of the courtroom, through a public 
concourse for approximately 14 metres to a service door, though the service door to a goods 
lift and then to a holding cell in the court complex occupied by the Circuit Court.  The MSS 
guards supervised Mr Stradford while he was detained in the holding cell. 
43 
There is no dispute that the conduct of the relevant MSS guards constituted a detention of 
Mr Stradford which was undertaken for and on behalf of the Commonwealth.   
44 
Between approximately 12.35 pm and 12.40 pm, officers of the Queensland Police Service 
arrived at court complex occupied by the Circuit Court.  Between approximately 12.54 pm and 
1.00 pm, those police officers left with Mr Stradford, handcuffed in their custody, and took him 
in a police van to the Roma Street Watchhouse.   
45 
For reasons that will become apparent, it is relevant to note that the Queensland Police Service 
had received a telephone call requesting the attendance of police officers at the Circuit Court 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
11 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 89 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 27 of 225
 
at 11.43 am on 6 December 2018.  That was before the Judge recommenced the hearing during 
which he purportedly dealt with Mr Stradford for contempt. 
46 
Mr Stradford was transferred from the Roma Street Watchhouse to the Brisbane Correctional 
Centre on the morning of 10 December 2018.  He was therefore imprisoned at the watch house 
by officers of the Queensland Police Service from 6 December 2018 to 10 December 2018; a 
total of 4 nights and 5 days.  Further facts concerning Mr Stradford’s imprisonment at the watch 
house will be detailed later in these reasons in the context of the assessment of damages. 
47 
There is no dispute that the conduct of the relevant officers of the Queensland Police Service 
between 6 December 2018 and 10 December 2018 constituted imprisonment of Mr Stradford. 
48 
Mr Stradford arrived at the Brisbane Correctional Centre on the morning of 10 December 2018.  
From that point in time he was detained by officers of Queensland Corrective Services.   
49 
On 12 December 2018, the matter was listed again before the Judge to hear an oral application 
to stay the orders made by his Honour on 6 December 2018.  On this occasion Mr Stradford 
was legally represented by counsel and Mrs Stradford appeared unrepresented by telephone.  
By this time, Mr Stradford had filed an appeal against the judgment and orders of the Judge.  
The nub of the appeal was that the Judge had proceeded on the erroneous premise that Judge 
Turner had found that Mr Stradford was in contempt and that it was not open on the evidence 
to find to the requisite standard that Mr Stradford had acted in flagrant challenge the court’s 
authority as required by s 112AP(1)(b) of the Family Law Act.  The basis of the stay application 
was that if a stay was not granted, Mr Stradford would serve a significant proportion of his 
sentence of imprisonment and that to that extent the appeal would be rendered nugatory.  
Counsel for Mr Stradford also submitted that the appeal had reasonable prospects of success.         
50 
The Judge delivered an ex tempore judgment in which he granted the stay application: 
Stradford & Stradford (No 2) [2018] FCCA 3961 (stay judgment or SJ).  His Honour 
effectively conceded that he erred in finding that Mr Stradford was in contempt and erred in 
sentencing him to imprisonment.  In particular, his Honour appeared to accept that he 
incorrectly assumed that Judge Turner had already found that Mr Stradford was in contempt.  
His Honour’s reasons for allowing the stay application were as follows (SJ at [1]-[15]): 
On 6 December 2018, I made an order that Mr Stradford was in contempt of orders 
that I had previously made on 10 August 2018. 
Specifically, I found him in contempt of order 3(a), (h), (j), (k), (l), (m), (n) and (o) of 
those orders. I had actually not found him in contempt of orders 3(k) or 3(l), but had 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
12 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 90 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 28 of 225
 
found him in contempt of the others. 
My reason for doing so was that I had been given a list with markings from Her 
Honour, Judge Turner. My reasons for having made the orders on 10 August 2018 
were to tell the Applicant husband that he needed to make this disclosure properly, 
especially since there had been previous orders for him to do so. 
My notation was that the matter would go back to a duty judge; but if the duty judge 
was of the opinion that the Applicant has not made full and frank disclosure in 
accordance with today’s orders, that he was to be dealt with for contempt of those 
orders. 
That was to allow that Court to then deal with the contempt, or, if the Court so chose, 
they could send the matter back to me and I would deal with the matter as a contempt 
of my orders. My very clear memory is that I had told the Applicant that he would be 
looking at two years’ imprisonment if I found that he was in contempt of my orders. 
What has been shown to me is that I could very well have been in error in assuming 
that Her Honour had actually found, by the markings that she had given to me, that the 
Applicant was prima facie in contempt of my orders. 
Whilst I had read the affidavit of the Applicant that he had filed on 2 November 2018, 
the only matters that I had really gone through in any depth were the G Group accounts 
and the tax returns; that is, making a finding that the G Group accounts and the online 
gambling accounts had not been properly disclosed. I had been given the documents 
that the Applicant had disclosed and they were totally insufficient for the purposes of 
affording the wife knowledge of the financial circumstances of the husband. 
The husband had claimed that he had disclosed his tax returns but the fact was that he 
had not disclosed his tax returns; he had only disclosed his tax assessments and not his 
actual returns. 
Those were the matters that I specifically highlighted as they were the matters that I 
felt were most illustrative of the contempt shown by the Applicant husband. I did not 
feel the need to explore any other aspect further because I had, in effect, proceeded 
upon the basis that Her Honour had already made a finding of contempt. 
It seems, on the material, that this could well have been an incorrect assumption. If that 
was an incorrect assumption, then it is an error by me not to have actually gone through 
with each and every item on that list and made a ruling as to whether the Applicant 
father was in contempt of my orders. 
To do that I would have had to have the Applicant sworn to give evidence and cross-
examined upon the material. I could have then used that actual sworn evidence to 
decide whether the contempt had actually occurred. But I proceeded straight to a 
“sentencing” proceeding because I was of the view that the issue of whether the 
Applicant husband was in contempt had already been decided. 
It seems to me if that is also the conclusion that is reached by a Court of Appeal (and 
I think that it would be), then that Court would really have no hesitation in allowing 
the appeal and remitting the matter back to me. 
I have looked at the declaration that I made on 6 December 2018 and, after discussion 
with counsel, have come to the conclusion that I am functus officio with regard to that 
declaration. I do not have the power to stay that declaration, even though I am of the 
view that it should be stayed. 
However, I can stay the orders that I had made, especially the one that the Applicant 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
13 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 91 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 29 of 225
 
be sentenced to a period of imprisonment of 12 months, but to be released after serving 
five months. It seems to me that the basis upon which I made that order is almost 
certainly incorrect. Therefore, it would be totally unjust not to grant the relief that has 
been sought by the Applicant husband today. 
So, I will allow the oral application for a stay of order 1 sentencing the Applicant to 
imprisonment. That order is stayed pending the outcome of the appeal of that order and 
declaration. 
51 
The Judge stayed the order he had made on 6 December 2018 sentencing Mr Stradford to 
imprisonment for 12 months and ordered that Mr Stradford be forthwith released from custody 
pending the outcome of the appeal from his judgment.  
52 
Mr Stradford was released from the Brisbane Correctional Centre on 12 December 2018. 
53 
Mr Stradford was imprisoned at the Brisbane Correctional Centre by Queensland Corrective 
Services officers from 10 December 2018 to 12 December 2018; a total of two days and two 
nights.  Further facts concerning Mr Stradford’s imprisonment at the Brisbane Correctional 
Centre will be detailed later in the context of the assessment of damages.  
54 
There was no dispute that the conduct of the relevant officers of the Queensland Corrective 
Services 10 December 2018 and 12 December 2018 constituted imprisonment of Mr Stradford. 
55 
There is no dispute that the Judge’s conduct in making the declaration and orders on 
6 December 2018 was a direct or proximate cause of the whole of Mr Stradford’s imprisonment 
from 6 December 2018 to 12 December 2018.  Nor was there any dispute that the Judge’s 
conduct in initiating and maintaining the contempt proceeding against Mr Stradford was a 
necessary cause of the whole of Mr Stradford’s imprisonment from 6 December 2018 to 12 
December 2018. 
56 
The appeal from the Judge’s contempt judgment was swiftly heard and determined.  On 
15 February 2019, the FamCA Full Court delivered judgment unanimously allowing 
Mr Stradford’s appeal from the orders made by the Judge on 6 December 2018: Stradford.  The 
FamCA Full Court’s view of the Judge’s conduct of the proceeding which resulted in 
Mr Stradford being imprisoned is readily apparent from the following passage at the 
commencement of the judgment (Stradford at [9]): 
We are driven to conclude that the processes employed by the primary judge were so 
devoid of procedural fairness to the husband, and the reasons for judgment so lacking 
in engagement with the issues of fact and law to be applied, that to permit the 
declaration and order for imprisonment to stand would be an affront to justice …    
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
14 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 92 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 30 of 225
 
57 
The FamCA Full Court set aside both the declaration and the order made by the Judge on 
6 December 2018 sentencing Mr Stradford to imprisonment.  The key findings made by the 
FamCA Full Court may be summarised as follows. 
58 
First, the Judge proceeded in apparent ignorance or disregard of the provisions of the FCC Act 
and Family Law Act which separately deal with the punishment for a contempt of court 
committed in the face or hearing of the court (relevantly dealt with in Pt XIIIB of the Family 
Law Act and s 17 of the FCC Act) and the imposition of sanctions for failing to comply with 
orders (dealt with in Pt XIIIA of the Family Law Act).   
59 
Second, it was clear that the Judge had resolved or pre-determined, in advance of any finding 
that Mr Stradford had breached any of the disclosure orders, and irrespective of whether any 
application was made by Mrs Stradford, that he would, of his own motion, treat any non-
compliance as a contempt, as distinct from a failure to comply with orders: Stradford at [13]-
[20].   
60 
Third, and relatedly, the procedure adopted by the Judge was fundamentally flawed from the 
outset.  The FamCA Full Court’s conclusion in that regard is summarised in the following 
passage (at [19]): 
It can thus be seen that the primary judge’s process failed from the outset on a number 
of levels. In advance of any breach of orders the primary judge pre-determined that 
any such breach, of whatsoever nature, would constitute “contempt” within the 
meaning of the Act. Moreover, the primary judge cast himself as prosecutor in any 
future proceeding for the offence of contempt. Both of these conclusions were reached 
by the primary judge without particularising any charge; establishing that the charges 
as particularised were prima facie established; and affording the husband any 
opportunity to be heard.           
61 
The FamCA Full Court considered that the Judge’s pre-judgment as to how he would deal with 
Mr Stradford for non-compliance with the disclosure orders was “made all the more egregious 
by reason of the judge pre-judging imprisonment as the punishment before knowing the 
particulars of the offence or any matters in mitigation”: Stradford at [21]. 
62 
Fourth, the Judge in effect performed the roles of prosecutor, witness and judge and failed to 
follow the procedure mandated in r 19.02 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (FCC 
Rules) for dealing with allegations of contempt other than contempt in the face or hearing of 
the court: Stradford at [22]-[27].  There was “no feature of this case which warranted, in the 
broader interests of justice, any departure from the fundamental principles of justice reflected 
in r 19.02”: Stradford at [28].  The Judge did not “employ, by way of procedure, anything 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
15 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 93 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 31 of 225
 
remotely resembling the procedures specified in r 19.02 for the purposes of the hearing” on 
6 December 2018: Stradford at [37].       
63 
Fifth, the Judge proceeded on the erroneous premise that Judge Turner had determined that 
Mr Stradford was in contempt, even though it could not possibly be inferred that any such 
determination had in fact been made: Stradford at [40].  The FamCA Full Court plainly found 
it difficult to comprehend how the Judge could possibly have come to believe that Judge Turner 
had already found that Mr Stradford was in contempt.  The court also appears to have found 
that it was difficult to reconcile the Judge’s belief in that regard with what occurred during the 
hearing.  The FamCA Full Court said (at [41]-[43]): 
Further, if as is asserted, the primary judge was of the view that Judge Turner had 
already made a determination as to contempt, it is impossible to reconcile what follows 
in the transcript. There the primary judge can be seen questioning the husband as to his 
disclosure. Quite why that would be necessary if a determination of contempt had 
already been made is not at all apparent. 
It is also difficult to understand why, if the primary judge was of the view that Judge 
Turner had made the relevant determination as to contempt, it would be that the 
primary judge would himself ultimately make the relevant declaration or, indeed, to 
have heard the proceedings at all. Further, if Judge Turner had determined there was a 
contempt, it should be expected that, having followed the appropriate process, her 
Honour would move to sentence. 
Apart from erroneously stating that Judge Turner had made the determination, it is 
notable that the primary judge did not inform the husband of the particulars of the 
contempt if it can be construed that what the primary judge had purported to do was to 
receive submissions as to penalty. 
64 
Sixth, the FamCA Full Court found that, even putting to one side the Judge’s failure to follow 
the processes and procedures mandated by the FCC Act and FCC Rules, the Judge’s conduct 
of the proceeding constituted a clear denial of procedural fairness.  Having considered the key 
parts of the transcript of the hearing on 6 December 2018, the FamCA Full Court concluded as 
follows (at [52]-[53]): 
It can be seen that without providing any particulars whatsoever as to the alleged 
contempt, the husband has purportedly been found guilty. The husband has had no 
opportunity whatsoever to be heard about that. Indeed, he could not be because he did 
not know what charge he was facing. Neither, thereafter, was the husband afforded the 
opportunity to be heard about any sanction. The primary judge announced to the 
husband that he will be “serving 12 months in jail” if, as the primary judge postulates, 
his Honour deals with “contempt today”. 
It is difficult to envisage a more profound or disturbing example of pre-judgment and 
denial of procedural fairness to a party on any prospective orders, much less contempt, 
and much less contempt where a sentence of imprisonment was, apparently, pre-
determined as the appropriate remedy.  
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
16 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 94 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 32 of 225
 
65 
Seventh, the Judge’s conclusion that Mr Stradford had failed to comply with the orders made 
on 10 August 2018 was without any evidentiary foundation.  Mr Stradford had joined issue as 
to whether he had failed to comply with the orders and yet there was “[n]o determination of 
contested evidence”: Stradford  at [56].  The Judge’s failure to consider and reconcile 
Mr Stradford’s sworn evidence constituted a “profound denial of procedural fairness”: 
Stradford at [58]. 
66 
The FamCA Full Court concluded that the making by the Judge of the declaration that Mr 
Stradford was in contempt and the order that Mr Stradford be imprisoned “constituted a gross 
miscarriage of justice”: Stradford at [73]. 
ERRORS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY THE JUDGE 
67 
References to statutory provisions in these reasons should be taken to be references to the 
provisions as they were as at 6 December 2018. 
68 
Mr Stradford alleged that, in finding that he was in contempt and ordering that he be imprisoned 
for 12 months, the Judge made six separate errors.  He also contended that, whether considered 
individually or cumulatively, those errors were such that the Judge acted without or in excess 
of his jurisdiction.    
69 
The first alleged error was that the Judge lacked power to make the imprisonment order because 
it was made without the Judge first finding that there had been a breach of any orders. 
70 
The second alleged error was that the Judge lacked power to make the imprisonment order 
because it was made in the absence of any finding that the failure to comply with the orders 
constituted a “flagrant challenge to the authority of the court” as required by s 112AP of the 
Family Law Act and otherwise did not comply with Pt XIIIA of the Family Law Act. 
71 
The third alleged error was that the Judge had failed to follow or apply the procedure for 
hearing and determining contempt allegations which was mandated in r 19.02 of the FCC 
Rules. 
72 
The fourth alleged error was that the Judge denied Mr Stradford procedural fairness. 
73 
The fifth alleged error was that the Judge pre-judged the issue of whether Mr Stradford was in 
contempt and whether he should be sentenced to imprisonment. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
17 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 95 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 33 of 225
 
74 
The sixth alleged error was that the Judge acted for an improper purpose in that he used the 
threat of imprisonment as a means of exerting pressure on Mr Stradford to settle the case 
outside the courtroom. 
75 
Some, but not all, of those errors were admitted or not disputed by the Judge, the 
Commonwealth and Queensland.  The Judge and Queensland also admitted that the Judge’s 
decision to imprison Mr Stradford was infected by jurisdictional error.  It is nevertheless 
necessary to make findings concerning the individual errors alleged by Mr Stradford, 
particularly those which were not admitted. 
Alleged error 1: failure to make any finding that there had been a breach of the orders 
76 
This alleged error may be dealt with in brief terms.  The Judge and Queensland each admitted 
that the Judge made an order that he lacked the power to make in the particular circumstances 
of the case because he sentenced Mr Stradford to imprisonment for contempt without first 
finding that Mr Stradford had in fact breached or failed to comply with any orders.   
77 
The Commonwealth, however, denied that the Judge erred in this way.  It contended that the 
Judge had found that there had been a breach of the orders made on 10 August 2018.  It pointed, 
in that regard, to paragraph 20 of the contempt judgment.  
78 
While the Judge’s reasons for judgment in respect of the finding of contempt lack clarity and 
are beset by ambiguities, it is in all the circumstances impossible to accept that he in fact made 
any finding that Mr Stradford breached the orders.  Rather, he simply proceeded on the 
assumption, albeit an entirely erroneous and somewhat inexplicable assumption, that Judge 
Turner had somehow already found that Mr Stradford was in contempt.  That is what the Judge 
said at the very commencement of the hearing: “… because Judge Turner has determined that 
you are in contempt of the orders that I made on 10 August”.  It is also what the Judge said in 
the contempt judgment at [13]-[14] and the stay judgment at [9]: “I had, in effect, proceeded 
upon the basis that Her Honour [Judge Turner] had already made a finding of contempt”.   
79 
The Commonwealth’s reliance on paragraph 20 of the contempt judgment is misplaced.  In that 
paragraph, the Judge stated that “it seems to me that given everything that has been said, and 
especially the fact that Judge Turner has already found that there is a contempt, that the 
Applicant is in contempt for the non-compliance with orders of mine” (emphasis added).  Read 
in context and in light of what the Judge said during the hearing, in the balance of the contempt 
judgment and in the stay judgment, it is quite clear that his Honour made no independent 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
18 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 96 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 34 of 225
 
finding that Mr Stradford had failed to comply with the orders.  The Judge’s reference to 
“everything that has been said” appears to be a reference to what Mr Stradford had said during 
the hearing, which his Honour characterised as amounting to an attempt to “give some excuses 
for his failure”: CJ at [15].   
80 
It is also difficult to see how the Judge could possibly be said to have made an independent 
finding that Mr Stradford had failed to comply with the orders in circumstances where, as the 
FamCA Full Court found, Mr Stradford had denied breaching the orders and had sworn an 
affidavit concerning his compliance with the orders.  It is abundantly clear from the transcript 
and the contempt judgment that the Judge in fact made no determination in respect of the 
contested evidence: see Stradford at [55]-[58].  It may also be noted in that regard that, to 
convict Mr Stradford of contempt, the Judge was required to find that all of the elements of the 
contempt, including non-compliance with the court orders, had been proved beyond reasonable 
doubt.  At no point did the Judge state that he was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there 
had been non-compliance with the orders.  Indeed, there is no indication that the Judge applied 
the criminal standard of proof to any of the elements that needed to be established before 
Mr Stradford could be found to have been in contempt.      
81 
Mr Stradford’s claim that the Judge lacked power to make the imprisonment order by making 
it without first finding that there had been a breach of any orders must accordingly be upheld. 
82 
For reasons that will become apparent, it is important to emphasise that it is clear that the Judge 
had the means and ability to ascertain that Judge Turner had not in fact made any finding that 
Mr Stradford had breached any aspect of the disclosure orders and that Judge Turner had not 
found that Mr Stradford was in contempt.  The Judge did not, in his submissions, contend 
otherwise.  It is abundantly clear that the Judge ought to have known that Judge Turner had 
made no such finding. 
Alleged error 2: failure to comply with Pts XIIIA and XIIIB of the Family Law Act 
83 
Mr Stradford contended that the Judge lacked power to make the imprisonment order in the 
circumstances because he did not comply with the provisions of Pts XIIIA and XIIIB of the 
Family Law Act.  The requirements of Pts XIIIA and XIIIB of the Family Law Act are 
discussed in general terms in Stradford at [13]-[15], [18] and [67]-[70].  There could be little 
doubt that the Judge had no regard whatsoever to the provisions in those Parts of the Family 
Law Act.  He was either entirely ignorant of the existence of those provisions or chose to 
completely ignore them.    
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
19 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 97 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 35 of 225
 
84 
Part XIIIA sets out a regime for the imposition of sanctions in respect of the contravention of 
orders under the Family Law Act, which included orders made under the Family Law Rules 
2004 (Cth) (FamL Rules) and orders made by the Circuit Court under the related FCC Rules: 
s 112AA and s 4(3)(e) and (f) of the Family Law Act.  While it is somewhat unclear, the 
relevant disclosure orders made by the Judge must have been made under either the FamL 
Rules (see rr 1.10(1) and 13.04) or the FCC Rules (see rr 14.04 and 24.03).  Either way, the 
order must be taken to be an order made under the Family Law Act and therefore subject to the 
provisions in Pt XIIIA.    
85 
Provisions in Pt XIIIA require that, before a court imposes a sanction on a person for 
contravening an order, the court must find: first, that the person intentionally failed to comply 
with the order, or made no reasonable attempt to comply with the order (s 112AB(1)(a) of the 
Family Law Act); and second, the contravention occurred without reasonable excuse: 
s 112AD(1) of the Family Law Act.  The making of findings in respect of those matters is in 
effect a mandatory precondition to the imposition of sanctions for non-compliance of orders 
pursuant to Pt XIIIA of the Family Law Act.  The Judge made no such findings.   
86 
Perhaps more significantly, s 112AD(2) of the Family Law Act specified the sanctions that a 
court was permitted to impose for contravening an order.  Those sanctions included 
imprisonment.  However, s 112AE(2) provided that a court was not permitted to impose a 
sentence of imprisonment for contravening an order unless the court was satisfied that “in all 
the circumstances of the case, it would not be appropriate for the court to deal with the 
contravention pursuant to any of the other paragraphs of subsection 112AD(2)”.  It is 
abundantly clear that the Judge did not turn his mind to that issue.  Indeed, as the FamCA Full 
Court effectively found, the Judge pre-judged imprisonment as the punishment before his 
Honour even knew the particulars of the contravention or any matters in mitigation: Stradford 
at [21]. 
87 
Part XIIIB of the Family Law Act, which consists of s 112AP, deals specifically with contempt 
of court.  Section 112AP(1) provides that the section applies to a contempt of court that either 
“does not constitute a contravention of an order under this Act” or “constitutes a contravention 
of an order under this Act and involves a flagrant challenge to the authority of the court” 
(emphasis added).  Plainly the contempt for which the Judge imprisoned Mr Stradford allegedly 
involved a contravention of an order under the Family Law Act.  It follows that, for s 112AP 
to apply, the Judge was required to find that the contravention involved a “flagrant challenge 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
20 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 98 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 36 of 225
 
to the authority of the court”.  His Honour made no such finding.  And as the FamCA Full 
Court found, it is “difficult to envisage a case where failure to comply with orders for disclosure 
could be said to involve a flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court or where an 
established failure to fully disclose could be other than a contravention covered by Pt XIIIA of 
the Act and not Pt XIIIB”: Stradford at [68]. 
88 
The Judge did not dispute that he did not follow or comply with the requirements of either Pt 
XIIIA or s 112AP of the Act.  Nor did the Commonwealth nor Queensland.  The Judge and the 
Commonwealth submitted, however, that the failure to follow or comply with those 
requirements did not amount to an error because the Judge was empowered to deal with Mr 
Stradford for contempt pursuant to s 17 of the FCC Act, which does not prescribe or mandate 
any of the requirements or limitations found in Pt XIIIA and s 112AP of the Family Law Act.   
89 
Section 17 of the FCC Act provided as follows: 
(1)  
The Federal Circuit Court of Australia has the same power to punish contempts 
of its power and authority as is possessed by the High Court in respect of 
contempts of the High Court. 
(2)  
Subsection (1) has effect subject to any other Act.  
(3)   
The jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia to punish a contempt 
of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia committed in the face or hearing of 
the Federal Circuit Court of Australia may be exercised by the Federal Circuit 
Court of Australia as constituted at the time of the contempt. 
Note:  See also section 112AP of the Family Law Act 1975, which deals with 
family law or child support proceedings. 
90 
Section 35 of the Family Law Act was in relevantly similar terms to s 17(1) of the FCC Act.   
91 
The Judge relied on judgments of the Supreme Court of New South Wales that tended to 
suggest that the predecessor provision to s 112AP of the Family Law Act (s 108 of the Family 
Law Act, repealed in 1989) was supplementary to and did not cut down the operation of s 35 
of the Family Law Act, at least insofar as the Family Court’s power to punish for contempt was 
concerned: Skouvakis v Skouvakis (1976) 11 ALR 204; [1976] 2 NSWLR 29 at 34; Moll v 
Butler (1985) 4 NSWLR 231 at 235-236.  The Commonwealth also relied on dicta in the 
judgment of the High Court in Re Colina; Ex parte Torney (1999) 200 CLR 386; [1999] HCA 
57, a case concerned with whether s 80 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia 
required that a person charged with contempt of the Family Court be tried before a jury. 
92 
There are a number of difficulties with the Judge’s reliance on the decisions in Skouvakis and 
Moll v Butler.  Both decisions concerned the contempt powers under the Family Law Act before 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
21 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 99 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 37 of 225
 
the substantial amendments to the Family Law Act in 1989, which included the insertion of Pts 
XIIIA and XIIIB.  As already noted, both decisions concerned the operation of s 108 of the 
Family Law Act, which was the predecessor to s 112AP.  Section 108 was, however, in 
materially different terms to s 112AP.  In particular, s 108 did not contain the express limitation 
in s 112AP(1)(b), the effect of which is that s 112AP does not apply in the case of a 
contravention of an order unless that contravention involved a “flagrant challenge to the 
authority of the court”.  Both Skouvakis and Moll v Butler also concerned the jurisdiction or 
powers of superior courts to punish for contempt; the Supreme Court of New South Wales in 
the case of Skouvakis and the Family Court in the case of Moll v Butler.  As was made clear in 
both  Skouvakis (at 2 NSWLR 33-34) and Moll v Butler (at 236), superior courts have an 
inherent power to punish for contempt.  That consideration appears to have influenced the 
reasoning in both Skouvakis and Moll v Butler.  In contrast, the Circuit Court was an inferior 
court with no inherent power to punish for contempt.    
93 
Perhaps most significantly, since the 1989 amendments to the Family Law Act, the FamCA 
Full Court has held that Pt XIIIB of the Family Law Act is a “complete code for dealing with 
contempts”:  DAI v DAA (2005) 191 FLR 360; [2005] FamCA 88 at [47], [67]; see also 
Rutherford v Marshal of Family Court of Australia (1999) 152 FLR 299; [1999] FamCA 1299; 
In the Marriage of Schwarzkopff (1992) 106 FLR 274.  It may be true, as the Judge submitted, 
that each of those cases dealt primarily with the question whether the sentencing principles in 
the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) applied when imposing sanctions for contempt under the Family 
Law Act.  It is, however, nevertheless clear from the reasoning in each of the cases that the 
FamCA Full Court conluded that the contempt powers under the Family Law Act were 
exhaustively dealt with in Pt XIIIB.  There was certainly no suggestion in any of the judgments 
that s 35 of the Family Law Act provided a separate and distinct power to punish for contempt 
that was not constrained by or subject to Pt XIIIB.  In particular, there was no suggestion that 
a contempt involving contravention of an order could be punished pursuant to s 35 of the 
Family Law Act, even if there was no allegation or finding that the contravention of the order 
involved a flagrant challenge to the authority of the court as required by s 112AP(1) of the 
Family Law Act.     
94 
I should follow judgments of the FamCA Full Court, an intermediate appellate court, unless 
persuaded that they are plainly wrong.  That is all the more so given that jurisdiction under the 
Family Law Act is a specialist jurisdiction and the Family Court is a specialist court in respect 
of that jurisdiction.  I am not persuaded that the FamCA Full Court was wrong in concluding 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
22 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 100 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 38 of 225
 
that, properly construed in the context of the Family Law Act as a whole, Pt XIIIB constitutes 
a code for dealing with contempts arising in the context of jurisdiction under the Family Law 
Act.  I should, in those circumstances, follow DAI, Rutherford and Schwarzkopff rather than 
the dicta in Skouvakis and Moll v Butler. 
95 
It is also clear that the FamCA Full Court in Stradford proceeded on the basis that Pt XIIIB 
was a code for dealing with contempts in the exercise of jurisdiction under the Family Law Act 
and that the Judge was required to, but did not, follow or apply that code.  In particular, it held 
that the power to punish for contempts in s 17 of the FCC Act is a “power to punish contempts 
committed in the face or hearing of the Court” (Stradford at [13]).  The court noted that the 
Family Law Act makes a distinction between such contempts and sanctions for failure to 
comply with orders and proceeded on the basis that contempts in the face or hearing of the 
court are to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions in Pt XIIIB of the Family Law Act, 
whereas sanctions for the non-compliance with orders are to be dealt with in accordance with 
Pt XIIIA, save for those that are found to constitute “flagrant challenges to the authority of the 
Court”: Stradford at [14].  The FamCA Full Court considered that it could not “sensibly be 
conceived” that the Judge “had in mind to treat [Mr Stradford’s] alleged breach or breaches of 
orders for disclosure made in financial proceedings as constituting contempt in the face of the 
court within the meaning of s 17 of the FCC Act or Pt XIIIB of the [Family Law] Act”: 
Stradford at [15].     
96 
Even putting the FamCA Full Court authorities to one side, the legislative intent behind 
Pts XIIIA and XIIIB of the Family Law Act is clear.  Part XIIIA and s 112AP were inserted in 
the Family Law Act in 1989 following a report by the Australian Law Reform Commission 
(ALRC) in relation to contempt (Contempt, Report No 35, 1987).  In considering contempts 
arising from non-compliance with court orders, the ALRC report drew a distinction between 
considerations associated with orders in family law and general civil law and took the view 
that the purpose of punishment in family law proceedings was not so much upholding the 
court’s authority as an end in itself, but in fulfilling the expectations of litigants that court 
orders will be obeyed: see In the Marriage of Tate (No 3) (2003) 30 Fam LR 427; [2003] 
FamCA 112 at [62].  That is why sanctions for non-compliance with orders are separately dealt 
with in Pt XIIIA of the Family Law Act, other than in the case where the non-compliance 
involves a flagrant challenge to the authority of the court and s 112AP applies.   
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
23 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 101 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 39 of 225
 
97 
The legislative purpose behind Pts XIIIA and XIIIB was in effect that those Parts of the Family 
Law Act would effectively constitute a code for dealing with non-compliance with orders and 
contempt in matrimonial causes.  That legislative purpose would be defeated if courts 
exercising jurisdiction under the Family Law Act, including the Circuit Court, could simply 
choose to ignore those provisions and punish for contempts, including contempts allegedly 
arising from non-compliance with orders, pursuant to general power conferring provisions such 
as s 17 of the FCC Act.  The prescriptive and exhaustive provisions in Pts XIIIA and XIIIB in 
effect excluded any other power to deal with contempt.  A similar conclusion was reached in 
respect of relevantly analogous statutory provisions in R v Metal Trades Employers’ 
Association; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union (Australian Section) (1951) 82 CLR 
208; [1951] HCA 3.         
98 
It is also important to emphasise in this context that s 17(2) of the FCC Act expressly provides 
that s 17(1) “has effect subject to any other Act”.  Plainly the Family Law Act is an “other 
Act”.  It is therefore clear that when the Circuit Court exercises jurisdiction under the Family 
Law Act, its power to punish for contempt pursuant to s 17(1) of the FCC Act gives way to, or 
is subject to, the exhaustive provisions in Pt XIIIA and Pt XIIIB of the Family Law Act.  The 
result is that, while s 17(1) may provide the Circuit Court with a general power to punish for 
contempt, when that court exercises jurisdiction under the Family Law Act it must exercise 
that power pursuant to, or in accordance with, Pt XIIIB of the Family Law Act.  If the alleged 
contempt relates to non-compliance with a court order, unless the court finds that the non-
compliance constituted a flagrant challenge to the court’s authority, the court must deal with 
the non-compliance in accordance with Pt XIIIA of the Family Law Act.  It should also be 
noted in this context that the reliance by both the Judge and the Commonwealth on the well-
known principle in Owners of the Ship “Shin Kobe Maru” v Empire Shipping Company Inc 
(1994) 181 CLR 404 at 421; [1994] HCA 54 was misconceived.  That is because the combined 
effect of s 17(2) of the FCC Act and Pt XIIIB of the Family Law Act is to impose an express, 
not implied, limitation on the Circuit Court’s power to punish for contempt.  
99 
In all the circumstances, the better view, consistent with the FamCA Full Court’s decision in 
DAI, is that in circumstances where the Judge was exercising the Circuit Court’s jurisdiction 
under the Family Law Act, Pt XIIIB of the Family Law Act provided a complete code for 
dealing with contempts.  His Honour plainly did not even turn his mind to the provisions in Pt 
XIIIB, or Pt XIIIA for that matter, let alone make any of the findings that he was required to 
make before imprisoning Mr Stradford for contempt.  That is a particularly serious omission 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
24 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 102 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 40 of 225
 
given that the alleged contempt involved non-compliance with orders as opposed to a contempt 
in the face or hearing of the court. 
100 
As for the Commonwealth’s reliance on Re Colina, I am also not persuaded that any of the 
reasoning in that case sheds any light on the issue.  As noted earlier, Re Colina was concerned 
with the question of whether s 80 of the Constitution required that a person charged with 
contempt of the Family Court be tried before a jury.  There was no discussion or consideration 
of whether, when exercising the contempt power conferred by s 35 of the Family Court Act, 
the Family Court was free to disregard s 112AP, or the rules made pursuant to it.  Nor was 
there any suggestion that the Family Court could disregard Pt XIIIA in the case of non-
compliance with orders.  The contempt charge in question in Re Colina was particularly serious 
and involved “scandalising the court”, so it is clear that s 112AP applied in the circumstances 
of the case.   
101 
The Commonwealth’s contention, based on Re Colina, that the Circuit Court has an implied 
constitutional power to punish for contempt is considered in detail later in these reasons.  It 
suffices at this point to note that the contention has no merit.  In any event, for the reasons 
already given, even if the Circuit Court did have such an implied power, it would in any event 
give way to the code in Pt XIIIB when the court was exercising jurisdiction under the Family 
Law Act.     
102 
It should finally be noted that there is, in any event, no basis for concluding that, when the 
Judge imprisoned Mr Stradford, his Honour was exercising the Circuit Court’s power under s 
17(1) of the FCC Act, as opposed to the powers under either Pt XIIIA or Pt XIIIB of the Family 
Law Act.  There is certainly no basis to conclude that his Honour disregarded those provisions 
in the Family Law Act because he considered that the power to punish for contempt under the 
FCC Act was not constrained or limited by Pt XIIIB of the Family Law Act.  His Honour did 
not refer to s 17(1) of the FCC Act or any provision of the Family Law Act when purporting to 
deal with Mr Stradford for contempt, either during the hearing or in his judgment.     
103 
Mr Stradford’s claim that the Judge lacked power to make the imprisonment order because he 
was required to, but did not, apply the provisions of either Pt XIIIA or Pt XIIIB of the Family 
Law Act is accordingly upheld.  The Judge was not empowered to punish Mr Stradford for 
contempt unless or until he found that his alleged non-compliance with the disclosure orders 
contstiuted a “flagrant challenge to the authority of the court”.  That was effectively a 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
25 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 103 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 41 of 225
 
mandatory statutory precondition to the Judge’s power to imprison Mr Stradford for contempt.  
His Honour made no such finding.   
104 
In the absence of such a finding, the Judge was restricted to applying sanctions for the alleged 
non-compliance pursuant to Pt XIIIA of the Family Law Act.  If the Judge had proceeded down 
that route, before imposing a sentence of imprisonment he would have been required to find 
that Mr Stradford intentionally failed to comply with the disclosure orders, or that he made no 
reasonable attempt to comply with those orders (as required by ss 112AB(1)(a)(i) or (ii) of the 
Family Law Act), that any contravention of the orders occurred without reasonable excuse (as 
required by s 112AD(1) of the Family Law Act), and that it would not have been appropriate 
to impose a sanction other than imprisonment in respect of the contravention as required by s 
112AE(2) of the Family Law Act.  His Honour made no such findings.  
105 
The Judge’s failure to follow or apply the provisions of either Pt XIIIB or Pt XIIIA of the 
Family Court Act was anything but a narrow or technical breach.  Rather, it displayed a 
wholsesale disregard of important provisions in the very Act pursuant to which he was 
exercising his jurisdiction in the matter before him.   
Alleged error 3: failure to follow r 19.02 of the FCC Rules 
106 
Rule 19.02 of the FCC Rules required the Judge to ensure that the following steps had been 
taken before dealing with Mr Stradford in respect of the alleged contempt.   
107 
First, an application was required to be made to the court.  That application was required to be 
in the approved form, was required to state the contempt alleged, and was required to be 
supported by an affidavit which set out the facts relied on: r 19.02(2).  The application also had 
to be made by either a party to the proceeding (in this case Mrs Stradford), the Marshal, or a 
police officer: r 19.02(3). 
108 
Second, the Judge was required to tell Mr Stradford of the allegation, ask him to state whether 
he admitted or denied the allegation and hear any evidence in support of the allegation: 
r 19.02(6). 
109 
Third, after hearing the evidence in support of the allegation, the Judge was required to decide 
whether there was a prima facie case: r 19.02(7).  If there was no prima facie case, the 
application was required to be dismissed: r 19.02(7)(a).  If the Judge decided that there was a 
prima facie case, he was required to invite Mr Stradford to state his defence to the allegation 
and, after hearing the defence, determine the charge: r 19.02(7)(b). 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
26 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 104 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 42 of 225
 
110 
The Judge did not ensure that any of those steps were taken.  None of the requirements were 
observed.  It is once again readily apparent that the Judge either did not turn his mind to the 
requirements in r 19.02 of the FCC Rules, or chose to ignore those requirements. 
111 
The Judge admitted that he did not follow the procedures and processes in r 19.02 of the FCC 
Rules.  He contended, however, that his non-compliance with r 19.02 did not amount to an 
error because he had the power, pursuant to r 1.06 of the FCC Rules, to dispense with 
compliance with the FCC Rules.  There are a number of difficulties with that contention. 
112 
First, as has already been noted, there is no indication whatsoever that the Judge even turned 
his mind to the requirements of r 19.02, let alone to the question whether it was appropriate or 
open to him to dispense with compliance with that rule pursuant to r 1.06 of the FCC Rules. 
113 
Second, it is at best doubtful that r 1.06 could operate to permit a judge of the Circuit Court to 
dispense with compliance with a rule such as r 19.02, which imposes fundamental requirements 
or obligations on the court to ensure that it exercises its jurisdiction in a way which is 
procedurally fair.  The proper construction of general dispensation rules such as r 1.06 of the 
FCC Rules is that they “enable the court in a proper case to relieve a party of an obligation to 
comply with particular provisions of the Rules, for instance, as to time or the filing of pleadings 
and suchlike”: Survival & Industrial Equipment (Newcastle) Pty Ltd v Owners of the Vessel 
“Alley Cat” (1992) 36 FCR 129 at 138; [1992] FCA 319; Harrington v Lowe (1996) 190 CLR 
311 at 321; [1996] HCA 8.  General dispensation rules like r 1.06 of the FCC Rules should not 
be construed in such a way as to permit the court to unilaterally dispense with obligations 
imposed on it, particularly those plainly designed to ensure procedural fairness. 
114 
Third, if the Judge did turn his mind to the question of dispensation and decided to dispense 
with the requirements imposed by r 19.02, which is at best difficult to accept, that would have 
amounted to a manifestly unreasonable exercise of discretion.  As the FamCA Full Court 
observed in Stradford at [28],  there was “no feature of this case which warranted, in the broader 
interests of justice, any departure from the fundamental principles of justice reflected in 
r 19.02”.  Needless to say, the Judge did not give Mr Stradford the opportunity to make any 
submissions as to whether compliance with r 19.02 could or should be dispensed with.  
115 
Mr Stradford’s claim that the Judge failed to comply with the processes and procedure that he 
was required by r 19.02 of the FCC Rules to apply in dealing with Mr Stradford for the alleged 
contempt is accordingly upheld.  
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
27 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 105 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 43 of 225
 
116 
It is important to emphasise that the Judge’s manifest failure to follow the procedure mandated 
in r 19.02 of the FCC Rules was anything but a mere procedural irregularity, or a narrow or 
technical breach.  It was of particular significance that Mr Stradford was never provided with 
a clear statement of the contempt alleged and of even more significance that not only was there 
no application filed by either a party, the Marshal or a police officer, but the other party to the 
proceeding, Mrs Stradford, effectively told the Judge that she did not want to proceed with any 
contempt application.  The fact that Judge took it upon himself to be the prosecutor, witness 
and judge (cf Stradford at [22]-[27]) is of particular significance given the nature of the alleged 
contempt, which was an alleged failure to comply with orders, as opposed to a contempt in the 
face of the court. 
Alleged error 4: denial of procedural fairness 
117 
There was no dispute that the Judge denied Mr Stradford procedural fairness.  The Judge 
admitted that, at the purported hearing of the contempt allegation on 6 December 2018, he 
denied Mr Stradford procedural fairness in the following ways: not providing Mr Stradford 
with particulars of the allegation of contempt; not inviting Mr Stradford to state whether he 
admitted or denied the allegation; not inviting Mr Stradford to state his defence to the 
allegation; not hearing evidence in support of or against the allegation; not giving Mr Stradford 
the opportunity to make submissions in support of his defence to the allegation; and not making 
a finding that the allegation was established before proceeding to punishment. 
118 
The bare recital of the particulars of those procedural failings does not, however, adequately 
reflect the full gravity of the denial of procedural fairness.  Throughout the hearing, the Judge 
acted in a thoroughly unsatisfactory and unjudicial manner.  Even the most cursory perusal of 
the transcript of the hearing reveals that the Judge repeatedly interrupted, hectored, berated and 
bullied Mr Stradford.  That was notwithstanding the fact that, as the FamCA Full Court noted 
in Stradford at [63], “at no point did [Mr Stradford] speak or behave in a disrespectful manner”.  
It is also readily apparent that the Judge effectively pre-judged the outcome.  It is unnecessary 
to give further examples of the Judge’s unsatisfactory conduct.  As the FamCA Full Court in 
Stradford observed at [53], it is “difficult to envisage a more profound or disturbing example 
of pre-judgment and denial of procedural fairness to a party on any prospective orders, much 
less contempt, and much less contempt where a sentence of imprisonment was, apparently, pre-
determined as the appropriate remedy”.  That, in my respectful opinion, is an entirely accurate 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
28 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 106 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 44 of 225
 
and correct description of the manner in which the Judge dealt with the contempt allegation 
against Mr Stradford.   
Alleged error 5: pre-judgment 
119 
Mr Stradford claimed that the Judge pre-judged the issue of whether Mr Stradford was in 
contempt and whether he should be sentenced to imprisonment.  The Judge denied that he did 
so, and asserted that he had an open mind and was open to be persuaded one way or the other.  
The Judge did not, however, give evidence.  The issue, therefore, is largely to be determined 
by reference to the transcript of the hearings before the Judge.  There was, however, some other 
evidence that potentially bears on the question of pre-judgment.  
120 
The transcripts of the hearings clearly and inescapably support the conclusion that the Judge 
did not approach the matter with an open mind and that he had determined, at the outset, that 
Mr Stradford was in contempt and was to be imprisoned.   
121 
The rot set in, as it were, on 10 August 2018, the very first occasion that the parties appeared 
before the Judge.  At that hearing, Mrs Stradford complained, from the bar table, that Mr 
Stradford’s disclosure was inadequate or deficient.  The Judge’s response to that complaint 
was: “what do you want me to do, to adjourn the matter, expect full and frank disclosure; if 
not, charge him with contempt and jail him?”.  The thinly veiled threat that Mr Stradford would 
be gaoled if he failed to comply with any disclosure orders was repeated on numerous occasions 
throughout the balance of the hearing on 10 August 2018, for example: “[i]f people don’t 
comply with my orders there’s only [one] place they go”; “I don’t have any hesitation in jailing 
people for not complying with my orders”; to Mr Stradford “I will have no hesitation in jailing 
you”; “I will have no hesitation in jailing you for three years”; if “she [Mrs Stradford] comes 
here, and she complains that she has asked for things and you have not given them to her, bring 
your toothbrush”.  The last statement is particularly significant.  It suggests that the Judge 
considered that it would suffice, to support a finding of contempt by Mr Stradford, for Mrs 
Stradford to simply complain or allege that Mr Stradford had not disclosed certain matters. 
122 
As discussed earlier in these reasons, when the matter came back before the Judge on 6 
December 2018, the Judge inexplicably stated, at the very commencement of the hearing, that 
Judge Turner had determined that Mr Stradford was in contempt.  It is almost impossible to 
conceive how the Judge had arrived at that conclusion.  Judge Turner had made no such order 
and had not delivered any judgment.  The basis for the conclusion appeared to be that “Judge 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
29 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 107 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 45 of 225
 
Turner wouldn’t have sent it to me [the Judge] without making a determination that you [Mr 
Stradford] had actually failed to do that”. 
123 
The Judge then went through some of the categories of documents in the disclosure orders and 
sought Mr Stradford’s response as to whether he had provided those documents.  Mr Stradford 
responded to the Judge’s questions.  Mr Stradford’s explanations included, in some instances, 
that the documents sought did not exist or could not be produced because, for example, the 
specified bank account did not exist, or Mr Stradford was unable to obtain access to the 
documents.  Those explanations were broadly consistent with the explanations provided in an 
affidavit which Mr Stradford had filed.  It is unclear whether the Judge had read the affidavit.  
Mrs Stradford was also not specifically asked to provide her response to those explanations.   
124 
Despite the very cursory consideration that was given to Mr Stradford’s position, the Judge’s 
response was “despite everything that [Mr Stradford] has said, I don’t believe that he has 
complied fully with my orders”.  Worse still, before hearing anything further, the Judge said, 
addressing Mr Stradford: “You will be serving 12 months in jail”.  After a short break, the 
Judge indicated that he would “go ahead with the contempt hearing” and said “[s]o I hope you 
brought your toothbrush, [Mr Stradford]”.  
125 
It is abundantly clear that, from this point, the Judge had determined that Mr Stradford had not 
fully complied with the orders and the result was that he would be imprisoned.  That would 
appear to be the case even though the evidence, including Mr Stradford’s affidavit, had not 
been formally read, let alone tested by cross-examination, and even though the contempt 
hearing had not commenced, or at least had not concluded – it was supposed to “go ahead” 
after the break.  It is also clear from the transcript that Mrs Stradford had not submitted that Mr 
Stradford should be sentenced to imprisonment.  Indeed, she had made it quite plain that she 
did not want that to occur.  
126 
The transcript reveals that the proceeding was adjourned between 10.46 am and 11.57 am.  A 
document produced by the Queensland Police Service indicated that at 11.43 am on 
6 December 2018, one of the MSS guards who was on duty at the Circuit Court building on 
that day, Mr Stuart Dunn, contacted the Queensland Police Service.  The document contains 
the following note: 
ADVICE RE [THE JUDGE] WHO IS ISSUING WARRANT FOR POI 
[STRADFORD] TO BE HELD IN CUSTODY AND REQUESTING QPS 
ASSISTANCE TO HOLD POI. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
30 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 108 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 46 of 225
 
127 
It may be observed that the notation was not that the Judge might issue a warrant; it was that 
the Judge “is” issuing a warrant.  Mr Dunn’s evidence, based on a perusal of that document, 
was that he believed that he was “given advanced notice that [the Judge] would make an 
imprisonment order that day”.  The available or logical inference is that the “advanced notice” 
emanated from the Judge.  
128 
That is, in any event, readily apparent from what occurred when the court reconvened at 
11.57 am.  The Judge repeated to Mr Stradford that Judge Turner had already found that he 
was in contempt and asked Mr Stradford what he wanted to say.  Mr Stradford began to respond 
to that question by saying that he had disclosed what he had been able to disclose, however the 
Judge almost immediately interrupted him and said: “You understand that’s just rubbish”.  
Given that response, it is perhaps not surprising that Mr Stradford said little more. 
129 
As Mr Stradford submitted, what occurred was at best a gross parody of a court hearing. 
130 
The Judge submitted that it cannot be inferred that he had pre-judged the question of Mr 
Stradford’s guilt because he was operating under the mistaken belief that Judge Turner had 
already found that Mr Stradford was in contempt.  The available inference, therefore, was not 
that he had pre-judged Mr Stradford’s guilt, but that he did not think that he had to determine 
it.  I am not persuaded by that submission. 
131 
As has already been observed, the Judge’s statement that Judge Turner had already found that 
Mr Stradford was in contempt was confounding.  It is difficult to understand how the Judge 
could reasonably have believed that Judge Turner had made any such finding.  That is 
particularly the case given that Judge Turner had made no declaration or order to that effect.  
Nor had her Honour delivered any judgment concerning the alleged contempt.  It is equally 
difficult to understand why or how the Judge would have thought that the matter had been 
referred to him to impose a sentence or sanction if Judge Turner had found that Mr Stradford 
was in contempt.  The almost invariable course is that the judge who determines that a person 
is in contempt also imposes the sanction in respect of the contempt.  There is nothing to suggest 
that the Judge turned his mind to any of those issues.    
132 
It is also extremely difficult to reconcile the Judge’s stated belief that Judge Turner had already 
found that Mr Stradford was in contempt with what occurred at the hearing on 6 December 
2018.  Why, if he believed that Judge Turner had already decided that Mr Stradford was in 
contempt by failing to comply with the Judge’s orders, did the Judge question Mr Stradford 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
31 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 109 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 47 of 225
 
about his compliance at the hearing on 6 December 2018?  Why did the Judge say, in the course 
of that exchange with Mr Stradford: “I am really only here today to look at whether you are in 
contempt of my orders”?  Why did the Judge, not Judge Turner, make the declaration that Mr 
Stradford was in contempt of the orders? 
133 
It is ultimately unnecessary to reach a concluded view concerning those imponderables.  If the 
Judge genuinely believed that Judge Turner had already determined that Mr Stradford was in 
contempt, that belief was manifestly unreasonable, in the sense that it cannot be accepted that 
there was any reasonable basis for him to have formed that belief.  More importantly, even if 
it be accepted that the Judge was operating under the mistaken belief that he did not need to 
determine whether Mr Stradford was in contempt because that determination had already been 
made by Judge Turner, the Judge was still required to determine the appropriate sanction or 
penalty to impose in respect of that contempt.  He was plainly required to bring an open mind 
to that issue.  It is, on the evidence as a whole, impossible to accept that he did so.           
134 
The almost inescapable inference from the available evidence is that the Judge had 
predetermined that the appropriate sanction for Mr Stradford’s non-compliance with the 
disclosure orders was a substantial sentence of imprisonment.  That inferience is supported, at 
least to some extent, by the note which recorded tht the police had been summoned prior to 
what was supposed to be the final part of the contempt hearing.  I am, in all the circumstances, 
satisfied that the evidence as a whole establishes that the Judge was “so committed to a 
conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments 
may be presented”: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 
205 CLR 507; [2001] HCA 17 at [72].  The evidence plainly demonstrates that nothing that 
Mr Stradford could have said or done could have diverted the Judge from imprisoning him for 
the contempt that the Judge had either assumed or believed he had committed.   
135 
I am, of course, mindful that an allegation that a judge had predetermined a matter is a 
particularly serious allegation, particularly where the outcome was a sentence of imprisonment.  
An allegation of pre-judgment, which amounts to an allegation of actual bias, is “about as 
serious an allegation as any that could be made against a judicial officer” because it “involves 
a finding of judicial impropriety and probably of judicial misconduct”: Spirits International 
BV v Federal Treasury (FKP) Sojuzplodoimport [2013] FCAFC 106 at [13].  I take the 
seriousness of the allegation into account in determining whether the inference of pre-judgment 
is available and should be drawn: cf Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
32 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 110 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 48 of 225
 
HCA 34 and s 140(2)(c) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).  I am nevertheless satisfied that the 
inference can and should be drawn.  
136 
It should finally be noted that, as the previous discussion of the judgment of the FamCA Full 
Court in Stradford revealed, the FamCA Full Court also clearly inferred and concluded that the 
Judge had pre-judged the issue of whether Mr Stradford was in contempt and whether he should 
be sentenced to imprisonment.  At risk of repetition, the FamCA Full Court concluded that it 
was “difficult to envisage a more profound or disturbing example of pre-judgment and denial 
of procedural fairness to a party on any prospective orders, much less contempt, and much less 
contempt where a sentence of imprisonment was, apparently, pre-determined as the appropriate 
remedy” (at [53]).  I have effectively reached the same conclusion independently, but also 
respectfully agree with the FamCA Full Court’s reasoning and conclusion in that regard.  
Alleged error 6: improper purpose 
137 
Mr Stradford alleged that the Judge acted for an improper purpose, in that he used the threat of 
imprisonment as a means of exerting pressure on Mr Stradford to settle the case outside the 
courtroom.  The Judge, the Commonwealth and Queensland all denied that allegation. 
138 
Mr Stradford’s allegation of improper purpose was almost entirely based on what was said 
during the hearing on 6 December 2018.  He submitted that the transcript plainly revealed that 
the Judge was using the threat of imprisonment as a lever to force Mr Stradford to capitulate 
and agree to a property settlement which was acceptable to Mrs Stradford.  The Judge, however, 
submitted that he was not making the threat of imprisonment to induce the parties to settle.  
Rather, he was merely observing what would be the likely course of events, including what 
would happen if the parties managed to resolve the matter. 
139 
As has already been noted, at the very commencement of the hearing on 6 December 2018, the 
Judge told the parties that Judge Turner had found that Mr Stradford was in contempt and had 
made it plain that he did not believe that Mr Stradford had fully complied with the disclosure 
orders.  It was in that context that the Judge asked Mrs Stradford what she really wanted.  Mrs 
Stradford indicated that what she really wanted was a property settlement.  The following 
exchange then occurred: 
HIS HONOUR: And I’m prepared to deal with him for contempt. But, you know, I can 
see that that’s not what you particularly want. You want an amicable settlement, 
because you’ve got children. 
[MRS STRADFORD]: We’ve got children. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
33 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 111 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 49 of 225
 
HIS HONOUR: And you don’t want him to be going to jail unnecessarily, because 
that’s exactly where he is going to be going. 
[MRS STRADFORD]: I know. 
HIS HONOUR: You do realise that. You will be serving 12 months in jail. So I’m 
happy to do that. I can deal with that contempt today. And I’ve told you what will 
happen. Or, if you want, I can in effect give you an adjournment until the new year. If 
you come back with consent orders as to a proper property adjustment, even if 
he doesn’t have the actual money to make good on that adjustment, given that 
$400,000 is going to have to come into the pool, if you can sort that out so that it 
is amicable, I’m happy to give you that time to do that, so that you don’t feel as 
though in any way you have, you know, contributed to this. But this is not your 
doing. This is all on [Mr Stradford].  
And I’m the one who sends him into jail, not you. You understand that. I don’t want 
you to have that guilt or to feel that you have to explain to your children that, “Because 
I pursued this, you know, dad has had to go to jail.” Okay. I don’t want for you to 
think that way. But I’m prepared to, you know, adjourn this over to January and 
for you to be able to come to me with a proper settlement. If you can’t, the matter 
will go back into the list for Judge Turner to allocate a trial date just on the material 
that we have. But that trial date will await [Mr Stradford’s] release from prison, 
because that’s what will happen in January. 
[MRS STRADFORD]: And that is my concern, is that I’m financially struggling and 
I’ve still got the cars, I’ve still got this as well. 
HIS HONOUR: I understand that. But I don’t --- 
[MRS STRADFORD]: Yes. Yes, of course. 
HIS HONOUR: On what I’m seeing, on what I’ve got at the moment, I’m not seeing 
a very good outcome for you, because even if I order that you be paid, you know, 
$300,000 out of that pool, $100,000, you’re not going to see that. 
[MRS STRADFORD]: Yes. 
HIS HONOUR: And, you know, nothing is going to happen and he will be in jail and 
you will have a piece of paper that says, “Yes, we’ve got the settlement”, but, you 
know, it really isn’t going to do anyone any good. So I’m going to adjourn just for 
five minutes and then I will let you talk to Mr Stradford. And it will be only for 
five minutes. Then you can come back and you can tell me what you want to do. 
If it is that there’s not going to be a resolution, I’m going to proceed with the 
contempt hearing. It’s as simple as that. Okay. Thank you. Okay. All right. 
[MRS STRADFORD]: Thank you, your Honour. 
(Emphasis added)   
140 
That exchange is somewhat puzzling.  Initially the Judge seems to suggest that he would be 
prepared to adjourn the matter until January 2019 to enable the parties to settle.  Subsequently, 
however, after indicating that Mr Stradford would be serving 12 months in gaol if the contempt 
hearing proceeded, the Judge allowed only a very short adjournment for the parties to determine 
if there was any prospect of a resolution.  The Judge made it clear that if there was “not going 
to be a resolution”, the contempt hearing would proceed.  The Judge had also made it quite 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
34 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 112 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 50 of 225
 
clear that the inevitable outcome, if that were to occur, was that Mr Stradford would be 
imprisoned.   
141 
Not surprisingly, the parties were unable to resolve the matter in the five minutes that the Judge 
allowed them to discuss a possible resolution.  After the short break, Mrs Stradford reiterated 
that she did not want Mr Stradford to go to gaol, but that she was not content with whatever 
Mr Stradford may have offered by way of property settlement.  At that point, the Judge 
indicated that, because the parties had been unable to resolve their differences, the contempt 
hearing would proceed, though not before 11.45 am as the Judge had another commitment.  
The Judge also reiterated that the inevitable result of the contempt hearing would be that 
Mr Stradford would be imprisoned, this time by employing the well-worn cliché that he hoped 
that Mr Stradford had brought his toothbrush.   
142 
Before adjourning, however, the Judge made what appeared to be one last attempt to encourage 
the parties to settle the proceeding.  In response to a further plea by Mrs Stradford that she did 
not want Mr Stradford to go to gaol, the Judge said: 
Not your order. You can’t come to a conclusion, so therefore it means that this is still 
on foot. If this matter is still on foot, he is in contempt. The only way he gets out of 
contempt is if this matter is not on foot any more. You said that it cannot be 
settled, that he will not give you what you think is just and equitable. Therefore, 
it’s still on foot. Therefore, he is in contempt. Therefore, I am going to deal with him 
for contempt. Okay. I’ve made that very, very clear. It’s not your decision; it’s my 
decision. You’re not the one that’s sending him to jail; I am. These are court orders 
and court orders need to be obeyed. Otherwise, what’s the use of making the court 
orders. I made it very clear in August 2018 exactly what would happen if there was no 
compliance with these orders. Now, it’s not your fault. You’re not the one who’s 
sentencing him to jail; I am. But he won’t settle justly and equitably with you, the 
matter is on foot. You understand it. This is not anyone’s fault but your own. Quarter 
to 12. 
(Emphasis added)  
143 
It is plainly open to infer that the statements emphasised in the above extracts, considered in 
context, were likely to have had the effect of exerting considerable pressure on the parties, 
though particularly Mr Stradford, to settle the property dispute.  It was, in all the circumstances, 
entirely inappropriate and bordering on improper for the Judge to put the parties in that position.  
That was the conclusion effectively arrived at by the FamCA Full Court in Stradford when the 
court said: “[q]uite how it could be thought proper or appropriate behaviour for a judge to tell 
(self-represented) parties, in effect, ‘settle outside the courtroom now or one of you will go to 
gaol’ entirely eludes us” (at [50]).  I agree.  Despite that, I am not disposed to infer and conclude 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
35 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 113 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 51 of 225
 
that the Judge acted for an improper purpose when he told Mr Stradford that he proposed to 
sentence him to imprisonment.   
144 
A finding that a judge acted for an improper purpose is a particularly serious finding which 
should not be lightly made.  In making such a finding, due consideration must be given to the 
gravity of the allegation and the inherent unlikelihood that a judge would act in such a manner: 
s 140(2)(c) of the Evidence Act; Briginshaw at 60 CLR 362 (Dixon J).  While it was 
undoubtedly inappropriate for the Judge to have put the parties in the invidious position of 
having to engage in settlement discussions under the spectre of Mr Stradford almost certainly 
being imprisoned if the matter did not settle, I am ultimately not satisfied the Judge was 
motivated or actuated by an improper purpose.   
145 
The difficulty for Mr Stradford in relation to this allegation is that there is another possible 
inference, that being that the Judge was motivated by a somewhat misguided and misconceived 
sense of pragmatism.  The Judge appears to have believed that it was in the best interests of 
both parties if they were able to reach an amicable property settlement.  Despite the seriousness 
with which he apparently viewed Mr Stradford’s supposed contempt, the Judge appears to have 
been prepared to effectively overlook that contempt if the parties were able to resolve their 
dispute.  He told the parties as much.   
146 
It is very difficult to reconcile the Judge’s apparent willingness to overlook the supposed 
contempt with the apparent seriousness with which the Judge had viewed the contempt.  
Moreover, if, as the Judge apparently believed, Mr Stradford had been found by Judge Turner 
to have committed a contempt, it was incumbent on the Judge to either refer the matter back to 
Judge Turner, or at least proceed to deal with Mr Stradford in respect of that contempt.  It was 
entirely inappropriate and misconceived for the Judge to suggest that the contempt could be 
overlooked if the parties settled the principal proceeding – all the more so given the pressure 
that that suggestion was likely to place on the parties in the circumstances. 
147 
While it was undoubtedly inappropriate for the Judge to conduct the proceeding in the way he 
did, I am ultimately not satisfied, to the requisite standard, that his predominant or actuating 
purpose in pursuing or prosecuting the contempt allegation against Mr Stradford was to exert 
pressure upon the parties to settle the proceeding, or force Mr Stradford to capitulate.  The 
Judge appears to have believed that Judge Turner had already found that Mr Stradford was in 
contempt and to have already formed the view that the appropriate penalty for that contempt 
was imprisonment.  He obviously knew that Mr Stradford did not want to go to gaol.  He also 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
36 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 114 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 52 of 225
 
knew that Mrs Stradford did not want Mr Stradford to go to gaol and had also formed the view 
that that would also not be in Mrs Stradford’s best interests.  He appears, in those 
circumstances, to have sent the parties outside for further discussions in the misguided belief 
that it was somehow in their best interests to do so, despite the obvious pressure that placed 
upon them.  While the effect of the Judge’s actions was to exert pressure upon the parties to 
settle, I am not persuaded that that was his predominant purpose for acting as he did.  That is 
all the more so given the absence of any apparent advantage that the Judge may have derived 
from forcing the parties to settle, other than perhaps ridding the Judge of a case that he would 
otherwise have been required to hear and determine on its merits.              
148 
It follows that, not without some misgivings, I reject Mr Stradford’s allegation that the Judge 
acted for an improper purpose in that he used the threat of imprisonment as a means of exerting 
pressure on Mr Stradford to settle the proceeding.   
149 
I should perhaps add that, even if it could be inferred that the threats of imprisonment that the 
Judge made during the course of the hearing on 6 December 2018 were made for the alleged 
improper purpose, it would not necessarily follow that the Judge exceeded or acted outside his 
jurisdiction in either declaring that Mr Stradford was in contempt, or ordering that Mr Stradford 
be imprisoned for that contempt.  Mr Stradford did not allege that the Judge brought or pursued 
the contempt allegation against Mr Stradford for an improper purpose.  Nor did he allege that 
the Judge made the imprisonment order for an improper purpose.  Rather, Mr Stradford 
appeared to accept that the Judge believed that Judge Turner had found that he was in contempt 
and that the Judge considered in those circumstances that it was incumbent on him to punish 
Mr Stradford for that contempt.  It is in those circumstances at least questionable whether it 
could be said that the Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in making the imprisonment order simply 
on the basis of threats made during the course of the hearing, even if those threats were made 
for the improper purpose of pressuring the parties to settle the matter.  It is unnecessary to 
express a concluded view in respect of that issue given that I have, in any event, not accepted 
that the Judge’s conduct in making the threats was actuated by an improper purpose.      
THE TORTS ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY THE JUDGE 
150 
Mr Stradford’s causes of action against the Judge were for the tort of false imprisonment and 
the tort of collateral abuse of process. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
37 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 115 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 53 of 225
 
False imprisonment 
151 
The tort of false imprisonment essentially involves two elements: first, imprisonment or 
detention of the plaintiff; and second, the unlawfulness of the imprisonment or detention.   
152 
In  Lewis v Australian Capital Territory (2020) 271 CLR 192; [2020] HCA 26, Gageler J 
described the elements of the tort of false imprisonment in the following terms (at [24]-[25]): 
“To constitute the injury of false imprisonment”, as Sir William Blackstone put it, 
“there are two points requisite: 1. The detention of the person; and, 2. The unlawfulness 
of such detention”. Despite the onus shifting to the defendant to negative the element 
of unlawfulness where the plaintiff establishes the element of detention, it is detention 
in combination with unlawfulness that constitutes the tort. Through the tort, the “right 
to personal liberty” is protected by the common law - not from all restraints, but from 
those restraints for which “lawful authority” cannot be shown.  
The right to personal liberty continues to be protected by the tort of wrongful 
imprisonment though liberty is vulnerable to restraint in the exercise of lawful 
authority. Whether a citizen or an alien and whether subject to a sentence of 
imprisonment imposed by a court or not, a person whose status or prior conduct renders 
that person especially vulnerable to detention in the exercise of lawful authority is not 
an outlaw. The person is entitled to expect that if, when, and for so long as, detention 
occurs in fact it will occur only in accordance with law. If the person is in fact detained 
for any period otherwise than in the exercise of lawful authority, the person is entitled 
to maintain an action for wrongful imprisonment in which the person is entitled to 
obtain an award of compensatory damages if the compensatory principle is satisfied. 
(Footnotes omitted) 
153 
In Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612; [2005] HCA 48, Kirby J said of the tort (at [140]):  
Throughout the common law world, the conclusion consistently reached by courts 
addressing this question is that, in the absence of statutory provisions that clearly afford 
an immunity or defence to the administrator, the result must favour the individual 
whose rights have been violated. Wrongful imprisonment is a tort of strict liability. 
Lack of fault, in the sense of absence of bad faith, is irrelevant to the existence of the 
wrong. This is because the focus of this civil wrong is on the vindication of liberty and 
reparation to the victim, rather than upon the presence or absence of moral wrongdoing 
on the part of the defendant. A plaintiff who proves that his or her imprisonment was 
caused by the defendant therefore has a prima facie case. At common law it is the 
defendant who must then show lawful justification for his or her actions.  
(Footnotes omitted) 
154 
As that passage from Ruddock v Taylor discloses, the tort of false imprisonment is one of strict 
liability.  The applicant must first show that the imprisonment had occurred.  If that is 
established, the onus then shifts to the respondent to show that the imprisonment had some 
lawful justification. 
155 
Any person who actively promotes and causes the complainant to be imprisoned may be liable: 
Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 at 616.  That person may be held liable even if other 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
38 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 116 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 54 of 225
 
people who were involved in the imprisonment, including those who actually effected the 
imprisonment, are immune or have a defence: Ruddock v Taylor at [151]-[153].  
156 
There could be little doubt that the Judge, in ordering or directing that Mr Stradford be 
imprisoned, actively promoted and caused Mr Stradford to be imprisoned.  The Judge admitted 
as much.   
157 
The Judge and the Commonwealth contended, however, that there was lawful justification for 
Mr Stradford’s detention.  That was said to be the case even though the FamCA Full Court in 
Stradford set aside both the declaration and order of the Judge pursuant to which he had been 
imprisoned, and even though both the Judge and the Commonwealth did not dispute that the 
declaration and order were both vitiated by jurisdictional error.  The essence of the case 
advanced by the Judge and the Commonwealth in relation to lawful justification was that the 
imprisonment order and warrant remained valid and effective until set aside.  Mr Stradford’s 
imprisonment, so it was submitted, was lawfully justified until the order and warrant were set 
aside by the FamCA Full Court, by which time Mr Stradford had been released on bail in any 
event. 
158 
The issue of lawful justification is the critical, if not determinative, issue in respect of the 
Judge’s liability for false imprisonment, save for the issue concerning judicial immunity.   
Collateral abuse of process 
159 
The tort of collateral abuse of process is committed where the defendant employs a process of 
the court for some purpose other than the attainment of the principal claim for relief in an 
action.  As Issacs J put it in Varawa v Howard Smith Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 35 at 91; [1911] 
HCA 46: “[i]f the proceedings are merely a stalking horse to coerce the defendant in some way 
entirely outside the ambit of the legal claim upon which the Court is asked to adjudicate they 
are regarded as an abuse of process”.  Lord Sumption described the essence of the tort as 
follows in Crawford Adjusters (Cayman) Ltd v Sagicor General Insurance (Cayman) Ltd 
[2014] AC 366 at [149]; [2013] 4 All ER 8: 
The essence of the tort is the abuse of civil proceedings for a predominant purpose 
other than that for which they were designed. This means for the purpose of obtaining 
some wholly extraneous benefit other than the relief sought and not reasonably owing 
from or connected with the relief sought. The paradigm case is the use of the processes 
of the court as a tool of extortion, by putting pressure on the defendant to do something 
wholly unconnected with the relief, which he has no obligation to do. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
39 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 117 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 55 of 225
 
160 
The abusive purpose must be the predominant or effective purpose of the moving party: 
Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509 at 529; [1992] HCA 34. 
161 
It is also not enough for the plaintiff to simply prove an improper purpose or motive of the 
defendant.  The plaintiff must also prove the “deployment of the relevant process, in 
furtherance of that purpose, by way of an overt act or threat, distinct from pursuit of the 
proceeding itself according to its ordinary course”: Maxwell-Smith v S & E Hall Pty Ltd (2014) 
86 NSWLR 481; [2014] NSWCA 146 at [54].  In other words, the plaintiff must prove “an 
improper act in the prosecution of the process”: Butler v Simmonds Crowley & Galvin [2000] 
2 Qd R 252; [1999] QCA 475. 
162 
The onus of proof on the plaintiff in order to succeed on a claim of collateral abuse of process 
is “a heavy one”: Williams v Spautz at 529.  
163 
The case against the Judge for the tort of collateral abuse of process is somewhat out of the 
ordinary.  Ordinarily the defendant is the moving party in the impugned proceeding.  In this 
case, however, the defendant is the judge.  The parties in the principal proceeding were Mr and 
Mrs Stradford.  That said, it would not be entirely inaccurate to describe the Judge as the 
moving party in the contempt proceeding against Mr Stradford.  As the FamCA Full Court 
observed, the Judge effectively assumed the role of prosecutor: Stradford at [19], [26] and [71].  
164 
Mr Stradford’s case against the Judge for collateral abuse of process was that the Judge initiated 
the contempt proceeding against him and threatened to prosecute that proceeding through to 
completion as a means of putting pressure on Mr Stradford to capitulate in his litigation with 
Mrs Stradford.  The overt acts were alleged to be the threats made by the Judge during the 
purported hearing of the contempt allegation. 
LIABILITY OF THE JUDGE FOR COLLATERAL ABUSE OF PROCESS 
165 
I propose to first deal with Mr Stradford’s case for the tort of collateral abuse of process.  That 
is because it can be dealt with fairly shortly. 
166 
I am not satisfied that the Judge committed the tort of collateral abuse of process.  That is so 
for a number of reasons. 
167 
First, I am mindful that the allegation that the Judge instigated or maintained the contempt 
proceeding against Mr Stradford for the improper purpose of forcing Mr and Mrs Stradford to 
settle their family law proceeding, or forcing Mr Stradford to capitulate in that litigation, is an 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
40 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 118 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 56 of 225
 
extremely serious allegation.  I must take the seriousness of the allegation into account in 
determining whether the inference of improper purpose is available and should be drawn: 
Briginshaw; s 140(2)(c) of the Evidence Act.  
168 
Second, it is not entirely clear that the Judge instigated, or saw himself as the instigator of, the 
contempt proceeding against Mr Stradford.  Rather, as discussed earlier, he proceeded under 
the mistaken belief that Judge Turner had already found that Mr Stradford had failed to comply 
with the court’s orders and was therefore in contempt.  Implausible as it may seem, he appears 
to have proceeded on the basis that, while Judge Turner had made the contempt finding, it was 
a matter for him to proceed to sentence Mr Stradford for that contempt. 
169 
Third, while it may be accepted that the Judge pursued or maintained the contempt proceeding 
against Mr Stradford in that regard, and to that extent can be regarded as the moving party, I 
am not satisfied to the requisite standard that the Judge’s predominant purpose in pursuing the 
contempt allegation was a purpose other than that for which contempt proceedings of the sort 
in question are properly pursued.  That purpose was to punish Mr Stradford for his non-
compliance with the court’s orders and thereby vindicate the court’s authority.  I would infer 
that the Judge believed that Mr Stradford had been found to be in contempt and that it was 
appropriate to proceed to deal with him for that contempt. 
170 
Fourth, it is true that in the course of the contempt proceeding the Judge indicated to the parties 
that if they settled the proceeding he would effectively forgive or overlook the contempt, but 
that if they did not settle Mr Stradford would be going to gaol.  He told the parties to engage in 
settlement discussions with that in mind.  That was entirely inappropriate and bordering on 
improper.  I am not, however, satisfied to the requisite standard that the Judge’s inappropriate 
statements and conduct in that regard were motivated or actuated by any improper purpose.  
Rather, for the reasons given earlier in the context of the allegation that the Judge acted for an 
improper purpose, the Judge appears to have acted in the pragmatic but nonetheless misguided 
belief that it was somehow in the parties’ best interests to try to settle the proceeding and 
thereby avoid the spectre of Mr Stradford going to gaol.  While it is difficult to imagine that 
the Judge was entirely oblivious to the pressure that his action put the parties under, I am not 
persuaded that his predominant purpose was to force the parties to settle the proceeding, or 
force Mr Stradford to capitulate.        
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
41 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 119 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 57 of 225
 
THE LIABILITY OF THE JUDGE FOR FALSE IMPRISONMENT 
171 
As has already been noted, there could obviously be no dispute that Mr Stradford was 
imprisoned.  There was also no dispute that the Judge’s conduct in making the imprisonment 
order and issuing the warrant was the direct cause of Mr Stradford’s imprisonment.  Mr 
Stradford was imprisoned from the date that the Judge made the imprisonment order and issued 
the warrant (6 December 2018) until the date that the Judge stayed the imprisonment order and 
directed that Mr Stradford be released (12 December 2018), a total of seven days.   
172 
The critical issue is whether there was lawful justification for that imprisonment. 
Lawful justification 
173 
Both the Judge and the Commonwealth contended that there was lawful justification for Mr 
Stradford’s detention.  They obviously did not dispute that the FamCA Full Court in Stradford 
set aside both the declaration and order of the Judge pursuant to which he had been imprisoned.  
They also conceded that the declaration and order were invalid and vitiated by jurisdictional 
error.  That concession was properly made.   
174 
There could be little doubt that the Judge had the jurisdiction to entertain the matter between 
Mr and Mrs Stradford, and had the power to deal with any alleged contempt by Mr Stradford 
in the context of that litigation.  In making the imprisonment order, however, the Judge acted 
outside or in excess of his jurisdiction by, among other things: making the imprisonment order 
and issuing the warrant without first finding that Mr Stradford was in contempt; failing to make 
findings that were necessary before the sanction of imprisonment could be imposed pursuant 
to the provisions in Pt XIIIA and Pt XIIIB of the Family Law Act; failing to comply with the 
procedure mandated by the FCC Rules for dealing with allegations of contempt; and denying 
procedural fairness to Mr Stradford in a manner described by the FamCA Full Court in 
Stradford as amounting to a “gross miscarriage of justice” (at [73]).  Those errors 
unquestionably constituted jurisdictional errors. 
175 
The thrust of the Judge’s and the Commonwealth’s contention that the Judge’s imprisonment 
order and warrant nonetheless provided lawful justification for the imprisonment of Mr 
Stradford was that the order and warrant were valid until set aside by the FamCA Full Court.  
They submitted that the source of the Circuit Court’s power to punish for contempt carried with 
it the power to make orders which were valid until set aside.  The Constitution was said to be 
the source of the Circuit Court’s power to punish for contempt, because the power to punish 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
42 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 120 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 58 of 225
 
for contempt was said to be a feature of courts established under Ch III of the Constitution and 
the Circuit Court was a Ch III court.  They also appeared to rely on the fact that s 17 of the 
FCC Act provided that the Circuit Court’s powers to punish for contempt were the same as the 
powers that the High Court has to punish for contempt.  It followed, in their submission, that 
when the Circuit Court exercises its jurisdiction under s 17, it exercises the jurisdiction of a 
superior court, or exercises its jurisdiction in effect as a superior court, or in the capacity of a 
superior court.  It followed, so the Judge and the Commonwealth submitted, that contempt 
orders made by the Circuit Court are valid until set aside, which is the position that would apply 
in the case of a superior court.  
176 
The starting point in resolving this issue is to consider whether orders made by an inferior court 
generally are valid until set aside.  Consideration can then be given to whether contempt orders 
made by an inferior court, or the Circuit Court specifically, fall into a different category. 
Are orders made by an inferior court valid until set aside? 
177 
The first question, shortly stated, is whether, as a general proposition, orders made by an 
inferior court are valid until set aside, even if they are infected by jurisdictional error.  The 
short answer to that question is “no”.   
178 
There is no doubt that orders made by a superior court are valid until set aside: New South 
Wales v Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118; [2013] HCA 26 at [38].  The position is, however, different 
in the case of an inferior court, like the Circuit Court.  As Gageler J explained in Kable (at 
[56]): 
There is, however, a critical distinction between a superior court and an inferior court 
concerning the authority belonging to a judicial order that is made without jurisdiction. 
A judicial order of an inferior court made without jurisdiction has no legal force as an 
order of that court. One consequence is that failure to obey the order cannot be a 
contempt of court. Another is that the order may be challenged collaterally in a 
subsequent proceeding in which reliance is sought to be placed on it. Where there is 
doubt about whether a judicial order of an inferior court is made within jurisdiction, 
the validity of the order “must always remain an outstanding question” unless and until 
that question is authoritatively determined by some other court in the exercise of 
judicial power within its own jurisdiction. 
(Footnotes omitted) 
179 
Similarly, in Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Kmetyk (2018) 85 MVR 25; [2018] 
NSWCA 156, Leeming JA (with whom Meagher JA and Sackville AJA agreed) held that 
orders made by the District Court of New South Wales were vitiated by jurisdictional error 
and, because the District Court was an inferior court, those orders were “nullities” (at [43]).  
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
43 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 121 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 59 of 225
 
Justice Leeming cited Pelechowski v Registrar, Court of Appeal (NSW) (1999) 198 CLR 435; 
[1999] HCA 19 in support of that conclusion.   
180 
It may be accepted that there may be issues surrounding the use of the words “nullity”, “void” 
and “voidable” in this context: cf Kable at [21]-[22] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell 
and Keane JJ).  Be that as it may, the issue, in the present context, is whether the Judge’s 
imprisonment order lacked legal force such as to provide a lawful basis for Mr Stradford’s 
imprisonment.  The better view is that, whatever issues may arise in respect of the use of words 
like “nullity”, “void” and “voidable”, an order made by an inferior court which is infected by 
jurisdictional error has no legal force or effect from the outset.      
181 
In Oakey Coal Action Alliance Inc v New Acland Coal Pty Ltd (2021) 272 CLR 33; [2021] 
HCA 2, the High Court considered, among other things, the legal effect of an order made by 
the Land Court of Queensland, an inferior court.  That order had been set aside on the basis 
that it was affected or infected by apprehended bias and a denial of procedural fairness on the 
part of the court.  The plurality (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ) said as follows as to 
whether the order only lacked legal force when it was set aside (at [48]): 
The circumstance that the Land Court has been established as an inferior court, as 
distinct from a superior court, means that failure to comply with a condition of its 
jurisdiction to perform a judicial function renders any judicial order it might make in 
the purported performance of that judicial function lacking in legal force. That is so 
whether or not the judicial order is set aside.  
(Footnotes omitted) 
182 
The Judge and the Commonwealth relied on the following passage from the judgment of 
McHugh JA (with whom Hope JA agreed) in Attorney-General (NSW) v Mayas Pty Ltd (1988) 
14 NSWLR 342 at 357: 
If an inferior tribunal exercising judicial power has no authority to make an order of 
the kind in question, the failure to obey it cannot be a contempt. Such an order is a 
nullity. Any person may disregard it. Different considerations arise, however, if the 
order is of a kind within the tribunal’s power but which was improperly made. In that 
class of case, the order is good until it is set aside by a superior tribunal. While it exists 
it must be obeyed. 
183 
That passage from Mayas was subsequently cited by McHugh J in Pelechowski in support of 
the proposition that “[a] long line of cases establishes that an order made by an inferior court, 
such as the District Court, will be null and void if that court did not have jurisdiction to make 
the order” (emphasis added).  The passage from Mayas upon which the Judge and the 
Commonwealth rely has been understood and applied as drawing a distinction between cases 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
44 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 122 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 60 of 225
 
where the order made by the inferior court was made within jurisdiction, and those where the 
error was infected by jurisdictional error: see, for example, Ho v Loneragan [2013] WASCA 
20 at [32]-[35]; Firth v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2018] NSWCA 78 at [19]-
[20].  As noted earlier, in Kmetyk, Leeming JA cited Pelechowski (and therefore, in effect, 
Mayas) in support of the conclusion that orders made by an inferior court which were vitiated 
by jurisdictional error were nullities.  It follows that the Judge’s and the Commonwealth’s 
reliance on Mayas was misplaced.       
184 
The Circuit Court was an inferior court.  The Judge’s imprisonment order was infected by 
jurisdictional errors.  Subject to the contention advanced by the Judge and the Commonwealth 
that the imprisonment order should be approached differently because it was made on the basis 
of the Circuit Court’s contempt powers, the order lacked legal effect from the outset and 
provided no lawful justification for Mr Stradford’s imprisonment. 
Was the imprisonment order nevertheless valid until it was set aside?    
185 
The Judge and the Commonwealth submitted that the imprisonment order was valid until set 
aside, despite the fact that the Circuit Court was an inferior court.   They did not go so far as to 
say that all orders made by the Circuit Court are valid until set aside.  Apart from their reliance 
on Mayas, they did not appear to directly challenge the general proposition, supported by the 
authorities referred to earlier, that orders made by inferior courts which are infected by 
jurisdictional error lack legal force whether or not they are set aside.  Rather, they submitted 
that the imprisonment order was of a different nature because it was made in exercise of the 
Circuit Court’s contempt powers.  That was said to be so for two reasons.   
186 
First, they submitted that the Circuit Court had the power to punish for contempt by virtue of 
it having been invested with the judicial power of the Commonwealth.  They submitted, relying 
on Re Colina, that the power to punish for contempt was an attribute of the judicial power of 
the Commonwealth which was vested in the Circuit Court as a court under Ch III of the 
Constitution.  That amounted, in effect, to a submission that the Circuit Court had a 
constitutionally implied power to punish for contempt.  That implied power, so it was 
submitted, was not subject to the provisions of Pt XIIIA and Pt XIIIB of the Family Law Act.  
Moreover, it followed that orders made pursuant to that power are by their nature valid until 
set aside. 
187 
Second, they appeared to rely on the fact that s 17 of the FCC Act provided that the Circuit 
Court’s power to punish for contempt was the “same” as that possessed by the High Court.  
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
45 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 123 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 61 of 225
 
Orders made by the High Court punishing for contempt are valid until set aside.  It followed, 
in the Judge’s and the Commonwealth’s submission, that orders made by the Circuit Court 
pursuant to s 17 of the FCC Act possess the same quality.  Orders made pursuant to s 17 of the 
FCC Act were said, in that regard, to have “superior court legal effect”. 
188 
I am not persuaded that there is any merit in either of the arguments advanced by the Judge and 
the Commonwealth in support of the proposition that orders made by the Circuit Court in the 
exercise of its contempt powers are valid until set aside. 
189 
The argument based on Re Colina relied entirely on the following short passage in the judgment 
of Gleeson CJ and Gummow J (at [16]): 
Section 24 of the Judiciary Act and s 35 of the Family Law Act are not expressed to 
confer federal jurisdiction in respect of a particular species of “matter”. They set out 
particular powers of this Court and the Family Court and should read as declaratory of 
an attribute of the judicial power of the Commonwealth which is vested in those Courts 
by s 71 of the Constitution. The acts constituting the alleged contempts by Mr Tomey 
are not offences against any law of the Commonwealth. That which renders such acts 
(if proved) liable to punishment has its source in Ch III of the Constitution. The power 
to deal summarily with contempts is, to use Isaacs J’s phrase “inherent” and is “a power 
of self-protection or a power incidental to the function of superintending the 
administration of justice”.     
(Footnotes omitted) 
190 
The Judge and the Commonwealth highlighted the statement that the powers “set out” in ss 24 
and 35 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and the Family Law Act should be “read as declaratory 
of an attribute of the judicial power of the Commonwealth which is vested in” the High Court 
and Family Court.  As can be seen, however, that statement concerns the attributes of the High 
Court and the Family Court as repositories of the judicial power of the Commonwealth, not the 
attributes of all courts that may be the repositories of federal jurisdiction.  Moreover, the 
statement must be taken as being limited to superior courts that are repositories of federal 
jurisdiction.  That is apparent from that part of the reasoning that refers to the inherent power 
of courts to deal summarily with contempts.  That reasoning can only apply to superior courts 
because inferior courts like the Circuit Court have no inherent powers: Minister for 
Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v AAM17 (2021) 272 
CLR 329; [2021] HCA 6 at [26].  The Chief Justice and Gummow J emphasised that the Family 
Court was a superior court of record (see [15]).    
191 
It should also be noted that, while Hayne J agreed with the reasons of Gleeson CJ and Gummow 
J, McHugh J (with whom Kirby J relevantly agreed) did not (see [45]-[50] and [80]-[81]) and 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
46 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 124 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 62 of 225
 
Callinan J did not squarely deal with the issue addressed in the reasoning upon which the Judge 
and the Commonwealth rely.  
192 
In any event, even if the passage from Re Colina relied on by the Judge and the Commonwealth 
provides some support for the proposition that the Circuit Court’s power to deal with contempts 
as conferred by s 17 of the FCC Act is declaratory of an inherent power it has as a repository 
of federal jurisdiction, it does not follow that orders made by the Circuit Court in the exercise 
of its contempt powers are somehow imbued with the characteristics of orders made by superior 
courts.  Nor does it follow that orders made by the Circuit Court in the exercise of its contempt 
powers are valid until set aside.  The passage from the judgment of Gleeson CJ and Gummow 
J says nothing at all about the nature or characteristics of orders made by Ch III courts in the 
exercise of contempt powers, or the effect or enforceability of such orders.  Still less does that 
passage say anything about the effect or enforceability of orders made by Ch III courts which 
are inferior courts, like the Circuit Court.  The Chief Justice and Gummow J said nothing 
concerning the contempt powers of inferior courts.             
193 
Another answer to the arguments advanced by the Judge and the Commonwealth based on Re 
Colina is that, when he made the imprisonment order, the Judge was not exercising the Circuit 
Court’s powers pursuant to s 17(1) of the FCC Act.  Nor was he exercising any inherent or 
implied power of which s 17 of the FCC Act was perhaps declaratory.  Rather, as discussed 
earlier in these reasons in the context of the errors made by the Judge, while he may not have 
known or appreciated it, his Honour was exercising, or at least purporting to exercise, the 
court’s powers under either Pt XIIIA or Pt XIIIB of the Family Law Act.  Those provisions 
constituted a code for dealing with contempts when the Circuit Court was exercising 
jurisdiction under the Family Law Act.  The operation of those prescriptive and exhaustive 
provisions effectively excluded or limited any other general powers the Circuit Court may have 
had to deal with contempts, in particular contempt of the sort in issue in this case. 
194 
That also provides an answer to the argument advanced by the Judge and the Commonwealth 
to the effect that, because the effect of s 17 of the FCC Act was to confer on the Circuit Court 
the High Court’s powers to deal with contempts, the effect was that orders made in the exercise 
of the power in s 17 had a “superior court legal effect”.  In any event, even if the Judge was 
exercising the Circuit Court’s power under s 17 of the FCC Act, the fact that the Circuit Court 
had the same power as the High Court in respect of contempts does not mean that orders made 
by the Circuit Court in exercise of that power are of the same nature, or have the same effect 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
47 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 125 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 63 of 225
 
or enforceability, as orders made by a superior court.  Section 17 of the FCC Act says nothing 
about whether orders made by the Circuit Court in the exercise of its contempt powers under 
that provision are valid until set aside.     
195 
It follows that I am not persuaded that orders made by the Circuit Court pursuant to its power 
to punish for contempt, particularly when those orders are made in the context of the exercise 
of jurisdiction under the Family Law Act, have “superior court legal effect” or are otherwise 
valid until set aside.  The better view is that, like other orders made by an inferior court, orders 
made by a judge of the Circuit Court in purported exercise of the power to punish for contempt 
are of no legal effect if they are infected by jurisdictional error.  It is not the case that such 
orders are, or remain, valid until set aside.  It follows that the order made by the Judge to 
imprison Mr Stradford, infected as it was by jurisdictional error, was of no legal effect.  It 
provided no lawful justification for Mr Stradford’s imprisonment. 
Conclusion concerning the elements of the tort of false imprisonment 
196 
Mr Stradford was imprisoned for seven days as the direct result of the imprisonment order 
made, and the warrant issued, by the Judge. 
197 
For the reasons that have been given, there was no lawful justification for Mr Stradford’s 
imprisonment.  The imprisonment order and warrant were invalid and of no legal effect.  The 
contention advanced by the Judge and the Commonwealth that the order and warrant remained 
valid until set aside is unmeritorious and rejected.  It follows that the elements of the tort of 
false imprisonment have been made out.   
198 
The only remaining issue concerning the Judge’s liability for the tort of false imprisonment is 
whether the Judge was immune from civil suit in respect of Mr Stradford’s imprisonment by 
virtue of his status as a Circuit Court judge.         
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY 
199 
The Judge contended that Mr Stradford’s case against him must fail because he is entitled to 
the protection of judicial immunity.  He was, he submitted, entitled to the protection of judicial 
immunity for two reasons.   
200 
The first reason was that, even if he was only entitled to the judicial immunity available to 
inferior court judges, the errors made by him were errors within jurisdiction and the judicial 
immunity available to inferior court judges is not lost as a result of such errors.   
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
48 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 126 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 64 of 225
 
201 
The second reason was that, in his submission, he was in any event entitled to the judicial 
immunity available to superior court judges.  That immunity is only lost in circumstances where 
the judge acted in bad faith or knowingly without jurisdiction.  No such allegation is made 
against him.  The Judge submitted that the Court should find that there is either no distinction 
between the judicial immunity available to inferior and superior court judges, or if there is, that 
he was in any event effectively acting as a superior court judge, or was effectively exercising 
the powers of a superior court judge, when imprisoning Mr Stradford for contempt. 
202 
Mr Stradford contended that the Circuit Court was an inferior court and the Judge was an 
inferior court judge.  There is, Mr Stradford submitted, a long line of cases that establish that 
an inferior court judge loses the protection of judicial immunity if the judge acts outside or in 
excess of jurisdiction.  In Mr Stradford’s submission, the Judge was acting outside or in excess 
of jurisdiction, insofar as that notion or concept is understood or applied in the relevant 
authorities.  He submitted that this Court should not depart from that long line of cases, or hold 
that there is no longer any distinction between the immunity available to inferior and superior 
court judges. 
203 
The first step in resolving the controversy between the parties in respect of judicial immunity 
is to consider and determine precisely what the authorities establish in relation to the scope of 
the immunity available to inferior court judges at common law.  Before delving into that 
difficult area, two brief points should be emphasised. 
204 
First, as has already been noted, the Circuit Court was undoubtedly an inferior court: AAM17 
at [26].  
205 
Second, many inferior court judicial officers are now protected by various forms of statutory 
immunity.  For whatever reasons, judges of the Circuit Court were not protected by any 
statutory immunity. 
The scope of judicial immunity of inferior court judges 
206 
It is well established that a superior court judge is not liable for anything he or she does while 
acting judicially, which is generally taken to mean when acting bona fide in the exercise of his 
or her office and under the belief that he or she has jurisdiction, though he or she may be 
mistaken in that belief: Sirros v Moore [1975] 1 QB 118 at 135D (Lord Denning MR); [1974] 
3 All ER 776. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
49 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 127 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 65 of 225
 
207 
There is, however, also authority to the effect that “judges of courts other than superior courts 
are not immune if they act outside jurisdiction whether or not they did so knowingly (unless 
the excess of jurisdiction was caused by an error of fact in circumstances where the court had 
no knowledge of or means of knowing the relevant facts …)”: Wentworth v Wentworth [2000] 
NSWCA 350 at [195] (Heydon JA, with whom Fitzgerald JA and Davies AJA relevantly 
agreed), citing Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed) vol 1(1) at [216]; Abimbola Olowofoyeku, 
Suing Judges: A Study of Judicial Immunity (Oxford University Press, 1993) pp 64-65; and 
Enid Campbell, ‘Inferior and Superior Courts and Courts of Record’ (1997) 6 Journal of 
Judicial Administration 249 at 260.  It should be noted that those parts of Heydon JA’s 
judgment in Wentworth v Wentworth which deal with this issue are not reproduced in the 
reported version of the judgment: (2001) 52 NSWLR 602. 
208 
Putting aside, for the moment, the issue of whether the distinction between the immunity 
available to superior and inferior court judges still exists, or should be changed or departed 
from, the thorny question is precisely what acting “outside” or “in excess of” jurisdiction  
means in this context.  In Wentworth v Wentworth, Heydon JA suggested that the answer to 
that question was “obscure” (at [195]).  Given the somewhat protean or chameleon-like 
character of the word “jurisdiction”, the safest guide would appear to be the cases in which 
inferior court judicial officers have been held liable in damages for consequences flowing from 
a purported exercise of jurisdiction held to be beyond the relevant limit: cf In re McC (A Minor) 
[1985] 1 AC 528 at 544F (Lord Bridge); [1984] 3 All ER 908.  
209 
Before embarking on a consideration of some of the key cases, three brief points should be 
noted.   
210 
First, Mr Stradford did not, as the Judge appeared to suggest, contend that an inferior court 
judge loses immunity from suit if the judge commits any form of jurisdictional error as that 
concept is understood in contemporary administrative law jurisprudence in Australia.  The 
relevant authorities suggest that there are at least some types or categories of jurisdictional error 
that may not, or would not necessarily, result in an inferior court judge losing the immunity.     
211 
Second, Mr Stradford submitted that it was ultimately unnecessary for the Court to endeavour 
to determine the precise meaning, or precise metes and bounds, of the concept of “outside” or 
“in excess of” jurisdiction in this context.  It is only necessary for the Court to determine 
whether the errors found to have been made by the Judge fell within the apparent metes and 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
50 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 128 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 66 of 225
 
bounds of that concept as established in the cases.  There is in my view considerable merit in 
that submission. 
212 
Third, and flowing from the second point, I do not propose to attempt to address all of the many 
decided cases in this area.  The cases stretch back over 400 years.  Rather, I propose to primarily 
address those cases that directly bear on the issue having regard to the particular facts and 
circumstances of this case, particularly those where an inferior court officer has been held liable 
in circumstances comparable or analogous to those in this case. 
Authorities dealing with the civil liability of inferior court judges 
213 
An early case dealing with the liability of inferior court judges, frequently cited in later 
judgments, was The Case of the Marshalsea (1612) 10 Co Rep 68b; 77 ER 1027.  The Court 
of Marshalsea purported to issue a warrant for the arrest of the plaintiff.  That court, however, 
only had jurisdiction over members of the King’s Household.  The plaintiff was not a member 
of the King’s Household.  The plaintiff brought an action of trespass of assault, battery, 
wounding and false imprisonment against the marshal of the court and the officers who 
executed the warrant.  That action was held to lie against the defendants because the court had 
no “jurisdiction of the cause” (at 77 ER 1038). 
214 
There was no clear indication in Marshalsea that the liability of the defendants depended on 
their knowledge, or ability to ascertain, that the court lacked jurisdiction.  As will be seen from 
the analysis of Marshalsea in later cases, however, it would appear that the defendants may at 
least have had the capacity to ascertain that the plaintiff was not a member of the King’s 
Household.  In any event, some 80 years later, the Court of Common Pleas in Gwinne v Poole 
(1692) 2 Lutw 935; 125 ER 522 distinguished Marshalsea and held, in comparable 
circumstances, that the inferior court officers in question were not liable because they did not 
know, and could not have known, “except by the Confession of the Plaintiff or Defendant”, the 
facts that revealed that the court lacked jurisdiction: see The Reports and Entries of Sir Edward 
Lutwyche (1718, Nutt and Gosling) at 293-294.    
215 
In Groome v Forrester (1816) 5 M & S 314; 105 ER 1066, the plaintiff, the late overseer of 
the parish of Broseley, was convicted of not delivering over to the succeeding overseers of the 
parish a certain book (the no doubt aptly named “Bastardy Ledger”).  Founded on that 
conviction, the defendants, two magistrates, committed the plaintiff to gaol “until he shall have 
yielded up all and every the books concerning his said office of overseer, belonging to the said 
parish” (at 105 ER 1067).  The commitment was held to be invalid.  The magistrates were only 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
51 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 129 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 67 of 225
 
authorised to commit the plaintiff to gaol until he returned the Bastardy Ledger.  The question 
for the court was whether the defendants were liable to an action of trespass and false 
imprisonment for having so committed the plaintiff.  The court found that they were.   
216 
Having reviewed a number of authorities, Lord Ellenborough CJ held (at 105 ER 1068):  
Upon these authorities, and the reason of the thing, we are obliged to pronounce that 
the commitment made in pursuance of the said adjudication in this case, as well as the 
adjudication itself, in respect to the imprisonment, being, in this particular, a clear 
excess of jurisdiction, was not warranted by law, and that the imprisonment 
thereunder was a trespass in the committing magistrates, for which this action is 
maintainable; which we cannot but regret, as the facts of the case would have 
authorised a commitment, if the warrant had been framed in a manner 
conformable to the powers of the magistrates under the statute. 
(Emphasis added) 
217 
The important point to note is that there was no doubt that the magistrates had jurisdiction to 
issue a commitment in respect of the Bastardy Ledger.  The conviction upon which the 
commitment was founded was held to be valid.  The problem for the magistrates was that the 
commitment that they issued in respect of “all and every the books concerning his said office 
of overseer” was too broad.  It was only in that respect that they exceeded or acted outside their 
jurisdiction. 
218 
Another relatively early case concerning the liability of a magistrate arising from the issue of 
an invalid warrant was the decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench in Caudle v Seymour (1841) 
1 QB 889; 113 ER 1372.  In that case, a magistrate issued a warrant to apprehend the plaintiff, 
a surgeon, and bring him before the magistrate to answer a complaint that had been made 
against him by a child who had alleged that she had been injured by the surgeon as a result of 
a bad surgical treatment.  The problem for the magistrate was that he only had jurisdiction to 
issue that warrant if the complaint, or information, had been made on oath before him 
personally.  That did not occur.  The warrant was issued on the strength of a deposition taken 
by the magistrate’s clerk.  The warrant also did not state any information on oath, or state a 
charge.  The magistrate’s defence to the action for false imprisonment failed.  Lord Denman 
CJ held as follows (at 1 QB 892-893): 
The warrant is clearly insufficient. It does not state any information on oath, or that the 
fact was really committed. But then it is said (and the argument raises a question 
of great importance) that although the warrant was irregular, the justice was still 
protected against an action of trespass, having, as a magistrate, jurisdiction over 
the offence. But his protection depends (as my brother Coleridge has observed), 
not on jurisdiction over the subject matter, but jurisdiction over the individual 
arrested. To give him that jurisdiction there should have been an information properly 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
52 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 130 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 68 of 225
 
laid. Here the defendant went with his clerk to the complainant’s residence, but never 
saw her; the clerk took the deposition, but not in his presence. The matter of fact, 
therefore, on which alone his defence could have been rested, fails; and he has acted 
without jurisdiction. 
(Emphasis added) 
219 
Thus it would seem that, while the magistrate had jurisdiction to issue warrants to apprehend 
persons to answer complaints or informations on oath – that is, “jurisdiction over the subject 
matter” – he acted without jurisdiction in the plaintiff’s case because he did not personally take 
or receive the complaint on oath from the complainant.  His defence, which appeared to be akin 
to a claim of judicial immunity, accordingly failed.      
220 
The following two cases are of particular importance because they were subsequently referred 
to and followed in at least one intermediate appellate court in Australia. 
221 
In Calder v Halket (1840) 3 Moo PC 28; 13 ER 12, the respondent, a judge and magistrate of 
the Foujdarry Court of the Zillah of Nuddeah, in Bengal, India, issued a form of order which 
resulted in the arrest and subsequent detention of the appellant.  Unfortunately for the 
respondent, the appellant was a British-born subject and not amenable to the jurisdiction of the 
court.  The appellant brought an action for trespass.  The case ultimately found its way to the 
Privy Council where it was held, in effect, that the plaintiff’s action failed on the basis that 
there was no evidence before the court suggesting that the judge knew, or ought to have known, 
of the defect of jurisdiction.  Baron Parke delivering the advice of the Privy Council stated (at 
13 ER 36): 
But the answer to the objection to the Defendant’s jurisdiction, founded on the 
European character of the Plaintiff, is, that it does not appear distinctly in the evidence, 
upon which alone we are to act, whatever our suspicions may be, that the Defendant 
knew, or had such information, as that he ought to have known of that fact; and it is 
well settled that a Judge of a Court of Record in England, with limited 
jurisdiction, or a Justice of the Peace, acting judicially, with a special and limited 
authority, is not liable to an action of trespass for acting without jurisdiction, 
unless he had the knowledge or means of knowledge of which he ought to have 
availed himself, of that which constitutes the defect of jurisdiction. Thus in the 
elaborate judgment of Mr. Baron Powell, in Gwynn v. Poole (Lutw. App. 1566), it is 
laid down, that a Judge of a Court of Record in a Borough was not responsible, as a 
trespasser, unless he was cognizant that the cause of action arose out of the jurisdiction, 
or, at least, that he might have been cognizant, but for his own fault; which last 
proposition Mr. Baron Powell illustrates by a reference to the case of the Marshalsea 
Court [10 Co. Rep. 69], which had jurisdiction only in certain cases where the King’s 
servants were parties, who being all enrolled, the Judge ought to have had a copy of 
the enrolment, and so would have known the character of the parties. 
(Emphasis added) 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
53 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 131 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 69 of 225
 
222 
Thus, the Privy Council affirmed the principle that where the defect in the inferior court’s 
jurisdiction arose because of the absence of a jurisdictional fact (in Calder v Halket, the fact 
that the plaintiff was not a native Indian), the magistrate or judge responsible for making the 
offending order will only be personally liable if they knew, or ought to have known, or had the 
means of knowing, that fact.  
223 
In  Houlden v Smith (1850) 14 QB 841; 117 ER 323, a judge of the County Court of 
Lincolnshire at Spilsby issued a summons which was served on the plaintiff at Cambridge, 
where he resided, which was outside the district of the Spilsby Court.  The summons was 
beyond jurisdiction as the relevant enactment only authorised a county court to issue a 
summons within its district.  The plaintiff did not appear in answer to the summons and the 
judge ordered that, for his contempt in disobeying the summons, the plaintiff be committed to 
Cambridge gaol.  A warrant issued accordingly and the plaintiff was arrested and imprisoned.  
The judge apparently knew that the plaintiff was a resident of Cambridge, however he mistook 
the law and believed that he had the power and authority to commit the plaintiff to 
imprisonment.  The judge was found to be liable to the plaintiff for false imprisonment, subject 
to the opinion of the Court of Queen’s Bench.  That court affirmed the judgment in favour of 
the plaintiff, its reasons including as follows (at 117 ER 327):  
That this commitment was without jurisdiction is plain; that the defendant ordered it 
under a mistake of the law and not of the facts is equally plain; for it is impossible that 
he could be ignorant that the plaintiff dwelt and carried on his business in 
Cambridgeshire, the service of all the processes having been proved to have been made 
there, and the defendant having originally specially allowed the plaint to be made in 
his Court, within the jurisdiction of which the cause of action accrued, the defendant 
(the now plaintiff) residing in Cambridgeshire. This case is not therefore within the 
principle of Lowther v. The Earl of Radnor (8 East, 113, 119), or Gwinne v. Poole (2 
Lutw. Appendix, 1560, 1566), where the facts of the case, although subsequently found 
to be false, were such as, if true, would give jurisdiction, and it was held that the 
question as to jurisdiction or not must depend on the state of facts as they appeared to 
the magistrate or Judge assuming to have jurisdiction. Here the facts of the case, 
which were before the defendant and could not be unknown to him, shewed that 
he had not jurisdiction; and his mistaking the law as applied to those facts cannot 
give him even a prima facie jurisdiction, or semblance of any. The only questions, 
therefore, are, whether the defendant is protected from liability at common law, 
being and acting as the Judge of a Court of Record, in which case the plea of not 
guilty would be sufficient; or whether he is protected by the provisions of any statute, 
and, if so, whether he can take advantage of such statute, having omitted the words “by 
statute” in his plea and the margin of it. 
As to the first question, although it is clear that the Judge of a Court of Record is not 
answerable at common law in an action for an erroneous judgment, or for the act of 
any officer of the Court wrongfully done, not in pursuance of, though under colour of, 
a judgment of the Court, yet we have found no authority for saying that he is not 
answerable in an action for an act done by his command and authority when he 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
54 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 132 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 70 of 225
 
has no jurisdiction. Here the defendant had not only no jurisdiction to commit 
the plaintiff to the gaol of Cambridgeshire, but he had no jurisdiction to summon 
him to shew why he had not paid the debt.   
(Emphasis added) 
224 
The significance of Houlden v Smith is that it is authority for the proposition that an inferior 
court judge is not immune from an action for false imprisonment where the plaintiff’s 
imprisonment was a result of an order made by the judge in a proceeding in which the judge 
had no jurisdiction, but assumed he or she had jurisdiction as a result of a mistake of law.   
225 
The judgments in Calder v Halket and Houlden v Smith were referred to with approval by 
Griffith CJ in the Supreme Court of Queensland in Raven v Burnett (1895) 6 QLJ 166.  It is 
unnecessary to recount the facts in Raven v Burnett.  It suffices to note that the case concerned 
the personal liability of justices of a court of petty sessions in Queensland to pay damages 
arising from the setting aside of a judgment in a case they had no jurisdiction to entertain.  In 
the course of considering whether the justices were immune from the suit, Griffith CJ said 
(at 168): 
In order to establish the jurisdiction of an inferior court it must be shown that the court 
had cognisance of the subject matter of the action, both as to amount and kind, had 
authority to call the defendant before it, and had authority to make an adjudication of 
the kind it purported to make. If either of these three elements is wanting, the judgment 
is ineffective and cannot be pleaded, even against the party who obtains it (Briscoe v. 
Stephens, 2 Bing., 213). A plaintiff executing the process of an inferior court in a matter 
beyond its jurisdiction is liable to an action, whether he knew of the defect or not. And 
judges and officers of the court are liable if they know of the defect (per Willis, J., in 
Mayor of London v. Cox, L.R., 2 H.L, at p. 263). In the case of a judge, the rule is 
that he is not liable to an action for acting without jurisdiction unless he had 
knowledge, or means of knowledge of which he ought to have availed himself, of 
that which constitutes the defect of jurisdiction (Calder v. Halkett, 3 Moore, P.C. 
28, 58). His liability depends, therefore, upon the facts as they appear to him when the 
matter comes before him for adjudication, and not as they may afterwards be shown to 
have existed. But an erroneous, though honest, conclusion on a matter of law, on 
which his jurisdiction over the subject matter, or his authority to make the order 
which he makes, depends, will not protect him (Houlden v. Smith, 14 Q.B., 841; 
Agnew v. Jobson, 47 L.J., M.C., 67). 
(Emphasis added) 
226 
It is noteworthy that Griffith CJ considered that an inferior court judge may be liable for acting 
without jurisdiction not only where the judge had no jurisdiction in respect of the “subject 
matter of the action”, or authority to “call the defendant before it”, but also where the court did 
not have the “authority to make an adjudication of the kind it purported to make”.  Chief Justice 
Griffith’s judgment was upheld by the Full Court. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
55 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 133 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 71 of 225
 
227 
Both Calder v Halket and Houlden v Smith were also referred to with approval by the Full 
Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Wood v Fetherston (1901) 27 VLR 492.   The 
plaintiff in that case sued two justices of the peace in the Court of Petty Sessions at Prahran for 
trespass.  The justices had issued a warrant pursuant to which the plaintiff was ejected from his 
residence.  His furniture was also damaged in the process of the execution of the warrant.  The 
problem for the justices was that the giving of a valid notice of intention to recover possession 
by the landlord was a condition precedent to their issue of the warrant.  The notice of intention 
given to the plaintiff was defective because it was served before the plaintiff’s tenancy was 
terminated.  The trial judge found that the justices acted bona fide and without malice.  The 
question reserved for the Full Court was whether the plaintiff was entitled to maintain her 
action in trespass.  The Full Court held that the justices had acted without jurisdiction and the 
plaintiff could proceed with her action.  The reasoning of Williams J (with whom Hood and 
Holroyd JJ agreed) included the following (at 501-502): 
The authorities to which we have been referred seem to show this principle – that if 
justices have acted without jurisdiction, and they know the facts which, it is said, oust 
their jurisdiction, or ought to know them – have the means of knowing them – then an 
action of trespass may be successfully maintained against them. Calder v. Halket is a 
high authority for the proposition that where justices have acted without 
jurisdiction, and know the facts or have the means of knowing them, then an 
action of trespass will lie against them. The cases also of Houlden v. Smith and 
Willis v. McLachlan show that where the facts are before the justices undisputed, 
and where from these facts which are known and undisputed they come to an 
erroneous conclusion of law which gives them jurisdiction, that this is no 
protection and does not excuse them, and for that erroneous assumption of 
jurisdiction, formed on a mistaken view of the law, they are liable to an action of 
trespass. It appears to us that this is the case here. The justices here, on their own 
record, recite the facts proved before them: Notice to quit dated 2nd June, and notice of 
intention to apply and take proceedings under the Act dated 9th June; so that they show 
not only the facts, but knowledge of the facts. The obvious inference is that the justices 
came, upon these facts, to an erroneous conclusion in law – that is to say, they 
apparently did not know the law that the notice to quit did not expire until midnight on 
9th June 1900; and while in that state of ignorance of the law they gave themselves 
jurisdiction to exercise this summary procedure under the Landlord and Tenant 
Statute, which they would not have had upon a right conclusion of law upon these 
facts. 
That being the state of things, it appears to us this action will lie. We therefore answer 
the question thus: That the plaintiff is entitled to maintain this action of trespass. 
It is a case of great importance, especially to justices of the peace, and shows the 
necessity of looking more carefully into questions such as have arisen in this case than 
the justices concerned have done. Presuming that they knew the law, if they had looked 
into the dates of these notices which they recite in their warrant they would have seen 
that the notice of intention to apply and proceed was premature, and could not have 
been given under the Act until the tenancy had expired. If they did not know the law 
that fact only shows the necessity for some care on their part in ascertaining the law.    
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
56 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 134 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 72 of 225
 
(Emphasis added; footnotes omitted) 
228 
In summary, Williams J accepted Calder v Halket as “high authority” and followed and applied 
Houlden v Smith, concluding that the justices were liable for trespass because they made a 
mistake of law and wrongly concluded that they had jurisdiction to issue the warrant in 
question.  It should perhaps be noted that there was no question that the justices had jurisdiction 
to entertain the application for the warrant.  The problem was that they erroneously concluded 
that a condition precedent to the issue of a warrant had been met. 
229 
The judgment in Houlden v Smith was also cited with apparent approval by Davidson J in the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales in Ward v Murphy (1937) 38 SR (NSW) 85 as authority 
for the proposition that an inferior court judge cannot rely on judicial immunity in defence to 
an action for false imprisonment where the judge, acting on a mistaken view of the law, makes 
an order which the judge had no jurisdiction to make and which resulted in the imprisonment 
of the plaintiff.  His Honour said that “[i]n the case of the [inferior court] judge, ignorance of 
the law is no excuse, if he was not misled and knew the facts which, in law, would show that 
there was no jurisdiction” (at [94]).      
230 
The next case worthy of consideration is the judgment of the Scottish Court of Session in 
M’Creadie v Thomson 1907 SC 1176.  This case is of particular importance because it follows 
and applies Groome v Forrester and affirms that an inferior court judge is not immune from 
suit, and may be personally liable, not only where the judge purports to exercise jurisdiction in 
a matter which he or she had no jurisdiction to entertain, but also where the judge makes an 
order or imposes a sentence that he or she is not authorised or empowered to make or impose 
in the circumstances having regard to the terms of the enactment.   
231 
The facts in M’Creadie v Thomson were that the plaintiff was brought before a magistrate in a 
police court on charge that she used indecent language to the annoyance of a police constable.  
The relevant enactment provided that the penalty for that offence was a fine and that, if that 
fine was not paid, the offender could be imprisoned for up to one month until the fine was paid.  
The plaintiff pleaded guilty and the magistrate sentenced her to imprisonment for 14 days 
without first imposing any fine.  The plaintiff brought an action for damages against the 
magistrate.  The court rejected the magistrate’s plea that the action was incompetent.   
232 
Delivering the judgment of the court, the Lord Justice-Clerk accepted that an immunity 
attached to inferior court judges and magistrates “when sitting in judgment”, but held that the 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
57 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 135 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 73 of 225
 
immunity was limited, or may be lost in certain circumstances.  His Lordship reasoned as 
follows (at 1183-1184): 
But while this is so, it is a totally different question whether a Magistrate who when 
sitting as such does official acts which he has no power to do under a statute in 
accordance with which he is bound to act, and which judicial acts have the effect of 
restraining the liberty of the subject, and subjecting him to penalty in his person, is 
immune from civil consequences for the wrong he has done. I do not think that this has 
ever been held, and the opposite has been held in many cases. Where a Magistrate, 
professing to sit as such, and dealing with a case which he has no jurisdiction to deal 
with at all, commits what is an undoubted wrong upon a citizen, both by principle and 
practice he is held liable for the wrong done. If that is so, can it be said that a 
Magistrate who has before him a case which he can competently try under an Act 
of Parliament on which the complaint is founded, and who, instead of dealing with 
the case as it is before him, and on conviction awarding such punishment as the 
Act prescribes and allows, proceeds knowingly to pronounce a sentence which is 
not competent under the Act of Parliament, and thereby sends a person to prison 
contrary to the Act of Parliament, — I say, can it be said that he is in any more 
favourable position than a Magistrate trying a case in circumstances where he 
has no jurisdiction? In the one case his sentence is illegal, because he has no 
complaint before him on which he can pronounce a sentence at all. In the other 
he has a complaint before him, on which he cannot pronounce the sentence which 
he does pronounce. The wrong is as great in the latter case as in the former. For 
as well might he have no jurisdiction at all as step outside the jurisdiction which he 
does possess, to do something which he could not do if he held himself within the 
limits prescribed to him by the law under which he was called to exercise his 
jurisdiction. The case of Groome v. Forrester, decided in England, is a forcible 
illustration of the fact that there may be liability in a Magistrate, not merely for 
acting without jurisdiction, but for doing an act in excess of the jurisdiction he 
was called upon to exercise. In that case, as here, the Magistrate could have 
pronounced an effective judgment, under which incarceration might have taken place. 
The mistake was made that while the thing complained of was that an overseer had 
refused to obey an order of Court by delivering up a certain book, he was committed 
till he should have delivered up “all and every, the books,” &c. In that case, the 
Magistrates were held liable in damages for “a clear excess of jurisdiction”. 
(Emphasis added)  
233 
It should be noted that in this passage, the Lord Justice-Clerk held, among other things, that an 
inferior court judge or magistrate may be liable where he or she “proceeds knowingly to 
pronounce a sentence which is not competent” under the relevant enactment.  In In re McC, a 
decision that will be addressed in more detail later in these reasons, the House of Lords 
approved the judgment and reasoning of the court in M’Creadie v Thomson, save for the word 
“knowingly” in that sentence.  Their Lordships could “not see how ignorance of the terms of 
the statute regulating their powers of sentence in any particular case could afford justices any 
defence” (at 1 AC 548-549 per Lord Bridge). 
234 
As noted earlier, the importance of the judgment in M’Creadie v Thomson is that it is clear 
authority for the proposition that an inferior court judge or magistrate may be liable “not merely 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
58 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 136 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 74 of 225
 
for acting without jurisdiction, but for doing an act in excess of the jurisdiction he was called 
upon to exercise”.   
235 
Further support for that proposition may be found in the judgment in O’Connor v Isaacs [1956] 
2 QB 288; 2 All ER 417. 
236 
In O’Connor v Isaacs, the plaintiff’s wife took out a summons under a particular enactment 
alleging that the plaintiff had been guilty of persistent cruelty and seeking, on that basis, a 
separation and maintenance order.  At the hearing of the summons, the magistrates made an 
order that the plaintiff pay his wife maintenance, even though the allegation of persistent 
cruelty had not been proved.  The plaintiff fell into arrears in paying the maintenance and as a 
result was imprisoned.  The plaintiff commenced proceedings against the magistrates who 
made the maintenance order seeking damages for false imprisonment.  While that action 
ultimately failed because of a limitation issue, it is readily apparent that, but for that issue, the 
action would have succeeded.   
237 
It was conceded before the trial judge, Diplock J, that the magistrates had no jurisdiction to 
make the maintenance order because a finding that the plaintiff was guilty of a matrimonial 
offence (relevantly, that he was guilty of persistent cruelty) was a condition precedent to their 
making of that order.  It appeared to be accepted that the magistrates had made a bona fide 
mistake of law in that regard.  In addressing the question whether the magistrates could be held 
personally liable in respect of the plaintiff’s imprisonment, that imprisonment having flowed 
from the making of the maintenance order, Diplock J referred, with apparent approval, to 
Houlden v Smith, and continued (at 2 QB 304): 
The law, therefore, appears to me to be clear that where a magistrate or any judge of 
an inferior court assumes jurisdiction where he has no jurisdiction as a result of a 
mistake of law, he is liable in trespass for acts done as a result of that erroneous 
assumption of jurisdiction, and if his mistake of law appears upon the face of the record 
itself, the setting aside of the order is not a condition precedent to the action at common 
law. In the present case it appears upon the face of the record that the magistrates made 
the order without jurisdiction. 
238 
It should be emphasised that it is clear that the magistrates had jurisdiction to entertain the 
summons.  If they had made a finding concerning the alleged matrimonial offence, they would 
also plainly have had jurisdiction to make the maintenance order in question.  Their error of 
law, it appears, was to proceed on the basis that they could make the order without first making 
a finding concerning the alleged matrimonial offence.   
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
59 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 137 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 75 of 225
 
239 
An appeal from Diplock J’s judgment was dismissed, though not surprisingly the appeal 
focussed on the limitation issue. 
240 
The decisions in Calder v Halket, Houlden v Smith and O’Connor v Isaacs were referred to, 
albeit fairly fleetingly, in the judgment of Crisp J in the Supreme Court of Tasmania in Gerard 
v Hope [1965] Tas SR 15.  The plaintiff in that case was convicted in a court of petty sessions 
of failing to lodge a tax return.  That conviction was entered in the plaintiff’s absence as he had 
not been personally served.  The magistrate imposed a fine in respect of the conviction.  
Importantly, the magistrate did not order that the plaintiff be imprisoned if he failed to pay the 
fine, or make any order of committal.  It would appear, however, that a clerk informally and 
incorrectly endorsed the court file with a note suggesting that the plaintiff be imprisoned for 
14 days if he defaulted in paying the fine.  At about this point in time, the plaintiff became 
aware of the proceedings.  He contacted the Taxation Department and made appropriate 
arrangements in respect of his tax affairs.  The Taxation Department wrote to the court and 
requested a stay of the proceedings against the plaintiff, however that letter was mislaid by the 
court.  When the fine remained unpaid after the time for payment expired, the clerk who had 
entered the incorrect endorsement on the court file, purporting to act as a justice of the peace, 
issued a warrant of commitment in respect of the unpaid fine.  The plaintiff was subsequently 
arrested and gaoled pursuant to the warrant.  He subsequently sued the justice of the peace, the 
constable who arrested him and the controller of prisons for false imprisonment.  They were 
all held liable. 
241 
The decision of Crisp J in respect of the liability of the constable and the gaoler will be 
discussed in more detail later.  As for the justice of the peace, he endeavoured to defend the 
action by arguing that there were various statutory sources of jurisdiction which supported his 
issuing of the warrant.  Those arguments all failed.  While some of Crisp J’s reasoning is, with 
respect, somewhat difficult to follow, it would appear that all of the defences advanced by the 
justice, both at common law and under statute, ultimately failed because his Honour found that 
the issuing of the warrant was “wholly beyond the jurisdiction of the justice” (at 53).  Indeed, 
this was a case in which it would appear that the justice did not have “jurisdiction in respect of 
the subject matter” (at 62).              
242 
The next judgment which is necessary to consider is the judgment of the House of Lords in In 
re McC.  This is a case of particular importance. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
60 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 138 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 76 of 225
 
243 
The facts in In re McC were fairly straightforward.  The respondent, a juvenile, was charged 
with various offences.  He appeared unrepresented before the appellants, the resident 
magistrate and two lay justices, in the Belfast Juvenile Court.  He pleaded guilty and the 
appellants made an order which amounted to a sentence of detention.  An enactment in 
Northern Ireland provided that, relevantly, a magistrates’ court could not pass a sentence of 
detention on an offender who was unrepresented and had not previously been sentenced to that 
punishment unless the offender either applied for legal aid, or having been informed of his right 
to apply for legal aid, refused or failed to apply.  The Divisional Court in Northern Ireland 
(Queen’s Bench Division) subsequently quashed the detention order on the basis that it was 
not lawfully made because the respondent had not been informed of his right to apply for legal 
aid.  The respondent commenced an action for damages for false imprisonment against the 
appellants.   
244 
The question of law that was ultimately considered by the House of Lords was whether the 
action for false imprisonment could proceed against the appellants.  That question in turn 
depended on whether the action was precluded by s 15 of the Magistrates’ Courts (Northern 
Ireland) Act 1964 (NI) (Magistrates’ Court Act), which provided: 
No action shall succeed against any person by reason of any matter arising in the 
execution or purported execution of his office of resident magistrate or justice of the 
peace, unless the court before which the action is brought is satisfied that he acted 
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. 
(Emphasis added) 
245 
Without getting into the complexities of the matter, it was broadly accepted that s 15 of the 
Magistrates’ Court Act gave statutory force to, and operated in much the same way as, the “old 
common law rule that justices were civilly liable for actionable wrongs suffered by citizens 
pursuant to orders made without jurisdiction” (see 1 AC 541F per Lord Bridge).  The critical 
question was whether the detention order made by the appellants was made “without 
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”.     
246 
The House of Lords held that the action could proceed because the appellants had acted without 
or in excess of jurisdiction. 
247 
The lead judgment was delivered by Lord Bridge.  The other members of the House of Lords 
relevantly agreed with Lord Bridge’s reasons, though Lord Templeman provided some 
additional reasons.  In considering the meaning of the words “without jurisdiction or in excess 
of jurisdiction” in s 15 of the Magistrates’ Court Act, Lord Bridge noted the “many different 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
61 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 139 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 77 of 225
 
shades of meaning” that the word “jurisdiction” has depending on the context in which it was 
used (at 1 AC 536B-C).  His Lordship eschewed reliance on the “innumerable certiorari cases” 
in construing the expression “without or in excess of jurisdiction” and said that a “safer guide” 
was the “few cases since 1848 where persons exercising a limited jurisdiction have been held 
liable in damages for consequences flowing from a purported exercise of the jurisdiction held 
to be beyond the relevant limit” (at 1 AC 544F).   
248 
Lord Bridge then considered a number of cases, including Houlden v Smith, in which damages 
had been awarded against inferior court judges or magistrates in circumstances where the judge 
or magistrate had no “jurisdiction of the cause” (at 1 AC 546A).  His Lordship then said (at 1 
AC 546E-547B): 
But once justices have duly entered upon the summary trial of a matter within their 
jurisdiction, only something quite exceptional occurring in the course of their 
proceeding to a determination can oust their jurisdiction so as to deprive them of 
protection from civil liability for a subsequent trespass. As Johnston v. Meldon, 30 
L.R.Ir. 15 shows, an error (whether of law or fact) in deciding a collateral issue on 
which jurisdiction depends will not do so. Nor will the absence of any evidence to 
support a conviction: Rex (Martin) v. Mahony [1910] 2 I.R. 695; Rex v. Nat Bell 
Liquors Ltd. [1922] 2 A.C. 128. It is clear, in my opinion, that no error of law 
committed in reaching a finding of guilt would suffice, even if it arose from a 
misconstruction of the particular legislative provision to be applied, so that it could be 
said that the justices had asked themselves the wrong question. I take this view 
because, as I have intimated earlier, I do not believe that the novel test of excess of 
jurisdiction which emerges from the Anisminic case [1969] 2 A.C. 147, however 
valuable it may be in ensuring that the supervisory jurisdiction of the superior courts 
over inferior tribunals is effective to secure compliance with the law and is not lightly 
to be ousted by statute, has any application whatever to the construction of section 15 
of the Northern Ireland Act of 1964 or section 45 of the Act of 1979. 
Justices would, of course, be acting “without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction” 
within the meaning of section 15 if, in the course of hearing a case within their 
jurisdiction they were guilty of some gross and obvious irregularity of procedure, as 
for example if one justice absented himself for part of the hearing and relied on another 
to tell him what had happened during his absence, or of the rules of natural justice, as 
for example if the justices refused to allow the defendant to give evidence. But I would 
leave for determination if and when they arise other more subtle cases one might 
imagine in which it could successfully be contended in judicial review proceedings 
that a conviction was vitiated on some narrow technical ground involving a procedural 
irregularity or even a breach of the rules of natural justice. Such convictions, if 
followed by a potential trespass to person or goods would not, in my opinion, 
necessarily expose the justices to liability in damages. 
249 
The following propositions flow from this passage.  First, justices can lose their protection 
from civil liability for trespass even in cases where they have jurisdiction of the cause, or 
subject-matter jurisdiction.  Second, in such cases, something “quite exceptional” must occur 
to deprive the justice of their protection.  Third, justices would be acting “without jurisdiction 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
62 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 140 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 78 of 225
 
or in excess of jurisdiction” if in the course of the proceeding they were “guilty of some gross 
and obvious irregularity of procedure”. 
250 
Lord Bridge noted (at 1 AC 547C-D) that there was no question that the appellants had 
jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings against the respondent.  His Lordship then considered 
a number of cases where inferior court judges or magistrates who had jurisdiction of the cause 
had nevertheless been found to be liable for damages for trespass or false imprisonment on the 
basis that they had acted in excess of jurisdiction.  The cases considered by Lord Bridge, with 
apparent approval, in that context included Groome v Forrester, M’Creadie v Thomson and 
O’Connor v Issacs.  Lord Bridge concluded that those cases established the “the clear principle 
that justices, though they have ‘jurisdiction of the cause’ and conduct the trial impeccably, may 
nevertheless be liable in damages on the ground of acting in excess of jurisdiction if their 
conviction of the defendant before them or other determination of the complaint against him 
does not provide a proper foundation in law for the sentence imposed on him or order made 
against him and in pursuance of the sentence or order he is imprisoned or his goods are seized” 
(at 1 AC 549C-D).      
251 
Lord Bridge concluded that, despite having had jurisdiction of the cause, the appellants 
nevertheless had acted without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, because the statutory 
precondition to the imposition of the detention order (informing the respondent of his right to 
apply for legal aid) was essential to support the appellants’ jurisdiction to impose the detention 
order.  
252 
As noted earlier, the other members of the House of Lords, including Lord Templeman, agreed 
with Lord Bridge’s reasons, though Lord Templeman gave some additional reasons.  His 
Lordship reviewed the authorities, including Marshalsea, Gwinne v Poole,  Groome v 
Forrester, Calder v Halket, Houlden v Smith, M’Creadie v Thomson, and O’Connor v Issacs 
and expressed the following opinion (at 1 AC 558D-G): 
In my opinion the authorities disclose that a magistrate is not liable in damages for the 
consequences of an unlawful sentence passed by him in his judicial capacity in a 
properly constituted and convened court if he has power to try the offence and the 
offender, duly convicts the offender of the offence and imposes a sentence which he 
has power to impose for the offence and on the offender. If the magistrate fails to 
convict the offender of the offence or if he imposes a sentence which he has no power 
to impose on the offender for the offence he acts without jurisdiction and if the sentence 
results in imprisonment, is liable to the accused in a civil action for damages for false 
imprisonment. 
If in the course of a trial which a magistrate is empowered to undertake, the magistrate 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
63 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 141 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 79 of 225
 
misbehaves or does not accord the accused a fair trial, or is guilty of some other breach 
of the principles of natural justice or reaches a result which is vitiated by any error of 
fact or law, the decision may be quashed but the magistrate acting as such acts within 
jurisdiction. Similarly if the magistrate after a lawful trial imposes a sentence which 
he is authorised to impose on the defendant for the offence, but follows a procedure 
which is irregular, the sentence may be quashed but the magistrate acts within 
jurisdiction.        
253 
While Lord Templeman also agreed with Lord Bridge’s reasons, his Lordship’s separate 
reasons might appear, at least at first blush, to be slightly narrower than Lord Bridge’s.  That 
is because his Lordship expressed the opinion that a magistrate who “misbehaves or does not 
accord the accused a fair trial, or is guilty of some other breach of the principles of natural 
justice” nevertheless relevantly acts within jurisdiction.  It is, however, possible to reconcile 
that opinion with Lord Bridge’s reasons because Lord Bridge’s opinion was that only “gross 
and obvious” irregularities of procedure or breaches of the rules of justice would support a 
conclusion that a magistrate had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.  In any event, as all 
of the other members of the House of Lords agreed with Lord Bridge’s reasons, his opinion 
reflects the majority position. 
254 
The decision in In re McC is highly persuasive authority in relation to the metes and bounds of 
the judicial immunity available to inferior court judges, including in Australia.  While strictly 
speaking the case may have involved the construction of a form of statutory immunity, it is 
clear that the House of Lords effectively proceeded on the basis that the statutory immunity in 
question reflected the position at common law.  It was on that basis that the common law 
authorities were closely considered and analysed.  I was not taken to any case, in England or 
Australia, which doubted Lord Bridge’s careful analysis of the authorities and his Lordship’s 
conclusion concerning the scope of an inferior court judge’s immunity.   
255 
There is another aspect of In re McC that is of some importance.  That is whether the distinction 
between superior and inferior courts in respect of judicial immunity continues to apply.  That 
issue is considered separately later in these reasons. 
256 
The decision in In re McC was followed and applied by the High Court of England and Wales 
in R v Manchester City Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte Davies [1988] 1 WLR 667; 1 All ER 
930.  In that case, a rating authority issued a distress warrant to the applicant in respect of 
outstanding rates and, upon non-payment, applied for a warrant of committal in the Manchester 
City Magistrates’ Court.  The relevant legislation provided that, before issuing a warrant of 
committal, it was necessary for the court to be satisfied that the applicant’s failure to pay the 
rates was due to culpable neglect.  The magistrates issued a warrant of committal and the 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
64 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 142 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 80 of 225
 
applicant was imprisoned.  That decision was subsequently quashed on the basis that, while the 
magistrates’ were of the opinion that the applicant was guilty of culpable neglect in failing to 
follow his accountant’s advice, they had no regard to the necessity of it being established that 
the applicant’s failure to pay the rates was due to that culpable neglect.  The applicant claimed 
damages from the magistrates.  The main question for the court was whether the magistrates 
had exceeded their jurisdiction. 
257 
Justice Simon Brown considered and applied the decision in In re McC and concluded as 
follows (at 1 AC 673A-B): 
Although I would not go so far as to characterise the insufficiency of the justices’ 
inquiry here as a gross and obvious irregularity, I believe it right to equate the justices’ 
plain failure to address themselves to the question whether or not the applicant’s failure 
was ‘due … to his culpable neglect’ within the plain meaning of [the relevant 
enactment] with the justices’ failure in In re McC. to satisfy the requirements of the 
Irish order. 
258 
It can be seen that Simon Brown J picked up and applied Lord Bridge’s formulation of one of 
the categories of cases in which an inferior court justice loses judicial immunity.  His Honour’s 
decision was affirmed on appeal: R v Manchester City Magistrates’ Court Ex parte Davies 
[1988] 3 WLR 1357; [1989] 1 All ER 90.  Lord Justice O’Connor concluded that the need to 
find that the applicant’s non-payment of the rates was due to culpable neglect was “a statutory 
condition precedent to the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment and its fulfilment [was] 
essential to support the justices’ jurisdiction to impose it” (at 3 WLR 1363).  Similarly, Neill 
LJ held that a “statutory condition precedent to the exercise by the justices of their power to 
issue a warrant under [the relevant enactment] was not satisfied” and that the justices’ failure 
to examine whether the applicant’s non-payment of the rates was due to culpable neglect was 
not “merely a procedural irregularity” (at 3 WLR 1367). 
259 
Mr Stradford identified a number of other cases where magistrates or inferior court judges had 
been held liable for actions in trespass, false imprisonment or similar torts in circumstances 
where they had made orders, or issued warrants in good faith (or at least without malice) but 
without or in excess of their jurisdiction.  Those cases included: Scavage v Tateham (1600) Cro 
Eliz 829; 78 ER 1056; Smith v Bouchier (1734) 2 Str 993; 93 ER 989; Davis v Capper (1829) 
10 B & C 28; 109 ER 362; Lindsay v Leigh (1848) 11 QB 455; 116 ER 547; Willis v Maclachlan 
(1876) 1 Ex D 376; Agnew v Jobson (1877) 13 Cox CC 625 and Polley v Fordham (No 2) 
(1904) 91 LT 525.  It is, in light of the preceding discussion, unnecessary to give any detailed 
consideration to any of these cases.  It suffices to note that they provide further support for the 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
65 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 143 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 81 of 225
 
proposition that at common law, an inferior court judge who makes an order, or issues a 
warrant, in circumstances where they did not have jurisdiction to do so, is not protected from 
suit by judicial immunity, except where they did not know, or have the means of knowing, the 
facts which deprived them of their jurisdiction. 
260 
Mr Stradford also relied on the decision of Owen J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales 
in Ex parte Taylor; Re Butler (1924) 41 WN (NSW) 81.  In that case a personal costs order 
was made against a magistrate because the magistrate denied a party procedural fairness and 
“disregarded his judicial position” (at 84).  That case, however, does not greatly assist in 
resolving the issue in the present case.  The reasoning of Owen J does not specifically address 
the principles concerning judicial immunity.                 
Cases relied on by the Judge concerning the notion of jurisdiction in the context of judicial 
immunity 
261 
In his submissions, the Judge was somewhat dismissive of many of the authorities concerning 
the judicial immunity available to inferior court judges.  Indeed, he contended that the common 
law in respect of that issue was “deeply unsatisfactory”.  He submitted that the law had evolved 
and changed since many of the older cases had been decided.  He relied on what he called the 
“modern case law” on the notion of “jurisdiction” in the context of judicial immunity.  He 
contended, in essence, that the modern case law established that the meaning of “jurisdiction” 
in the context of judicial immunity, including the immunity that attaches to inferior court 
judges, meant “subject matter jurisdiction”.  That, in his submission, meant that so long as a 
judge had jurisdiction in respect of the subject-matter of the case, the judge was immune from 
any damages suit irrespective of the nature or character of any errors made by the judge in the 
exercise of that jurisdiction.  As will be seen, however, all but one of the cases relied on by the 
Judge in that regard were cases that concerned the judicial immunity attaching to superior court 
judges. 
262 
The main cases relied on by the Judge were: Sirros v Moore; Nakhla v McCarthy [1978] 1 
NZLR 291; Moll v Butler; Rajski v Powell (1987) 11 NSWLR 522; Gallo v Dawson (1988) 63 
ALJR 121; (1988) 82 ALR 401; and Fingleton v The Queen (2005) 227 CLR 166; [2005] HCA 
34.   
263 
Sirros v Moore is a confusing case and has been subject to criticism.  The facts were that the 
plaintiff, a citizen of Turkey, was convicted of an offence and fined by a magistrate.  The 
magistrate also made a recommendation to the Home Secretary that the plaintiff be deported, 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
66 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 144 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 82 of 225
 
though he ordered that the plaintiff should not be detained pending the Home Secretary’s 
decision.  The plaintiff appealed to the Crown Court.  A judge in the Crown Court dismissed 
the appeal.  As the plaintiff was leaving the Court, the judge directed a police officer to detain 
the plaintiff and subsequently refused him bail.  A writ of habeas corpus was subsequently 
issued on the basis that the judge had been functus officio when he ordered the plaintiff to be 
detained.  The plaintiff subsequently filed a writ claiming damages for assault and false 
imprisonment.  That writ was struck out.  The question for the Court of Appeal was whether 
the judge was immune from suit.  The Court held that the judge was immune from suit, though 
each of the judges gave somewhat different reasons. 
264 
Lord Denning MR proceeded on the basis that the Crown Court was a superior court and that 
a judge of a superior court “is not liable for anything done by him while he is ‘acting as a 
judge’” and “is protected when he is acting in the bona fide exercise of his office and under the 
belief that he has jurisdiction, though he may be mistaken in that belief” (at 1 QB 135C-D).  
His Lordship held that, while the judge had no jurisdiction to detain the plaintiff, “he acted 
judicially and for that reason no action will lie against him” (at 1 QB 137B). 
265 
In obiter dicta relied on by the Judge in his submissions, Lord Denning MR distinguished 
between the liability of a judge in respect of acts within jurisdiction and acts done outside his 
jurisdiction.  In the case of the former, Lord Denning MR maintained that it had been accepted 
that “no action is maintainable against a judge for anything said or done by him in the exercise 
of a jurisdiction which belongs to him” (at 1 QB 132D).  In the case of the latter, his Lordship 
recognised that “in the old days … there was a sharp distinction between the inferior courts 
and the superior courts” (at 1 QB 136A).  In relation to inferior courts, according to 
Lord Denning MR, it had been “established for centuries that a judge of an inferior court was 
only immune from liability when he was exercising – albeit wrongly – a jurisdiction which 
belonged to him” and that the immunity “did not exist when he went outside that jurisdiction” 
(at 1 QB 133B).  Lord Denning MR also asserted that the reason for the distinction between 
inferior and superior courts in respect of judicial immunity “is no longer valid” and that “as a 
matter of principle the judges of superior courts have no greater claim to immunity than the 
judge of the lower courts” (at 1 QB 136A-B).   
266 
Lord Denning MR’s suggestion that the distinction between superior and inferior courts in 
respect of judicial immunity should no longer apply is discussed in more detail later.  It suffices 
to say that it was subsequently rebuffed by the House of Lords in In re McC.  Indeed, the House 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
67 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 145 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 83 of 225
 
of Lords in In re McC did not embrace any of Lord Denning MR’s reasoning.  Lord Bridge 
supported the decision in Sirros v Moore on the very narrow ground expressed in the judgment 
of Buckley LJ.  
267 
Perhaps more importantly, Lord Denning MR’s reasoning has also been criticised as wavering 
“confusingly between different senses of the expression ‘jurisdiction’” and as arguably stating 
the immunity “more narrowly than in former times”: Wentworth v Wentworth at [260] 
(Heydon JA).  I respectfully agree with those criticisms.  Lord Denning MR’s short summation 
of the immunity attaching to inferior court judges is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile 
with the authorities discussed in detail earlier in these reasons. 
268 
Lord Justice Buckley proceeded on the basis that, in exercising its appellant jurisdiction, the 
Crown Court was an inferior court.  His Lordship concluded, in effect, that the judge in the 
Crown Court had the power to determine whether the plaintiff should or should not be detained 
in custody consequent on hearing the appeal, that he was therefore acting within jurisdiction 
and that, while he adopted an erroneous course of procedure, that was an error of practice, not 
jurisdiction (at 1 QB 143E-144F). 
269 
Lord Justice Ormrod, like Lord Denning MR, appeared to proceed on the basis that the Crown 
Court was a superior court.  His Lordship recognised that there was a dichotomy in the common 
law concerning judicial immunity in superior and inferior courts.  That dichotomy was that a 
“judge of a superior court was not answerable for anything said or done by him when acting in 
a judicial capacity” whereas a “judge of an inferior court was personally liable if he acted 
outside his jurisdiction” (at 1 QB 148F).  Like Lord Denning MR, however, Ormrod LJ was of 
the view that the “old rules should be modified”, that judges of inferior courts should be given 
“enhanced protection” and that the formulation of that protection that should be adopted was 
that a judge be protected where he “makes an order, in the bona fide exercise of his office, and 
under the belief of his having jurisdiction, though he may not have any” (at 1 QB 149G). 
270 
The Judge’s submission concerning the meaning of “jurisdiction” in this context finds some 
support in some of Ormrod LJ’s reasons.  His Lordship expressed the view that the word 
“jurisdiction” in this context is used in the “strict sense” and that “a judge of an inferior court 
acts outside his jurisdiction when he exceeds the limits imposed on his court; but not when, 
having jurisdiction over the subject-matter, he assumes a power which has not been given to 
him” (at 1 QB 150C-D).  It followed, according to Ormrod LJ, that if the Crown Court was to 
be classified as an inferior court, the plaintiff was subject to its jurisdiction, the court had the 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
68 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 146 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 84 of 225
 
power, or jurisdiction, to cause the plaintiff to be lawfully detained and the order that was made 
was only invalid because “appropriate steps had not been taken” (at 1 QB 150G). 
271 
I have, with respect, considerable difficulty reconciling Ormrod LJ’s views concerning the 
meaning of jurisdiction in this context with the authorities considered in detail earlier in these 
reasons, including In re McC.  The House of Lords in In re McC certainly did not embrace or 
approve Ormrod LJ’s reasoning in Sirros v Moore. 
272 
Overall, I do not consider that the dicta in Sirros v Moore concerning the principles applicable 
to the immunity of inferior court judges to be of much assistance.  I certainly do not consider 
it to be persuasive, particularly in light of the decision in In re McC. 
273 
I should note in that context, however, that the reasoning of Lord Denning MR was followed 
by Wood J in Moll v Butler, a case referred to earlier in these reasons in the context of the 
Family Court’s powers in respect of contempt.  It concerned the immunity of a judge of the 
Family Court, a superior court.  It is also clear that Wood J only followed Lord Denning MR’s 
reasoning insofar as it related to the position of superior court judges.  That is apparent from 
the passage in Wood J’s judgment where his Honour accepted that the House of Lords in In re 
McC had doubted the reasoning in Sirros v Moore insofar as it equated the position of inferior 
and superior courts, but noted that “there is nothing in their Lordships’ speeches [in In re McC] 
providing any support for the proposition that the immunity of judges of superior courts is less 
than was stated by the majority in Sirros” (at 243F-G).   
274 
The Judge also placed considerable reliance on the judgment of the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal in Nakhla v McCarthy.  Nakhla v McCarthy involved an action against the President of 
the New Zealand Court of Appeal for damages for “abuse of legal process”.  It therefore 
concerned the immunity of superior court judges, not inferior court judges.        
275 
The rather unusual facts of the case were that the plaintiff appealed against his conviction for 
an offence.  One of his grounds of appeal challenged the trial judge’s directions of law 
concerning the elements of the offence.  The Court of Appeal’s judgment dismissing the appeal 
was handed down by the President.  The written judgment made no reference to the ground of 
appeal concerning the trial judge’s direction.  The President subsequently explained that a page 
of the judgment which dealt with that ground of appeal had been omitted from the published 
judgment as a result of an administrative error.  The plaintiff nevertheless commenced an action 
against the President alleging that in failing to adjudicate on that ground the President had acted 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
69 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 147 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 85 of 225
 
without jurisdiction.  The plaintiff’s statement of claim was struck out and he appealed to the 
Court of Appeal. 
276 
The Court of Appeal upheld the striking out of the statement of claim on the basis that, contrary 
to the plaintiff’s central allegation, the President acted within his jurisdiction.  In the course of 
so doing, Woodhouse J, who delivered the judgment of the Court, dealt with the principle of 
judicial immunity.  In his submissions, the Judge relied in particular on the following passage 
from the judgment of Woodhouse J (at 300): 
So far as we are able to understand his case the plaintiff accepts the age-old principle 
that whatever the rank of a judge, whether his court is a superior court or a court of 
limited jurisdiction, his exemption from civil liability is absolute in respect of all of his 
acts done within the jurisdiction that belongs to him. The plaintiff’s counsel referred 
us to numerous cases all of which accept that principle without qualification although 
there are variations in nuance or approach in the case of a judge who should act outside 
his jurisdiction. But for the moment we are concerned only with acts done within 
jurisdiction and, as we say, counsel appear to be agreed that here the immunity is 
absolute. 
277 
Justice Woodhouse went on to express the view that the court was “in no doubt that when the 
principle of judicial immunity is discussed in the cases in relation to acts done within the 
jurisdiction of the judge that word must be regarded as referable to the broad and general 
authority conferred upon his court and upon himself to hear and to determine issues between 
individuals or between individuals and the Crown” (at 301).   
278 
A number of points should be made in respect of that statement. 
279 
First, as has already been noted, the case before the court concerned judicial immunity of a 
superior, not inferior, court judge. 
280 
Second, while Woodhouse J referred to what had been discussed in the cases in relation to acts 
done within jurisdiction, his Honour referred to only three cases.  The first was Calder v Halket 
which was a case, as the discussion earlier in these reasons makes clear, which concerned acts 
done by an inferior court judge who had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff because the court 
only had jurisdiction over persons of Indian nationality and the plaintiff was a British-born 
subject.  The second case was the case of Garthwaite v Garthwaite [1964] P 356; 2 All ER 
233, a case which was not at all concerned with the principle of judicial immunity.  The third 
case was Sirros v Moore, a case primarily concerned with judicial immunity of superior court 
justices.  For the reasons already given, the dicta in Sirros v Moore concerning immunity of 
inferior court judges is somewhat questionable and has been criticised in later cases.   
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
70 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 148 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 86 of 225
 
281 
Importantly, there is no indication that the court in Nakhla v McCarthy was taken to the 
authorities concerning the immunity of inferior court judges, such as Groome v Forrester, 
M’Creadie v Thomson and O’Connor v Issacs, which establish that an inferior court judge may 
not be immune from suit, despite having had “jurisdiction of the cause”, if the judge acts in 
excess of jurisdiction. 
282 
In all the circumstances, to the extent that the observations made by Woodhouse J in Nakhla v 
McCarthy concerned the immunity of inferior court judges, those observations should be 
viewed with considerable caution and, with respect, given limited weight. 
283 
In his submissions, the Judge relied on the fact that the decision in Nakhla v McCarthy has 
been referred to with approval in a number of Australian cases.  It is, however, clear upon 
analysis that those cases all concerned the immunity of superior court judges, or the statutory 
immunity of judges in terms which reflected the immunity of superior court judge. 
284 
The first of the Australian cases relied on by the Judge was Moll v Butler.  As noted earlier, 
Moll v Butler was a case, like Nakhla v McCarthy itself, which concerned the immunity of a 
superior court judge.  Justice Wood’s acceptance of the approach taken in Nakhla v McCarthy 
must be considered in that context. 
285 
The next case relied on by the Judge was Rajski v Powell.  That case concerned an action 
commenced by a rather notorious self-represented litigant, Mr Leszek Rajski, against a judge 
of the Supreme Court of New South Wales for damages caused by allegedly unlawful acts by 
the judge.  Mr Rajski’s summons was struck out by the Court of Appeal.  The case therefore, 
again, concerned the immunity of a superior court judge.  It is also abundantly clear that the 
reasoning of both Kirby P (as he then was) and Priestley JA (with whom Hope JA agreed) 
applied the principles applicable to superior court judges.  President Kirby’s reference, with 
apparent approval, to Nakhla v McCarthy, should be understood in that context.  President 
Kirby had also earlier referred to the distinction that had been drawn between the immunity of 
superior and inferior judges.  While his Honour noted that the distinction had been criticised, 
he did not hold that the distinction had been, or should be regarded as having been, abolished 
(see 528G-529A).   
286 
Rajski v Powell was cited in Re East; Ex parte Nguyen (1998) 196 CLR 354; [1998] HCA 73 
at [30], however that was an administrative law case which did not directly concern judicial 
immunity.  
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
71 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 149 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 87 of 225
 
287 
Gallo v Dawson was another case in which an unrepresented applicant sought damages against 
a superior court judge, this time a justice of the High Court of Australia.  The plaintiff alleged 
that, since his appointment to the High Court, the defendant had “shown noticeable 
discrimination against the plaintiff in cases in which she has been involved and that he has 
failed in his duty as a Justice” (at 63 ALJR 121).  Perhaps not surprisingly, the action was 
summarily dismissed.  Justice Wilson noted that there was no suggestion that the defendant 
lacked jurisdiction to perform the acts alleged.  His Honour cited Nakhla v McCarthy in support 
of the proposition that “jurisdiction” in that context meant “the broad and general authority … 
to hear and determine a matter” (at 63 ALJR 122) and cited Sirros v Moore in support of the 
proposition that “no action is maintainable against a judge for anything said or done by him in 
the exercise of a jurisdiction which belongs to him” (at 63 ALJR 122).  Not surprisingly, given 
the nature of the case, Wilson J did not suggest that those principles applied in the case of an 
inferior court judge. 
288 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Yeldham v Rajski (1989) 18 NSWLR 48 likewise does 
not advance matters any further.  In this case, Mr Rajski charged, by summons, a judge of the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales with contempt.  Mr Rajski alleged that, in refusing him 
leave to prosecute a third party for perjury, the judge had made defamatory statements which 
were unsupported by evidence.  The Court of Appeal, again perhaps not unsurprisingly, 
dismissed Mr Rajski’s summons because, among other things, the judge, a superior court judge, 
was immune from civil proceedings in respect of his judicial acts.  President Kirby cited Nakhla 
v McCarthy, along with other cases concerning superior court judges, in support of the rather 
anodyne statement that the usual context in which judicial immunity is raised is in cases where 
a plaintiff brings a claim against a judge for a civil wrong (at 58).  Justice Hope, with whom 
Priestley JA agreed, held that the judge had jurisdiction to hear the application for leave to 
prosecute and cited the statement by Wilson J in Gallo v Dawson, in which his Honour cited 
Nakhla v McCarthy, concerning the meaning of “jurisdiction” in that context.  There was no 
consideration of the applicable principles in respect of judicial immunity of inferior court 
judges. 
289 
The decision in Wentworth v Wentworth, a case referred to earlier in these reasons, was also 
relied on by the Judge.   It is a complex case which requires careful analysis.  It raised a number 
of issues, however the issue of relevance to this case was whether a taxing officer of the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales, who occupied the position of a Deputy Registrar, was 
protected by judicial immunity from a personal costs order.  A determination made by the 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
72 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 150 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 88 of 225
 
taxing officer had been set aside on the basis of apprehended bias.  The primary judge found 
that the taxing officer had the same protection as a superior court judge and did not fall outside 
that immunity because he had not deliberately acted beyond power and there had been no 
finding of actual bias. 
290 
On appeal, Fitzgerald JA proceeded on the basis that, when a taxing officer carried out a judicial 
function of the Supreme Court, he or she had the same immunity as a judge of that court, a 
superior court (see [58]-[59]).  His Honour’s consideration of the applicable principles in 
relation to judicial immunity must be approached on that basis.  His Honour concluded that a 
costs order should not be made against the taxing officer because he was entitled to immunity 
in respect of the conduct which the appellant alleged against him.    
291 
Justice Fitzgerald referred to Sirros v Moore in the context of rejecting the appellant’s 
submission that the doctrine of judicial immunity was “inapplicable” to allegations of actual 
bias and malice (see [23]-[27]).  His Honour noted, in that context, that there was “no present 
purpose in investigating whether … there is a difference between the immunity afforded at 
different levels of the judicial hierarchy” (at [26]).  That was no doubt because his Honour had 
determined that the immunity at issue in the case was the immunity afforded to superior court 
judges.   
292 
Justice Fitzgerald also referred with apparent approval to the statement in Nakhla v McCarthy 
that a judge is acting within jurisdiction if he or she is exercising jurisdiction which the court 
possesses and that “jurisdiction” in that context means the broad and general authority 
conferred upon the court to hear and determine issues (at [28]).  His Honour also referred to 
Gallo v Dawson,  Rajski v Powell and Yeldham v Rajski in that context (at [29]-[42]) and 
concluded that the authorities established that judicial immunity extends to whatever a judge 
does in the exercise of the broad and general authority conferred upon the court to hear and 
decide the matter (at [43]). 
293 
Justice Heydon, with whom Davies AJA agreed, approached the matter differently.  His 
Honour ultimately concluded that there was no ground upon which the taxing officer should 
be ordered to pay costs.  He therefore reserved to a future occasion, where the analysis was 
crucial to the outcome, the “important questions of what the tests are for judicial immunity 
from suit” including the “correctness and scope” of the “tests for judicial immunity of judges 
of superior courts stated in Sirros v Moore” (at [260]).  It should be noted that his Honour 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
73 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 151 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 89 of 225
 
considered that Sirros v Moore concerned the immunity which attaches to a superior court 
judge.   
294 
Justice Heydon did, however, make a number of observations concerning the immunity of 
judges other than judges of superior courts.  Some of those observations have already been 
adverted to, however, it is appropriate to set out the entire passage from his Honour’s judgment 
(at [195]): 
There is authority before Sirros v Moore [1975] QB 118 that judges of courts other 
than superior courts are not immune if they act outside jurisdiction whether or 
not they did so knowingly (unless the excess of jurisdiction was caused by an error 
of fact in circumstances where the court had no knowledge of or means of 
knowing the relevant facts: Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed) vol 1(1) para 216 n 
0; AA Olowofoyeku, Suing Judges: A Study of Judicial Immunity (Oxford University 
Press, 1993) pp 64-65; Enid Campbell “Inferior and Superior Courts and Courts of 
Record” (1997) 6 JJA 249 at 260 n 24). Let it be assumed that Santow J was wrong to 
apply  Sirros v Moore and wrong to treat the Taxing Officer as having the same 
immunity as is possessed, according to that case, by a superior court judge. Let it be 
assumed that Santow J should have treated the Taxing Officer as having only the 
traditional immunity of a non-superior court judge. An immunity of that kind might be 
defeated by proof of malice, since it is controversial whether acting maliciously causes 
a non-superior court to act in excess of jurisdiction: see cases discussed in Campbell, 
op cit p 252 n 25; Margaret Brazier, “Judicial Immunity and the Independence of the 
Judiciary” [1976] PL 397 at 398-9 n 6; AA Olowofoyeku, Suing Judges: A Study of 
Judicial Immunity (Oxford University Press, 1993), pp 65-66; Halsbury’s Laws of 
England (4th ed) vol I(1) para 216 n 1). But even if malice does cause a non-superior 
court to act in excess of jurisdiction, malice was not found in the reasons for judgment 
dated 6 February 1998, and it was too late to seek to establish it after that date. Precisely 
what “acting outside jurisdiction” means in this context is obscure. Thus in In re McC 
(A Minor) [1985] AC 528 at 456-7, Lord Bridge contemplated that a “gross and 
obvious irregularity of procedure”, or a breach of the rules of natural justice by reason 
of justices refusing to permit a defendant to give evidence would be outside 
jurisdiction, while other breaches of the rules of natural justice might not. Lord 
Templeman said at 558: “If in the course of a trial which a magistrate is empowered to 
undertake, the magistrate … does not accord the accused a fair trial or is guilty of some 
other breach of the principles of natural justice … the decision may be quashed but the 
magistrate acting as such acts within jurisdiction.” Even assuming, which is 
questionable, that merely acting so as to give an appearance of bias is to act outside 
jurisdiction, the position of the Taxing Officer cannot be worse than if he had no 
immunity at all, and even if he had no immunity at all, for reasons about to be given, 
there is no ground on which he should be ordered to pay costs: [196]-[199]. 
(Emphasis added)     
295 
It should be noted, for the sake of clarity, that this passage does not appear in the reported 
version of the judgment: see (2001) 52 NSWLR 602. 
296 
The “authority before Sirros v Moore” to which Heydon JA refers would almost certainly 
include some or all of the cases referred to earlier in these reasons.      
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
74 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 152 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 90 of 225
 
297 
Ultimately I am not persuaded that the decision and reasoning in Wentworth v Wentworth 
greatly assists in resolving the critical issue in this case.  The principles discussed in the case 
would appear to be those applicable to superior, not inferior, court judges.  The obiter 
observations of Heydon JA are, however, instructive.  
298 
The next case relied on by the Judge was Fingleton.  Fingleton was a case which involved an 
inferior court officer, the Chief Magistrate of Queensland.  The immunity that was considered 
by the High Court, however, was a statutory immunity from criminal responsibility which 
applied to all judicial officers, including not only judges, but also magistrates, members of 
tribunals, arbitrators and umpires.  The Chief Magistrate, therefore, was entitled to the same 
immunity under that statutory provision as a superior court judge.   
299 
Section 30 of the Criminal Code provided: 
Except as expressly provided by this Code, a judicial officer is not criminally 
responsible for anything done or omitted to be done by the judicial officer in the 
exercise of the officer’s judicial functions, although the act done is in excess of the 
officer’s judicial authority, or although the officer is bound to do the act omitted to be 
done.  
300 
The High Court concluded that the statutory immunity provided by s 30 of the Criminal Code 
applied to the relevant acts engaged in by the Chief Magistrate and accordingly set aside the 
Chief Magistrate’s conviction. 
301 
While  Fingleton concerned a statutory immunity that applied to all judicial officers, it is 
nevertheless relevant to consider closely what Gleeson CJ said concerning judicial immunity 
generally.  The Chief Justice said as follows (at [34]-[35]): 
The Code now defines “judicial officer”. The definition was inserted, with effect from 
19 July 2002, by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2002 (Qld). The explanatory notes 
to the Bill said: “A new definition of ‘judicial officer’ is now included. As well as 
judges or magistrates the definition of ‘judicial officer’ includes members of tribunals, 
persons conducting hearings of the Crime and Misconduct Commission, arbitrators 
and umpires.” That reflects the view, which was common ground in this appeal, that, 
from the outset, “judicial officer” in s 30 included magistrates. In any event, it certainly 
included magistrates by September 2002. In dealing generally, and in the same 
manner, with all “judicial officers”, s 30 put aside distinctions between various 
levels in the judicial hierarchy which existed at common law in relation to judicial 
immunity. Those distinctions attracted strong criticism in the United Kingdom 
from the Court of Appeal in Sirros v Moore and the House of Lords in Re McC. 
Section 30 treats all judicial officers in the same way, and confers immunity from 
criminal responsibility for acts or omissions by the judicial officer in the exercise of 
the officer’s judicial functions, even where an act done is in excess of authority, or an 
officer is bound to do an act omitted. 
The immunity provided by s 30 is limited, not only by the introductory words of the 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
75 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 153 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 91 of 225
 
section, but also by the words which confer the immunity. It applies only to acts or 
omissions in the exercise of judicial functions, although conduct in excess of authority 
has the benefit of the protection. The Code’s use of the words “excess of authority” 
reflects what courts applying the common law have held to be the sense in which 
“jurisdiction” is used in the context of judicial immunity, that is to say, “the broad 
and general authority conferred upon [a judicial officer’s] court and upon [the 
judicial officer] to hear and to determine issues between individuals or between 
individuals and the Crown”.   
(Emphasis added; footnotes omitted)          
302 
The Chief Justice cited Nakhla v McCarthy as support for the proposition concerning the sense 
in which “jurisdiction” is used in the context of judicial immunity. 
303 
The Chief Justice went on to refer to the policy of the common law in respect of judicial 
immunity and, in that context, to what Lord Denning MR had said in Sirros v Moore in relation 
to judicial immunity generally (at [36]).  His Honour also referred to a passage from the 
judgment of Lord Bridge in In re McC (at [37]).  It is unnecessary to repeat what was said 
earlier in these reasons concerning Sirros v Moore and In re McC.     
304 
It should also be noted that the judgments of the other members of the High Court in Fingleton 
did not deal with the issue of common law judicial immunity, save for a brief reference by 
Kirby J to what his Honour considered to be the “artificial distinctions” drawn at common law 
between judicial officers at different ranks in the hierarchy (at [137]).          
305 
The following points may be made in respect of these passages from the Chief Justice’s 
judgment.   
306 
First, as already noted, his Honour was dealing with a statutory immunity which treated all 
judicial officers equally, whatever level they may occupy in the judicial hierarchy.   
307 
Second, the Chief Justice accepted that the common law drew a distinction between judicial 
officers at different levels of the hierarchy.   
308 
Third, while the Chief Justice noted that the distinction between superior and inferior court 
judges in this context had been criticised in England in Sirros v Moore and In re McC, his 
Honour did not suggest that the distinction no longer existed, or did not apply in the common 
law of Australia, or should be overruled or not applied in Australia. 
309 
Fourth, the Chief Justice’s statement concerning the meaning of “excess of authority” and what 
was said in Nakhla v McCarthy concerning the meaning of “jurisdiction” in the context of 
judicial immunity should be read in light of the fact that the High Court was dealing with a 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
76 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 154 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 92 of 225
 
statutory provision which equated judicial officers at all levels of the judicial hierarchy.  It is 
difficult to read the Chief Justice’s reference to what was said in Nakhla v McCarthy, a case 
concerning the immunity of a superior court judge, as applying to the position in respect of 
inferior court judges at common law.  Indeed, his Honour subsequently noted that “the present 
case does not fall to be determined under the common law, it is unnecessary to explore the 
precise boundaries of the common law immunity from criminal responsibility in the exercise 
of judicial functions” (at [41]). 
310 
Fifth, while the Chief Justice referred to In re McC, the Chief Justice did not disapprove of 
anything that was said in that case  in respect of the immunity of inferior court judges at 
common law.  As already noted, his Honour indicated that, given that the case fell to be 
determined on the basis of the statutory immunity, it was unnecessary for him to determine the 
precise boundaries of judicial immunity at common law, including in respect of inferior court 
judges. 
Conclusion as to the meaning of “jurisdiction” in the context of judicial immunity  
311 
Two conclusions can be drawn from the cases relied on by the Judge in respect of the notion 
or meaning of “jurisdiction” in the context of judicial immunity. 
312 
First, a superior court judge is immune from civil action or liability for acts done by him or her 
within his or her jurisdiction. 
313 
Second, “jurisdiction”, in that context, means the broad or general authority conferred on the 
judge and his or her court to hear and determine issues between the parties in the matter before 
them. 
314 
It is difficult to draw any firm conclusions beyond that.  That is because the cases concerning 
the meaning of jurisdiction in the context of judicial immunity, or at least those that were relied 
on by the Judge, all relate to either superior court judges, or to statutory forms of immunity that 
apply whether or not a judge is an inferior or superior court judge.  The Judge submitted that 
none of the cases said that the word “jurisdiction” should be given a different meaning in the 
context of the immunity available to inferior court judges.  That may be so, though that was 
most likely because the cases did not involve the immunity available to inferior court judges.  
It might also be said that the cases did not expressly or explicitly say that the word jurisdiction 
should be given the same meaning in the context of the immunity available to inferior court 
judges. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
77 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 155 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 93 of 225
 
315 
The Judge submitted that it would be unusual if the word “jurisdiction” in the context of judicial 
immunity meant something different depending on whether the judge in question was a 
superior or an inferior court judge.  While there may be some force in that submission, the fact 
that it might be unusual does not mean that the long line of cases which deal expressly with the 
issue in respect of inferior court judges can be simply dismissed or disregarded.  Moreover, 
and perhaps more significantly, the answer to what is the critical question in this matter – what 
are the precise boundaries of the common law immunity of inferior court judges? – may not in 
any event be resolved by simply determining what is meant by “jurisdiction” in the context of 
judicial immunity.   
316 
Even if it be accepted that “jurisdiction”, in the context of judicial immunity, means the 
authority conferred on the judge to determine the issues in the matter, that may not be the end 
of the inquiry when it comes to determining the scope or boundaries of judicial immunity in 
respect of inferior court judges.  That is because many of the authorities concerning judicial 
immunity referred to in detail earlier in these reasons tend to indicate that, even in a case where 
an inferior court judge has jurisdiction in the matter in that sense, the judge may still lose that 
immunity if he or she acts outside or exceeds that jurisdiction.  Once that is accepted, as it must 
or should be, the critical question is this: what are the categories of cases where an inferior 
court judge who had jurisdiction to hear and determine the issues between the parties in the 
matter before them, can be said to have acted outside or exceeded their jurisdiction such as to 
deprive them of the protection of judicial immunity?  That is effectively the way that the issue 
was approached in In re McC.     
317 
Before addressing that question, it is necessary to consider a further contention that was 
advanced by the Judge.  That contention was that the distinction between superior and inferior 
courts as it applies to judicial immunity either has been abolished, or can and should be 
abolished by this Court. 
Abolition of the distinction between superior and inferior courts in respect of judicial 
immunity 
318 
The starting point in respect of this topic is the reasoning of Lord Denning MR and Ormrod LJ 
in Sirros v Moore. 
319 
Lord Denning MR did not doubt that the authorities had distinguished between inferior and 
superior court judges when it came to judicial immunity.  His Lordship noted that judges of 
superior courts had been “very strict” against the courts below them, in particular justices of 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
78 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 156 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 94 of 225
 
the peace, and quoted the statement by Lambard that superior courts “now and then correct the 
dulnesse of these justices, with some strokes of the rodde, or spur”: Larmbard’s Eirenarcha 
(1614) Cap 4 370 at 13H.  Lord Denning MR, however, was plainly of the view that the 
distinction between superior and inferior courts in respect of judicial immunity should be 
abolished.  His Lordship said in that regard (at 1 QB 136): 
In the old days, as I have said, there was a sharp distinction between the inferior courts 
and the superior courts. Whatever may have been the reason for this distinction, it is 
no longer valid. There has been no case on the subject for the last one hundred years 
at least. And during this time our judicial system has changed out of all knowledge. So 
great is this change that it is now appropriate for us to reconsider the principles which 
should be applied to judicial acts. In this new age I would take my stand on this: as a 
matter of principle the judges of superior courts have no greater claim to immunity 
than the judges of the lower courts. Every judge of the courts of this land – from the 
highest to the lowest – should be protected to the same degree, and liable to the same 
degree. If the reason underlying this immunity is to ensure “that they may be free in 
thought and independent in judgment”, it applies to every judge, whatever his rank. 
Each should be protected from liability to damages when he is acting judicially. Each 
should be able to do his work in complete independence and free from fear. He should 
not have to tum the pages of his books with trembling fingers, asking himself: “If I do 
this, shall I be liable in damages?” So long as he does his work in the honest belief that 
it is within his jurisdiction, then he is not liable to an action. He may be mistaken in 
fact. He may be ignorant in law. What he does may be outside his jurisdiction – in fact 
or in law – but so long as he honestly believes it to be within his jurisdiction, he should 
not be liable. Once he honestly entertains this belief, nothing else will make him liable. 
He is not to be plagued with allegations of malice or ill-will or bias or anything of the 
kind. Actions based on such allegations have been struck out and will continue to be 
struck out. Nothing will make him liable except it be shown that he was not acting 
judicially, knowing that he had no jurisdiction to do it. 
This principle should cover the justices of the peace also. They should no longer be 
subject to “strokes of the rodde, or spur”. Aided by their clerks, they do their work with 
the highest degree of responsibility and competence – to the satisfaction of the entire 
community. They should have the same protection as the other judges.                   
320 
Lord Justice Ormrod expressed a similar view, at least in respect of inferior court judges, 
though his Lordship spoke in terms of “modifying” the “old rules” (at 1 QB 149): 
In my judgment, these rules in their old form are not appropriate to the conditions of 
today. There is no ground today for drawing a distinction between judges of different 
status or between judges and magistrates. The Courts Act 1971 provides, in effect, the 
reductio ad absurdum. By section 4(1) the Crown Court is declared to be a superior 
court of record. But by subsequent provisions, the court consists of High Court judges, 
circuit (formerly county court) judges and, sometimes, lay magistrates. So far as trials 
on indictment are concerned, it is a superior court, though staffed largely by judges 
who are judges of inferior courts when not sitting in crime. At the same time, when 
hearing appeals from magistrates’ courts, it has one of the stigmata of an inferior court: 
the prerogative writs will go to it (section 10(5)). Moreover, in cases arising under the 
Matrimonial Causes Acts, High Court judges sit as county court judges, and county 
court judges sit as deputy High Court judges as occasion demands. 
I, therefore, agree with Lord Denning MR that it is impossible to maintain double 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
79 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 157 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 95 of 225
 
standards in so important a matter as a personal liability of judges, and that, 
accordingly, the old rules should be modified by giving judges of inferior courts 
(including magistrates) enhanced protection. 
321 
In  In Re McC, however, Lord Bridge effectively suppressed Lord Denning MR’s judicial 
activism in this respect.  In relation to the position of justices and magistrates, his Lordship 
said that the “sweeping judgment of Lord Denning MR in favour of abolishing the distinction 
between superior and inferior courts in this respect cannot possibly be supported in relation to 
justices” (at 1 AC 550F).  In relation to inferior court judges, his Lordship said (at 1 AC 550F-
G):    
The narrower question whether other courts of limited jurisdiction can and should be 
given the same immunity from suit as the superior courts, in which Lord Denning MR 
was supported in his view by Ormrod LJ, is one on which I express no concluded 
opinion, though my inclination is to think that this distinction is so deeply rooted in 
our law that it certainly cannot be eradicated by the Court of Appeal and probably not 
by your Lordships’ House, even in exercise of the power declared in the Practice 
Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234 made by the House. So 
fundamental a change would, in my present view, require appropriate legislation. 
322 
Lord Templeman also expressed the view that the “time is ripe for the legislature to reconsider 
the liability of a magistrate” (at 1 AC 559A) and that a “possible solution is to extend to 
magistrates the immunity which protects the High Court judge acting as such” (at 1 AC 559E-
F). 
323 
The criticism of the distinction between superior and inferior court judges in respect of judicial 
immunity has been noted in some cases in Australia.  There has also been some suggestions, 
mostly based on what was said in Sirros v Moore, that the law had changed, or may have 
changed.  None of the Australian cases, however, provide any support, let alone compelling or 
persuasive support, for the contention that the distinction at common law has been abolished 
or that the law has changed.   
324 
As noted earlier, in Rajski v Powell, Kirby P noted the distinction that had been drawn between 
superior and inferior court judges in respect of judicial immunity and observed that the basis 
of the distinction had been criticised (at 528G-529A).  His Honour did not, however, go so far 
as to say that the distinction had not been, or was not, recognised in Australia, or that it should 
be abolished.   
325 
In Fingleton, Kirby J, then in the High Court, also appeared to suggest that the “rules … that 
formerly drew artificial distinctions in this respect [judicial immunity] between judicial officers 
at different ranks in the hierarchy” had been “overtaken by statute and the common law” (at 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
80 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 158 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 96 of 225
 
[137]).  With great respect to Kirby J, the cases that his Honour cited in support of that 
proposition, including Sirros v Moore and his Honour’s own decision in Rajski v Powell, in 
fact provide no support for such a sweeping conclusion.  In any event, none of the other judges 
in Fingleton agreed with the reasons of Kirby J. 
326 
In Yeldham v Rajski, Hope AJA, in the context of considering the question of contempt in 
relation to the conduct of judges of superior courts, referred to some textbooks which suggested 
that judges of inferior courts and magistrates could be punished for contempt, but then noted 
that “the law may now have changed and that judges of inferior courts and magistrates may be 
in the same position as judges of superior courts” (at 67).  His Honour cited Sirros v Moore in 
support of that proposition.  His Honour noted, however, that it was unnecessary to “stay to 
consider” that matter as the defendant was a judge of the Supreme Court.     
327 
In his submissions, the Judge relied on statements made in a number of Australian cases which 
he submitted supported the conclusion reached in Sirros v Moore that the distinction had been 
or should be rejected.  Those statements, however, for the most part comprise broad and general 
obiter dicta concerning the nature and scope of judicial immunity generally, though almost 
invariably in the context of a case concerning the judicial immunity enjoyed by a superior court 
judge: see Attorney-General (NSW) v Agarsky (1986) 6 NSWLR 38 at 40 (Kirby P); Rajski v 
Powell at 528-529 (Kirby P) and 538-539 (Hope JA); Re East at [29]-[30]; Wentworth v 
Wentworth at [26] (Fitzgerald JA); and Fingleton at [34]-[36] (Gleeson CJ).   
328 
Many, if not most, of the statements relied on by the Judge in relation to this issue have already 
been addressed in one way or another in the preceding analysis of the authorities.  I do not 
propose to address them further.  Suffice it to say that none of the statements support the broad 
proposition that the distinction between inferior and superior court judges is either not 
recognised in the common law of Australia, or should no longer be recognised.  None of the 
cases in which the statements were made refer to, let alone disapprove of or overrule, the long 
line of cases, albeit mostly English cases, referred to earlier in these reasons, which consider 
the judicial immunity that applies in respect of inferior court judges, as opposed to superior 
court judges. 
329 
The Judge also relied on the judgment of Beazley JA in O’Shane v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd 
(2013) 85 NSWLR 69; [2013] NSWCA 315 at [87]-[88].  That was a particularly curious case 
in which a magistrate who sued a media organisation for defamation then attempted to rely on 
her judicial immunity to prevent the media organisation from running a truth defence.  The 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
81 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 159 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 97 of 225
 
majority in the Court of Appeal, perhaps not surprisingly, held that judicial immunity could 
not be relied on “offensively”, or as a sword, to prevent a defendant in a defamation action 
pleading a truth defence.  Despite making that finding, Beazley P made some obiter 
observations concerning the application of the principles of judicial immunity to a magistrate.  
Her Honour referred to Sirros v Moore in that context.  Those obiter observations, with respect, 
are not helpful.  There is no indication that the scope or boundaries of judicial immunity as it 
applies to magistrates was the subject of any argument, or that the court was taken to any 
authorities that actually addressed that issue.       
330 
It follows that the Judge’s contention that the distinction between superior and inferior courts 
as it applies to the common law in respect of judicial immunity has been abolished must be 
rejected.  To the extent that the judgment of Lord Denning MR in Sirros v Moore can be 
construed as amounting to the abolition of the distinction, as opposed to a recommendation that 
it be abolished, that aspect of the judgment must be regarded as obiter dicta.  In any event, that 
aspect of Lord Denning MR’s judgment was expressly disapproved of by the House of Lords 
in In re McC.  Moreover, while the criticism of the distinction in Sirros v Moore has been 
referred to in some Australian cases, none of those cases held that the distinction has been 
abolished or no longer applies.  
331 
As for the suggestion that this Court should abolish the distinction, the Judge submitted that 
there were a number of policy reasons why inferior court judges should have the same 
immunity as superior court judges.  Some of those policy reasons appeared to have some merit.  
There would also appear to be some force in some of the sentiments expressed by both Lord 
Denning MR and Ormrod LJ in Sirros v Moore in respect of that issue.  In particular, while 
there may in the past have been some legitimate justification or rationale for affording inferior 
court judges a more qualified immunity than that available to superior court judges, it is at best 
doubtful that any such justification or rationale still applies in the case of modern-day 
magistrates and inferior court judges in Australia.  That is no doubt why many States and 
Territories have enacted legislation which provides that all judicial officers have the same 
immunity as a superior court judge: see for example s 44B of the Judicial Officers Act 1986 
(NSW).    
332 
The fact that there may be some sound policy reasons for abolishing the common law 
distinction between inferior and superior court judges when it comes to judicial immunity is, 
however, somewhat beside the point for present purposes.  The role and duty of a single judge 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
82 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 160 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 98 of 225
 
exercising the original jurisdiction of this Court is to apply the law, not change it.  As Lord 
Bridge noted in In re McC, the distinction is “deeply rooted” in the common law of England.  
The distinction has also been recognised and applied in the common law of Australia, though 
there have been few cases where it has been decisive.  If the distinction is to be abolished, that 
is a matter for the legislature, or perhaps the High Court, not a single judge of this Court.  
Additional cases relied on by the Commonwealth 
333 
The Commonwealth advanced some submissions on the topic of judicial immunity.  In its 
written submissions, it referred to a number of the cases relied on by the Judge.  The 
Commonwealth’s submissions concerning those cases have effectively already been addressed 
in the preceding discussion.  The Commonwealth addressed three additional cases in its oral 
closing submissions.  It remains to briefly address those cases. 
334 
In Fleet v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals [2005] NSWSC 926, Johnson 
J heard an appeal by an unrepresented litigant against a decision of a Master to strike out his 
pleading on the basis that it was embarrassing.  The causes of action that the plaintiff had 
endeavoured to plead included misfeasance in public office on the part of the District Court of 
New South Wales.  When one considers the pleading of that cause of action (reproduced at 
[24]) it is, to say the very least, hardly surprising that the appeal in respect of the dismissal of 
that part of the pleading was dismissed.       
335 
Nevertheless, in the course of addressing the plaintiff’s case against the District Court, 
Johnson J considered some authorities concerning judicial immunity.  The pleaded cause of 
action accrued before s 44B of the Judicial Officers Act commenced operation.  That provision 
conferred on all judicial officers, including judges of the District Court, “the same protection 
and immunity as a Judge of the Supreme Court has in the performance of his or her duties as a 
Judge”.  It might be noted parenthetically that the enactment of that provision would hardly 
have been necessary if, at common law, the protection and immunity of an inferior court judge 
was the same as that of a superior court judge.  In any event, because the cause of action accrued 
before the commencement of the Judicial Officers Act, Johnson J proceeded on the assumption 
that he was required to consider the common law principles surrounding the doctrine of judicial 
immunity with respect to inferior court judges (at [31]).      
336 
The difficulty, however, is that many of the passages from the cases to which his Honour 
subsequently referred either concerned the immunity of a superior court judge, or at least dealt 
with immunity generally without distinguishing between superior and inferior court judges.  
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
83 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 161 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 99 of 225
 
For example, his Honour referred to general statements concerning judicial immunity in Re 
East, however the immunity that applied to the judicial officers in that case was likely to have 
been affected by the operation of the Judicial Officers Act.  His Honour also referred to 
Fitzgerald JA’s judgment in Wentworth v Wentworth, however the passages his Honour 
referred to were those that concerned the immunity available to a superior court judge.  As 
discussed earlier, Fitzgerald JA had found that the Supreme Court taxing officer had the same 
immunity as a Supreme Court judge.  Justice Johnson also referred to a passage from the 
judgment of Gleeson CJ in Fingleton, however Gleeson CJ had noted that the operation of the 
legislation in question in that case had eliminated the distinction between superior and inferior 
court judges in respect of judicial immunity.  It also appears that his Honour was not taken to 
any of the cases that pre-dated Sirros v Moore.  While his Honour noted that Gleeson CJ in 
Fingleton had referred to In re McC, Johnson J did not himself address that case or its 
significance.          
337 
In all the circumstances I am, with respect, not persuaded that anything said by Johnson J in 
Fleet is of any assistance in resolving the issue concerning the scope of judicial immunity 
available to an inferior court judge. 
338 
The Commonwealth also relied on a passage from a judgment of the Full Court of this Court 
in Luck v University of Southern Queensland (2014) 145 ALD 1; [2014] FCAFC 135.  In that 
case, an unrepresented litigant argued on appeal that the primary judge, a judge of this Court, 
somehow breached the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) in refusing her adjournment 
application.  Perhaps not surprisingly, that contention was given short shrift, the court 
concluding that “[a]t least in the performance of judicial functions, judicial officers are not 
subject to the [Discrimination Act] and any claim of discrimination would be precluded by the 
principle of judicial immunity” (at [41]).  Needless to say, the primary judge was a judge of a 
superior court and the court was not required to consider the immunity of an inferior court 
judge.  Nor does it appear that the court was taken to any relevant authorities in respect of that 
issue.  
339 
Finally, the Commonwealth relied on a judgment of a single judge of this Court in Winters v 
Fogarty [2017] FCA 51.  Winters was another case involving a strike out application.  That 
application required the presiding judge to give some consideration to the statutory immunity 
given to a mediator, which was the same immunity as a judge of this Court.  Once again, 
therefore, the lengthy discussion in that case concerning judicial immunity did not concern the 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
84 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 162 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 100 of 225
 
immunity of an inferior court judge.  In any event, his Honour ultimately found it unnecessary 
to “try and chart the outer perimeter of the judicial immunity” (at [133]).  In the circumstances, 
I do not propose to consider the reasoning in this case.  It does not assist the resolution of the 
issue in this proceeding concerning the scope of judicial immunity available to inferior court 
judges.  
Conclusion as to the scope of judicial immunity of inferior court judges  
340 
Cases stretching back over 400 years have drawn a distinction between the scope and 
boundaries of judicial immunity applicable to inferior court magistrates and judges, as opposed 
to superior court judges.  While those cases are mostly English, they have been applied in some 
cases in Australia: see in particular Raven v Burnett and Wood v Fetherston.  While the 
rationale or policy behind the distinction has been questioned, no case in England or Australia 
has authoritatively determined that the distinction has been abolished.  No case in Australia has 
authoritatively determined that the distinction does not apply in the common law of Australia. 
341 
It may perhaps be accepted that the common law concerning the metes and bounds of the 
judicial immunity available to inferior court judges may not be entirely pellucid and to that 
extent may be said to be somewhat unsatisfactory.  The clarity of the law in this area has not 
been assisted by the often unhelpful and, with the greatest respect, sometimes ill considered or 
inadequately reasoned obiter dicta in cases concerning statutory immunity or the immunity 
available to superior court judges.  Be that as it may, it is necessary and incumbent on me to 
endeavour to distil the applicable principles from the authorities.  In In re McC, Lord Bridge 
described that task, insofar as the common law of England was concerned, to be “daunting” (at 
1 AC 537B).  It is, in my view, all the more daunting insofar as the common law of Australia 
is concerned. 
342 
The principles that, in my view, emerge from the authorities concerning the scope and 
boundaries of the judicial immunity enjoyed by inferior court judges may be summarised as 
follows. 
343 
First, an inferior court judge may be held liable, and will not be protected by judicial immunity, 
where the judge makes an order in a proceeding or cause in which the judge did not have 
“subject-matter” jurisdiction; that is, no jurisdiction to hear or entertain in the first place.  It 
does not matter whether the judge knew, or did not know, that he or she did not have jurisdiction 
to hear or entertain the proceeding.  It also does not matter whether the judge believed or 
assumed that he or she had jurisdiction in the proceeding as a result of a mistake of fact or a 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
85 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 163 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 101 of 225
 
mistake of law.  The only exception is where the judge had no knowledge, or means of 
ascertaining, the fact or facts that relevantly deprived him or her of jurisdiction to hear or 
entertain the proceeding.  The cases which support this principle include: Marshalsea; Calder 
v Halket; Houlden v Smith; Raven v Burnett; and Wood v Fetherston. 
344 
Second, in certain exceptional circumstances, an inferior court judge may be held liable, and 
will not be protected by judicial immunity, where the judge, despite having subject-matter 
jurisdiction in the proceeding, nevertherless makes an order without, or outside, or in excess of 
the jurisdiction he or she had to hear or entertain the proceeding.  
345 
Third, one of the exceptional circumstances in which an inferior court judge may lose the 
protection of judicial immunity and be held liable is where, despite having jurisdiction to hear 
or entertain the proceeding, the judge is guilty of some gross and obvious irregularity in 
procedure, or a breach of the rules of natural justice, other than an irregularity or breach which 
could be said to be a merely narrow technical.  The cases which support this principle include: 
In re McC at 1 AC 546H-547B and R v Manchester City Magistrates’ Court at 1 WLR 671E-
F. 
346 
Fourth, another exceptional circumstance in which an inferior court judge may be held liable 
is where, despite having jurisdiction to hear or entertain the proceeding, the judge acts in excess 
of jurisdiction by making an order, or imposing a sentence, for which there was no proper 
foundation in law, because a condition precedent for making that order or sentence had not 
been made out.  The cases which support this principle include: In re McC at 1 AC 549C-D 
and 558; Groome v Forrester; M’Creadie v Thomson; O’Connor v Issacs; and R v Manchester 
City Magistrates’ Court. 
347 
I do not suggest that the latter two principles exhaustively define or catalogue the circumstances 
in which an inferior court judge, despite having subject-matter jurisdiction, may nevertheless 
lose the protection of judicial immunity by making an order which was without, outside, or in 
excess of, that jurisdiction.  For reasons that will become apparent, it is unnecessary for me to 
go further than identifying what appear from the authorities to be the established circumstances 
where an inferior court judge will not be able to rely on judicial immunity to protect them from 
suit.    
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
86 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 164 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 102 of 225
 
348 
Before endeavouring to apply these principles to this case, it is necessary to briefly deal with 
the Judge’s contention that, despite being an inferior court judge, he should nevertheless have 
the protection afforded to superior court judges in the circumstances of this case.       
Was the Judge entitled to the immunity of a superior court judge in the circumstances? 
349 
The Judge contended that when he imprisoned Mr Stradford, he was acting judicially in the 
exercise of a superior court power.  That is because he was, in his submission, acting pursuant 
to s 17 of the FCC Act, which provided that the Circuit Court had the “same power to punish 
contempts of its power and authority as possessed by the High Court in respect of contempts 
of the High Court”.  The High Court is a superior court of record.  Accordingly, so the Judge 
submitted, the immunity that attaches to a superior court judge should apply to his exercise of 
that power. 
350 
The Judge relied, in support of that submission, on the following statement by Latham CJ in 
Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571 at 585; [1944] HCA 5:  
An inferior court such as a county court may be made a superior court for a particular 
purpose. Thus where a court is described in a statute as a branch of a principal court 
and is also given the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery for purposes of bankruptcy 
jurisdiction, it may, though a county court (and therefore an inferior court) in its 
ordinary jurisdiction, be a superior court in relation to bankruptcy proceedings. 
351 
I am not persuaded that the Judge was acting as a superior court judge when he imprisoned Mr 
Stradford, or that he was entitled to the immunity afforded a superior court judge. 
352 
It may be accepted that, as Cameron v Cole establishes, legislation can provide that an inferior 
court may be deemed, or taken to be, a superior court for certain purposes.  Section 17 of the 
FCC Act does not, however, provide, either expressly or by necessary implication, that the 
Circuit Court is deemed, or taken to be, a superior court when exercising the contempt power 
conferred on it by that provision.   
353 
It may also be accepted that in some circumstances where a statute confers certain specified 
superior court jurisdiction on an inferior court, the inferior court may, by necessary implication, 
be taken to be a superior court when exercising that jurisdiction.  In Day v The Queen (1984) 
153 CLR 475 at 479; [1984] HCA 3, the High Court held, in effect, that a sentence imposed on 
a person convicted on indictment by the District Court of Western Australia (an inferior court) 
had the same effect and operation as a sentence imposed by a superior court.  That was because 
a provision in the District Court of Western Australia Act 1969 (WA) provided that the District 
Court had “all the jurisdiction and powers that the Supreme Court has in respect of any 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
87 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 165 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 103 of 225
 
indictable offence” and that “[i]n all respects … the practice and procedure of the Court as a 
Court of criminal jurisdiction shall be the same as the practice and procedure of the Supreme 
Court in like matters”.     
354 
Section 17 of the FCC Act, however, is far removed from the sort of statutory provision 
considered in Day v The Queen.  Section 17 of the FCC Act is far more confined in its scope 
and operation.  It does not confer any jurisdiction on the Circuit Court.  It simply provides that 
the Circuit Court has the same power to punish for contempt as the High Court.  Section 17 
also does not provide that, in exercising that power, the Circuit Court’s practice and procedure 
was the same as the High Court’s practice and procedure, or that orders made in the exercise 
of that power are taken to have the same effect, in terms of enforceability, as orders made by 
the High Court in the exercise of its contempt powers. 
355 
I am not persuaded that the effect of s 17 of the FCC Act is that an order made by the Circuit 
Court in the exercise of its contempt powers is taken or deemed to be an order of a superior 
court.  Still less am I persuaded that the effect of s 17 of the FCC was such that a Circuit Court 
judge who exercises that court’s contempt powers is taken to be a superior court judge, or to 
be acting as a superior court judge, in particular for the purposes of judicial immunity.            
356 
There is, in any event, no sound basis for concluding that the Judge was exercising the power 
under s 17 of the FCC Act when he imprisoned Mr Stradford.  Nothing that was said or done 
by the Judge indicates that he was exercising that power.  More importantly, as discussed in 
detail earlier, Pt XIIIB of the Family Law Act has been held to be a “complete code for dealing 
with contempts”: DAI  at [47], [67].  The jurisdiction that the Judge was exercising in Mr 
Stradford’s proceeding was jurisdiction under the Family Law Act.  Accordingly, when 
exercising, or purporting to deal with Mr Stradford’s alleged contempt, the Judge was 
exercising the power in Pt XIIIB of the Family Law Act, not the powers under s 17 of the FCC 
Act.  
357 
I was not taken to any persuasive authority in support of the proposition that a judge of an 
inferior court should be considered to be a superior court judge, and thereby attract the 
immunity of a superior court judge, when exercising contempt powers conferred on the inferior 
court in terms similar to s 17 of the FCC Act.  Nor am I satisfied that the Judge was exercising 
the Circuit Court’s powers pursuant to s 17 of the FCC Act when imprisoning Mr Stradford.  
In those circumstances, I am not persuaded that the Judge’s potential liability should be 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
88 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 166 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 104 of 225
 
considered on any basis other than that he is entitled to the judicial immunity afforded to an 
inferior court judge.     
Is the Judge immune from liability arising from his imprisonment of Mr Stradford? 
358 
Having regard to the principles applicable to the judicial immunity of an inferior court judge 
that I have outlined, I consider that the Judge is liable for any loss or damage suffered by Mr 
Stradford arising out of his unlawful imprisonment.  As an inferior court judge, the Judge was 
not protected from liability arising from his imprisonment of Mr Stradford.  That is so for a 
number of reasons. 
359 
First, while the Judge obviously had jurisdiction to hear and entertain the proceeding between 
Mr and Mrs Stradford, being a proceeding pursuant to the Family Law Act, it is clear that when 
he imprisoned Mr Stradford, purportedly for contempt, he acted without or in excess of 
jurisdiction.  That is because, as discussed earlier in these reasons, he imposed that sanction 
without first finding that Mr Stradford had in fact failed to comply with the relevant orders and 
was in fact in contempt.   
360 
It may be accepted, for present purposes, that when the Judge ordered that Mr Stradford be 
imprisoned for contempt, his Honour did so on the basis of a mistaken belief or assumption 
that Judge Turner had already found that Mr Stradford had failed to comply with the disclosure 
orders and was therefore in contempt.  The problem for the Judge, however, is that his Honour 
plainly had the means to ascertain whether Judge Turner had in fact made any such findings.  
The Judge plainly should have been aware that her Honour had made no such findings.  Judge 
Turner had made no order or declaration to that effect and had delivered no judgment.  The 
Judge could readily have ascertained that Judge Turner had not found that Mr Stradford had 
failed to comply with the disclosure orders and had certainly not made any finding that Mr 
Stradford was in contempt.  There is no evidence to suggest that the Judge made any attempt 
to speak with Judge Turner or consult the court records which, no doubt, would have revealed 
that no such finding had been made. 
361 
In this respect, the circumstances of this case are entirely analogous to the circumstances in 
Wood v Fetherston; O’Connor v Issacs; In re McC and R v Manchester City Magistrates’ Court 
in particular.  A finding of contempt was a condition precedent to the imposition of the sanction 
imposed by the Judge.  There was no proper foundation in law for the making of the 
imprisonment order.  In imposing a sentence of imprisonment in the absence of any such 
finding, the Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in the requisite sense.   
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
89 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 167 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 105 of 225
 
362 
Second, for the reasons given earlier, as the alleged contempt by Mr Stradford was a failure to 
comply with orders made in the exercise of jurisdiction under the Family Law Act, the Judge 
was required, before imprisoning Mr Stradford, to satisfy himself of certain matters under 
either Pt XIIIA or Pt XIIIB of the Family Law Act. 
363 
If the matter were to proceed under Pt XIIIB, the Judge had to be satisfied not only that there 
had been a contravention of the disclosure orders, but also that the contravention involved a 
“flagrant challenge to the authority of the court”.  The Judge made no such finding.  
364 
If the matter were to proceed under Pt XIIIA, the Judge had to be satisfied not only that Mr 
Stradford had contravened the disclosure orders, but also that he did so without reasonable 
excuse and that, in all the circumstances of the case, it would not be appropriate to impose one 
of the other sanctions provided in ss 112AD(2)(a), (b) or (c).  The Judge did not satisfy himself 
of any of those matters. 
365 
The making of the required findings under either Pt XIIIA or Pt XIIIB were, in effect, 
conditions precedent to the Judge imposing a sentence of imprisonment.  In imposing a 
sentence of imprisonment in the absence making any of those findings, his Honour acted 
without or in excess of jurisdiction in the requisite sense.  There was no proper foundation in 
law for the making of the imprisonment order.  In that regard, the circumstances of this case 
are again analogous to the circumstances in Wood v Fetherston, O’Connor v Issacs, In re McC, 
and R v Manchester City Magistrates’ Court. 
366 
Third, in conducting the contempt proceedings against Mr Stradford in the way he did, the 
Judge was guilty of a “gross and obvious irregularity of procedure”: cf In re McC at 1 AC 
546H.  The statutory procedure for contempt, other than contempt in the face of the court, was 
prescribed in r 19.02 of the FCC Rules.  The procedure followed by the Judge did not comply 
with any of the requirements of r 19.02.  There was no application in the approved form and 
no supporting affidavit. The Judge did not clearly advise Mr Stradford of the contempt 
allegation, or ask him to state if he admitted or denied that allegation.  Nor did his Honour hear 
any evidence in support of the allegation, or determine if there was a prima facie case, or invite 
Mr Stradford to state his defence and, after hearing that defence, determine the charge.  For the 
reasons given earlier, it was not open to the Judge to dispense with the procedure in r 19.02.  
Nor did he do so.  The available inference is that he either ignored it, or proceeded in complete 
ignorance of it.    
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
90 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 168 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 106 of 225
 
367 
The Judge’s complete failure to comply with the procedure in r 19.02 of the FCC Rules could 
not possibly be seen as a “narrow technical ground”: cf In re McC at 1 AC 547A. 
368 
The gross and obvious irregularity of procedure that infected the Judge’s purported exercise of 
his contempt powers meant that he acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction in the requisite 
sense.   
369 
Fourth, the Judge was guilty of a gross denial of procedural fairness and breach of the rules of 
natural justice having regard not only to his complete failure to comply with the procedure in 
r 19.02 of the FCC Rules, which was clearly designed to ensure procedural fairness, but also 
more generally.  As the FamCA Full Court found in Stradford, the Judge pre-judged that the 
alleged contravention of the order would constitute a contempt within the meaning of the 
Family Law Act (at [20]); pre-judged the penalty for the contravention without first knowing 
the particulars of the alleged contravention (at [21]); performed the roles of prosecutor, witness 
and judge (at [22]-[27]); and made findings concerning the alleged contravention without any 
evidentiary foundation (at [57]).  As the FamCA Full Court said at [53]: 
It is difficult to envisage a more profound or disturbing example of pre-judgment and 
denial of procedural fairness to a party on any prospective orders, much less contempt, 
and much less contempt where a sentence of imprisonment was, apparently, pre-
determined as the appropriate remedy. 
370 
The FamCA Full Court concluded that the entire episode constituted a “gross miscarriage of 
justice” (at [9] and [73]).  
371 
Needless to say, the denial of procedural fairness in this case could not possibly be 
characterised as a “narrow” or “technical” breach.  It constituted, at the very least, a “gross and 
obvious irregularity of procedure”, to use the words of Lord Bridge in In re McC (at 1 AC 
546H).  The result of it was that the Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in the 
requisite sense.   
372 
The four findings just outlined, considered either individually or cumulatively, deprive the 
Judge of judicial immunity in respect of the impugned acts. 
CONCLUSION – LIABILITY OF THE JUDGE 
373 
For the reasons given earlier, Mr Stradford established against the Judge all of the elements of 
the tort of false imprisonment.  Mr Stradford was imprisoned as a result of the imprisonment 
order made, and the warrant issued, by the Judge on 6 December 2018.  Mr Stradford’s 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
91 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 169 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 107 of 225
 
imprisonment was not lawfully justified because the imprisonment order and warrant were 
invalid and of no effect.  They were infected by manifest jurisdictional error.    
374 
For the reasons that have been given, the Judge was not immune from Mr Stradford’s suit on 
the basis of his status as an inferior court judge.  That is because he is an inferior court judge 
and when he made the imprisonment order was made, and issued the warrant, he acted without 
or in excess of jurisdiction.   
375 
It follows that the Judge is liable to Mr Stradford in respect of the tort of false imprisonment.                          
THE TORTS FOR WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH AND QUEENSLAND ARE 
ALLEGEDLY LIABLE 
376 
Mr Stradford contended that both the Commonwealth and Queensland were vicariously liable 
to him in or for the tort of false imprisonment.   
377 
As for the Commonwealth, Mr Stradford contended that on 6 December 2018, after the Judge 
delivered ex tempore reasons and ordered that he be imprisoned, he was escorted to a holding 
cell in the Circuit Court building by MSS guards.  He was detained in the cells, under the 
supervision of the MSS guards, until he was taken into custody by officers of the Queensland 
Police service.  The conduct of the MSS guards in that respect constituted a detention of Mr 
Stradford which was undertaken for and on behalf of the Commonwealth.  If that detention had 
no lawful justification, the Commonwealth was vicariously liable for the conduct of the MSS 
guards which constituted false imprisonment. 
378 
As for Queensland, Mr Stradford contended that officers of the Queensland Police Service 
attended the Circuit Court building on 6 December 2018 and took custody of Mr Stradford. He 
was initially taken to and detained at the Roma Street Watchhouse.  On 10 December 2018, he 
was transported to the Brisbane Correctional Centre where he was imprisoned until 12 
December 2018, that being the date that the Judge stayed his imprisonment order.  In those 
circumstances, Mr Stradford contended that he was imprisoned by officers of the Queensland 
Police Service and Queensland Corrective Services.  If that imprisonment had no lawful 
justification, Queensland was vicariously liable for the conduct of those officers which 
constituted false imprisonment. 
379 
As previously discussed, the Commonwealth contended that there was lawful justification for 
Mr Stradford’s detention by the MSS guards because the Judge’s imprisonment order and 
warrant were valid until set aside by the FamCA Full Court.  For the reasons given earlier, that 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
92 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 170 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 108 of 225
 
contention is unmeritorious and is rejected.  The order made by the Judge, being an order made 
by a judge of an inferior court, lacked legal force from the outset and therefore provided no 
lawful basis for Mr Stradford’s imprisonment. 
380 
The Commonwealth also contended that it was a principle of the law of tort that if a compulsive 
order is made, or warrant issued, by a judicial officer, including a judge of an inferior court, 
“enforcing officials” who execute that compulsive process are protected against any liability 
in tort if the order or warrant is subsequently found to be invalid, at least if the order or warrant 
appeared to be regular on its face.  That was said to be so irrespective of the nature of the error 
made by the judge that led to the order or warrant being found to be invalid.   
381 
The Commonwealth did not contend that the MSS guards, or the Commonwealth, were 
protected, or afforded a defence, by any statutory provision.  The Commonwealth also admitted 
that, if the detention effected by the MSS guards was found to be without lawful justification, 
it was vicariously liable. 
382 
While Queensland mainly relied on a statutory defence, it also embraced the Commonwealth’s 
argument as to the existence of a common law principle or defence, which protected from 
liability persons who executed a warrant which appeared valid on its face, even if the warrant 
was subsequently set aside.  In Queensland’s submission, that principle also protected the 
officers of the Queensland Police and Queensland Corrective Services from any liability arising 
from Mr Stradford’s imprisonment.  Queensland also submitted that the authorities established 
that executing officers could only be held liable in respect of the execution of a warrant in 
circumstances where the warrant was a “nullity” because the issuing justice or inferior court 
judge had no jurisdiction to issue the warrants.  In that regard, Queensland submitted that “no 
jurisdiction” meant that there was a “total absence of jurisdiction, of no general authority to 
decide, of no authority to enter upon the question”.  That was said not to be the case in respect 
of the warrant issued by the Judge.  Finally, Queensland relied on a statutory provision which 
it contended provided it with a defence.        
383 
Mr Stradford disputed the existence of the common law principle articulated by the 
Commonwealth and Queensland.  He submitted that no such principle had ever been 
recognised in the relevant case law.  Indeed, he submitted that the common law principle 
articulated by the Commonwealth was contrary to many authorities stretching back hundreds 
of years.  He accepted that there were some authorities that supported the proposition that 
certain officers of inferior courts, often referred to in the cases as “ministerial officers”, had a 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
93 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 171 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 109 of 225
 
“special” defence when they were obeying an order made by the court of which they were 
officers, which appeared valid on its face, but turned out to be invalid.  He submitted, however, 
that police officers and “gaolers” who were not officers of the court did not have the benefit of 
any such special defence.  They were liable for any tortious acts they committed in execution 
of the court’s order, though the perceived harshness of that circumstance had been overridden 
or ameliorated by statute in England and some other jurisdictions.  In Mr Stradford’s 
submission, the MSS guards were not officers of the Circuit Court, or ministerial officers, and 
therefore did not have the benefit of any special defence.  The same could be said in respect of 
the officers of the Queensland Police Service and Queensland Corrective Services.  
384 
The critical question for the Court to resolve in respect of this issue is whether, at common law, 
police officers and gaolers who detain or imprison a person pursuant to an order or warrant of 
an inferior court, later found to be invalid and of no effect, have available to them a defence to 
the tort of false imprisonment, at least when the defect or invalidity of the order was not 
apparent on the face of the order or warrant.  Resolution of that question, like the question of 
the scope of judicial immunity available to an inferior court judge, requires a deep dive into 
the common law authorities, some of which date back hundreds of years.  Once again, the 
parties cited or relied on a plethora of cases in support of their respective positions. Once again, 
I propose to focus mainly on those that the parties emphasised in their closing submissions, or 
which have some apparent precedential or persuasive authority.   
385 
Before delving into the authorities, however, it is necessary to resolve a pleading issue or 
complaint raised by the Commonwealth.  It is also necessary to briefly consider whether the 
MSS guards were officers of the court, or ministerial officers, as that expression is understood 
in the authorities. 
386 
I will deal with the statutory provisions relied on by Queensland after the consideration of the 
position at common law.   
A pleading point? 
387 
In its closing submissions, the Commonwealth complained that Mr Stradford had shifted 
position and departed from his pleaded case in respect of the liability of the Commonwealth.  
It contended that in his pleadings, Mr Stradford had described the MSS guards as “court 
security officers” and had alleged that the MSS guards placed him in the custody of the Acting 
Marshal of the Circuit Court who was an employee of the Commonwealth in respect of whom 
the Commonwealth was vicariously liable.  Those allegations were admitted in the 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
94 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 172 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 110 of 225
 
Commonwealth’s defence.  Mr Stradford did not file any reply.  The Commonwealth submitted 
that Mr Stradford should be held to his pleaded case and not be permitted to deny that the MSS 
guards were officers of the Circuit Court, or “ministerial officers” as that expression is 
understood in the authorities. 
388 
I am not persuaded that the Commonwealth’s complaint concerning the pleadings has any 
merit.  Nor am I satisfied that the Commonwealth was prejudiced in any way by the manner in 
which Mr Stradford pleaded his case.  Indeed, if anything, the Commonwealth’s pleading was 
deficient.   
389 
I do not agree that the manner in which Mr Stradford pleaded his case involved an acceptance 
that the MSS guards were officers of the court or “ministerial officers”.  While Mr Stradford’s 
pleading used the shorthand expression “court security officers” to describe the MSS guards, 
his particulars clearly indicated that the security services provided by the MSS guards were 
provided pursuant to a contract between the Commonwealth and MSS Security.   
390 
Mr Stradford’s pleading also alleged that the conduct of the MSS guards “constituted 
imprisonment of [Mr Stradford]” in respect of which there was no lawful justification.  That 
constituted an allegation that the MSS guards falsely imprisoned Mr Stradford.  That said, it 
appears that Mr Stradford also alleged that Mr Stradford was in the custody of the Acting 
Marshal, that the Acting Marshal was liable to Mr Stradford for false imprisonment and that 
the Commonwealth was vicariously liable for the false imprisonment committed by the Acting 
Marshal. 
391 
The Commonwealth appears to have accepted that Mr Stradford had alleged that the MSS 
guards had falsely imprisoned him.  In its defence, it admitted, among other things, that the 
MSS guards detained Mr Stradford for and on behalf of the Commonwealth and that “if the 
detention effected by the court security officers was without lawful justification, the 
Commonwealth would, in respect of that detention, be liable to [Mr Stradford] for the tort of 
false imprisonment”.  Importantly, the Commonwealth did not plead in its defence, at least 
explicitly, that the MSS guards were “officers of the court”, or “ministerial officers”.  
Moreover, while the Commonwealth pleaded, in answer to Mr Stradford’s plea that his 
detention by the MSS guards was without justification, that the MSS guards were executing 
orders made by the Judge which “appeared to have been regularly made and issued”, it did not 
explicitly plead that the officers therefore had available to them a defence based on the fact that 
they were officers of the court, or ministerial officers. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
95 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 173 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 111 of 225
 
392 
It would therefore appear from the pleadings that the parties were proceeding on the basis that 
Mr Stradford was alleging that the Commonwealth was vicariously liable for the conduct of 
the MSS guards in detaining him and that the Commonwealth’s defence to Mr Stradford’s case 
against it was that there was lawful justification for Mr Stradford’s imprisonment.  Moreover, 
while the Commonwealth’s defence also uses the shorthand expression “court security 
officers” to describe the MSS guards, the Commonwealth did not explicitly plead that the MSS 
guards had available to them a common law defence based on the fact that they were ministerial 
officers, or officers of the court.   
393 
The central issue on the pleadings was clearly whether there was lawful justification for Mr 
Stradford’s detention.  In those circumstances, the fact that Mr Stradford did not file a reply is 
of no moment.  That is all the more so given that, as discussed earlier in the context of the 
elements of the tort of false imprisonment, if the MSS guards detained Mr Stradford, which 
was admitted, the onus was on the Commonwealth to establish lawful justification.  There was 
a clear joinder of the issue concerning lawful justification.    
394 
The fact that both Mr Stradford and the Commonwealth proceeded on the basis that the central 
issue was lawful justification is also readily apparent from the statement of agreed facts.  It was 
an agreed fact that the “conduct of the MSS employees … constituted a detention of [Mr 
Stradford] which was undertaken for and on behalf of the Commonwealth” and that “[i]f that 
detention was unlawful, the Commonwealth is liable to [Mr Stradford] for that false 
imprisonment”.  The agreed facts make no mention of the Marshal.  Nor is there any agreed 
fact that the MSS guards were officers of the court, or ministerial officers.  It was, however, 
agreed that MSS Security Pty Ltd provided guarding services at the Circuit Court pursuant to 
a contract.  
395 
It follows from this analysis of the pleadings that if, as the Commonwealth contended, there 
was any deficiency or lack of clarity in the pleadings concerning the status of the MSS guards, 
or whether the Commonwealth had available to it a defence based on the fact that the MSS 
guards were officers of the court, or ministerial officers, that issue lies as much at the feet of 
the Commonwealth as Mr Stradford. 
396 
In any event, if there was any issue in the pleadings in that regard, I am far from persuaded that 
the Commonwealth suffered any prejudice arising from that issue.  It was clear from Mr 
Stradford’s opening submissions, oral and written, that his case against the Commonwealth 
hinged on the proposition that the MSS guards detained Mr Stradford for and on behalf of the 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
96 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 174 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 112 of 225
 
Commonwealth and that that detention was not lawfully justified.  It was also clear from Mr 
Stradford’s opening submissions that his case was that the MSS guards were not officers of the 
Circuit Court, but rather were akin to police officers.  The Commonwealth did not raise any 
issue concerning the pleadings at that point.  Indeed, the Commonwealth did not raise any issue 
concerning the pleadings until it filed its written outline of closing submissions.  
397 
The Commonwealth suggested, albeit rather faintly, that if it had known that Mr Stradford 
alleged that the MSS guards were not officers of the court, or denied that they were, it would 
have called evidence, perhaps from the Marshal.  It is, however, unclear what that evidence 
would have been.  It is equally unclear how any evidence from the Marshal could or would 
have added to the evidence that the Commonwealth had already filed concerning the role and 
status of the MSS guards.  The Commonwealth filed an affidavit sworn by one of the MSS 
guards.  That affidavit was read without objection and the guard was not cross-examined.  The 
guard’s evidence included that he had access to the court’s premises, facilities and resources 
and that he reported to the Marshal.  What more could the Marshal have said?   
398 
In any event, despite knowing how Mr Stradford put his case concerning the Commonwealth’s 
liability from, at the very least, the time he filed his written outline of opening submissions, the 
Commonwealth failed to raise any issue concerning the pleadings and, more significantly, 
made no attempt to adduce evidence from the Marshal.  Had the Commonwealth sought to 
adduce evidence from the Marshal during the course of the trial, it is highly likely that I would 
have permitted the Commonwealth to do so.         
399 
In all the circumstances, I reject the Commonwealth’s complaints concerning Mr Stradford’s 
pleading.  I do not consider that Mr Stradford should be constrained in the way he puts his case 
in the manner contended by the Commonwealth.   
Were the MSS guards officers of the Circuit Court? 
400 
As noted earlier, there is arguably a line of authority concerning the liability of officers of the 
court, or “ministerial officers”, who execute or act in obedience with orders made, or warrants 
issued, by the court of which they are officers.  Mr Stradford contended that that line of 
authority was distinct from, or developed separately to, the line of authority concerning the 
liability of police officers and gaolers who executed invalid orders or warrants of an inferior 
court.   
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
97 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 175 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 113 of 225
 
401 
The Commonwealth contended that there was no relevant distinction in the authorities between 
officers of the court, or ministerial officers, and other persons who executed orders or warrants 
issued by an inferior court.  It also appeared to argue that, even if there was any such distinction, 
the MSS guards were officers of the court, or ministerial officers.   
402 
The authorities that address the position of officers of the court, or ministerial officers, will be 
considered in detail shortly.  It is, however, convenient to first consider the Commonwealth’s 
contention that the MSS guards were officers of the Circuit Court.  That involves a short foray 
into the evidence.   
403 
The MSS guards were employees of MSS Security.  MSS Security entered into a contract for 
the provision of services to the Commonwealth.  Those services were defined, somewhat 
vaguely, in the contract as “consultancy and/or professional services”.  The services were to be 
provided at a number of sites throughout Australia, including, relevantly, the Harry Gibbs 
Commonwealth Law Courts Building in Queensland.  The Circuit Court occupied that 
building, along with certain other occupants, including the Family Court and the Federal Court.  
The “main objective” of the services was “to ensure that all sites including all external areas, 
are secured to protect the Judges, property, staff and general public at all times”.  The contract 
identified a number of duties which the guards supplied by MSS Security would perform 
pursuant to the contract.  None of the specified duties included executing orders made, or 
warrants issued, by a judge, or detaining persons pursuant to such orders or warrants.  
404 
As has already been noted, the Commonwealth adduced evidence from one of the MSS guards 
who provided services on behalf of MSS Security in discharge of its contractual obligations.  
The evidence of that officer, Mr Dunn, concerning his employment, role and duties was as 
follows.  He was employed by MSS Security and in that capacity worked at the relevant time 
as a “Security Supervisor” at the Family Court and Circuit Court in the Harry Gibbs 
Commonwealth Law Courts Building in Brisbane.  His role was to “supervise a team of court 
security officers and manage their day to day security operations”.  He “reported to the Marshal 
of the Federal Circuit Court about Federal Circuit Court security matters”.  Mr Dunn’s evidence 
was that it was “relatively unusual for court security to detain a person following a judge issuing 
a warrant of commitment”. 
405 
As discussed earlier in these reasons, Mr Dunn gave evidence about the “events” of 6 December 
2018, that being the day Mr Stradford was detained, though he had no recollection of those 
events.  His evidence was based on the documentary record.  The important point to emphasise, 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
98 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 176 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 114 of 225
 
in this context, is that there is nothing in the documentary record, or Mr Dunn’s evidence, to 
suggest that the Marshal had anything to do with Mr Stradford’s detention.  There is certainly 
no suggestion that Mr Dunn’s involvement in Mr Stradford’s detention was on the instructions 
of the Marshal, or that Mr Dunn reported to the Marshal in respect of his actions.  
406 
I am unable to see how it could possibly be concluded that Mr Dunn was an officer or 
“ministerial officer” of the Circuit Court who was, by virtue of that office or position, required 
to obey orders of that court or its judges.  Mr Dunn plainly was not appointed under the FCC 
Act.  Nor was he in any sense employed by the Circuit Court, or even the Commonwealth.  
While Mr Dunn’s evidence was that he reported to the Marshal of the Circuit Court, it could 
not be said that he was subject to the direct control of the Marshal, or any other officer of the 
Circuit Court, or that he was subject to any sanction or disciplinary action by the court, if he 
failed to perform any of his duties.  That is because he was not appointed under the FCC Act, 
or even employed by the Circuit Court or the Commonwealth.  If Mr Dunn failed to comply 
with his duties in any way, or failed to comply with any direction from the Marshal or any other 
officer of the Circuit Court, that may have had contractual implications for MSS Security, or 
implications for Mr Dunn’s employment by MSS Security.  He was not, however, subject to 
any sanction or action by the Marshal or the Circuit Court itself.  
407 
I should also note, in this context, that the MSS guards who were responsible for detaining Mr 
Stradford were not identified or referred to in either the order made, or warrant issued, by the 
Judge, either by name or office.      
408 
I accordingly reject the Commonwealth’s contention that the MSS guards were officers of the 
court, or ministerial officers, for the purpose of considering the availability of any common 
law defence based on the fact that the officers were purportedly acting pursuant to the warrant 
issued by the Judge.  The MSS guards were no more than private security guards who were 
retained, through their employer, to provide security services at the court complex in which the 
Circuit Court was housed.  
Were the officers of the Queensland Police and Queensland Corrective Services officers 
of the Circuit Court? 
409 
Queensland did not expressly or clearly contend that the Queensland Police officers and 
Queensland Corrective Services officers who were involved in Mr Stradford’s detention or 
imprisonment were officers of the court, or ministerial officers, for the purposes of any 
common law defence that may be available.  Queensland did, however, submit that the officers 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
99 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 177 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 115 of 225
 
were required to, and did, act in obedience to the warrant issued by the Judge.  It was said that 
they therefore acted “ministerially”.  To the extent that that submission may amount to a 
submission that the Queensland Police and Queensland Corrective Services officers were 
ministerial officers, as that expression is used and understood in the common law authorities, 
I should deal with it. 
410 
As will be seen, the line of authority concerning the liability of officers of the court, or 
ministerial officers, in respect of their conduct in executing warrants issued by a court, make it 
clear that only officers who occupy specific positions in the court which issued the warrant are 
afforded any protection.  That protection derives from the officers’ duty of obedience to the 
court of which they were an officer.   
411 
The Queensland Police officers and Queensland Corrective Services officers who were 
involved in Mr Stradford’s imprisonment plainly enough were not officers of the court.  They 
were obviously not appointed or employed by the Circuit Court.  They also owed no duty of 
obedience to the Circuit Court.  It may be accepted that they may have been obliged to assist 
in the execution and enforcement of warrants issued by judges, including judges of the Circuit 
Court.  Any such obligation, however, arose by virtue of their respective positions as officers 
of the Queensland Police Service, or Queensland Corrective Services, as the case may be.  It 
did not arise by virtue of any position they occupied with, or any duty they owed to, the Circuit 
Court.   
412 
Accordingly, to the extent that the common law authorities indicate that officers of the court, 
or ministerial officers, are afforded a special defence in circumstances where they execute 
warrants, that defence does not apply in the case of the officers of the Queensland Police and 
Queensland Corrective Services.  
LIABILITY AT COMMON LAW OF CONSTABLES AND “GAOLERS” ACTING ON 
ORDERS OF AN INFERIOR COURT  
413 
A number of points should be noted or reiterated before addressing the authorities concerning 
the liability at common law of constables and “gaolers” acting pursuant to orders made, or 
warrants issued, by an inferior court. 
414 
First, the relevant question is whether police officers and gaolers have a defence when their 
otherwise tortious acts were committed in the execution of an order made, or warrant issued, 
by an inferior court which was later found to be invalid.  The question does not arise in respect 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
100 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 178 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 116 of 225
 
of orders made, or warrants issued, by a superior court.  That is because, as discussed earlier, 
such orders are valid until set aside.  There is, therefore, no doubt that constables and prison 
officers who detain or imprison a person pursuant to an order made by a superior court are not 
liable if that order is subsequently set aside. 
415 
Second, as already noted, Mr Stradford accepted that different principles perhaps apply in the 
case of officers, or “ministerial officers”, of inferior courts who execute orders or warrants 
issued by such courts.  The Commonwealth disputed that there was any relevant distinction in 
the authorities between ministerial officers and police and prison officers.  It will be necessary 
to resolve that issue in due course.  At this point it suffices to observe that the cases which 
concern the liability of court officers and ministerial officers should be approached with some 
caution and with that potential distinction in mind.      
416 
Third, some of the English authorities should also be approached with caution.  That is because 
the perceived harshness of the common law concerning the liability of police officers and 
gaolers when acting in execution of warrants issued by magistrates or inferior court judges was 
ameliorated in England by statute as long ago as 1750.  The 24 Geo II, c 44  (Constables 
Protection Act) 1750 (Imp) was, as its name suggests, an “act for the rendering justices of the 
peace more safe in the execution of their office; and for indemnifying constables and others 
acting in obedience to their warrants”.  Section 6 of the Constables Protection Act provided 
protection to “any constable, headborough or other officer, or … any person or persons acting 
by his order and in his aid, for any thing done in obedience to any warrant under the hand or 
seal of any justice of the peace”.  The phrase “other officer” was held to extend to a gaoler: see 
Butt v Newman (1819) 171 ER 850; Gerard v Hope at 63. 
417 
Putting aside the obvious point that it is difficult to see why there would have been a need for 
the Constables Protection Act if the common law recognised a defence for constables acting in 
obedience to a warrant, the other point to emphasise is that the protection afforded by that Act 
essentially became part of the fabric of the law in England insofar as the liability of constables 
was concerned.  Broad statements of principle in some of the English cases accordingly must 
be approached with caution lest they be based on the “suppressed premise” that the defence or 
protection afforded to constables acting in obedience to warrants was in fact the statutory 
defence or protection (cf Kable v New South Wales (2012) 268 FLR 1; [2012] NSWCA 243 
at [48] per Allsop P).    
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
101 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 179 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 117 of 225
 
Cases relied on by Mr Stradford 
418 
Mr Stradford cited a number of very early English cases in which executing officers were held 
liable for conduct engaged by them in execution of orders or warrants subsequently found to 
be invalid: see Nicholas v Walker and Carter (1634) Cro Car 394; 79 ER 944; Read v Wilmot 
(1672) 1 Vent 220; 86 ER 148; Shergold v Holloway (1734) Sess Cas KB 154; 93 ER 156; also 
2 Str 1002; 93 ER 995; Morse v James (1738) Willes 122; 125 ER 1089; and Perkin v Proctor 
and Green (1768) 2 Wils KB 382; 95 ER 874.  It is unnecessary to consider those cases further, 
save to note that, aside from Perkin, they were all decided prior to the enactment of the 
Constables Protection Act.   
419 
A convenient starting point is the decision in Morrell v Martin (1841) 3 Man & G 581; 133 
ER 1273. 
420 
In Morell v Martin, a constable seized the plaintiff’s property (two stacks of wheat) under the 
authority of two justices of the peace for the non-payment of rates levied for the repair of 
highways.  The plaintiff sued the constable in replevin for the return of the goods.  In his 
defence, the constable pleaded reliance on the warrant, though that plea did not aver facts that 
would have established that the justices had jurisdiction to issue the warrant, including that the 
plaintiff was an occupier and had been duly assessed.  This case was heard after the 
commencement of the Constables Protection Act, however that Act did not apply because an 
action for replevin was not within its terms.  The question whether the constable’s plea was 
good was therefore determined on the basis of the common law.   
421 
The court found in favour of the plaintiff.  Chief Justice Tindal, who delivered the judgment of 
the court, reasoned as follows (at 133 ER 1278-1279): 
But notwithstanding the inference to be derived from these cases, we think the sounder 
construction is, that in the case of a justification at common law by a constable under 
the warrant of a justice of the peace, the plea is bad which does not shew the justice 
had jurisdiction over the subject-matter upon which the warrant is granted. If, at the 
common law the constable might have justified under the warrant simply, and 
independently of the consideration, whether the justice who issued it had jurisdiction 
or not, there would surely have been no necessity for the enactment contained in the 
sixth section of the 24 G. 2, c. 44 [Constables Protection Act], that if after a demand 
of the warrant, the action is brought against the constable without making the justice 
of peace defendant, the jury shall give their verdict for defendant, “notwithstanding 
any defect of jurisdiction in the justice of the peace;” and if such action be brought 
jointly against them both, then, on proof of such warrant, the jury shall find for such 
constable, “notwithstanding such defect of jurisdiction”; a provision which necessarily 
implies, as it appears to us, that at common law, and before the statute, the want of 
jurisdiction in the justice took away the protection of the constable who executed the 
warrant. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
102 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 180 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 118 of 225
 
422 
After referring to some earlier authorities, his Honour continued (at 133 ER 1279): 
Upon these grounds it appears to us, that when a limited authority only is given, as in 
the present case, if the party to whom such authority is given, extends the exercise of 
his jurisdiction to objects not within it, his warrant will be no protection to the officers 
who act under it; and that, by necessary consequence, where an officer justifies under 
a warrant so granted by a court of limited jurisdiction, he must shew that the warrant 
was granted in a case which fell within such limited jurisdiction; and that the present 
plea containing no sufficient allegation to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the 
justices, is bad, and that there must be judgment, on such plea, for the plaintiff. 
423 
It can be seen that the constable’s plea failed because the warrant in question was issued by an 
inferior court and the constable did not plead or show that the warrant was issued within the 
court’s jurisdiction.  The main thrust of Tindal CJ’s reasoning was that if, at common law, a 
constable could rely on the warrant in his defence, despite the fact that the warrant was invalid 
as a result of a “want of jurisdiction” on the part of the issuing justice, there would have been 
no need to enact the Constables Protection Act.   
424 
The next case of significance is the decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales in Feather v Rogers (1909) 9 SR (NSW) 192.  This case is of particular 
significance because it is a decision of an intermediate appellate court in Australia.  The facts 
of the case were fairly straightforward.  A justice issued a search warrant in respect of the 
plaintiff’s premises.  The defendant aided a constable in the execution of that warrant.  The 
warrant was subsequently held to be void.  That was because, before issuing the warrant, the 
justice had to be satisfied by evidence on oath that he had reasonable cause to suspect certain 
things.  The evidence did not establish that the issuing justice had in fact been so satisfied.   
425 
It would appear, that at this point in time, the Constables Protection Act was in force in New 
South Wales.  That was not, however, brought to the attention of the trial judge.  It was for that 
reason that the Full Court ultimately ordered a new trial.  Importantly, however, each of the 
judges on the Full Court held that the defendant had no defence available to him at common 
law and that, apart from the statutory defence, there should have been a verdict for the plaintiff.  
Acting Chief Justice Simpson delivered the lead judgment.  His Honour said (at 196-197): 
I never entertained a doubt from the commencement of this case, and I do not entertain 
the slightest doubt now, that the Justice acted without jurisdiction in issuing this 
warrant. It is utterly immaterial whether the form has been in use for years or not. The 
warrant which was issued, founded upon the information, was issued without 
jurisdiction. If a constable executes a warrant which the Magistrate had no jurisdiction 
to issue, the warrant affords him no protection at common law, and if a person, aiding 
the constable, commits a trespass on the lands or house of another, a warrant issued 
without jurisdiction is at common law no protection to that person. Apart, therefore, 
from the Statute 24 Geo. II. [Constables Protection Act], there ought to have been, a 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
103 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 181 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 119 of 225
 
verdict for the plaintiff for something His Honour, however, directed a verdict for the 
defendant upon the case as it was presented to the jury. In my opinion the learned 
Judge, so far as the common law is concerned, should have left the case to the jury and 
directed them in accordance with the first ground of the rule nisi. I am also of opinion 
that the defendant failed to prove his plea of justification. 
426 
Justice Cohen, who agreed with Simpson ACJ, said (at 198): 
I concur in the conclusion arrived at by the Acting Chief Justice, and I quite agree with 
him that at common law the defendant would have had no answer to the action. That 
is perfectly patent from the Statute 24 Geo. II. [Constables Protection Act], in which it 
is recited that the purport of the statute is to relieve constables and persons acting in 
aid of them from the liability to which they are exposed in executing warrants which 
they are bound to execute. That obviously shows that at common law their liability in 
executing warrants which are issued without jurisdiction exists. 
427 
Justice Rogers agreed with both Simpson ACJ and Cohen J that, but for the Constables 
Protection Act, “the defendant would have been without any defence whatever” (at 200). 
428 
It should be emphasised that, while both Simpson ACJ and Cohen J referred to the issuing 
justice having acted “without jurisdiction”, it is readily apparent that the justice in question had 
the jurisdiction to entertain the application to issue the warrant and also to issue search warrants 
of the sort in question.  As noted earlier, the problem for the defendant was that he was unable 
to prove that a necessary condition for the issue of the warrant in question – that the justice was 
satisfied by evidence given on oath that he had reasonable cause to suspect certain things – had 
been met.  The use by both Simpson ACJ and Cohen J of the expression “without jurisdiction” 
must be understood in that context.   
429 
It should also be noted that the reasoning of both Simpson ACJ and Cohen J did not suggest 
that the defendant was only liable because that deficiency was apparent on the face of the 
warrant.  Indeed, the deficiency was not readily apparent on the face of the warrant.  The 
warrant stated that the officer who applied for the warrant had “made information and 
complaint on oath” before the justice that the officer had reasonable cause to suspect the 
requisite things.  That is not to say that the issuing justice was not himself satisfied, based on 
the information put before him, that there was reasonable cause to suspect those things.    
430 
Mr Stradford also relied on the decision of Crisp J in Gerard v Hope.  The facts of that case 
were outlined earlier.  It will be recalled that the plaintiff was arrested by a constable and 
imprisoned on the basis of a warrant issued by a justice of the peace who had no jurisdiction to 
issue the warrant in question.  The plaintiff successfully sued the justice, the constable and the 
gaoler.  The liability of the justice was discussed earlier.  The gaoler pleaded that he was not 
liable because he had obeyed a warrant which was valid on its face.  That plea, which was said 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
104 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 182 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 120 of 225
 
to have been based on the common law, not statute, was found to be unsound.  Judge Crisp’s 
reasons for rejecting the plea were as follows (at 62): 
It is unsound because it does not allege that the justice had jurisdiction in respect of 
the subject matter nor does the evidence establish that he had. It is sufficient to cite 
Burn’s Justice of the Peace, 30th edn., Vol. 1, p. 1021: 
“Where a constable justifies his acts at common law under the warrant of a 
justice of the peace, the justification is insufficient, unless it shows that the 
justice had jurisdiction over the subject-matter upon which the warrant was 
granted. And though no want of jurisdiction appears on the face of the warrant, 
still the officer is not protected by it for what he does under it, unless the justice 
who issued it had jurisdiction in the case. (Morell v. Martin, 4 Scott, N.R. 306. 
But see Andrew v. Marris, 1 Q.B. 3; Carratt v. Morley, l Q.B. 18.)”  
and I have in any event as far as the defendant Hornibrook is concerned negatived its 
possible application by my findings as to the apparent invalidity of the warrant with 
which we are concerned. In my opinion if the plea is still regarded as being relied upon 
it does not avail. 
431 
Thus it would appear that the gaoler was found liable both because he was unable to show that 
the justice had jurisdiction to issue the warrant and because the invalidity of the warrant was 
apparent on its face. 
432 
Both the gaoler and the constable also relied on the Constables Protection Act, which was in 
force in Tasmania at the time.  It is unnecessary to consider Crisp J’s reasons as to why the 
defences based on that Act, as well as other statutory defences, were not made out.  
433 
The next case of importance is the decision of the High Court in Corbett v The King (1932) 47 
CLR 317; [1932] HCA 36.  The Commonwealth also relied on this decision, though Mr 
Stradford submitted that when the reasons of Gavan Duffy CJ, Rich and Dixon JJ are closely 
analysed, they in fact support his case.   
434 
The facts of the case were that a magistrate issued a warrant under the Landlord and Tenant 
Act 1899-1930 (NSW) which directed the police to enter certain premises, eject the occupants 
and give possession to the owner of the property.  That warrant was executed by police officers, 
however the occupants resisted and were, as a result, charged with resisting and wilfully 
obstructing the police in the execution of their duty.  The occupants defended that charge on 
the basis that the police were not acting in the exercise of their duty because the warrant did 
not comply with the requirements of the Landlord and Tenant Act.   
435 
At the trial of the occupants, the trial judge held that even if the warrant was invalid, it was not 
invalid on its face and that a constable who executed such a warrant was acting in the exercise 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
105 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 183 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 121 of 225
 
of his duty.  Chief Justice Gavan Duffy, Rich and Dixon JJ held, however, that that proposition 
was too widely stated.  They reasoned as follows (at 47 CLR 327-328): 
The constables whom the defendants resisted were attempting in the execution of a 
warrant of possession to evict a tenant from a dwelling. There could be no doubt that 
the constables were acting according to the exigency of the warrant, but the contention 
is made that the warrant conferred no authority upon them because it was not issued or 
granted in accordance with the provisions of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1899 and 
was a nullity. The Supreme Court did not decide whether any of the objections made 
to the warrant were well founded. The Court assumed that the warrant did not comply 
with the requirements of the statute, but held that the warrant did not appear upon its 
face to be invalid, and that a constable, who, in good faith, executed such a warrant, 
acted in the execution of his duty. This proposition is somewhat too widely stated. The 
cases decided upon enactments making penal the obstruction or resistance to an officer 
in the course of the execution of his duty show that, when the alleged duty arises from 
a warrant, the charge cannot be sustained unless the warrant did operate in law as an 
authority to the officer, and, unless when he was resisted, he was in the course of 
executing that authority according to law (R. v. Sanders; Codd v. Cabe; R. v. Cumpton; 
R. v. Levesque). It is not enough that the officer was acting bona fide in obedience 
to a warrant, which, although bad, appeared to be good. It is true that generally, 
in such a case, he would not be liable as for an actionable wrong. But he is not 
protected from liability because it is his duty to execute a bad warrant. The 
protection is conferred upon him because “the public interest requires that 
officers who really act in obedience to the warrant of a magistrate should be 
protected” (Price v. Messenger, 24 Geo. II. c. 44 [the Constables’ Protection Act]; 
cf. Landlord and Tenant Act 1899, sec. 28, and Jones v. Chapman). 
(Emphasis added; footnotes omitted) 
436 
Both the Commonwealth and Mr Stradford relied on the emphasised portion of this passage 
from the judgment.  The Commonwealth submitted that that part of the reasoning supported 
the proposition that a constable is generally not liable for an actionable wrong when executing 
a warrant which, while apparently valid on its face, turns out to have been invalid.  Mr Stradford 
submitted, however, that their Honours were saying no more than that a constable is only 
“protected” in those circumstances by operation of the Constables Protection Act.  In other 
words, the constable is not protected at common law.  That was said to be apparent from their 
Honours’ citation of Price v Messenger (1800) 2 Bos & P 158; 126 ER 1213, the Constables 
Protection Act, s 28 of the Landlord and Tenant Act and Jones v Chapman (1845) 14 M & W 
124; 153 ER 416.  There is considerable merit in that submission. 
437 
Price v Messenger was a case in which the operation of the Constables Protection Act was 
decisive.  A magistrate issued a warrant which authorised the police to search for and seize a 
quantity of sugar “concealed or deposited” at the plaintiff’s premises on the basis that it was 
suspected of being stolen.  The warrant also authorised the police to bring the person in whose 
custody the sugar was found before the magistrate.  Some constables went to the plaintiff’s 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
106 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 184 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 122 of 225
 
premises and found some sugar, as well as “a bag of nails and two parcels of tea of which no 
satisfactory account was given”.  Because the warrant did not refer to nails and tea, the 
constables contacted the magistrate for instructions and were ordered to seize the nails and tea, 
as well as the sugar.  The plaintiff was also taken to the magistrate.  The plaintiff was 
subsequently discharged and his property returned on the basis that insufficient evidence had 
been produced against him.  He sued the constables for assault, imprisonment and the seizure 
of his property.  The trial judge directed the jury that the warrant authorised the assault, 
imprisonment and seizure of the sugar, but not the seizure of the tea and nails.  The plaintiff 
was awarded damages in respect of that seizure. 
438 
It is quite clear from the judgment on appeal, which upheld the judgment of the trial judge, that 
the constables were only protected from liability in respect of the assault, imprisonment and 
seizure of the sugar because of the operation of the Constables Protection Act.  They were held 
liable in respect of the seizure of the tea and nails because those items were not specified in the 
warrant.  Lord Eldon said that “[t]he public interest requires that officers who really act in 
obedience to the warrant of a magistrate should be protected” and referred, in that context, to 
the fact that “[t]he statute [the Constables Protection Act] provides that no action shall be 
brought against an officer for any thing done in obedience to any warrant of any justice of the 
peace” (at 126 ER 1215).  It is clear, therefore, that the protection that Lord Eldon was referring 
to was provided by the statute, not the common law. 
439 
Another passage of Lord Eldon’s judgment is instructive as to the position at common law.  His 
Lordship said, in relation to the operation of the Constables Protection Act (at 126 ER 1215): 
The act therefore takes it for granted, that an officer may be said to act in obedience to 
the warrant of a justice of the peace, though such justice had no jurisdiction, and though 
the warrant be an absolute nullity.  For it is as much a defect of jurisdiction, if the 
justice grant an improper warrant in a case over which he has jurisdiction, as if he had 
no jurisdiction over the case at all. 
440 
That passage would tend to support the proposition that, save for the protection provided by 
the Constables Protection Act, a constable would be liable for acts performed in obedience to 
a warrant issued by a justice if the warrant turned out to be invalid either because the justice 
had no jurisdiction to issue the warrant, or because, despite having jurisdiction, the justice 
issued an “improper warrant”.   
441 
The citation of s 28 of the Landlord and Tenant Act also suggests that the protection being 
referred to in the relevant passage in Corbett v The King was statutory protection.  Section 28 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
107 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 185 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 123 of 225
 
of the Landlord and Tenant Act, like the Constables Protection Act, provided statutory 
protection to constables who executed warrants to evict tenants. 
442 
The other case cited in Corbett v The King,  Jones v Chapman was a case like Price v 
Messenger, which concerned the execution of a warrant for possession.  The defendants, 
including some constables, entered the plaintiff’s premises pursuant to a warrant issued by 
justices which authorised them to enter those premises and deliver possession of the premises 
to the owner.  The defendants’ plea sought to justify their entry of the premises on the basis 
that they were acting pursuant to the warrant.  They relied on a statute (1 & 2 Vict c 74 (Small 
Tenements Recovery Act) 1838 (Imp)) which, like s 28 of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 
provided that it was not lawful to bring an action against a constable for executing a warrant 
under the statute by reason that the person on whose application the warrant was issued did not 
have the lawful right to the possession of the premises.  That plea was held to be bad because 
protection under the statute was only provided to constables of the district in which the 
premises were located and the defendants had not established that to be the case.  The report of 
the case also notes that “the plea clearly cannot be regarded as a sufficient justification at 
common law” and notes that the observations of Tindall CJ in Morrell v Martin were 
“applicable to this point” (at 153 ER 419).  
443 
The relevant passage from the judgment of Gavan Duffy CJ, Rich and Dixon JJ in Corbett v 
The King was obiter dicta because the court held that the warrant in question in that case was 
valid.  As can be seen, the passage in any event provides no support for the Commonwealth’s 
position.  Indeed, if anything, it provides support for Mr Stradford’s contention that at common 
law, a constable who executes a warrant issued by an inferior court may be held liable for acts 
committed in the course of executing the warrant if the warrant is found to have been invalidly 
issued, even if the warrant appeared valid on its face.    
Cases relied on by the Commonwealth (and Queensland) 
444 
The main cases relied on by the Commonwealth were (in chronological order): Dr Drury’s 
Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 141; 77 ER 688; Andrews v Marris (1841) 1 QB 3; 113 ER 1030; 
Mooney v Commissioners of Taxation (NSW) (1905) 3 CLR 221; [1905] HCA 61; Hazelton v 
Potter (1907) 5 CLR 445; [1907] HCA 63; Smith v Collis (1910) SR (NSW) 800; Corbett v 
The King; Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Cavanough (1935) 53 CLR 220; [1935] HCA 
45; Posner v Collector for Interstate Destitute Persons (Vic) (1946) 74 CLR 461; [1946] HCA 
50;  Robertson v The Queen (1997) 92 A Crim R 115; von Arnim v Federal Republic of 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
108 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 186 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 124 of 225
 
Germany (No 2) [2005] FCA 662; Kable v New South Wales and  Haskins v The 
Commonwealth (2011) 244 CLR 22; [2011] HCA 28. 
445 
As noted earlier, Queensland essentially agreed and supported the Commonwealth’s 
submissions concerning the position at common law.  It relied on the same cases that were 
relied on by the Commonwealth, though it did not advance any separate submissions of 
substance in relation to those authorities.   
446 
The starting point, so far as the Commonwealth was concerned, was Dr Drury’s Case.  That 
case has been cited as authority for the principle that if acts are done in accordance with a 
judicial order, later set aside, they are protected as “acts done in the execution of justice, which 
are compulsive”: see Cavanough at 53 CLR 225 (Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ); Kable 
v New South Wales at [25] (Allsop P).  That statement of principle, however, must be 
considered in context and treated with caution.  Dr Drury’s Case concerned the liability of a 
sheriff for acts which he was “commanded and compelled by King’s writ” to do.  The passage 
from which the statement of principle is apparently drawn is as follows (at 77 ER 691): 
There is a difference between mean acts done in the execution of justice, which are 
compulsive, and acts which are voluntary: and, therefore, if an erroneous judgment is 
given in debt, and the sheriff, by force of a fieri facias sells a term of the defendant, 
and afterwards the judgment is reversed by a writ of error, yet the term shall not be 
restored, but only the sum, &c. because the sheriff was commanded and compelled by 
King’s writ to sell it, &c. 
(Footnotes omitted) 
447 
The Latin phrase “fieri facias” refers to a writ of execution which directs a specified officer, 
usually a sheriff, to take control of a piece of property and sell it in order to satisfy the owner’s 
debt obligations.   
448 
At the time Dr Drury’s Case was decided, a sheriff was not simply an officer of the court.  His 
“powers and duties could be described as being ‘either as a judge, as the keeper of the king’s 
peace, as a ministerial officer of the superior courts of justice, or as the king’s bailiff’”: R v 
Turnbull; Ex parte Taylor (1968) 123 CLR 28 at 44 (Windeyer J); [1968] HCA 88.  The point 
to emphasise is that the liability of sheriffs and other “ministerial officers”, who were bound to 
execute orders of the court of which they were officers, appears to have been treated differently 
to the liability of other persons who were not so bound.  In particular, a sheriff was not required, 
before executing an order of the court, to examine its legality.  In Watson, A Practical Treatise 
on the Office of Sheriff (Sweet, Maxwell, Stevens & Norton, 1848) it was said (at 67): 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
109 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 187 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 125 of 225
 
When a writ is delivered to a sheriff, he is bound to execute it, according to the 
exigency thereof, without inquiring into the regularity of the proceeding whereon the 
writ is grounded; and it will be found, by a variety of cases, that although the process, 
under which the sheriff takes the person or goods of the defendant, be voidable, or 
erroneous, and of which the defendant might have availed himself in the original 
action, yet such writ is a sufficient justification for the sheriff in an action for trespass 
brought against him, for the sheriff is a ministerial officer in the execution of writs, 
and is not to examine their legality. 
(Emphasis in original; footnotes omitted) 
449 
Similarly, in Churchill and Bruce, The Law of the Office and Duties of the Sheriff (1879, 
Stevens and Sons), it was said (at 278) that in “an action of trespass against the sheriff, the writ 
is a sufficient justification, for the sheriff, being a ministerial officer in the execution of writs, 
is not required to examine into their legality”.  
450 
It appears, therefore, to be tolerably clear that the principle derived from Dr Drury’s Case 
applies only to Sheriffs and similar court officers.  The same can be said concerning the next 
case relied on by the Commonwealth. 
451 
In Moravia v Sloper (1737) Willes 30; 125 ER 1039, Willes LCJ said that “in the case of an 
officer, who is obliged to obey the process of the Court and is punishable if he do not, it may 
not be necessary to set forth that the cause of action arise within the jurisdiction of the Court” 
(at 125 ER 1041).  The Lord Chief Justice explained that the reason that sheriffs and other 
officers of the court were treated differently in that regard was (at 125 ER 1042): 
For the inferior officer is punishable as a minister of the Court if he do not obey it’s 
commands; and it would be unjust that a man should be punished if he does not do a 
thing and should be liable to an action if he does. 
452 
The next case relied on by the Commonwealth, Andrews v Marris, was also a case concerned 
with ministerial officers of the court which issued the warrant.  That is apparent from the fact 
that the court followed Moravia v Sloper.   
453 
The facts of Andrews v Marris were that a clerk of the Caistor Court of Requests issued a 
warrant against the plaintiff in respect of an amount that was said to have been the subject of a 
judgment but remained unpaid.  The warrant was directed to “John Whitham, one of the 
serjeants of the said Court” and commanded and required the “serjeant” to “take and carry … 
the body” of the plaintiff to the prison at Kirton.  The plaintiff was arrested and imprisoned.  
The plaintiff sued the clerk and the “serjeant”, Mr Whitham, for false imprisonment.  The court 
found that the clerk did not have the jurisdiction or authority to issue the warrant.  The action 
against the clerk succeeded, however the action against the “serjeant” failed, essentially 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
110 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 188 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 126 of 225
 
because his situation as an officer of the court was considered to be analogous to that of a 
sheriff.  Lord Chief Justice Denman’s reasons included as follows (at 113 ER 1036): 
The case of the defendant Whitham, however, stands on very different grounds. He is 
the ministerial officer of the commissioners, bound to execute their warrants, and 
having no means whatever of ascertaining whether they issue upon valid judgments or 
are otherwise sustainable or not. There would therefore be something very 
unreasonable in the law if it placed him in the position of being punishable by the Court 
for disobedience, and at the same time suable by the party for obedience to the warrant. 
The law, however, is not so. His situation is exactly analogous to that of the sheriff in 
respect of process from a Superior Court; and it is the well known distinction between 
the cases of the party and of the sheriff or his officer, that the former, to justify his 
taking body or goods under process, must shew the judgment in pleading, as well as 
the writ; but for the latter it is enough to shew the writ only; Cotes v. Michill (3 Lev. 
20); Moravia v. Sloper (Willes, 30, 34).    
454 
It is worth reiterating at this point that, for the reasons given earlier, the MSS guards could not 
be said to have been ministerial officers of the Circuit Court.  Their situation could not be said 
to be analogous to the sheriff in Dr Drury’s Case, or the “serjeant” in Andrews v Marris.  They 
simply provided security services to the Circuit Court pursuant to a contract between their 
employer and the Commonwealth.  Unlike the serjeant in Andrews v Marris, they were not 
named or referred to in the warrant and were not commanded or compelled to do anything 
under the warrant.  Nor were they subject to any punishment if they did not obey the warrant. 
455 
The Commonwealth relied on a short passage in the judgment of Griffith CJ in Mooney  in 
which the decision in Andrews v Marris was cited.  Mooney was not, however, a case 
concerning the liability in tort of a ministerial officer of a court who acted in obedience to an 
invalid warrant issued by an inferior court.  Indeed, it did not concern the liability of anyone 
for acting in obedience to a warrant.  It was a tax case.   
456 
The facts in Mooney were that the Commissioners of Taxation assessed the appellant as being 
liable to pay tax under the Land and Income Tax Assessment Act 1895 (NSW) in respect of an 
amount he received as the purchase money of a mine.  The appellant did not appeal the 
assessment to the Court of Review in the manner prescribed in the Assessment Act.  The 
Commissioners sued for the amount of tax assessed and relied upon the “assessment book” as 
conclusive evidence of their claim pursuant to a provision in the Assessment Act.  The High 
Court held (per Griffith CJ and Barton J, O’Connor J dissenting), that the assessment by the 
Commissioners was in excess of their jurisdiction and the appellant was therefore not bound to 
appeal the assessment to the Court of Review.  He was entitled to wait until he was sued and 
then dispute his liability in that action. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
111 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 189 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 127 of 225
 
457 
One of the critical questions for the court in Mooney was whether the Commissioners had 
jurisdiction to issue the assessments.  That was said to depend on whether their jurisdiction was 
limited to assessing the taxes payable by persons who in fact and law were liable to pay them, 
or whether it also extended to determining whether persons alleged to be liable were in fact 
and law so liable.  The Commissioners argued, based on the decision in Allen v Sharp (1848) 
12 JP 693; 2 Exch 352, that their jurisdiction extended to determining whether persons alleged 
to be liable were in fact and law so liable.  Chief Justice Griffiths (with whom Barton J 
relevantly agreed) held that the decision in Allen v Sharp turned upon the language of the statute 
in question in that case and did not assist the Commissioners.  It was in that context that 
Griffiths CJ said (at 3 CLR 241-242): 
It is also to be remembered that there is a well known distinction between the case of 
an action for trespass brought against an executive officer for executing the warrant of 
a tribunal as to a matter prima facie within its jurisdiction and the case of a similar 
action against the person by whom, or the party at whose instance, the warrant is issued. 
In the former case the action will not lie. In the latter it will, if the matter were not in 
fact and law within the jurisdiction of the tribunal. (See Andrews v. Marris). In my 
judgment, therefore, the case of Allen v. Sharp, does not govern the present case, which 
depends upon a Statute framed on quite different lines. 
(Footnotes omitted) 
458 
The Commonwealth relied on this passage from the judgment of Griffith CJ, apparently on the 
basis that it approved the decision in Andrews v Marris.  Even if that be so, the decision in 
Andrews v Marris related to the liability for trespass of ministerial officers of the court, such 
as sheriffs and sergeants, for acts engaged by them in execution of warrants issued by their 
court.  Chief Justice Griffith uses the expression “executive officer” to describe such officers.  
As has already been noted, the MSS guards were not ministerial officers of the court.   
459 
In all the circumstances, the Commonwealth derives little assistance from Mooney.  That is all 
the more so given that the case did not concern or involve the liability of anyone in respect of 
the execution of a warrant.  The decision in Andrews v Marris also appears to have been cited 
by Griffith CJ for the purpose of distinguishing cases where a tribunal’s jurisdiction extended 
to determining whether matters were within the tribunal’s jurisdiction from cases where the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction was limited to matters which were in fact and law within its jurisdiction. 
460 
The Commonwealth’s reliance on the decisions of the High Court in Hazelton v Potter and 
Haskins is equally questionable.   
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
112 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 190 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 128 of 225
 
461 
Hazelton v Potter was only fleetingly addressed in the Commonwealth’s submissions.  It 
accordingly warrants only fleeting attention in these reasons.  The Commonwealth submitted 
no more than that the whole of the reasoning in the case supported the proposition that, if an 
“enforcing official” executes a warrant which is not defective on its face, the official is 
“protected”.  The Commonwealth did not direct attention to any particular passage in the 
judgment which was said to support that submission.   
462 
I am unable to see how the Commonwealth is able to derive any assistance from Hazelton v 
Potter, or how that case could be said to be authority for the proposition advanced by the 
Commonwealth.  The police officer who purported to execute the warrant in question in 
Hazelton v Potter was found liable essentially because the warrant did not authorise the 
officer’s conduct at all.  The police officer “was not within the terms of the persons described 
in the warrant” and the warrant provided “no justification of the conduct pursued towards the 
appellant” (Barton J at 5 CLR 463). 
463 
The Commonwealth’s reliance on Haskins can also be dealt with shortly.  In that case, an able 
seaman was found guilty by the Australian Military Court of misusing a travel card.  He was 
sentenced to, and served, a period of detention.  The provisions in the Act which established 
the Australian Military Court were subsequently declared to be invalid.  Parliament then 
enacted legislation to restore the system of military discipline.  The able seaman brought a 
claim in the High Court alleging that the new legislation was invalid because, among other 
things, it extinguished his cause of action against the Commonwealth for the tort of false 
imprisonment.  The High Court considered, in that context, the availability of an action for 
false imprisonment. 
464 
The Commonwealth relied on the following passages from the judgment of the majority 
(French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) (at [64] and [67]): 
The present case should be decided on the footing that the acts of which the plaintiff 
complains were acts done by one member of the defence force to another in obedience 
to what appeared to be a lawful command. The acts were not done for any reason other 
than the bona fide application of a kind of disciplinary measure for which the 
Discipline Act provided. That is, the punishment imposed was a lawful form of 
punishment. The punishment was executed in the manner prescribed by law. The 
complaint of false imprisonment is founded wholly on the invalidity of the law that 
established the body that imposed the punishment. No allegation of improper purpose, 
“malice” (whether that is understood as spite, ill will, ulterior motive, or otherwise) or 
oppression is made or was available. The plaintiff’s detention was effected in 
obedience to commands made by a warrant that those to whom the warrant was 
directed had no occasion to believe were other than lawful commands. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
113 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 191 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 129 of 225
 
… 
To permit the plaintiff to maintain an action against those who executed that 
punishment (whether service police or the officer in charge of the Corrective 
Establishment) would be destructive of discipline. Obedience to lawful command is at 
the heart of a disciplined and effective defence force. To allow an action for false 
imprisonment to be brought by one member of the services against another where that 
other was acting in obedience to orders of superior officers implementing disciplinary 
decisions that, on their face, were lawful orders would be deeply disruptive of what is 
a necessary and defining characteristic of the defence force. It would be destructive of 
discipline because to hold that an action lies would necessarily entail that a subordinate 
to whom an apparently lawful order was directed must either question and disobey the 
order, or take the risk of incurring a personal liability in tort. 
465 
The Commonwealth’s reliance on those passages from the judgment of the majority in Haskins 
is problematic.  That is because the principles discussed in those passages plainly concern 
military justice, discipline and punishment.  Nothing of any relevance is said about the 
principles that apply in respect of the liability of non-military police and gaolers for acts done 
to civilians in the execution of invalid warrants issued by civilian inferior courts.  That is readily 
apparent from even a cursory consideration of what is said in the passages in question.  It is 
made crystal clear in the paragraphs of the judgment which are sandwiched between the two 
paragraphs relied on by the Commonwealth.  The majority refer (at [65]) to what was said by 
Willes J in Keighly v Bell (1866) 4 F & F 763; 176 ER 781 and Pollock in The Law of Torts 
(1st ed, 1887) about the liability of a subordinate soldier for acts done in obedience to his 
commanding officer.  Their Honours then observe (at [66]): 
The application of a principle expressed in the form adopted by Willes J or by Pollock 
to acts done by a member of the defence force to civilians would raise very different 
issues from those that arise here, but those issues need not be explored. Attention is 
confined to acts done by one member of the force to another in intended execution of 
orders that reasonably appeared to be lawful orders of a superior officer.  
466 
In my view, nothing said in Haskins provides any support for the proposition advanced by the 
Commonwealth in this case.  
467 
The judgment in Corbett v The King was discussed earlier.  In my view, the passage from the 
judgment in Corbett v The King that is relied on by the Commonwealth in fact provides support 
for Mr Stradford’s contentions concerning the relevant principles. 
468 
The Commonwealth relied on the decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales in Smith v Collis.  That case concerned an action against the governor of a gaol 
for a penalty under s 6 of the 31 Car II, c 2  (Habeas Corpus Act)  1679  (Imp) for having 
knowingly imprisoned the plaintiff for the same offence for which he had been imprisoned 
before and freed upon the issue of a writ of habeas corpus.  The plaintiff contended that the 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
114 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 192 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 130 of 225
 
governor’s knowledge in that respect could be inferred from the “material before him when he 
received the plaintiff into his custody” (at 813).  The court rejected that contention and found 
that the evidence “clearly stops short of the proof required to make [the governor] liable” (at 
813).  It was in that context that the Chief Justice said (at 813): 
In the ordinary course of things the discharge of the governor’s duties would become 
impossible if he were called upon to decide upon the validity of a warrant good on the 
face of it, and his duty is simply to obey and not to question. In the case of actions for 
false imprisonment this has been made absolutely clear. In the case of Demer v. Cook 
(20 Cox C.C., at p. 448), it is said, “The authorities cited by the Attorney-General: 
Olliet v. Bessey (Sir Thomas Jones’ Reps. 214, 215); Butt v. Newman (Gow 97); 
Countess of Rutland’s Case (6 Rep. 54a); Henderson v. Preston (59 L.T. Rep. 334, 21 
Q.B.D. 362), and Greaves v. Keene (40 L.T. Rep. 216; 4 Ex. D. 73) – are, in my 
opinion, conclusive to show that where a gaoler receives a prisoner under a warrant 
which is correct in form, no action will lie against him if it should turn out that the 
warrant was improperly issued, or that the Court had no jurisdiction to issue it.” And 
at p. 449 “the warrant and nothing else is the protection of the gaoler, and he is not 
entitled to question it or go behind it.” 
469 
Mr Stradford submitted that this passage from the judgment of the Chief Justice was no more 
than an explanation of the legislative policy supporting his Honour’s construction of the Act.  
That is somewhat difficult to accept, though it may be accepted that the passage was obiter 
dicta given that the question whether the governor could rely on the warrant was not the 
decisive issue in the case.  Rather, the decisive issue was whether the governor had knowingly 
imprisoned someone contrary to the Habeas Corpus Act.  That said, the passage from the 
judgment in Demer v Cook (1903) 88 LT 629; 20 Cox CC quoted by the Chief Justice does 
seem to suggest that an action cannot lie against a gaoler for receiving a prisoner under a 
warrant which is correct in form.   
470 
The persuasive force of the obiter observations of the Chief Justice is, however, undermined 
somewhat when close consideration is given to the main case cited by his Honour, Demer v 
Cook, and the authorities cited in it.  In Demer v Cook, the gaoler in question was in fact found 
to be liable for acting under an invalid warrant (cf Kable v New South Wales at [47]), or at least 
acting pursuant to documents that could not be said to constitute a valid warrant.  The citation, 
in Demer v Cook, of the decisions in Olliet v Bessey (1682) T Jones Rep 214; 84 ER 1223 and 
Henderson v Preston (1888) 21 QBD 362, is also somewhat questionable.  The problem in 
Olliet v Bessey was not that the warrant in question was invalid.  Rather, the problem was that 
the officers who arrested the person pursuant to a valid warrant acted outside the geographical 
limits of the warrant.  The gaoler was held not to be liable in tort because he was presented 
with a valid warrant and he was not duty bound to inquire as to whether the arresting officers 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
115 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 193 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 131 of 225
 
had acted within the terms of the warrant.  Henderson v Preston similarly involved a valid 
warrant which the gaoler complied with its terms.  The problem in that case was that, 
unbeknownst to the gaoler, the prisoner had already spent a night in custody.    
471 
The Commonwealth did not expressly rely on Demer v Cook or the other cases identified in 
the relevant passage from the judgment of the Chief Justice in Smith v Collis.  While it might 
have cited some of those cases in its lengthy written submissions, and may have fleetingly, 
though parenthetically, referred to them in its oral submissions, it did not take the Court to 
those cases or the reasoning in them.  There is a limit to whether the Court must chase every 
rabbit down every burrow.  I am nevertheless prepared to proceed on the basis that those cases 
appear, at first blush at least, provide some support for the Commonwealth’s position and 
appear to be inconsistent with the authorities that deal with the liability of constables who act 
pursuant to a warrant. 
472 
The next decision that it is necessary to consider is the judgment in Cavanough.  The 
Commonwealth relied on Cavanough because Dr Drury’s Case is cited as authority for the 
proposition that “[a]cts done according to the exigency of a judicial order afterwards reversed 
are protected: they are ‘acts done in the execution of justice, which are compulsive’” (at 53 
CLR 225).  As discussed earlier, however, that statement of principle must be considered with 
some caution because in Dr Drury’s Case it was effectively confined to the issue of the liability 
of the sheriff, who was an officer of the court.  Moreover, the citation of Dr Drury’s Case in 
Cavanough must be considered in the context of the issues which were addressed in that case. 
473 
Cavanough did not concern the liability of an officer of the court, still less a constable or a 
gaoler, for acts committed in the execution of a warrant issued by an inferior court.  Rather, the 
case concerned an officer of the Commissioner for Railways who was convicted of the offence 
of larceny.  He was then suspended from his job.  The officer’s conviction was subsequently 
set aside on appeal.  He sued the Commissioner for his salary during the period of his 
suspension.  The Commissioner relied on a statutory provision which provided that an officer 
convicted of a felony shall be deemed to have vacated his office.  The High Court held that, 
upon the setting aside of the officer’s conviction, the conviction was avoided ab initio.  It 
followed that he could not be deemed to have vacated his office.  It was in that context that Dr 
Drury’s Case was cited, including for the proposition that “[a]cts done according to the 
exigency of a judicial order afterwards reversed are protected” (at 53 CLR 225).  It is, in those 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
116 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 194 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 132 of 225
 
circumstances, doubtful that the reasoning in Cavanough greatly assists in resolving the issue 
in question in this case.     
474 
The decision in Posner requires closer consideration.  Posner did not itself concern the liability 
of an officer in respect of acts carried out in execution of an order or warrant issued by an 
inferior court.  The judgments in Posner do, however, refer to some cases that do concern that 
scenario.  The facts of the case were, in summary, that Mr Posner was served in Victoria with 
a maintenance order which had been made against him in Perth.  He also received a demand 
for the payment of arrears under that order.  A summons was subsequently issued calling on 
him to show cause why he should not be imprisoned for failing to pay moneys in accordance 
with the order.  Mr Posner persuaded the Court of Petty Sessions that he had not been served 
with any process in Perth in respect of the maintenance order and the court held that the order 
was a nullity.  The court nevertheless held that it was bound to give effect to the order.  Mr 
Posner applied for a review of that order.  The High Court held, by majority, that the 
maintenance order was not a nullity and could properly be made the subject of the proceeding 
in Victoria.  It was in that context that reference was made to the authorities concerning the 
execution of invalid warrants.  
475 
Justice Starke said (at 74 CLR 476): 
A party, however, executing the process of an inferior court in a matter beyond its 
jurisdiction is liable to action and cannot justify under such process whether he knows 
the defect or not but the magistrate is only liable if he knew of the defect of jurisdiction 
(Calder v. Halket; Houlden v. Smith; Mayor etc. of London v. Cox). And an officer 
executing and obeying such process is protected (ibid). 
(Footnotes omitted) 
476 
Justice Dixon said (at 74 CLR 481-482): 
Another rule was expressed by Denman C.J. in Andrews v. Marris. Speaking of one of 
the defendants, his Lordship said: - “He is the ministerial officer of the commissioners, 
bound to execute their warrants, and having no means whatever of ascertaining 
whether they issue upon valid judgments or are otherwise sustainable or not. There 
would therefore be something very unreasonable in the law if it placed him in the 
position of being punishable by the Court for disobedience, and at the same time suable 
by the party for obedience to the warrant. The law, however, is not so. His situation is 
exactly analogous to that of the sheriff in respect of process from a Superior Court; and 
it is the well known distinction between the cases of the party and of the sheriff or his 
officer, that the former, to justify his taking body or goods under process, must show 
the judgment in pleading, as well as the writ; but for the latter it is enough to show the 
writ only; Cotes v. Michill; Moravia v. Sloper. It was said, indeed, for the plaintiff, that 
these and the numerous other authorities which might be cited to the same effect all 
went upon the principle that the proceeding, however irregular, was the Act of the 
Court.” Thus a conviction or order might be inefficacious in favour of a party but might 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
117 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 195 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 133 of 225
 
have some operation as against the other party in favour of officers etc. 
(Footnotes omitted) 
477 
Mr Stradford submitted that these passages from the judgments of Starke J and Dixon J in 
Posner do not take the matter any further.  Rather, they simply confirm the distinction between 
ministerial officers of the court and other offices.  In his submission, that analysis was 
supported by the fact that Dixon J quoted from the reasons of Denman CJ in Andrew v Marris 
and Starke J cited London v Cox (1867) LR 2 HL 239 at 263 in support of the statement that 
“an officer executing and obeying such process is protected”.  The page from the judgment of 
London v Cox cited by Starke J in turn cites Moravia v Sloper and Andrews v Marris.  
478 
There is some merit in Mr Stradford’s submission that the judgments in Posner do not take the 
matter any further.  As already noted, Posner did not concern the liability, or potential liability, 
of any officer for acts done in the execution of the warrant.  The safer course, in those 
circumstances, is to address what is actually decided in cases such as Andrews v Marris and 
Moravia v Sloper, as opposed to the summary of those cases in what were effectively obiter 
observations made by Starke J and Dixon J concerning those cases.  
479 
The next case relied on by the Commonwealth, Robertson v The Queen, cannot so readily be 
put to one side.  It provides some support for the defence relied on by the Commonwealth and 
Queensland.  Mr Stradford submitted, however, that the case was wrongly decided and that I 
should not follow it. 
480 
Robertson v The Queen was a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western 
Australia.  Ordinarily, of course, I should follow a decision of a State intermediate appellate 
court: cf Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89; [2007] HCA 22 
at [135].  I am, however, confronted by conflicting decisions of intermediate appellate courts.  
The decision in Robertson v The Queen appears to conflict with the decision in Feather v 
Rogers.  In those circumstances, I can “only proceed to determine the issue by considering 
which approach is correct in principle”: Obeid v Lockly (2018) 98 NSWLR 258; [2018] 
NSWCA 71 at [170] (Bathurst CJ). 
481 
The facts in Robertson v The Queen were that the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for 
an offence.  He was subsequently convicted of further offences in respect of which fines were 
imposed by a magistrate.  The magistrate ordered that if the appellant defaulted in the payment 
of the fines he would be required to serve short periods of imprisonment which were to be 
served cumulatively.  The warrant of commitment, however, incorrectly stated that the terms 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
118 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 196 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 134 of 225
 
of imprisonment would not only be cumulative on each other, but also cumulative on any other 
sentence the appellant was serving.  As a result of that error, and the fact that he did not pay 
the fines, the appellant served 56 more days in prison than was in fact required by the default 
sentences.  He sued the State of Western Australia on the basis that it was vicariously liable for 
the act of the responsible prison authority.  The trial judge dismissed that action on the basis 
that the appellant’s imprisonment had in fact been correctly calculated.  The Full Court found 
otherwise, but nonetheless dismissed the appellant’s appeal on the basis that the prison 
superintendent did not act unlawfully in imprisoning the appellant pursuant to the warrant of 
commitment even if the warrant was incorrect and unlawful. 
482 
Justice Steytler, with whom Malcolm CJ and Franklyn J agreed, held, in essence, that the prison 
superintendent could not be held liable for acting on a warrant which was valid on its face, but 
which turned out to have been wrongly issued.  That conclusion was based on his Honour’s 
review of various authorities, including Sirros v Moore,  London v Cox,  Posner,  Oldham 
Justices; Ex parte Cawley (1996) 2 WLR 681; 1 All ER 464 and Isaacs v Robertson [1985] 
AC 97; [1984] 3 All ER 140.  His Honour concluded (at AC 125): 
In the circumstances of this case, and in the light of the authorities to which I have 
referred, it seems to me that, if it be accepted that the warrant was unlawful and subject 
to being set aside, that did not render unlawful the conduct of the prison superintendent 
in acting upon the warrant. Rather, the warrant, being ex facie an order of a court of 
competent jurisdiction, was required to be obeyed by the prison authorities until 
discharged by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
483 
Mr Stradford submitted that Steytler J’s conclusion was wrong and his Honour’s reasoning was 
defective.  That was said to be the case for the following reasons.  First, Steytler J did not refer 
to the earlier intermediate appellate court decision in Feather v Rogers.  There is no indication 
that counsel drew that decision to his Honour’s attention.  Second, Steytler J failed to take into 
account the likelihood that the statements made by Lord Denning MR in Sirros v Moore upon 
which his Honour relied were premised on or influenced by the operation of the Constables 
Protection Act.  Third, in relying on what was said in London v Cox and Posner, Steytler J 
failed to have regard to the fact that the line of authority referred to in those cases concerned 
ministerial officers of the court, not constables and gaolers.  Fourth, his Honour appears to have 
been influenced by the irrelevant consideration that modern legislation does not favour the 
invalidation of orders of magistrates or other inferior courts.  Fifth, his Honour was wrong in 
saying that Simon Brown LJ in Cawley had cited, with apparent approval, Romer LJ’s 
judgment in Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] P 285; 2 All ER 567 because the passage of the 
judgment in Cawley which refers to Hadkinson was simply a recitation of counsel’s 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
119 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 197 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 135 of 225
 
submissions.  Sixth, his Honour was wrong to rely on the decision of Lord Diplock in Isaacs 
because that case concerned an order made by a superior court.        
484 
There is merit in Mr Stradford’s submission that Robertson v The Queen was wrongly decided 
and that I should not follow it.  I am not persuaded that Steytler J’s reasoning or assessment of 
the authorities was accurate or complete.  It is, as Mr Stradford submitted, of some significance 
that his Honour did not refer to Feather v Rogers.  As for some of the other authorities 
considered by his Honour, it is unnecessary to repeat what I have already said about the 
decisions in Posner and London v Cox.  The authorities considered in those cases primarily 
concern the liability of ministerial officers of the court, such as sheriffs and sergeants.  The 
generalised statement by Lord Denning MR in Sirros v Moore is also deserving of little weight 
in circumstances where it was supported by minimal reasoning and the Constables Protection 
Act was in force in any event.           
485 
Perhaps more significantly, in my view, Steytler J erred in relying, it appears to a significant 
extent, on the judgment of Simon Brown LJ in Cawley.  Properly considered, Cawley provides 
no support for the conclusion reached by his Honour.  Cawley did not concern the liability of 
an officer, such as a prison warden, who acted in execution of a warrant subsequently found to 
be void.  While it did involve warrants of commitment issued by inferior courts which were 
found to be defective, the issue before the court in Cawley was whether writs of habeas corpus 
should issue to secure the release of the minors who were the subject of those warrants.  The 
court held that writs of habeas corpus should not issue because an applicable statutory provision 
provided, in effect, that the warrants were not void and that the detention under the warrants 
was therefore not unlawful until the warrants were quashed.  The court also held that habeas 
corpus was not a necessary, recognised or appropriate means by which a defective warrant of 
commitment could be challenged.  It is also correct, as Mr Stradford submitted, that Simon 
Brown LJ did not cite the passages from Hadkinson referred to in his Lordship’s judgment.  
Those passages were identified or referred to as part of counsel’s submissions.  His Honour 
also only referred to Isaacs as part of counsel’s submissions.  
486 
My consideration of the relevant authorities, including those referred to and relied on by 
Steytler J in Robertson, leads me to conclude that Robertson was wrongly decided.   
487 
The next case relied on by the Commonwealth was von Arnim.  In that case, the applicant sued 
the Commonwealth and the Minister for Justice and Customs for, among other things, false 
imprisonment arising from his arrest and subsequent imprisonment pursuant to warrants issued 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
120 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 198 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 136 of 225
 
pursuant to the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth).  The applicant was released when the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General was advised that a German court had dismissed the arrest 
warrant which had issued in Germany and which had provided the basis for the extradition 
process and proceedings in Australia.  It is important to note, however, that the warrants issued 
under the Extradition Act had not been challenged, let alone set aside, by a court of competent 
jurisdiction.  It was in that context that Finkelstein J made some brief observations about what 
his Honour considered to be the assumptions underlying the applicant’s claim.    
488 
First, his Honour said that it was “by no means clear that a warrant which on its face appears 
to have been regularly issued can be disregarded” and that the “few cases” his Honour had 
looked at suggested that “the opposite is likely to be true” (at [5]).  His Honour cited, in the 
context of that observation, the decisions in Posner, Hadkinson and Cawley.   
489 
Second, his Honour observed that the applicant’s case proceeded on the assumption that, if he 
was able to show that the two warrants issued under the Extradition Act “should not have been 
issued” that would “make good his claim that his imprisonment was unlawful” (at [6]).  His 
Honour observed that that assumption was “probably false” and that “[a]ccording to the 
authorities there can be no action for false imprisonment if the imprisonment is in execution of 
an order which appears to have been regularly made by a judicial officer, even if the order is 
without jurisdiction” (at [6]).  His Honour cited, in support of that proposition, London v Cox 
and Ward v Murphy and Andrew v Marris. 
490 
In my view, the observations made by Finkelstein J do not take the issue much further.  They 
were no doubt obiter dicta and were in any event highly qualified.   
491 
The first observation was based on his Honour’s consideration of only a “few cases” and his 
observation was qualified by the words “it is by no means clear”.  The decisions in Posner, 
Hadkinson and Cawley have been addressed earlier in these reasons.  
492 
The second observation was that the assumption that the applicant’s case would be made out if 
the warrants should not have been issued was “probably false”.  The decisions in London v Cox 
and Andrews v Marris have been addressed earlier in these reasons.  As for Ward v Murphy, it 
concerned the liability of a sheriff – a ministerial officer – who declined to immediately release 
someone on the basis of correspondence which advised that the order pursuant to which a 
person had been imprisoned had been quashed.  The court held, among other things, that the 
sheriff was entitled to a reasonable time in order to make inquiries and that it would be 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
121 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 199 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 137 of 225
 
unreasonable for the jury to find that he acted unreasonably in leaving his inquiries in that 
regard until the morning.  It provides little support for his Honour’s observation and even less 
support for the Commonwealth’s case in this matter.  
493 
The final case relied on by the Commonwealth was Kable v New South Wales.  The applicant 
in that case was imprisoned by order of a Supreme Court judge made under a statute which was 
subsequently held to be constitutionally invalid.  He brought an action against the State which 
included a claim for false imprisonment on the basis that the State was vicariously liable for 
the conduct of its officers, including those who were responsible for detaining him.  The State 
sought to rely on what it said was a common law principle that, whether or not the order was 
of a superior court, persons who obeyed court orders were protected from suit.  The trial judge 
struck out the applicant’s claim for false imprisonment. 
494 
On appeal to the Court of Appeal of New South Wales, it was held that the claim for false 
imprisonment should not have been struck out.  In respect of the State’s plea that it was 
protected by the common law principle that persons who obeyed court orders were protected 
from suit, Allsop P and Basten JA (with whom the other members of the court agreed on this 
point) held, in effect, that if such a principle existed, it did not extend to protect officers who 
were acting pursuant to, or in execution of, an order that was a wholly invalid exercise of non-
judicial power.  While Allsop P and Basten JA did not, and did not need to, determine the 
existence of the asserted common law principle and its boundaries, it is nevertheless instructive 
to consider some of the observations made by their Honours in respect of that issue. 
495 
The judgment of Allsop P contains a fairly detailed analysis of the authorities that bear on the 
existence and scope of the principle in question, including Dr Drury’s Case;  Cavanough; 
London v Cox; Posner; Hadkinson; Sirros v Moore; Robertson v The Queen, and Gerard v 
Hope.  Those cases have all been considered earlier in these reasons and it is unnecessary to 
rehearse Allsop P’s analysis of them, save as to note the following brief points. 
496 
First, his Honour noted that the breadth of the proposition advanced by the State – that persons 
who obeyed court orders were protected from suit whether or not the order was of a superior 
court – “makes one immediately pause for thought, in particular in the light of what was said 
by Simpson ACJ in Feather v Rogers” (at [22]).  His Honour then referred to the passage from 
the judgment of Simpson ACJ at 197:    
It is no doubt very hard upon police officers who are bound to execute the warrants of 
Justices, that they should be made liable for so doing on the ground that the Justice 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
122 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 200 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 138 of 225
 
issuing the warrant exceeded his jurisdiction. It is very hard on laymen that they should 
have to take the risk of the warrant being irregular. It is more important, however, that 
the law should be upheld, notwithstanding the liability of constables and other persons. 
It was because of this hardship that the Act 24 Geo. II. c. 44 [Constables Protection 
Act], s. 6, was passed. 
497 
Second, Allsop P appears to have accepted, or at least noted, the distinction drawn in the 
authorities between officers of a court who were bound to obey orders made by the court of 
which they were an officer, and police and prison officers.  After referring to London v Cox 
and Posner, his Honour said (at [35]): 
In such cases, the courts are protecting third parties such as court officers or garnishees 
from the consequences of an invalid order (not being limited to an order of a superior 
court). Implicit and explicit in them is the protection of the authority of judicial 
proceedings. Further, there is every reason to consider that an officer of a court 
should be protected by his actions in obedience to an order of the court of which 
he is either part or an officer. Orders directed to police or gaolers in the form of 
a court order, not issued in the course of judicial process, but having the true legal 
character of an executive warrant, which is wholly lacking authority, do not stand 
as necessarily bringing the same protection to those who obey them as might be 
thought appropriate to officers of the court itself, even in such circumstances. It is 
unnecessary to explore this possible distinction. An invalid warrant gives a 
policeman no protection from the consequences of invasion of common law rights 
of person or property; it is statute that protects him: Feather v Rogers and Carroll 
v Mijovich (1991) 25 NSWLR 441 at 446-447 and 457. 
(Emphasis added) 
498 
It should be noted that Allsop P’s observation concerning the protection afforded to the police 
and gaolers, as opposed to officers of the court, related to the execution of executive orders, 
not judicial orders.  His Honour’s observation nevertheless tend to support the existence of a 
distinction between court officers who were bound by their duties to obey orders made by the 
court of which they were an officer, and other third parties such as the police and gaolers.  His 
Honour’s reference to garnishees was no doubt a reference to London v Cox, in which a 
garnishee was said to be entitled to the same protection as an officer. 
499 
Third, in relation to Sirros v Moore, Allsop P equated the position of the police in that case 
with that of “officers of the court” as they were “acting under the immediate orders of a judicial 
officer after the exercise of a judicial process” (at [38]).  His Honour also noted that the 
Constables Protection Act was also available at that time, which perhaps may have explained 
Lord Denning MR’s broad statement concerning the protection available to the police in 
question.  Moreover, Allsop P also noted (at [43]) that the correctness of Sirros v Moore and 
the “existence of any generalised common law protective principle” had been doubted by 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
123 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 201 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 139 of 225
 
Professors M Aronson and H Whitmore in Public Torts and Contacts Law (Law Book Co, 
1982). 
500 
Fourth, while Allsop P referred to Robertson v The Queen, his Honour noted that the parties 
had not argued that the decision in that case was plainly wrong (at [42]).  It nevertheless is 
apparent that his Honour did not consider that the decision compelled him to accept the 
existence of the principle identified or articulated by Steytler J in that case.  Nothing his Honour 
said could be regarded as an endorsement or approval of the decision in Robertson.  His Honour 
distinguished it on the basis that it dealt with a judicial order. 
501 
Fifth, Allsop P noted that in Gerard v Hope, Crisp J had “perceived a restriction on the defence 
of a constable following an order of an inferior court to orders which the judicial officer had 
jurisdiction to make” (at [44]).  His Honour noted that Crisp J had referred to Morrell v Martin 
and said (at [44]): 
Certainly the judgment of Tindal CJ in Morrell v Martin supports that limitation. 
Tindal CJ (at 3 Man & G at 593-597; 133 ER at 1278-1279) said that the action of the 
justices of the peace in issuing the warrant outside their jurisdiction, as opposed to 
merely irregularly, was fatal to a plea of justification by the person to whom the warrant 
was directed. Tindal CJ identified the terms of the statute (the 1750 Act) as indicative 
of a matter to be dealt with by the Parliament and not (as Steytler J reasoned in 
Robertson at 125) indicative of the conformance of the common law to the statute.  
502 
His Honour also referred to cases in which the matter was not so limited. 
503 
Ultimately Allsop P had the luxury of not having to decide the issue concerning the existence 
or scope of the common law principle advanced by the State.  His Honour concluded (at [48]):  
The existence of any such common law principle and its boundaries need not be finally 
decided upon to resolve this case. A number of matters are less than clear, including 
the place or influence of the 1750 Act as a suppressed premise, the influence of courts 
protecting their own processes and the extent to which this general rule applies to 
inferior courts acting without jurisdiction, and the meaning of jurisdiction in this 
context.  
504 
I respectfully agree with his Honour’s assessment that “[a] number of matters are less than 
clear”.  I, however, do not have the luxury of not having to finally decide whether the principle 
exists and, if it does, what its boundaries may be.  
505 
Like Allsop P, Basten JA did not find it necessary to decide whether the common law principle 
relied on by the State existed because, whatever common law protection may have been 
available, it did not extend to the “constitutionally invalid statutory detention order” in question 
(at [165]).  That said, his Honour also plainly did not accept that the common law principle 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
124 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 202 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 140 of 225
 
upon which the State relied existed.  Indeed, there are indications in Basten JA’s judgment that 
his Honour considered that such protection as may be afforded to the police and others who 
execute invalid warrants and orders made by inferior courts is ordinarily to be found in 
legislation, not the common law. 
506 
After considering the decision of the High Court in Love v Attorney-General (NSW) (1990) 
169 CLR 307; [1990] HCA 4 and the distinction between judicial and non-judicial orders, 
Basten JA said that that distinction was “consistent with the proposition that only orders made 
by a judge of a superior court in the exercise of judicial power are valid until set aside and thus 
provide immunity to those executing them in good faith” (at [160]).  His Honour continued (at 
[161]): 
The result of that conclusion may be that, absent statutory protection, public officers 
are exposed to potential liability in damages for obeying what they reasonably believe 
to be a valid court order. However, the conclusion means no more than that the order 
was of the kind which could be made by the Supreme Court under the Listening 
Devices Act, by a District Court judge or by a magistrate: to obtain protection, as has 
long been recognised, statutory protection is required. 
(Emphasis added) 
507 
Justice Basten went on to explain that the “potential difficulties faced by the police seeking to 
execute a void warrant have long been recognised, but have found their solution, not in the 
general law, but in statute” and that “a constable executing an invalid search warrant has been 
held to have no protection at common law in this State, but to enjoy protection originally 
available provided in England by the [Constables Protection Act]” (at [162]).  His Honour cited 
Feather v Rogers in support of that proposition.  After referring to the terms of the Constables 
Protection Act, his Honour said (at [164]): 
The Constables Protection Act has not operated in New South Wales since the Imperial 
Acts Application Act 1969 (NSW); nevertheless, the  existence of the statutory 
protection, dating from 1750, may well explain remarks in cases, made without 
supporting authority, to the effect that a court officer or other person executing an 
apparently valid order (though not of a superior court) is protected from liability: eg, 
Sirros v Moore [1975] QB 118 at 137, Lord Denning asserting that no action would lie 
against police officers acting in response to a judge’s direction, though the direction 
was invalid where they did not know of the invalidity; see also Aronson and Whitmore, 
at 151-152. Further, gaolers in New South Wales have enjoyed statutory protection 
under State legislation preceding the repeal of the Constables Protection Act: Prisons 
Act, s 46. 
508 
Justice Basten’s observation in that regard is consistent with Allsop P’s reference, noted earlier, 
to the possibility that the Constables Protection Act may have operated as a “suppressed 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
125 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 203 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 141 of 225
 
premise” in some of the discourse concerning the protection available to constables in the 
execution of orders and warrants. 
509 
In my view, the relevant observations in the judgments of both Allsop P and Basten JA provide 
more support for Mr Stradford’s case than they do the Commonwealth’s case.                                                  
Conclusion as to the availability of any relevant common law defence? 
510 
As the preceding discussion of the authorities has no doubt revealed, there is considerable 
uncertainty as to whether there exists, at common law, any general principle that a person who 
acted pursuant to an order made, or warrant issued, by an inferior court, which was void or 
invalid, cannot be held liable in respect of those actions so long as the invalidity or irregularity 
of the order or warrant was not apparent on its face.   
511 
There is also considerable uncertainty as to the precise scope or boundaries of any such 
principle, if it indeed exists or is recognised.  In particular, there is some uncertainty as to 
whether the principle, if it exists, only applies in respect of officers of the court which issued 
the warrant who are obliged by that office to obey the order or warrant, or if it applies to third 
parties generally.  There is also some uncertainty as to whether the principle, if it exists, does 
not apply where the justice or judge who made the order did so without, or in excess of, 
jurisdiction and if so, exactly what “jurisdiction” means in that context.        
512 
Having reviewed and analysed what appear to be the main authorities concerning this area of 
the law, I am not persuaded that the common law principle relied on by the Commonwealth 
and Queensland exists, or can be, or has been, recognised as being part of the common law of 
Australia.   
513 
I accept that there is some authority in support of the proposition that an officer of the court (or 
“ministerial officer”), such as a sheriff, who is required by virtue of their office, and under pain 
of punishment, to obey an order or warrant made or issued by the court of which they were an 
officer, may be immune from action if the defect or irregularity was not apparent on the face 
of the order, or was otherwise not apparent to the officer.  That protection would, in the 
circumstances of this case, perhaps extend to the Marshal of the Circuit Court, which perhaps 
explains why Mr Stradford’s case focussed, at the end of the day, on the actions of the MSS 
guards rather than the Marshal.  For the reasons given earlier, however, the MSS guards could 
not be said to be, or to be akin to, officers of the Circuit Court who were obliged, by their 
office, to obey the order made or warrant issued by the Judge.  The MSS guards were not 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
126 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 204 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 142 of 225
 
referred to or identified in either the order made or warrant issued by the Judge, either by name 
or office.   
514 
I am also not satisfied that officers of the Queensland Police, or officers of Queensland 
Corrective Services, fall under the rubric “officer of the court” or “ministerial officer” in this 
context.  Queensland relied, albeit faintly, on statutory provisions which it contended imposed 
upon the police and corrective service officers a statutory duty of obedience.  Those provisions 
were s 796 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) and s 276 of the 
Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld).  Properly construed, however, those provisions simply 
required police officers, in the execution of their duties, to comply with lawful orders (in the 
case of the former provision) or required corrective service officers to obey the directions of 
the chief executive (in the case of the latter provision).  They did not create any duty of 
obedience to the Circuit Court, and did not require the officers to obey an invalid order or 
warrant made by that court.  More significantly, those provisions could not sensibly be said to 
confer on the police or prison officers the status of officers of the court, or ministerial officers, 
as those expressions are used or understood in the relevant authorities. 
515 
I do not accept that the authorities unequivocally support the proposition that any person who 
acts pursuant to an order made, or warrant issued, by an inferior court is protected or immune 
from any civil action if the order or warrant was invalid or void.  While there may be some 
broad and general statements in some cases that might tend to suggest that third parties who 
act in accordance with warrants are protected, if the warrant appears valid on its face, those 
statements may be explained on the basis of the suppressed premise of statutory protection.  
Otherwise, in my view, they are wrong.  The preponderance of authority supports the 
conclusion that only officers of the court who are bound, by their office, to obey the order or 
warrant are afforded any protection if the order or warrants turns out to be invalid or void.      
516 
There is in particular no clear or unequivocal line of authority to the effect that, absent statutory 
protection, a police officer who arrests, or a prison officer who detains, a person on the basis 
of an invalid order or warrant made or issued by an inferior court, is immune or protected from 
civil suit if the invalidity of the order or warrant is not apparent on its face.  Indeed, a number 
of the cases to which I have referred suggest that it was precisely because the common law 
provided no such protection to the police and gaolers that statutes like the Constables Protection 
Act were enacted.  There are also numerous cases where police and prison officers who 
detained or imprisoned someone on the strength of an invalid inferior court order or warrant 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
127 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 205 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 143 of 225
 
have been held liable for trespass or false imprisonment, even where the invalidity was not 
apparent on the face of the order or warrant.  That is generally because their plea or defence 
had failed to assert or establish that the order or warrant had been made or issued within 
jurisdiction and was therefore valid.  Police and prison officers have been held to have had no 
lawful justification for detaining or imprisoning someone in those circumstances. 
517 
The authorities also do not clearly or unequivocally establish, as Queensland contended, that 
police and prison officers have only been, or can only be, pursued civilly for their actions in 
executing an invalid warrant where it had been held that the court which made or issued the 
order or warrant in question acted wholly without “subject-matter jurisdiction” – that is, as 
Queensland put it, “a total absence of jurisdiction, of no general authority to decide, of no 
authority to enter upon the question”.  Queensland was unable to point to any authoritative 
decision that established that to be the case.  There are also decisions that run directly contrary 
to that contention.  Feather v Rogers was one such case. 
518 
There could be no doubt that the justice who issued the warrant in Feather v Rogers had 
subject-matter jurisdiction, or authority to decide whether to issue a search warrant on the 
application of Mr Rogers.  The warrant was not held to be invalid because the issuing justice 
had no general authority to decide, or no authority to enter upon the question, of whether to 
issue the warrant.  Rather, the defendant’s plea or defence of justification failed because the 
defendant failed to prove that the issuing justice had reasonable cause to suspect certain things 
as required by the statutory provision which conferred the power to issue search warrants.  It 
was in that context that Simpson ACJ concluded that the justice had acted “without 
jurisdiction” (at 196).  His Honour also made it clear that police officers could be held liable 
for executing a warrant in circumstances where “the Justice issuing the warrant exceeded his 
jurisdiction” (at 197). 
519 
I should also refer, in this context, to what Lord Eldon said in Price v Messenger, a case which, 
as discussed earlier, concerned whether officers who acted in obedience to a warrant were 
protected by the Constables Protection Act.  That Act provided protection to the officer 
“notwithstanding any defect of jurisdiction in [the issuing] justice”.  Lord Eldon said, in that 
context (at 126 ER 1215): 
The act therefore takes it for granted, that an officer may be said to act in obedience to 
the warrant of a justice of the peace, though such justice had no jurisdiction, and though 
the warrant be an absolute nullity. For it is as much a defect of jurisdiction, if the 
justice grant an improper warrant in a case over which he has jurisdiction, as if 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
128 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 206 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 144 of 225
 
he had no jurisdiction over the case at all.  
(Emphasis added)       
520 
It may be accepted, as Allsop P noted in Kable v New South Wales, that where the authorities 
in respect of this issue refer to the warrant being issued, or the order being made, “without 
jurisdiction”, the meaning of “jurisdiction” in that context is “less than clear” (at [48]).  That 
is no doubt in part because many of the cases were decided well before the evolution and 
refinement of the contemporary law of jurisdictional error.  That said, I am not persuaded that, 
when the cases in this area refer to inferior court justice or judges acting “without jurisdiction”, 
that is confined to cases where the court had no subject-matter jurisdiction.  That is all the more 
so in cases, such as Feather v Rogers, where the relevant principle is expressed in terms of 
whether the issuing justice “exceeded his [or her] jurisdiction”. 
521 
It is unnecessary for me to finally decide precisely what is encompassed by the expressions 
“acting without jurisdiction”, or “exceeding jurisdiction”, in this context.  It suffices for me to 
consider and determine whether, in making the imprisonment order and issuing the warrant in 
question, the Judge relevantly acted without jurisdiction, or exceeded his jurisdiction.  In my 
view, for essentially the same reasons as given earlier in the context of the question whether 
the Judge’s conduct attracted judicial immunity, it can safely be concluded that, at the very 
least, the Judge relevantly exceeded or acted outside his jurisdiction.  I do not accept that the 
mere fact that the Judge may have had subject-matter jurisdiction means that it cannot be 
concluded, in this particular context, that his Honour nevertheless acted without, outside, or in 
excess of, his jurisdiction.   
522 
Without unnecessarily repeating what has been said earlier in these reasons, the Judge: ordered 
that Mr Stradford be imprisoned for contempt arising from his non-compliance with an order 
without first finding that Mr Stradford had failed to comply with the order and was therefore 
in contempt; ordered that Mr Stradford be imprisoned for contempt without considering or 
applying the relevant code in respect of non-compliance with orders and contempt in Pts XIIIA 
and XIIIB of the Family Law Act and, in that regard, imprisoned Mr Stradford without first 
finding that some other form of punishment was appropriate (as required by s 112AE(2) of the 
Family Law Act) and without first finding that any non-compliance with an order by Mr 
Stradford involved a “flagrant challenge to the authority of the court” (as required by s 
112AP(1) of the Family Law Act); failed to consider or apply the provisions in the FCC Rules 
which mandated the procedures that the Judge was required to follow in dealing with the 
contempt allegation against Mr Stradford; denied Mr Stradford a fair hearing of the allegation 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
129 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 207 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 145 of 225
 
that he was in contempt; and pre-judged not only whether Mr Stradford was in contempt, but 
also the appropriate punishment for the contempt.  The combined effect of the last-mentioned 
errors were described by the FamCA Full Court as constituting a “gross miscarriage of justice”.     
523 
I am satisfied that, whether the catalogue of errors made by the Judge in ordering the 
imprisonment of Mr Stradford are considered individually or cumulatively, it can be safely 
concluded that the Judge acted without jurisdiction, or at least exceeded his jurisdiction, for the 
purposes of any available common law justification defence relied on by the Commonwealth 
and Queensland. 
524 
It follows that, in all the circumstances, I am not persuaded that the Commonwealth and 
Queensland can avail themselves of any common law defence by reason of the fact that their 
officers acted pursuant to, or in accordance with, a warrant which appeared regular on its face.  
The invalid order and warrant provided no lawful justification for the MSS guards or the 
Queensland police and prison officers to detain Mr Stradford.    
A STATUTORY DEFENCE? 
525 
Queensland relied, albeit belatedly, on what it contended was a statutory defence under s 249 
of the Criminal Code.  That defence was not pleaded in Queensland’s defence as filed, though 
Mr Stradford took no issue with that pleading deficiency.  The agreed statement of issues 
prepared by the parties made no mention of any statutory defence.  The Commonwealth 
initially embraced that defence (though perhaps only tentatively) as also applying to the MSS 
guards and therefore the Commonwealth vicariously.  Upon consideration and reflection, 
however, the Commonwealth abandoned any reliance on the statutory defence and indeed 
advanced helpful and persuasive submissions as to why the defence was not available, 
including to Queensland.  
526 
Section 249 of the Criminal Code provides as follows: 
It is lawful for a person who is charged by law with the duty of executing a lawful 
warrant issued by any court or justice or other person having jurisdiction to issue it, 
and who is required to arrest or detain another person under such warrant, and for every 
person lawfully assisting a person so charged, to arrest or detain that other person 
according to the directions of the warrant. 
(Emphasis added) 
527 
The critical question is whether s 249 of the Criminal Code can apply to the circumstances of 
this case given that the warrant in question was issued by the Circuit Court, which is a federal 
court, not a Queensland Court.     
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
130 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 208 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 146 of 225
 
528 
Queensland contended that the Circuit Court was “any court” for the purposes of s 249 of the 
Criminal Code because that expression was broad enough to include any court which was 
physically or geographically within the State of Queensland.  It submitted that s 35 of the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), which provides that a reference in a Queensland Act to an 
“entity” or “thing” is a reference to such an entity or thing “in and for” or “in and of” 
Queensland, does not apply to s 249 of the Criminal Code and that, even if it did, the 
circumstances of this case were such that the Circuit Court was a court “in and for” or “in and 
of” Queensland. 
529 
Both Mr Stradford and the Commonwealth contended that, properly construed, s 249 of the 
Criminal Code was incapable of applying to a warrant issued by the Circuit Court, even if the 
court happened to be sitting in Queensland at the time the warrant issued.  In their submission, 
s 35 of the Interpretation Act applied in construing s 249 of the Criminal Code and that the 
Circuit Court could not be said to be a court “in and for” or “in and of” Queensland. 
530 
I will first deal with whether s 35 of the Interpretation Act applies when construing s 249 of 
the Criminal Code.  I will then deal with the question whether, assuming that s 35 of the 
Interpretation Act applies, the Circuit Court could be said to be a court “in and for” or “in and 
of” Queensland when the Judge issued the warrant in question. 
Does s 35 of the Interpretation Act apply? 
531 
Queensland submitted that s 35 of the Interpretation Act did not apply when construing s 249 
of the Criminal Code because the Criminal Code was a code and “contains its own exhaustive 
treatment of the meaning of terms”.  It followed, so it was submitted, that the Interpretation 
Act was displaced by a “contrary intention”: see s 4 of the Interpretation Act. 
532 
Queensland’s contention that s 35 of the Interpretation Act does not apply, or has been 
excluded, when it comes to construing s 249 of the Criminal Code, or the Criminal Code 
generally, may be dealt with briefly.  In short, it is wrong and is rejected. 
533 
First, the submission that the Interpretation Act does not apply to the construction of the 
Criminal Code generally is contradicted by many cases in which the Interpretation Act has 
been applied in construing provisions in the Criminal Code: see, for example, Lacey v Attorney-
General (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573; [2011] HCA 10 at [45]-[46]; R v Armstrong [1996] 1 Qd 
R 316 at 318;  R v Shetty [2005] 2 Qd R 540; QCA 225 at [22]; R v Deemal [2010] 2 Qd R 70; 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
131 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 209 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 147 of 225
 
[2009] QCA 131 at [23]; R v Paz [2018] 3 Qd R 50; [2017] QCA 263; R v HBZ (2020) 4 QR 
171; [2020] QCA 73 at [33]; and R v JAA [2019] 3 Qd R 242; [2018] QCA 365 at [107]. 
534 
Second, contrary to Queensland’s submission, the Criminal Code plainly does not purport to 
make exhaustive provision as to the rules governing its own interpretation to the exclusion of 
the Interpretation Act.  Some provisions of the Criminal Code include a note or cross-reference 
to the Interpretation Act: see for example ss 119A and 359A of the Criminal Code.  Some 
provisions in the Criminal Code also expressly exclude the operation of specific provisions in 
the Interpretation Act: see for example s 729(3) of the Criminal Code.  That would be 
unnecessary if the operation of the Interpretation Act was excluded generally in respect of the 
Criminal Code.  It is also clear that some provisions of the Criminal Code would be difficult to 
apply if the Interpretation Act did not apply to its provisions.  For example, the Criminal Code 
contains provisions that concern the time in which things need to be done, but the Criminal 
Code itself contains no provision concerning the reckoning of time.  Section 38 of the 
Interpretation Act fills that lacunae. 
535 
Third, there is no sound basis for the submission that the terms of s 249 of the Criminal Code 
itself provides a basis for excluding the operation of s 35 of the Interpretation Act.  That 
argument appeared to be based on the generality of the language used in s 249, in particular the 
generality of the expression “any court”.  The generality of the language in s 249 of the 
Criminal Code provides no basis for excluding the operation of s 35 of the Interpretation Act.  
Indeed, quite to the contrary.  In my view, the very generality of the language in s 249 provides 
a compelling reason why s 35 of the Interpretation Act should be applied in construing that 
provision. 
The Circuit Court was not a court “in and for” or “in and of” Queensland  
536 
When s 249 of the Criminal Code is read in conjunction with s 35 of the Interpretation Act, the 
question becomes whether, when the Judge issued the warrant in question, the Circuit Court 
could be said to be a court “in and for” Queensland, or a court “in and of” Queensland.  
Queensland’s submissions focussed on the fact that, when the Judge issued the warrant, the 
Circuit Court was physically sitting in, or located in, Queensland.  Queensland also relied on 
the fact that the Judge was acting within a constitutional mechanism set by s 120 of the 
Constitution, which provides, in summary, that the States must make provision for the 
detention of persons convicted of Commonwealth offences and that the Commonwealth 
Parliament may make laws which give effect to that provision.  Queensland also submitted, in 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
132 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 210 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 148 of 225
 
that context, that s 118 of the Constitution requires that full faith and credit be given to State 
laws, including s 249 of the Criminal Code.    
537 
Queensland’s contentions concerning the construction of s 249 of the Criminal Code have no 
merit and must be rejected.  The Circuit Court cannot be said to be a court “in and of” or “in 
and for” Queensland for a number of reasons. 
538 
First, that would be contrary to decisions concerning the longstanding general rule of 
construction which effectively confines references in State enactments to State courts, 
proceedings and officers.  It would also be contrary to a number of decisions which concern 
the operation of “localising” provisions such as s 35 of the Interpretation Act.    
539 
In Seaegg v The King (1932) 48 CLR 251; [1932] HCA 47, the High Court said the following 
in respect of the application of the general rule of construction in construing the meaning of 
the word “indictment” in a State statute (at 48 CLR 255): 
“Indictment” is defined to include any information presented or filed as provided by 
law for the prosecution of offenders. We do not think that the State enactment by these 
general words intends to refer to prosecutions on indictment preferred by the law 
officers of the Commonwealth for offences against the laws of the Commonwealth. 
Such prosecutions are governed by the special provisions contained in secs. 69-77 of 
the Judiciary Act 1903-1927, which deal not only with the manner in which they shall 
be instituted and the jurisdiction in which they shall be tried, but with the nature and 
extent of the appeal from a conviction and the power of the Court hearing that appeal. 
Apart from the general rule of construction requiring an interpretation which 
would restrain the general words so that they would not apply to Federal 
proceedings so regulated and would confine the State enactment to State 
proceedings, the State statute contains specific references to the Attorney-General of 
the State and to the Minister of Justice which place its meaning beyond doubt (see secs. 
13, 16, 24 and 17(2)) and show that the right of appeal it confers is limited to 
convictions upon indictment preferred according to State law. 
(Emphasis added) 
540 
More recently, the plurality in Solomons v District Court of New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 
119; [2002] HCA 47 said the following in relation to the operation of the s 12(1) of the 
Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), which is in equivalent terms to s 35 of the Interpretation Act, 
in construing the words “court” and “Judge” in a New South Wales statute (at [9]): 
There is a “general rule of construction” which would confine the State enactment 
to State proceedings and officers. In any event, the “Justices” referred to in s 2 of the 
Costs Act are Justices of the Peace. This follows from the definition in s 21 of the 
Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW). The power conferred by s 2 “was clearly intended 
to be conferred on all New South Wales courts, at whatever level, exercising 
criminal jurisdiction”. The “Court[,] Judge [and] Justices” identified in s 2 of the 
Costs Act, and the phrase therein “any proceedings relating to any offence”, do 
not extend to federal courts created by the Parliament under Ch III of the 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
133 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 211 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 149 of 225
 
Constitution or to this Court or to judicial officers of the Commonwealth, and the 
offences in question do not include offences under a law of the Commonwealth. This 
follows as a matter of construction of s 2 of the Costs Act in the light of s 12(1) of the 
Interpretation Act. 
(Emphasis added; footnotes omitted)  
541 
Seaegg was cited by the court as authority for the “general rule of construction” referred to in 
this passage. 
542 
Second, Queensland’s contention focussed almost entirely on the fact that when the Judge 
issued the warrant, the Circuit Court was sitting in Queensland.  In a loose sense it might 
perhaps be said that the Circuit Court was “in” Queensland when the warrant was issued, at 
least in a geographic sense.  Even if that were to be accepted, it entirely ignores whether the 
Circuit Court, as an “entity”, could be said to be “for” Queensland, as required by s 35(1)(a) of 
the Interpretation Act, simply because it was sitting in Queensland.  Plainly it could not.  The 
words “for” in that context plainly requires that the court in question be an entity “for” 
Queensland, in the sense of Queensland as a polity, not a place.   
543 
That point was was made clear in DRJ v Commissioner of Victims Rights (No 2) (2020) 103 
NSWLR 692; [2020] NSWCA 242.  That case concerned the New South Wales analogue of s 
35 of the Interpretation Act.  Justice Leeming (with whom Bell P and Meagher JA agreed) 
explained the operation of the provision as follows (at [97]): 
[T]he words “New South Wales” are used in two different senses. In paragraph (a), 
they are references to the polity within the Australian federation. In paragraph (b), 
they are references to a place within the Australian continent. One paragraph is 
institutional; the other geographical. “Officer”, “office” and “statutory body” all have 
an essential institutional relationship with New South Wales as a polity, which need 
not necessarily be geographically confined. A New South Wales statute referring, 
say, to a “judicial officer” would prima facie apply to a judge of the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales (and might well apply even if he or she was taking 
evidence on commission in London), but not to a judge of the Supreme Court of 
Western Australia visiting Sydney on holiday.  
(Italics emphasis in original; bold emphasis added) 
544 
It might also be added, in this context, that the Circuit Court could also be said to be a “thing” 
for the purposes of s 35(1)(b) of the Interpretation Act.  A warrant is also a “thing”.  Paragraph 
(b) of s 35(1) also refers to “jurisdiction”.  It follows that s 249 of the Criminal Code must be 
construed as referring to a warrant “of” Queensland issued by a court “of” Queensland having 
jurisdiction “of” Queensland.  That could hardly be said to be the case in respect of a warrant 
issued by a federal court exercising federal jurisdiction, even if the court issuing the warrant 
happens to be geographically sitting in Queensland at the time.  The requirement that the 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
134 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 212 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 150 of 225
 
relevant jurisdiction be “of” Queensland indicates that the jurisdiction in question be conferred 
by a Queensland law.  The Judge’s jurisdiction to issue the warrant could hardly be said to be 
jurisdiction “of” Queensland in that sense. 
545 
Third, Queensland’s reliance on s 120 of the Constitution is misconceived.  The fact that s 120 
of the Constitution required Queensland to make laws in respect of the imprisonment of federal 
offenders, and that the Commonwealth is able to make laws in that regard, does not shed any 
light on the construction of s 249 of the Criminal Code.  It certainly does not follow, expressly 
or by implication, that any Queensland laws, including the Criminal Code, must be construed 
in such a way as to ensure that Queensland officers who imprison federal offenders pursuant 
to warrants issued by federal courts are protected from any liability that might arise from their 
actions in that regard.   
546 
Of course, both the Queensland and Commonwealth Parliaments could enact legislation which 
explicitly protected Queensland officers in those circumstances.  The fact that they have not 
done so says nothing about how s 249 of the Criminal Code should be construed.  In particular, 
it does not require that s 249 be construed in a way which ignores the fact that, by operation of 
s 35 of the Interpretation Act, the court which issues the warrant for the purposes of s 249 must 
be a court “in and for” Queensland, and the jurisdiction pursuant to which the warrant was 
issued must be jurisdiction “in and of” Queensland.   
547 
Section 118 of the Constitution also does not assist.  That section operates in respect of State 
laws after they have been properly construed: Permanent Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd v 
Finlayson (1968) 122 CLR 338 at 343; [1968] HCA 85. 
548 
It follows that s 249 of the Criminal Code does not apply to the circumstances of this case.  
Queensland’s attempt to call it in aid of its defence is futile and must be rejected.                      
CONCLUSION – LIABILITY OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
549 
There is no dispute that the MSS guards detained and imprisoned Mr Stradford. 
550 
For the reasons that have been given, Mr Stradford’s detention and imprisonment was unlawful 
and unjustified.  Both the order that was made, and the warrant that was issued, by the Judge 
were invalid and of no legal effect.  They provided no lawful justification for the detention and 
imprisonment. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
135 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 213 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 151 of 225
 
551 
For the detailed reasons that have been given, there is no recognised common law defence 
available to the MSS guards based merely on the fact that they acted pursuant to a warrant that 
appeared regular on its face.  Nor are the MSS guards able to avail themselves of any common 
law defence that may be available to court officers, or ministerial officers, in those 
circumstances.  They were not officers, or ministerial officers, of the Circuit Court.  The MSS 
guards were also unable to avail themselves of any statutory defence. 
552 
It follows that the MSS guards committed the tort of false imprisonment.  They imprisoned Mr 
Stradford without lawful justification. 
553 
The Commonwealth is vicariously liable for the tort committed by the MSS guards. 
CONCLUSION – LIABILITY OF QUEENSLAND 
554 
There is no dispute that officers of Queensland Police and officers of Queensland Corrective 
Services detained and imprisoned Mr Stradford. 
555 
For the detailed reasons that have been given, Mr Stradford’s detention and imprisonment was 
unlawful and unjustified.  Both the order that was made, and the warrant that was issued, by 
the Judge were invalid and of no legal effect.  They provided no lawful justification for the 
detention and imprisonment. 
556 
For the detailed reasons that have been given, there is no recognised common law defence 
available to the officers of Queensland Police and officers of Queensland Corrective Services 
based merely on the fact that they acted pursuant to a warrant that appeared regular on its face.  
Nor are the Queensland officers able to avail themselves of any common law defence that may 
be available to court officers, or ministerial officers, in those circumstances.  They are not 
officers, or ministerial officers, of the Circuit Court.  The Queensland officers are also unable 
to avail themselves of any statutory defence.  Section 249 of the Criminal Code does not apply 
in the circumstances of this case.   
557 
It follows that the officers of Queensland Police and officers of Queensland Corrective Services 
who were involved in Mr Stradford’s detention and imprisonment committed the tort of false 
imprisonment.  They imprisoned Mr Stradford without lawful justification. 
558 
Queensland is vicariously liable for the tort committed by the relevant officers of Queensland 
Police and Queensland Corrective Services. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
136 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 214 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 152 of 225
 
DAMAGES – OVERVIEW   
559 
Mr Stradford claimed damages arising from his false imprisonment under a number of heads.   
560 
First, he claimed general and aggravated damages for deprivation of liberty.  He also claimed 
exemplary damages from the Judge for deprivation of liberty.   
561 
Second, he claimed damages for personal injury.  That injury was a psychiatric injury in the 
form of post-traumatic stress disorder.  He called evidence from a psychiatrist, Dr Malcolm 
Foxcroft, in respect of that diagnosis and the extent to which it impaired aspects of his life.   
562 
Third, he claimed damages for loss of earning capacity.  He called evidence from an accountant, 
Ms Julia Bossert, with a view to quantifying that loss.     
563 
The Judge, the Commonwealth and Queensland agreed that if Mr Stradford succeeded in 
proving that they were liable for false imprisonment, he was entitled to an award of general 
damages for deprivation of liberty, though there was disagreement as to what award would be 
appropriate in that regard.  The Judge, the Commonwealth and Queensland all submitted that 
an award of aggravated damages was inappropriate in the circumstances.  The Judge also 
submitted that an award of exemplary damages would not be appropriate in the circumstances. 
564 
The Judge, the Commonwealth and Queensland all agreed that if Mr Stradford established 
liability, it was appropriate to award him damages for personal injury on the basis that he had 
been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder.  They disagreed, however, with Mr 
Stradford’s contentions concerning the quantification of the damages for personal injury.  They 
called evidence from a psychiatrist, Dr Scott Harden, in respect of Mr Stradford’s diagnosis 
and prognosis.  Dr Harden agreed with Dr Foxcroft’s diagnosis of post-traumatic stress 
disorder, but disagreed with significant elements of Dr Foxcroft’s assessment of Mr Stradford’s 
impairment resulting from that condition.  There was also disagreement between Dr Foxcroft 
and Dr Harden concerning Mr Stradford’s prognosis.     
565 
There was also considerable disagreement between the parties concerning Mr Stradford’s claim 
of damages for economic loss and lost earning capacity.  Mr Stradford initially claimed 
damages in excess of $3 million in respect of his loss of earning capacity, that being the 
quantification of damages arrived at by Ms Bossert based on various assumptions concerning 
Mr Stradford’s past and anticipated future earning capacity. Evidence which emerged as the 
trial progressed, however, significantly undermined the assumptions upon which Ms Bossert’s 
evidence was based.  Mr Stradford eventually abandoned any reliance on Ms Bossert’s 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
137 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 215 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 153 of 225
 
evidence.  The Judge, the Commonwealth and Queensland ultimately submitted that no award 
for future economic loss should be made. 
566 
Before considering and making assessments concerning the particular heads of damages 
claimed by Mr Stradford, I should make some brief observations concerning Mr Stradford’s 
evidence.  
Mr Stradford’s credibility and the reliability of his evidence relevant to damages 
567 
As might be expected, Mr Stradford gave oral evidence concerning the circumstances in which 
he came to be imprisoned and, more significantly, what happened to him when he was detained 
and imprisoned, including how he felt about what was happening to him at the time.  Most of 
Mr Stradford’s evidence in that regard was not challenged at all in cross-examination.   
568 
Mr Stradford’s evidence concerning his experiences while detained and imprisoned was 
compelling.  It was readily apparent, both from Mr Stradford’s demeanour when giving 
evidence in respect of this issue and from the content of his evidence, that he was doing the 
best he could to give truthful and accurate evidence concerning his detention and 
imprisonment, including how he reacted and felt at the time.  When he was, perhaps not 
surprisingly, unable to recall precise details concerning his detetntion and imprisonment, he 
readily conceded as much. 
569 
The position was, however, very different when it came to other aspects of Mr Stradford’s 
evidence relevant to his economic damages claim.  That was particularly the case with respect 
to his evidence concerning his earning acapciaty and work and employment situation, both 
prior to and after his period in prison.  It was also the case in respect of any evidence concerning 
his financial dealings and position generally.     
570 
Mr Stradford’s evidence concerning his work and financial dealings was, at best, very vague, 
general and fairly unpersuasive.  It was also, for the most part, not corroborated by any cogent 
or reliable documentary evidence.  The problems with Mr Stradford’s evidence concerning his 
work history and financial position, however, really came to the fore when he was cross-
examined on those topics.  That was particularly the case when he was asked about prior 
statements he had made concerning his employment and financial position, including in 
affidavits and other documents filed in his family law proceedings in the Circuit Court.  When 
confronted with those statements, Mr Stradford became argumentative and his evidence was 
frequently non-responsive, evasive, defensive and obfuscatory.  That was apparent not only 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
138 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 216 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 154 of 225
 
from his answers, but also from his demeanour.  He also appeared to be unwilling to make any 
concessions in respect of his evidence concerning those topics, particularly when such 
concessions may have been, or been perceived by him to be, against his interests in the present 
proceeding. 
571 
It perhaps suffices to give one example to illustrate the evasiveness that permeated much of Mr 
Stradford’s evidence in respect of his employment and financial position.  In April 2017, Mr 
Stradford filed a financial statement in his family law proceedings in the Circuit Court.  He was 
legally represented at the time.  In that financial statement he acknowledged, on oath, that he 
was aware that he had an obligation to make a full and frank disclosure of his financial 
circumstances and that the information in the financial statement was true.  He stated in the 
financial statement, among other things, that his total average weekly income was zero.  When 
asked about that statement, he gave the following evidence: 
[MR HORTON:] This is a financial statement that you filed in the Family Court? 
[MR STRADFORD:] Mmm. 
[MR HORTON:] Or the Federal Circuit Court, I’m sorry? 
[MR STRADFORD:] Mmm. 
[MR HORTON:] And you have crossed that box there on the right-hand side about 
halfway down the page about your knowledge that you have an obligation to make full 
and frank disclosure in what you’re doing here? 
[MR STRADFORD:] Yes. 
[MR HORTON:] If you turn to page 4417. As at this date, 7 April 2017, you had zero 
total average weekly income? 
[MR STRADFORD:] I don’t recall, but it would – it’s quite possible. I – yes. I mean, 
that was three and a half years ago. There was periods where I had zero income. So I 
can’t recall. 
[MR HORTON:] Well, this is average weekly income, so it’s – let’s just focus on 
average. I’m just focusing on the words there at 2(a). Your total average weekly 
income as at the date you signed this financial statement was zero? 
[MR STRADFORD:] And what date was this? 
[MR HORTON:] It’s 7 April ’17. We can see that from page 4416? 
[MR STRADFORD:] Well, I didn’t have an employed position, if that’s what you’re 
talking about. 
[MR HORTON:] It’s a much simpler question than that. It’s your total average weekly 
income was zero as at 7 April 2017. 
… 
[MR HORTON:] I’m asking you to confirm the truth of what you have asserted at page 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
139 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 217 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 155 of 225
 
4417 that’s before you, Mr Stradford, regarding your total average weekly income? 
[MR STRADFORD:] In terms of my total average weekly income, I – I – I – I don’t 
know how to quantify that, or perhaps I – I – I don’t know at this point what you’re 
actually talking about. I do know that at some points, I didn’t have any money. Other 
times, I had money. 
… 
HIS HONOUR: Well, let me ask you this, Mr Stradford. Do you agree that as at 7 
April 2017 your total average weekly income was zero? 
[MR STRADFORD:] If at that moment I was not employed and I was not receiving an 
average weekly income, I possibly would have put zero. Whether I need to – I had to 
go back through my accounts and average out the income that I had received, I don’t 
know. But at that point, if I was receiving zero, I would have put zero. 
572 
This was by no means an isolated example.  On the whole, I considered Mr Stradford to be a 
most unimpressive and unreliable witness when it came to evidence concerning his work and 
employment history and financial position.  His evidence in respect of those issues, for the 
most part, was entirely lacking in credibility.  The reliability and credibility of some specific 
evidence given by Mr Stradford in respect of those issues will be discussed later in these 
reasons in respect of the head of damage concerning future economic loss.   
573 
The issues or problems with Mr Stradford’s credibility and the reliability of his evidence was 
not entirely limited to evidence concerning his work and employment history and financial 
position.  Indeed, my firm impression was that Mr Stradford became argumentative, evasive 
and obfuscatory in cross-examination in respect of any topic that he perceived to be potentially 
against his interests in the litigation.  It is perhaps useful to give another example.  After being 
questioned about his heavy gambling during 2017, Mr Stradford was asked some questions 
about the reports prepared by his psychiatrist, Dr Foxcroft.  He agreed that he had read Dr 
Foxcroft’s first report.  The following exchange then occurred: 
[MR HORTON:] I understand. Do you remember him saying in his first report that 
there was no history of excessive gambling? 
[MR STRADFORD:] What he wrote in his notes has nothing to do with me. I – I was 
upfront about every single aspect. If he didn’t ask a question, I wouldn’t have given 
him an answer, and I noticed from that report, there were a few discrepancies from 
what I told him. He was writing physical notes. So he wasn’t sitting there recording 
my – so there was a couple of discrepancies in there that I noticed. 
[MR HORTON:] Yes? 
[MR STRADFORD:] But, again, I’m not the expert and I’m not going to ring him up 
and say, hey, we’ve – you’ve made – like, there’s a few little things I’ve noticed in 
your notes that you must have reconstituted and possibly not expressed in the correct 
way. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
140 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 218 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 156 of 225
 
[MR HORTON:] Yes. I’m not trying to blame you for his notes for a minute, but I just 
wanted to ask you whether you, when you saw him, before he prepared this report, 
you’ve mentioned the gambling history? 
[MR STRADFORD:] The question wasn’t asked of me. He was asking the questions 
and I was giving the answers, sir. 
[MR HORTON:] I understand. I understand. And had – did you later tell him, when 
you next saw him, about that background? 
[MR STRADFORD:] The same story. The – the question hadn’t been brought up and, 
if it was, as you can see, I’m extremely forthcoming with it. 
[MR HORTON:] I see. So is the answer that – take away blame for the moment – just 
as a bare fact - - -? 
[MR STRADFORD:] If Dr Foxcroft asked me, I would have - - - 
[MR HORTON:] Sir, can you just let me finish, because, otherwise - - -? 
[MR STRADFORD:] Sorry. 
[MR HORTON:] - - - the transcript won’t reflect what I’ve asked. I’m sorry? 
[MR STRADFORD:] Okay. 
[MR HORTON:] But did you tell Dr Foxcroft on the second occasion about the 
gambling in any way? 
[MR STRADFORD:] Dr Foxcroft asked me the questions and I gave the answers. 
MR HORTON: Yes. 
HIS HONOUR: Well, I’m not sure that answers Mr Horton’s question? 
[MR STRADFORD:] I don’t recall the gambling even being mentioned or brought up. 
So anything he has mentioned in relation to that, is not because of any answers I have 
given, it has been in absence or assumptions that he possibly may have made, because 
I don’t recall – or having a specific conversation about gambling. If not, I would have 
told him. 
574 
Putting to one side the rather evasive and dissembling nature of Mr Stradford’s answers to the 
questions put to him on this topic, the evidence also tended to conflict with Dr Foxcroft’s 
evidence.  Dr Foxcroft’s recollection was that he specifically asked Mr Stradford whether he 
had any history of excessive gambling and that Mr Stradford had denied any problem gambling.   
Further issues in relation to Mr Stradford’s disclosure to the psychiatrists are discussed later.  
It suffices at this point to note that the evidence as a whole raised concerns about whether Mr 
Stradford had been entirely frank and forthright about his circumstances during his 
consultations with the psychiatrists.                
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
141 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 219 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 157 of 225
 
DAMAGES FOR DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY 
575 
There was no dispute that, if false imprisonment was established, Mr Stradford was entitled to 
an award of general damages for deprivation of liberty.  There was, however, a dispute as to 
whether an award of aggravated damages was appropriate. 
Overview 
576 
Mr Stradford submitted that an appropriate award of general and aggravated damages in respect 
of the brief period he was detained by the MSS guards at the court complex was $50,000.  He 
submitted that an award of general and aggravated damages in respect of the lengthier period 
during which he was detained and imprisoned by officers of the Queensland Police Service and 
Queensland Corrective Services was $250,000.  He also submitted that he was entitled to an 
award of exemplary damages of $400,000 against the Judge. 
577 
The Judge submitted that there was no basis for an award of aggravated or exemplary damages.  
He also submitted, in effect, that the damages sought by Mr Stradford for deprivation of liberty 
were excessive.   The Commonwealth submitted that an award against it in respect of general 
damages for deprivation of liberty should be nominal and as low as $500.  Queensland 
submitted that an award of general damages of about $100,000 would be appropriate.  Both the 
Commonwealth and Queensland submitted that an award of aggravated damages was not 
appropriate.    
Relevant principles – damages for deprivation of liberty 
578 
In  Spautz v Butterworth (1996) 41 NSWLR 1 at 14, Clarke JA (with whom Priestley and 
Beazley JJA agreed) referred with approval to the following passage from McGregor on 
Damages (15th ed, 1988, at [1619]) in respect of damages for false imprisonment: 
The details of how the damages are worked out in false imprisonment are few: 
generally it is not a pecuniary loss but a loss of dignity and the like, and is left much 
to the jury’s or judge’s discretion. The principal heads of damage would appear to be 
the injury to liberty, ie. the loss of time considered primarily from a non-pecuniary 
viewpoint, and the injury to feelings, ie. the indignity, mental suffering, disgrace and 
humiliation, with any attendant loss of social status. This will all be included in the 
general damages which are usually awarded in these cases: no breakdown appears in 
the cases. 
579 
Justice Clarke noted that a difficulty in the assessment of damages in false imprisonment arises 
because “the distinction between ordinary and aggravated compensatory damages may become 
blurred” in false imprisonment cases (at 15).  His Honour referred, in that context, to the 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
142 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 220 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 158 of 225
 
following statement by Lord Diplock in Broome v Cassell & Co Ltd [1972] AC 1027 at 1124; 
1 All ER 801 as being useful in “explaining the complexities in this area”:  
The three heads under which damages are recoverable for those torts for which 
damages are ‘at large’ are classified under three heads: (1) compensation for harm 
caused to the plaintiff by the wrongful physical act of the defendant in respect of which 
the action is brought. In addition to any pecuniary loss specifically proved the 
assessment of this compensation may itself involve putting a money value upon 
physical hurt, as in assault, upon curtailment of liberty, as in false imprisonment or 
malicious prosecution, upon injury to reputation, as in defamation, false imprisonment 
and malicious prosecution, upon inconvenience or disturbance of the even tenor of life, 
as in many torts, including intimidation. (2) Additional compensation for the injured 
feelings of the plaintiff where his sense of injury resulting from the wrongful physical 
act is justifiably heightened by the manner in which or the motive for which the 
defendant did it. This Lord Devlin calls ‘aggravated damages’. (3) Punishment of the 
defendant for his anti-social behaviour to the plaintiff. This Lord Devlin calls 
‘exemplary damages’. 
580 
While  Broome v Cassell concerned damages for libel, the principles referred to in it have 
frequently been applied in the context of damages for false imprisonment, no doubt because, 
like cases involving libel or defamation, the heads of damages in cases involving false 
imprisonment include hurt to feelings, humiliation and disgrace.  In particular, it has been 
generally accepted that the three heads of damages referred to in Broome v Cassell – general 
damages, aggravated damages and exemplary damages – are recoverable for the tort of false 
imprisonment.   
581 
It should be noted in that context that it was common ground that the Civil Liability Act 2003 
(Qld) applied in respect of the assessment of damages for personal injury in this case.  It was 
also effectively common ground that s 52 of the Civil Liability Act, which precludes the award 
of exemplary or aggravated damages in relation to a claim for personal injury damages, does 
not prevent a court from awarding aggravated and exemplary damages in respect of the tort of 
false imprisonment: Bulsey v The State of Queensland [2015] QCA 187 at [92]-[103] (Frazer 
JA, with whom Atkinson and McMeekin JJ agreed).   That is because a claim for damages for 
deprivation of liberty is not a claim for personal injury damages within the meaning of s 52 of 
the Civil Liability Act and like provisions: see New South Wales v Williamson (2012) 248 CLR 
417; [2012] HCA 57 at [34] (French CJ and Hayne J); New South Wales v Ibbett (2005) 65 
NSWLR 168; [2005] NSWCA 445 at [21] (Spigelman CJ); Coffey v State of Queensland 
[2010] QCA 291 at [28]-[30] (Fraser JA, Muir JA and Cullinane J agreeing).  
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
143 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 221 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 159 of 225
 
General damages 
582 
The duration during which Mr Stradford was deprived of his liberty is obviously relevant in 
assessing general damages for deprivation of liberty: Goldie v Commonwealth (No 2) (2004) 
81 ALD 422; [2004] FCA 156 at [14] (French J).  Such damages should not, however, be 
calculated as if there were an applicable daily rate; a substantial portion of the ultimate award 
should be referrable to the initial shock of being arrested: Ruddock v Taylor (2003) 58 NSWLR 
269; [2003] NSWCA 262 at [49] (Spiegelman CJ, with whom Ipp JA agreed).  It is permissible 
to have regard to awards in other false imprisonment cases: Spautz v Butterworth at 13 (Clarke 
JA, with whom Priestley and Beazley JJA agreed).  The assessment of general damages is “at 
large” and does not depend on proof of actual injury or special damage: McFadzean v 
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2004] VSC 289 at [98] (Ashley J). 
Aggravated damages 
583 
Aggravated damages are “a form of general damages, given by way of compensation for injury 
to the plaintiff, which may be intangible, resulting from the circumstances and manner of the 
wrongdoing”: New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; [2006] HCA 57 at [31] (Gleeson 
CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Heydon and Crennan JJ).  They are given not to punish the defendant 
but to “compensate the plaintiff when the harm done to him by a wrongful act was aggravated 
by the manner in which the act was done”: Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 
118 at 149 (Taylor J); [1996] HCA 40.  False imprisonment is a tort which by its very nature 
generally gives rise to aggravated damages: McFadzean at [101].   
584 
As Clarke JA observed in Spautz v Butterworth, the distinction between ordinary or general 
damages and aggravated damages in false imprisonment cases may become blurred.  That is 
no doubt partly due to the fact that both general and aggravated damages are compensatory.  
What then, distinguishes general damages from aggravated damages given that both are 
awarded to compensate a plaintiff for injury to feelings?  In State of New South Wales v Riley 
(2003) 57 NSWLR 496; [2003] NSWCA 208, Hodgson JA (with whom Sheller JA and 
Nicholas J relevantly agreed) explained the distinction as follows (at [127]-[131]): 
...Ordinary compensatory damages are supposed to be an amount adequate to 
compensate the plaintiff for all consequences of the defendant’s wrongful conduct that 
are not too remote; so what room is there for additional damages, which although 
dependent on some aggravating feature of the defendant’s wrongful conduct, are still 
supposed to do no more than compensate for consequences of that conduct? 
In cases where the wrongful conduct is trespass to land, for which damages for 
psychological injuries are not generally awarded, one can say that aggravated damages 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
144 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 222 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 160 of 225
 
are compensatory damages for injury to the plaintiff’s feelings by the manner of the 
trespass, which would not otherwise have been awarded. 
But aggravated damages are also awarded in cases where ordinary compensatory 
damages for injury to feelings are generally awarded, such as assault or defamation. 
If, in addition to ordinary compensatory damages for injury to feelings, aggravated 
damages are to be awarded, then plainly it is important to avoid double counting; and 
the question arises, what can the additional aggravated damages be compensation for 
when injury to feelings have already been included in ordinary compensatory 
damages? 
In my opinion, the only principled explanation must be along the following lines. It is 
extremely difficult to quantify damages for hurt feelings. In cases of hurt feelings 
caused by ordinary wrong-doing, of a kind consistent with ordinary human fallibility, 
the court must assess damages for hurt damages neutrally, and aim towards the centre 
of the wide range of damages that might conceivably be justified. However, in cases 
of hurt to feelings caused by wrong-doing that goes beyond ordinary human fallibility, 
serious misconduct by the defendant has given rise to a situation where it is difficult to 
quantify appropriate damages and thus where the court should be astute to avoid the 
risk of under-compensating the plaintiff, so the court is justified in aiming towards the 
upper limit of the wide range of damages which might conceivably be justified. 
585 
In assessing compensatory damages in false imprisonment cases, the Court can take into 
account any conduct of the defendant up to the time of verdict which may have the effect of 
increasing the injury to the plaintiff’s feelings, including, for example, the absence of an 
apology; however, for a plaintiff to be entitled to aggravated damages, he or she must show 
that the conduct of the defendant was neither bona fide nor justifiable: Spautz v Butterworth at 
17-8; see also Triggell v Pheeney (1951) 82 CLR 497 at 514; [1951] HCA 23.  It should be 
noted, in this context, that there was no suggestion that the Judge, the Commonwealth or 
Queensland had apologised to Mr Stradford.     
Exemplary damages 
586 
As explained in the passage of Lord Diplock in Broome v Cassell which was referred to earlier, 
unlike general and aggravated damages, exemplary damages are punitive, not compensatory.  
Exemplary damages are generally only awarded where the defendant’s conduct has been high-
handed, insolent or vindictive, or exhibited “conscious wrong doing in contumacious disregard 
of the plaintiff’s rights”: Whitfield v De Lauret and Co Ltd (1920) 29 CLR 71 at 77; [1920] 
HCA 75; Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1 at 13; [1987] HCA 47; Gray v Motor Accident 
Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1; [1998] HCA 70 at [14].  It is, however, not necessary for a 
plaintiff to show that the defendant acted with malice or conscious wrong-doing.  As Hodgson 
JA explained in Riley (at [138]): 
In my opinion, as made clear in Gray, while “conscious wrong-doing in contumelious 
disregard of another’s rights” describes the greater part of the field in which exemplary 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
145 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 223 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 161 of 225
 
damages may properly be awarded, it does not fully cover that field. Similarly, malice 
is not essential: Lamb v Cotogno. Conduct may be high-handed, outrageous, and show 
contempt for the rights of others, even if it is not malicious or even conscious wrong-
doing. However, ordinarily conduct attracting exemplary damages will be of this 
general nature, and the conduct must be such that an award of compensatory damages 
does not sufficiently express the court’s disapproval or (in cases where the defendant 
stood to gain more than the plaintiff lost) demonstrate that wrongful conduct should 
not be to the advantage of the wrong-doer. 
587 
An award of exemplary damages may serve a “valuable purpose in restraining the arbitrary and 
outrageous use of executive power” and “oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the 
servants of the government”: Ibbett at [39] quoting Devlin LJ in Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 
1129 at 1226; 1 All ER 367.  The power to award exemplary damages in certain cases “serves 
to uphold and vindicate the rule of law because it makes clear that the courts will not tolerate 
such conduct”: Kuddas v Chief Constable of Leicestershire [2002] 2 AC 122 at 149 (Hutton 
LJ); [2001] 3 All ER 193, referred to with apparent approval in Ibbett at [40].          
Relevant evidence and factual findings 
588 
The basic facts concerning Mr Stradford’s detention and imprisonment were set out earlier in 
these reasons.  It is necessary to provide some further detail for the purposes of determining 
the appropriate damages for deprivation of liberty.  Ultimately there was no significant dispute 
concerning the nature and circumstances of Mr Stradford’s detention and imprisonment.  
Indeed, Queensland ultimately submitted that the Court could proceed on the basis of Mr 
Stradford’s oral evidence, which was not seriously challenged in cross examination.    
589 
Mr Stradford’s oral evidence concerning his time in detention and prison was compelling.  It 
was readily apparent from Mr Stradford’s demeanour while recounting his time in detention 
and prison that, while he may not  have  recalled  some  of  the finer details, his general 
recollection of the events and his feelings at the time was vivid and ingrained.  There could be 
little doubt that Mr Stradford was and remains deeply affected by his time in custody.  At times 
during his evidence about his time in custody he became quite emotional.  There was no reason 
to doubt the authenticity of his emotions.  Nor was there any basis for doubting the reliability 
of this aspect of Mr Stradford’s evidence.  
590 
The following short summary of the evidence concerning Mr Stradford’s incarceration is based 
primarily on Mr Stradford’s evidence, but draws also on the documentary evidence and the 
affidavit evidence from one of the MSS guards (Mr Dunn) and numerous Queensland Police 
and Queensland Corrective Services officers.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the individual guards 
and officers had no, or very limited, direct recollection of any engagement with Mr Stradford 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
146 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 224 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 162 of 225
 
and their evidence was essentially based on the documentary record.  Mr Stradford’s evidence 
is recounted in more anodyne terms that it was actually given.     
Detention by the MSS guards 
591 
Mr Stradford’s evidence was that he was quite fearful when he appeared before the Judge, 
unrepresented, on 6 December 2018.  That was essentially because the Judge had appeared to 
be angry and upset during Mr Stradford’s earlier appearance before him on 10 August 2018.  
While the Judge did not appear to be as angry at the commencement of the hearing on 6 
December 2018, he became angrier as the hearing progressed.  During the lunch adjournment, 
Mr Stradford called his best friend, Mr Aaron Irwin, and asked him to come to the courthouse 
as he thought he was going to be sent to gaol.  
592 
When Mr Stradford returned to the courtroom after the lunch adjournment, there were more 
people in the courtroom.  Mr Irwin was there, as well as two court officers.  So too, obviously, 
was Mrs Stradford.  Mr Stradford’s evidence was that he was berated by the Judge, in the 
presence of his former wife and Mr Irwin, and sentenced to imprisonment for a year.  He was 
then escorted from the courtroom by two officers – the MSS guards.  This occurred at about 
12.27 pm. 
593 
The two MSS guards escorted Mr Stradford for about 40 to 50 meters through a public area 
which included public seating, a security desk, interview rooms and a lift lobby.  Mr Stradford 
was not physically restrained by the MSS guards.  He was then taken down a goods lift to the 
basement of the building.  At that point he was frisk searched by one of the MSS guards and 
asked to remove his cufflinks, belt and shoes.  He was then placed in a holding cell, which was 
about two by three meters in size with glass walls.  While the cell was small, Mr Stradford’s 
evidence was that he did not feel like he was in a “tiny box”, perhaps because of the glass walls.   
594 
Mr Stradford’s evidence was that he felt shocked and fearful in the holding cell and was 
thinking about how he had let everyone down.  He also thought about what was going to happen 
to his children and fiancée.  
595 
Queensland Police officers attended the holding cells and departed with Mr Stradford in their 
custody at about 12.54 pm.  It follows that Mr Stradford was detained by the MSS guards for 
no more than 30 minutes.  
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
147 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 225 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 163 of 225
 
Detention and imprisonment by Queensland officers 
596 
Queensland Police officers arrived at the courthouse at about 12.40 pm on 6 December 2018.  
After speaking with officers at the courthouse and attending to certain administrative tasks, the 
police officers obtained custody of Mr Stradford at about 12.54 pm.  It should be noted that the 
evidence of one of the police officers was that she read the warrant that had been issued by the 
Judge.   
597 
Mr Stradford was transported from the courthouse to the police “watch house” in Brisbane in 
the back of a police van or “paddy wagon”.  Mr Stradford thought that he was handcuffed at 
this time.  The back of the van was small and Mr Stradford felt claustrophobic; “like you’re a 
dog in the back of a cage”.  The watch house was about three city blocks from the courthouse.  
598 
Mr Stradford was brought into the watch house at about 1.29 pm.  At that point, custody of Mr 
Stradford was transferred from the police officers who had picked him up at the courthouse to 
the officer in charge of the watch house.   
599 
When he arrived at the watch house, Mr Stradford was placed in an “interim cell”.  He was 
then taken to a counter where he was “processed” by police officers who were behind the 
counter.  The officers asked him questions.  Evidence adduced by Queensland indicated that 
those questions concerned Mr Stradford’s mental and physical health.  Mr Stradford’s evidence 
was that one of the officers confused him by saying: “so you owe money”.  Another quipped: 
“well, you will have a tough time in here”.  He was also told that he might be in the watch 
house for months, which did not make him feel good as it appeared to be a “bad place full of 
bad people”. 
600 
Mr Stradford was then strip searched.  He had to remove his clothing and was told to lift his 
legs and spread his buttocks so the police could check whether he had concealed anything in 
his anus.  Not surprisingly, he felt degraded during that procedure.   
601 
A police officer then gave Mr Stradford some clothes to wear.  The officer said that he could 
not find any shorts for Mr Stradford so he would get him a pair from the “women’s pile”.  The 
shorts he was given were denim, unlike the green shorts the other inmates were wearing.  While 
Mr Stradford initially thought nothing of that, when he encountered the first group of inmates, 
they taunted him with questions like: “where did you get your shorts” and “are you a cop”?  
About an hour or so later, Mr Stradford was given some track pants which he could wear over 
the top of the shorts.  It should be noted, in this context, that evidence adduced by Queensland 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
148 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 226 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 164 of 225
 
indicated that clothing in the watch house was “unisex”.  Mr Stradford was not given any shoes 
or socks while at the watch house.  
602 
Mr Stradford was next taken to a long narrow holding cell which was about three metres long 
and just over one metre wide.  There were four other inmates in that cell sitting on a bench 
along the side of the cell.  Shortly after he was placed in the cell, one of the other inmates 
punched the wall above Mr Stradford’s head.  He tried to laugh it off, but was in fact panicking. 
He felt terrified and overwhelmed.  At this time Mr Stradford was still wearing the shorts he 
had been given earlier and this was when the inmates taunted him about the shorts.  He was 
called “constable” or “copper” throughout his time in the watch house.  He believed that was 
because he was clean shaven and had a neat haircut, unlike the other inmates.  He was also 
called “cheeseball”.  He believed that was because he called one of the guards “mate”, which 
was seen to be “sucking up” to the guards.  
603 
Mr Stradford was next taken to his first “pod”.  Evidence adduced by Queensland referred to 
this area as the “overnight cells”.  Records indicated that Mr Stradford was taken to the 
overnight cells at about 1.47 pm.  Mr Stradford’s evidence was that he shared the pod with five 
other inmates, though he had his own cell.  His cell in the pod had a bed which was just a “lump 
of concrete”, though he was given a mattress and blanket.  He was not given a pillow.  At this 
point Mr Stradford felt upset and distressed.  He put the blanket over his head, however an 
officer told him to take the blanket off his head or it would be taken from him.  The cell also 
had a bubbler and sink.  The bubbler in the cell where Mr Stradford spent his first few nights 
was not working.  The cell had a metal toilet.  There was, however, no toilet paper.  He had to 
be asked to be provided with tissue paper.  There was a shower at the end of the pod where 
inmates showered in the morning.  He was given a towel and a toothbrush, however the 
toothbrush was taken from him each time after he used it.  Mr Stradford recalled that the watch 
house was bitterly cold.  As noted earlier, he was not given any shoes or socks to wear.  He 
asked for, but was refused, a second blanket. 
604 
Inmates were locked in their cells during mealtime.  The meals were passed through a hatch in 
the door and they were required to return their rubbish through the hatch.  They were given 
takeaway chicken (“Red Rooster”) for lunch.  Indeed, it appears that “Red Rooster” was on the 
menu for each lunch and dinner at the watch house.  
605 
Mr Stradford was permitted to make a telephone call.  He rang his fiancée.  Records produced 
by Queensland indicated this call was made at 3.33 pm.  Mr Stradford’s telephone conversation 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
149 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 227 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 165 of 225
 
with his fiancée did not make him feel “very nice” as he knew how devastated she would be.  
Mr Stradford was taunted by other inmates after he made that telephone call. 
606 
Records produced by Queensland indicated that at 6.21 pm Mr Stradford was given dinner in 
his cell.  
607 
After his first night in the watch house, Mr Stradford was moved to a different pod.  In that 
pod, he shared a cell with another inmate.  That inmate told Mr Stradford that he was “coming 
off ice and heroin”, had been “in and out of mental health wards” and had been homeless at 
various times.  On the first night he shared the cell with this cell mate, he woke up to find the 
cell mate’s hands around his throat.  He felt intimidated having to sleep in that environment.  
According to Mr Stradford, his cell mate also had no regard for his personal hygiene and did 
not use toilet paper.  He considered that the cell was not cleaned properly and was “disgusting”. 
608 
Mr Stradford was using a prescription medication for the treatment of rosacea, a skin 
inflammation that affects the face.  He requested that he be provided with that medication, but 
that request was refused.  He also requested that he be provided with a non-prescription cream 
that was available at pharmacies, however that request was also refused.  Without medication, 
Mr Stradford’s skin would break out in a rash.  Evidence adduced by Queensland indicated that 
Mr Stradford was seen by a nurse at 9.06 am on 7 December 2018.  Arrangements were made 
to obtain the appropriate cream, however Mr Stradford was told that it would take at least two 
days for the cream to be obtained.    
609 
Records produced by Queensland indicated that Mr Stradford was given lunch and dinner on 
7 December 2018 while in his cell with his cell mate.  His cell mate was apparently named Mr 
Strange. 
610 
Mr Stradford witnessed various episodes of violence and aggression between the inmates in 
the watch house.  According to Mr Stradford, the guards were not always watching the inmates.  
On one occasion Mr Stradford was punched in the head by another inmate and told, with the 
addition of expletives, to “shut up”.  Mr Stradford did not report that incident to the guards as 
he considered that it would be dangerous to do that.  He considered that it was better for him 
to shut his mouth, “deal with things” and “conform” with other inmates. 
611 
Mr Stradford did not sleep well while he was at the watch house.  He worried about his family 
and worried about what his children would think of him.  He started to “struggle mentally”. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
150 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 228 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 166 of 225
 
612 
Mr Stradford was able to contact his then lawyers, but was told that they could not assist him 
“without money” and that they would need between $15,000 and $20,000.  Records produced 
by Queensland suggested that this telephone call was made at 2.46 pm on 7 December 2018.  
Mr Stradford said that he also contacted Legal Aid, but was told that Legal Aid could not assist 
him until he was moved to his “final” gaol.   
613 
Mr Stradford’s evidence was that, at this point, he felt hopeless and helpless.  He felt that he 
was “spiralling” into a “very bad mental state”.  He had suicidal thoughts.  On one occasion, 
he took some preliminary steps towards a suicide attempt.  On that occasion, a guard had not 
closed the food hatch in the door of his cell.  Mr Stradford made a noose out of a blanket or 
towel and hung it on the hatch, thinking that he could strangle himself by twisting it around his 
neck.  The only reason he did not take that step was that he heard his daughter’s favourite song 
playing on the radio at the time.  This was one occasion where Mr Stradford became 
particularly emotional while giving his evidence. 
614 
Evidence adduced by Queensland indicated that Mr Stradford received breakfast in his cell 
with Mr Strange at 6.49 am on 8 December 2018 and that at 10.17 am he was seen by a nurse, 
at his request.  Records of that consultation indicted that Mr Stradford was very “teary” and 
had stated that he was feeling overwhelmed and distressed, but that he denied any “suicidal 
ideation, plan or intention”.  Mr Stradford received lunch and dinner in his cell with Mr Strange 
on 8 December 2018.   
615 
Evidence and records adduced by Queensland also indicated that Mr Stradford received 
breakfast in his cell with Mr Strange on 9 December 2018 and, more importantly, was again 
seen by a nurse at 10.15 am.  Records of that consultation recorded that Mr Stradford was “very 
teary on account of situational crisis” and that Mr Stradford had stated that he was “not coping”.   
Approval was obtained for Mr Stradford to be given diazepam, which he received at 8.28 pm.  
The records also indicated that Mr Stradford was given time in the “exercise yard” during the 
morning and afternoon of 9 December 2018 and was given lunch and dinner in the usual 
manner.  
616 
The records produced by Queensland in respect of Mr Stradford’s time at the watch house 
clearly corroborate Mr Stradford’s evidence concerning the circumstances giving rise to the 
mental and emotional anguish that he suffered as a result of the nature and circumstances of 
his detention at that facility. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
151 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 229 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 167 of 225
 
617 
Mr Stradford was transferred from the watch house to the Brisbane Correctional Centre on 10 
December 2018.  Records produced by Queensland indicated that Mr Stradford left the watch 
house at about 6.30 am and arrived at the prison at 8.05 am.  It follows that he was at the watch 
house for a total of four nights and five days.   
618 
Mr Stradford was handcuffed during his transfer from the watch house to the Brisbane 
Correctional Centre.  Mr Stradford recalled that the transport van was divided into “boxes” and 
he was placed into a box with two other inmates.  Mr Stradford described the box as “tiny” and 
that he felt like “a dog in a cage on the back of a greyhound trailer”.  He was “freaking out” 
and started to bang the side of the van.  That prompted one of the other inmates to tell him to 
shut up.  The other inmate put his hands over Mr Stradford’s head.  The officers in the van did 
not intervene.  Records produced by Queensland indicated that officers in the van could observe 
what was happening in the van via a camera.  Those records did not, however, indicate that the 
officers in fact saw any incident involving Mr Stradford. 
619 
Evidence adduced by Queensland indicated that the Brisbane Correctional Centre was a 
“reception centre” where newly sentenced male prisoners were received for “assessment and 
processing”, including an assessment to determine the best correctional centre placement for 
each prisoner.  Prisoners only tended to remain at the Brisbane Correctional Centre for a 
relatively short time.   
620 
Mr Stradford’s evidence was that, when he arrived at the Brisbane Correctional Centre, the 
officer who opened the door of the van asked Mr Stradford whether it was his first time in 
prison and said “you’re going to love Christmas”.  That made him think of his children.  He 
felt “like crap”. 
621 
Shortly after arriving at the Brisbane Correctional Centre, Mr Stradford was taken to see a 
psychologist.  He told the psychologist that he was “not doing all that well”.  As a result, he 
was placed under observation.  That in turn meant that he received fewer “privileges”.  Later, 
other prison inmates told him that, because he was on observation, he would stay in a maximum 
security prison, which made him feel very anxious.  He understood from other inmates that his 
chances of being detained at a minimum security prison would improve if he presented as being 
mentally well. 
622 
Evidence adduced by Queensland indicated that Mr Stradford was assessed by a psychologist 
at 8.30 am on 10 December 2018.  The psychologist recommended that Mr Stradford be placed 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
152 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 230 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 168 of 225
 
on “low level” observations, which was the least intensive observation level and which 
occurred every 120 minutes.  A prisoner is generally placed on that level if they “present with 
some potential risk factors”, which may include that the prisoner is a first time offender or 
demonstrates signs of anxiety or depression, or has a history of suicidal ideation or behaviour.  
Mr Stradford was also assessed by a nurse at 10.00 am.     
623 
After seeing the psychologist, Mr Stradford was again strip searched.  Queensland adduced 
evidence concerning what ordinarily occurred during a strip search.  It is unnecessary to detail 
that evidence.  It suffices to note that prison officers do not touch the prisoner during the 
process, though the process again involved Mr Stradford parting his buttocks so the officers 
could ensure that he had not secreted anything in his anus.  
624 
Mr Stradford’s evidence was that he again requested medication for the treatment of his 
rosacea.  He also asked to see a doctor.  He said, however, that he did not receive any 
medication during his imprisonment.  As a result, his rosacea flared up and became itchy. 
625 
Evidence adduced by Queensland indicated that after Mr Stradford went through the 
admissions process, he was allocated to a particular unit of the centre which was designated 
primarily for those experiencing their first time in prison, or for prisoners who were subject to 
“at-risk observations”.  
626 
Mr Stradford’s evidence was that the dimensions of his cell in the Brisbane Correctional Centre 
were approximately two metres by three metres.  His cell contained a bed, desk, television, 
toilet and shower.  The shower could only be used for approximately three minutes and was 
scalding hot.  There were periods of time during the day when Mr Stradford was locked down 
in his cell. 
627 
Evidence adduced by Queensland indicated that prisoners in the unit in which Mr Stradford 
was housed: were taken out of their cells by around 8.00 am in the morning and placed in a 
common area; were offered cell access at about 10.30 am to retrieve any possessions they 
wanted for the afternoon; received lunch in the common area at 12.00 pm; received dinner in 
the common area at 3.45 pm; and were returned to their cells and locked down at 6.10 pm.  
Throughout his imprisonment, Mr Stradford was observed every 120 minutes and an 
observation log was completed.  
628 
Mr Stradford’s evidence was that he felt that he had to be “very careful” while at the 
Correctional Centre.  He referred in his evidence to two incidents involving other inmates.  On 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
153 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 231 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 169 of 225
 
one occasion, an inmate grabbed Mr Stradford’s backside during a “muster” and told him that 
he would “look a lot sexier” if he shaved his legs.  That night, Mr Stradford used his razor and 
soap to shave his legs.  The fact that Mr Stradford did that perhaps demonstrates the 
extraordinary impact that imprisonment was having on his mental state.  On another occasion, 
an inmate elbowed Mr Stradford in the side of the head and said “don’t fucking touch” while 
he was lining up for a piece of toast at breakfast.  Mr Stradford did not report that incident, 
essentially because it was apparent to him that an inmate’s life in gaol was “not going to be 
very good” if they reported such incidents to the guards.  
629 
While Mr Stradford’s description of his experience at the correctional centre was harrowing, it 
should be noted that he did not suggest that any prison officer mistreated him, or acted 
inappropriately towards him, during his time in prison.  His evidence was that most of the 
officers he encountered were “quite cordial”. 
630 
On his last day at the Correctional Centre, Mr Stradford was informed by prison officers that 
he would soon be sent to a maximum security prison.  Mr Stradford telephoned his friend to 
tell him this so his friend could tell his fiancée.  His friend, however, told him that he was going 
to be released as he had won his appeal.  Mr Stradford again became very emotional as he gave 
that evidence.  He recalled being in a state of euphoria when he received that news.  His 
evidence was, in effect, that if he had known from the start that he was only going to be in 
prison for a relatively short time, he would have been able to handle it much better than he did. 
631 
Mr Stradford was released from the Brisbane Correctional Centre at 4.25 pm on 12 December 
2018.  He therefore spent a total of two days and two nights at that prison.  
632 
The total period during which Mr Stradford was imprisoned by the Queensland Police and 
Queensland Corrective Services was seven days and six nights.                                         
Aggravated damages? 
633 
Mr Stradford submitted that an award of aggravated damages was warranted in respect of the 
conduct for which the Judge and the Commonwealth were jointly liable because: he was 
sentenced in front of his former wife, his best friend and others; he was escorted through a 
public place for a “considerable distance”; he was made to remove items of clothing and was 
frisk searched; he was confined in a small space without knowing how long he would be there; 
he felt shocked, fearful and apprehensive; he later “capitulated” and settled the property 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
154 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 232 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 170 of 225
 
proceedings with his former wife; he suffered a psychiatric injury as a result of his 
imprisonment; and at no time has either the Judge or the Commonwealth apologised to him. 
634 
Mr Stradford submitted that an award of aggravated damages was warranted in respect of the 
conduct for which the Judge and the Queensland were jointly liable because, in summary: he 
was transported in confined vehicles while handcuffed; he was confined at the watch house in 
“small, freezing and dirty cells”; he was twice strip searched; he was forced to wear women’s 
clothing and taunted by other inmates as a result; he was left barefoot in the watch house for 
four days; he was subjected to assaults by other inmates; he was given meagre bedding at the 
watch house; he was required to share a toilet with a “drug-affected cellmate” at the watch 
house who “left its surrounds filthy”; he was fed “Red Rooster” through a hatch in the door of 
his cell for lunch and dinner every night; throughout his imprisonment he was unable to access 
medication for his skin condition; he was unable to sleep properly at the watch house and 
became so distressed that he tried to take his own life; he was placed on observation at the 
Brisbane Correctional Centre; his movements and communications were highly restricted 
during his incarceration; throughout his imprisonment he believed that he would be in prison 
for many months; as a result of his experience he settled his property proceedings by a complete 
capitulation; he suffered psychiatric injury as a result of his experience; and at no time has 
either the Judge or Queensland apologised to him.  
635 
The Judge submitted that there should be no award of aggravated damages because there was 
no particular feature by which Mr Stradford’s sense of injury from his false imprisonment had 
been “heightened by the manner in which or the motive for which the defendant did it”: cf 
Broome v Cassell at 1124-1126 (Lord Diplock) cited in Spautz v Butterworth at 15 (Clark JA).  
The Judge conceded that he had fallen into error in imprisoning Mr Stradford and that he had 
expressed himself in “critical, strong and candid” language, however that was said not be an 
“uncommon occurrence in courts around the country”.  While Mr Stradford had said that he 
felt intimidated, shocked and fearful, in the Judge’s submission that was not indicative of a 
heightened sense of injury on his part.      
636 
The Commonwealth also submitted that aggravated damages should not be awarded as there 
was no evidence of hurt to feelings, or any special need to compensate Mr Stradford for the 
manner in which the tort was committed.  It contended that Mr Stradford had given no evidence 
of any “special hurt from his time in Commonwealth custody” which would warrant an award 
of aggravated damages.  The evidence did not indicate that Mr Stradford had been forcibly 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
155 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 233 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 171 of 225
 
escorted out of the courtroom, or that there had been any “touching”.  In the Commonwealth’s 
submission, the fact that Mr Stradford’s friend and former wife were present was not an 
aggravating feature.  Mr Stradford had also not suggested that he suffered any particular hurt 
because he was escorted through a public concourse, or required to remove various 
“accessories”.    
637 
Queensland submitted that Mr Stradford’s experience at the watch house and prison was “not 
exceptional” and did not make out a basis for awarding aggravated damages against it.  In 
Queensland’s submission, the behaviour that Mr Stradford described during his time at the 
watch house and prison was not so “outrageous” that an increased award was necessary to 
compensate any injury to Mr Stradford’s feelings of dignity and pride.  Rather, what Mr 
Stradford had described was nothing more than “an ordinary prison experience”. 
638 
While the issue as to whether Mr Stradford should be awarded aggravated damages is by no 
means easy, I am persuaded that the compensatory damages payable to him should include a 
component reflecting the aggravating circumstances in which he was detained and imprisoned.   
639 
In relation to the period of imprisonment for which the Judge and the Commonwealth are 
jointly responsible and liable, the aggravating circumstances almost entirely relate to the 
manner in which the Judge dealt with Mr Stradford.  It is unnecessary to repeat what was said 
earlier concerning the Judge’s treatment of Mr Stradford.  Even accepting that the Judge 
believed that Mr Stradford was in contempt for not complying with his orders, his Honour 
conducted the contempt proceeding in an entirely unsatisfactory way.  His general demeanour 
and attitude to Mr Stradford was high-handed and unnecessarily demeaning, contemptuous and 
dismissive.  That, in my view, exacerbated and amplified the shock, humiliation and fear that 
Mr Stradford unquestionably felt as he was escorted by the MSS guards though public areas to 
the cells.  I do not consider that anything done by the MSS guards could be considered as 
aggravating the hurt and distress that was felt by Mr Stradford during his imprisonment at the 
courthouse.  The MSS guards were simply doing their job and did nothing to increase Mr 
Stradford’s sense of hurt.  
640 
It should be noted, in this context, that the Commonwealth submitted that it was not responsible 
for any of the Judge’s actions in the context of determining whether an award of aggravated 
damages was warranted.  I disagree.  The Judge and the Commonwealth were jointly liable in 
respect of the period during which the MSS guards imprisoned Mr Stradford.  The MSS guards 
were present when the Judge ordered that Mr Stradford be imprisoned and immediately took 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
156 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 234 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 172 of 225
 
him into custody.  It may perhaps be accepted that Mr Stradford’s aggravated feelings of hurt, 
distress and fear during the period he was imprisoned by the MSS guards were largely the 
product of the manner in which he had been dealt with by the Judge, and the initial shock of 
being sentenced to imprisonment and then immediately detained.  The actions of the MSS 
guards themselves may not have specifically or materially contributed to the aggravation of Mr 
Stradford’s feelings of hurt, distress and fear.  It does not, however, follow that the 
Commonwealth can escape liability for aggravated damages relating to Mr Stradford’s 
detention by and on behalf of the Commonwealth.  Aggravated damages are compensatory, not 
punitive in nature.  It is not to the point for the Commonwealth to point the finger of blame at 
the Judge.  The fact remains that Mr Stradford is entitled to be compensated for the aggravated 
feelings of hurt, distress and fear he felt and experienced during his initial detention for and on 
behalf of the Commonwealth. 
641 
I should also add that there was no suggestion that neither the Judge nor the Commonwealth 
had ever apologised to Mr Stradford.  While both the Judge and the Commonwealth conceded, 
or at least did not dispute, that the Judge had erred in finding that Mr Stradford was in contempt 
and in ordering that he be imprisoned, they nevertheless maintained that his imprisonment was 
lawful and justified.  That alone provides some basis for the award of aggravated damages.  
The failure to offer any apology to Mr Stradford in all the circumstances was unjustifiable, 
even accepting that the Judge and the Commonwealth believed that they had a reasonable 
defence to his claim. 
642 
As for the period of imprisonment in respect of which the Judge and Queensland are jointly 
responsible and liable, the aggravating circumstances are again primarily to be found in the 
conduct of the Judge.  I would infer from the evidence as a whole that the high-handed, 
unnecessarily contemptuous and dismissive manner in which the Judge dealt with Mr Stradford 
continued to exacerbate the distress, humiliation and fear that Mr Stradford felt while he was 
imprisoned both at the Brisbane watch house and the Brisbane Correctional Centre.  In any 
event, I also consider that the thoroughly humiliating, demeaning and degrading manner in 
which Mr Stradford was dealt with and housed, both at the watch house and the gaol, 
significantly aggravated the injury to Mr Stradford’s feelings and mental state during that 
period of imprisonment.  It is no answer to say that Mr Stradford suffered no more than the 
“ordinary prison experience”, whatever that may mean.  The fact remains that Mr Stradford 
did not deserve to be treated in the thoroughly demeaning, degrading and humiliating manner 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
157 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 235 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 173 of 225
 
in which he was, at times, treated while imprisoned at the watch house and gaol for which 
Queensland was responsible.   
Exemplary damages against the Judge? 
643 
Mr Stradford submitted that an award of exemplary damages was warranted because the Judge 
had acted in a manner which was “high handed” and exhibited a “flagrant” and “contumelious 
disregard for [his] rights”: cf Uren at 117 CLR 129 (Taylor J) and 154 (Windeyer J); Australian 
Consolidated Press v Uren (1966) 117 CLR 185 at 212 (Windeyer J).  In Mr Stradford’s 
submission, the Judge’s conduct cannot be explained away as simply involving a mistake.  
Rather, at best it demonstrated a reckless disregard for the serious consequences to Mr 
Stradford of imprisoning him for contempt.  An award of exemplary damages was necessary, 
so it was submitted, both to punish the Judge and to deter him and others from such conduct in 
the future.  Such an award was also said to be warranted both to vindicate Mr Stradford’s rights 
and vindicate “the strength of the rule of law”. 
644 
The Judge submitted that an award of exemplary damages was not warranted.  In his 
submission, if it came to it, the very fact of him being held liable and ordered to pay 
compensatory damages would suffice to deter both him and judges generally from behaving in 
the way he did.  No further action would be required to punish him or mark the Court’s 
condemnation of his conduct.  He also pointed out that he had obtained no ill-gotten benefit by 
imposing the imprisonment order.  The Judge’s submissions also lamented the “significant” 
publicity and opprobrium which the Judge had already been exposed to by the initiation of this 
proceeding. 
645 
There is some merit in the Judge’s submissions concerning exemplary damages.  It is highly 
unusual, at least in modern-day Australia, for a judge to be held liable for false imprisonment.  
That finding alone would undoubtedly have a salutary effect on the Judge and other decision-
makers in a similar position to him.  I also unquestionably accept that the Judge made no ill-
gotten gain and has already been the subject of some adverse publicity and opprobrium arising 
from this matter.  More to the point, I also accept that the Judge did not act with malice and did 
not appear to be conscious of his wrongdoing at the time.   
646 
That said, as I have already explained, the Judge’s conduct towards Mr Stradford was, on just 
about any view, high-handed and demonstrated a thoroughly reckless disregard of, if not 
outright contempt for, Mr Stradford and his rights.  Indeed, to a certain extent his Honour’s 
actions displayed an almost contemptuous disregard for the rule of law, which of course 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
158 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 236 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 174 of 225
 
involves due process and procedural fairness.  While the Judge’s actions have already been 
condemned by the FamCA Full Court, in my view his actions warrant an award of exemplary 
damages in all the circumstances.  I am not satisfied that the award of compensatory damages, 
including aggravated damages, sufficiently expresses or reflects the Court’s disapproval of the 
Judge’s conduct and treatment of Mr Stradford.  I also consider that an award of exemplary 
damages, while somewhat exceptional, will serve to deter any repetition of such a thoroughly 
unacceptable abuse of judicial power in the future.          
Assessment of damages for deprivation of liberty    
647 
To unlawfully deprive a person of their liberty is to deprive them of their most basic and 
fundamental human right.  As Mason and Brennan JJ said in Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 
CLR 278 at 292; [1986] HCA 88: 
The right to personal liberty is, as Fullagar J described it, ‘the most elementary and 
important of all common law rights’: Trobridge v Hardy (1955) 94 CLR 147 at 152. 
Personal liberty was held by Blackstone to be an absolute right vested in the individual 
by the immutable laws of nature and had never been abridged by the laws of England 
‘without sufficient cause’: Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford, 1765), Bk 
1, pp 120-121, 130-131. He warned: 
‘Of great importance to the public is the preservation of this personal liberty: 
for if once it were left in the power of any, the highest, magistrate to imprison 
arbitrarily whomever he or his officers thought proper … there would soon be 
an end of all other rights and immunities’. 
… 
The right to personal liberty cannot be impaired or taken away without lawful authority 
and then only to the extent and for the time which the law prescribes. 
648 
In  Ruddock v Taylor, McHugh J (at [120]) and Kirby J (at [138]) cited with approval the 
following statement by Deane J in Re Bolton; Ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514; [1987] 
HCA 12 (at 162 CLR 528-529): 
The common law of Australia knows no letter de cachet or executive warrant pursuant 
to which either citizen or alien can be deprived of his freedom by mere administrative 
decision or action. Any officer of the Commonwealth Executive who, without 
judicial  warrant, purports to authorize or enforce the detention in custody of 
another person is acting lawfully only to the extent that his conduct is justified by 
clear statutory mandate. That being so, it is the plain duty of any such officer to 
satisfy himself that he is acting with the authority of the law in any case where, in 
the name of the Commonwealth, he directs that a person be taken and held in 
custody. The lawfulness of any such administrative direction, or of actions taken 
pursuant to it, may be challenged in the courts by the person affected: by application 
for a writ of habeas corpus where it is available or by reliance upon the constitutionally 
entrenched right to seek in this Court an injunction against an officer of the 
Commonwealth. It cannot be too strongly stressed that these basic matters are not 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
159 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 237 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 175 of 225
 
the stuff of empty rhetoric. They are the very fabric of the freedom under the law 
which is the prima facie right of every citizen and alien in this land. They represent 
a bulwark against tyranny. They provide the general context of the present case. 
(Emphasis added) 
649 
The damages awarded to Mr Stradford should adequately reflect the fact that he was deprived 
of his elementary and absolute right to personal liberty.  What occurred to him was undoubtedly 
a grievous denial and deprivation of that right.  He was not “treated as one might expect in a 
civilised society governed by the rule of law”: Bulsey at [119] (Atkinson J).  
650 
The parties relied on some comparative cases in which damages have been awarded for false 
imprisonment.  I accept that I should have regard to the awards of damages in those cases, 
though ultimately the awards in those cases themselves are of fairly limited assistance given 
that the facts and circumstances of each were materially different to the facts and circumstances 
of this case. 
651 
Mr Stradford primarily relied on Bulsey.  In that case, six armed police officers forcibly entered 
the appellants’ house, shouted commands at the second appellant, entered the first appellant’s 
bedroom, took him from his bed, handcuffed him and dragged him out to the street.  The first 
appellant was held in police custody and questioned for two days before he was charged with 
certain offences, taken before a magistrate and remanded in custody.  The charges were 
subsequently withdrawn.  The trial judge awarded the first appellant damages of $80,000 for 
assault, battery and false imprisonment.  That award was found on appeal to be manifestly 
inadequate.   
652 
The Court of Appeal of the Queensland Supreme Court (Fraser JA, with whom Atkinson and 
McMeekin JJ agreed) awarded the first appellant damages of $165,000, comprising damages 
(including aggravated damages) of $60,000 for assault, battery and false imprisonment during 
the wrongful arrest, damages of $100,000 for false imprisonment after the wrongful arrest 
(ending when the first appellant was taken before the magistrate) and general damages of 
$5,000 for personal injury (the latter being the same award granted at first instance, and not in 
issue).  Justice Fraser considered that a “very substantial award of damages [was] required to 
compensate the first appellant for the wrong done to him by that wrongful exercise of executive 
power over a citizen” and that the award should take into account “the violence and the 
particularly distressing and humiliating circumstances of the torts” (at [109]).  The second 
appellant, whose false imprisonment was very short, was awarded damages of $70,000, an 
increase from $30,000 as granted by the trial judge.  In arriving at that award, Fraser JA took 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
160 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 238 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 176 of 225
 
into account, among other things, the “extraordinarily traumatic atmosphere” and “very real 
indignity” felt by the second appellant (at [112]).      
653 
The Judge submitted that the facts and circumstances in Bulsey were “vastly different” to the 
facts and circumstances of this case.  That is no doubt the case.  The wrongful arrest in Bulsey 
involved violence and the award included damages for assault and battery.  However, the award 
of $100,000 for two days in police detention was for false imprisonment alone and is somewhat 
instructive.  The award of $70,000 to the second appellant is also somewhat instructive given 
the very short duration of her false imprisonment (which consisted of her being directed, during 
the police raid, to walk around and remain in different areas of her house).  
654 
Mr Stradford also referred, in the context of the award against the Judge and the 
Commonwealth, to the award of damages in Vignoli v Sydney Harbour Casino (2000) Aust 
Torts Reports 81-451; [1999] NSWSC 1113.  In that case, Mr Vignoli had been gambling at 
the Sydney Harbour Casino.  At about 6.00 pm on the evening in question he was prevented 
from leaving the Casino by various Casino employees on the basis that the Casino believed 
that he had been overpaid.  He was subsequently detained in various rooms of the Casino until 
approximately midnight.  The police were called, as was Mr Vignoli’s solicitor, and Mr Vignoli 
was eventually permitted to leave shortly after midnight.  Justice Bergin, in the Supreme Court 
of New South Wales, accepted that  the incident had been a “searing experience” for Mr 
Vignoli; he “felt deep humiliation and disgrace” and “experienced a deal of mental anguish 
and discomfort” (at [108]).  Her Honour awarded total damages of $75,000 comprising general 
damages of $30,000, aggravated damages of $10,000 and exemplary damages of $35,000.   
655 
The Commonwealth submitted that the award of damages in Vignoli was not an appropriate 
comparator.  Again, there can be no doubt that the facts and circumstances of Vignoli differ in 
a number of material respects from the facts and circumstances of this case.  That said, Vignoli 
suggests that a not insubstantial award of damages may be warranted even when the period of 
detention is relatively short, Mr Vignoli having only been detained at the Casino for 
approximately six hours.  As for the Commonwealth’s suggestion that the circumstances of Mr 
Vignoli’s detention were more distressing than Mr Stradford’s detention by the MSS guards at 
the Circuit Court, I doubt that being detained at a Casino could be regarded as being any more 
humiliating or distressing than being escorted by guards through a public area, taken down a 
goods lift, frisked and detained in a cell in the basement of a court complex for a period while 
waiting to be taken to prison by the police or prison authorities.         
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
161 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 239 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 177 of 225
 
656 
In its submissions, Queensland noted that most of the cases concerning false imprisonment in 
Queensland involved a plaintiff being imprisoned for relatively short periods of time.  
Queensland referred to “comparatives”: Hemelaar v Walsh [2017] QDC 151; Eaves v Donnelly 
[2011] QDC 207; and Coleman v Watson [2017] QSC 343. In Hemelaar, fairly modest awards 
of general damages of $4,000 and $5,000 were awarded to two appellants who were unlawfully 
detained by police officers for about five hours.  In Eaves, compensatory damages of $30,000 
were awarded for the plantiff’s false imprisonment in circumstances where she had been 
detained for approximately two and a half hours following her unlawful arrest.  In Coleman, 
Cullinane J in the Supreme Court of Queensland awarded the plaintiff general damages of 
$20,000 for false imprisonment in circumstances where the plaintiff was unlawfully arrested 
and detained in a police watch house for about five hours before being granted bail.     
657 
Queensland also referred to the decision in Raad v New South Wales [2017] NSWDC 63.  In 
that case, Mr Raad was unlawfully arrested by police officers outside a hotel in the early hours 
of the morning.  He was handcuffed, placed in the back of a police van and detained for slightly 
less than two hours.  In respect of the tort of false imprisonment, Mr Raad was awarded $15,000 
in general damages and $5,000 in aggravated damages.  He was also awarded damages of 
$25,000 for malicious prosecution.  
658 
I do not consider that any of the cases referred to by Queensland greatly assist the assessment 
of damages in this case.     
659 
As noted earlier, Mr Stradford submitted that damages should be assessed as follows: an award 
of general damages (including aggravated damages) of $50,000 in respect of the period of 
detention for which the Judge and the Commonwealth were jointly responsible and liable; an 
award of general damages (including aggravated damages) of $250,000 in respect of the period 
of detention for which the Judge and Queensland were jointly responsible; and an award of 
exemplary damages of $400,000.  An award of exemplary damages of that magnitude was said 
to be warranted because the Judge sentenced Mr Stradford to imprisonment for one year, and 
$400,000 represented the Judge’s annual salary.    
660 
The Judge submitted that there was no basis for an award of either aggravated or exemplary 
damages.  He did not proffer an amount that would represent an appropriate award of general 
damages.  
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
162 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 240 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 178 of 225
 
661 
The Commonwealth submitted that there was no basis for an award of aggravated damages in 
respect of the period of imprisonment for which it was responsible.  It submitted that any award 
in relation to loss of liberty should be “extremely low, towards nominal” given the very short 
time Mr Stradford was detained by the MSS guards and the fact that the MSS guards did not 
mistreat Mr Stradford in any way.   
662 
Queensland submitted that an appropriate award of general damages for the period in which it 
and the Judge were jointly liable was $100,000.  It submitted that an award of aggravated 
damages was not warranted.  
663 
In my view, the following awards of damages are appropriate in all the circumstances. 
664 
First, in respect of the period of imprisonment for which the Judge and the Commonwealth are 
jointly liable, being the time from when the Judge ordered that Mr Stradford be imprisoned to 
the time that custody of Mr Stradford was transferred from the MSS guards to the Queensland 
Police (from about 12.27 pm to about 12.54 pm on 6 December 2018), there should be an award 
of compensatory damages, including aggravated damages, of $35,000.  While I accept that this 
period of false imprisonment was short, I am nevertheless satisfied that Mr Stradford suffered 
significant injury to his feelings as a result of this period of imprisonment, including 
considerable shock, distress, fear and humiliation.  As discussed earlier, those feelings were 
aggravated by the high-handed and unnecessarily demeaning, contemptuous and dismissive 
manner in which he was treated by the Judge.  The Judge’s treatment of Mr Stradford no doubt 
heightened the sense of distress, fear and hopelessness that Mr Stradford experienced during 
his time in detention by the Commonwealth.   
665 
Second, in respect of the period of imprisonment for which the Judge and Queensland are 
jointly liable, being the time from which Queensland Police officers took custody of Mr 
Stradford to the time Mr Stradford was released from the Brisbane Correctional Centre (from 
about 12.54 pm on 6 December 2018 to 4.25 pm on 12 December 2018), there should be an 
award of compensatory damages (including aggravated damages) of $165,000.  The period of 
imprisonment for which the Judge and Queensland are jointly liable was lengthy – seven days 
and six nights.  He is entitled to a significant award of damages to compensate him for the 
breach of his fundamental right to liberty during that period.  The conditions and events that 
Mr Stradford suffered and endured during that period were also demeaning, humiliating and 
distressing, regardless of whether or not they represented a normal prison experience.  Mr 
Stradford’s feelings of fear, distress and hopelessness during this period, going as far as suicidal 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
163 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 241 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 179 of 225
 
ideation, were, not surprisingly in the circumstances, extreme and aggravated by the overall 
circumstances in which he came to be in prison, including the contemptuous actions of the 
Judge.    
666 
Third, there should be an award of exemplary damages against the Judge in the sum of $50,000.  
I do not accept that an award of exemplary damages in the amount sought by Mr Stradford is 
warranted or would be appropriate in all the circumstances.  Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, 
I consider that that an award of exemplary damages, albeit in the fairly modest sum of $50,000, 
is warranted and appropriate to both express the Court’s disapproval of the high-handed 
conduct of the Judge and his Honour’s reckless disregard of due process and the rights of Mr 
Stradford.  Such an award should also deter the repetition of such conduct.       
GENERAL DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY 
667 
The parties broadly agreed that if Mr Stradford made out his case in respect of liability, he was 
entitled to an award of damages for personal injury.  That was because it was essentially 
common ground that Mr Stradford had been diagnosed with a psychiatric condition, post-
traumatic stress disorder, that was caused by his imprisonment.  He was also jointly diagnosed 
with major depressive disorder, though it was essentially a “secondary condition”.  The 
evidence and submissions focussed almost entirely on Mr Stradford’s post-traumatic stress 
disorder.  It was also common ground that that award of damages in respect of that injury was 
to be assessed having regard to the provisions of the Civil Liability Act and Civil Liability 
Regulation 2014 (Qld).  That was where the common ground ended. 
Summary of issues concerning the assessment of damages for personal injury   
668 
The main area of disagreement between the parties concerned the appropriate calculation of 
the damages for Mr Stradford’s psychiatric injury under the Civil Liability Act and Regulation.  
The disagreement related to the determination of the appropriate “injury scale value” in respect 
of Mr Stradford’s psychiatric injury.  That disagreement primarily flowed from a disagreement 
between the two psychiatrists who had consulted with Mr Stradford, Dr Foxcroft and Dr 
Harden, as to the extent of Mr Stradford’s impairment and, more specifically, where Mr 
Stradford’s impairment was situated within the Psychiatric Injury Rating Scale (PIRS), a scale 
used to rate the impairment caused by psychiatric disorders which is scheduled to the 
Regulation.  Dr Foxcroft’s opinion was that Mr Stradford’s mental disorder was moderate and 
that the applicable impairment rating was 15%.  Dr Harden’s opinion that Mr Stradford’s 
mental disorder was mild and that the appropriate or applicable impairment rating was 6%.    
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
164 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 242 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 180 of 225
 
669 
The determination of the issue concerning the extent of Mr Stradford’s impairment and the 
appropriate injury rating was complicated by two matters: first, the complexity and opacity of 
the applicable statutory provisions and criteria; and second, the fact that the psychiatrists’ 
opinions relevant to the impartment ratings were no doubt a product, at least in part, of what 
Mr Stradford had told them during their respective consultations throughout 2020 and 2021.  
The problem in that regard was that it soon became apparent, mainly as a result of evidence 
which emerged in the course of the cross-examination of Mr Stradford, that Mr Stradford had 
not been entirely frank and open with the psychiatrists.  In particular, it appeared that he had 
not revealed certain facts that may have been relevant to whether he had been suffering from a 
pre-existing psychiatric condition, as well as certain facts that may have been relevant to an 
accurate assessment of Mr Stradford’s functional impairment relevant to his ability to 
concentrate and his employability.  
670 
There was also a disagreement between the psychiatrists in respect of Mr Stradford’s prognosis, 
though ultimately that issue is of more significance in the context of Mr Stradford’s claim for 
economic loss or loss of earning capacity. 
671 
Mr Stradford ultimately submitted that he was entitled to an award of $39,350 in respect of his 
psychiatric injury, together with an amount of $13,560 for future or ongoing medical expenses. 
672 
The Judge submitted that Mr Stradford was entitled to an award of $9,450 in respect of his 
psychiatric injury.  Queensland’s submission was more or less the same.  Queensland also 
allowed a sum of $15,000 for future medical expenses.  The Commonwealth submitted that the 
opinion expressed by Dr Harden should be accepted and that Mr Stradford had not established 
that he will incur any future costs in connection with any ongoing psychiatric treatment. 
673 
There is also a separate issue as to whether the Commonwealth is liable at all in respect of any 
damages arising from the injury suffered by Mr Stradford.  The Commonwealth submitted, in 
short, that it was not liable for any damages arising from Mr Stradford’s injury because the 
evidence did not establish that the very short period in which Mr Stradford was detained by the 
MSS guards, on behalf of the Commonwealth, was a cause of Mr Stradford’s injury.  That issue 
is dealt with separately later in these reasons.      
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
165 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 243 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 181 of 225
 
Applicable statutory provisions 
674 
The calculation of general damages for personal injury is governed by ss 61 and 62 of the Civil 
Liability Act.  Relevantly, schedule 2 of the Civil Liability Act defines “personal injury” to 
include a psychological or psychiatric injury. 
675 
Section 61 of the Civil Liability Act provides as follows: 
61 
Assessment by court of injury scale 
(1)  
If general damages are to be awarded by a court in relation to an injury arising
 
after 1 December 2002, the court must assess an injury scale value as follows– 
(a)  
the injured person’s total general damages must be assigned numerical
 value 
(injury scale value) on a scale running from 0 to 100; 
(b)  
the scale reflects 100 equal gradations of general damages, from a case 
in which an injury is not severe enough to justify any award of general 
damages to a case in which an injury is of the gravest conceivable 
kind; 
(c)  
in assessing the injury scale value, the court must – 
(i)  
assess the injury scale value under any rules provided under a 
regulation; and 
(ii)  
have regard to the injury scale value given to similar injuries 
in previous proceedings. 
(2)  
If a court assesses an injury scale value for a particular injury to be more or 
less than any injury scale value prescribed for or attributed to similar particular 
injuries under subsection (1)(c), the court must state the factors on which the 
assessment is based that justify the assessed injury scale value.   
(Emphasis in original) 
676 
Regulation 7 of the Regulation provides the relevant rules for the assessment of the injury scale 
value for an injury.  It provides as follows: 
7  
Rules for assessing injury scale value – Act, s 61(1)(c)(i) 
(1)  
This section and schedules 3 to 6 provide the rules under which a court must 
assess the injury scale value for an injury. 
(2)  
Schedule 4 provides the ranges of injury scale values for particular injuries that 
the court is to consider in assessing the injury scale value for those injuries.  
(3) 
In assessing an injury scale value for an injury not mentioned in schedule 4, a 
court may have regard to the ranges prescribed in schedule 4 for other injuries. 
(4)  
Schedule 3 provides matters to which a court may or must have regard in 
applying schedule 4. 
(5)  
Schedule 6 provides the PIRS that may be used with schedule 4. 
(6)  
Schedule 5 provides – 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
166 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 244 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 182 of 225
 
(a) 
matters relevant to the application of schedule 6; and 
(b) 
requirements with which a medical expert must comply in assessing a 
PIRS rating for a mental disorder of an injured person. 
677 
As can be seen from reg 7(2) above, schedule 4 sets out the ranges of injury scale value (ISVs) 
for various kinds of injuries.  The items in schedule 4 which are relevant to this matter are item 
11 “serious mental disorder”, which is defined as a “mental disorder with a PIRS rating between 
11% and 30%” and specifies an ISV range of 11 to 40; and item 12 “moderate mental disorder”, 
which specifies a “mental disorder with a PIRS rating between 4% and 10%” and specifies an 
ISV range of 2 to 10. 
678 
Schedule 5 to the Regulation sets out how PIRS ratings are assessed.  It contains a number of 
rules which assist in assessing a PIRS rating.  Two provisions in schedule 5 are of particular 
relevance to this case.  They are items 5 and 11 which deal with pre-existing mental disorders.  
Those provisions are in the following terms: 
5 
Assessment if pre-existing mental disorder 
(1)  
If an injured person has a pre-existing mental disorder, a medical expert 
must— 
(a)  
work out a percentage impairment for the pre-existing mental disorder 
at the time immediately before the injury using the steps set out in 
section 4 (the pre-injury rating); and 
(b)  
work out a percentage impairment for the current mental disorder 
using the steps set out in section 4 (the post-injury rating); and 
(c)  
subtract the pre-injury rating from the post-injury rating. 
(2)  
The remaining percentage impairment is the PIRS rating assessed by the 
medical expert for the mental disorder of the injured person. 
Editor’s note— 
See also section 11 (Pre-existing mental disorder). 
… 
11  
Pre-existing mental disorder 
If a medical expert assessing a PIRS rating for a mental disorder of an injured person 
considers the injured person had a pre-existing mental disorder, the medical expert 
must— 
(a)  
make appropriate enquiry into the pre-existing mental disorder; and 
(b)  
consider any psychiatric or psychological reports made available to the 
medical expert. 
(Emphasis in original) 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
167 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 245 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 183 of 225
 
679 
Schedule 6 to the Regulation identifies different classes of PIRS ratings in respect of various 
areas of impairment.  The areas of impairment include: self-care and personal hygiene; social 
and recreational activities; travel; social functioning; concentration, persistence and pace; and 
adaptation (which includes employability). As discussed later in these reasons, Dr Foxcroft and 
Dr Harden’s evidence addressed each of these areas of impairment.  Their PIRS ratings in 
respect of some of those areas were the same.  They arrived at different ratings in respect of 
other areas.     
680 
It is finally necessary to have regard to s 62 of the Civil Liability Act and reg 8 of the 
Regulation.  Section 62 provides as follows:  
62  
Calculation of general damages  
(1)  
For an injury arising after 1 December 2002, general damages must be 
calculated by reference to the general damages calculation provisions applying 
to the period within which the injury arose.  
(2)  
In this section—  
general damages calculation provisions, applying to a period, means the 
provisions prescribed for the period under a regulation. 
(Emphasis in original) 
681 
Regulation 8 of the Regulation contains the relevant general damages calculation provision for 
the purposes of s 62 of the Civil Liability Act:  
8  
General damages calculation provisions— Act, s 62(2), definition general 
damages calculation provisions  
(1)  
For each period stated in a table in schedule 7, this section and that table are 
the general damages calculation provisions for the period.  
(2)  
For an injury within the injury scale value stated in an item of a table, the 
general damages are the sum of—  
(a)  
the base amount for the item (if any); and  
(b)  
the variable amount for the item.  
(3)  
In this section—  
variable amount means the amount worked out in the way stated in the column 
of a table with the heading ‘variable amount’. 
(Emphasis in original) 
682 
The applicable table in schedule 7 of the Regulation is Table 9 which provides as follows: 
 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
168 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 246 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 184 of 225
 
Table 9—For an injury arising from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019 (dates inclusive) 
Item  Injury scale value 
Base amount 
Variable amount 
1 
5 or less 
— 
Injury scale value x $1,530 
2 
10 or less but more than 5 
$7,650 
(Injury scale value - 5) x $1,800 
3 
15 or less but more than 10 
$16,650 
(Injury scale value - 10) x $2,120 
4 
20 or less but more than 15 
$27,250 
(Injury scale value - 15) x $2,420 
5 
25 or less but more than 20 
$39,350 
(Injury scale value - 20) x $2,710 
6 
30 or less but more than 25 
$52,900 
(Injury scale value - 25) x $3,030 
7 
35 or less but more than 30 
$68,050 
(Injury scale value - 30) x $3,340 
8 
40 or less but more than 35 
$84,750 
(Injury scale value - 35) x $3,640 
9 
50 or less but more than 40 
$102,950 
(Injury scale value - 40) x $3,910 
10 
60 or less but more than 50 
$142,050 
(Injury scale value - 50) x $4,170 
11 
70 or less but more than 60 
$183,750 
(Injury scale value - 60) x $4,440 
12 
80 or less but more than 70 
$228,150 
(Injury scale value - 70) x $4,740 
13 
90 or less but more than 80 
$275,550 
(Injury scale value - 80) x $5,010 
14 
100 or less but more than 90 
$325,650 
(Injury scale value - 90) x $5,290 
 
683 
As can be seen, once an injury scale value for an injury is calculated or assessed in accordance 
with the provisions of the Regulation referred to earlier, Table 9 specifies a base amount and a 
variable amount.  The sum of the base amount and variable amount comprises the general 
damages for the injury.  Mr Stradford submitted, based on Dr Foxcroft’s assessment, that the 
applicable item in Table 9 was item 4.  The Judge and Queensland submitted, based largely on 
Dr Harden’s assessment, that the applicable item in Table 9 was item 2.  The Commonwealth 
submitted that the applicable item was either item 1 or 2. 
Issues arising from the evidence of the psychiatrists 
684 
Dr Foxcroft prepared three reports for the purposes of the proceedings: his first report dated 14 
February 2020; a second report dated 7 September 2021; and a short supplementary report 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
169 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 247 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 185 of 225
 
dated 6 October 2021.  In his supplementary report, Dr Foxcroft noted that he had read Dr 
Harden’s report and confirmed his PIRS assessment arising from his earlier assessments.   Dr 
Harden prepared a report dated 6 September 2021.  The psychiatrists conferred and prepared a 
joint report dated 8 November 2021.  They gave oral evidence concurrently at the trial.  There 
was no dispute concerning the qualifications and expertise of either Dr Foxcroft or Dr Harden, 
though notably Dr Harden purported to have received specific training in the PIRS. 
685 
It is perhaps useful to first address the matters about which Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden were in 
agreement.   
686 
First, they both diagnosed Mr Stradford as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and a 
major depressive disorder.  Dr Foxcroft referred to the latter diagnosis as “secondary”. 
687 
Second, they agreed that “the psychiatric diagnosis and subsequent impairment relate to the 
incarceration”.  It will in due course be necessary to say something further about this issue in 
the context of the submissions advanced by the Judge, the Commonwealth and Queensland to 
the effect that Mr Stradford did not disclose to either of the psychiatrists that he had suffered 
from depression prior his imprisonment. 
688 
Third, they agreed on the appropriate PIRS ratings in respect of three areas or “domains” of 
impairment, those being “travel”, “social functioning” and “adaptation”.   
689 
It is unnecessary to say anything further concerning the psychiatrists’ agreed ratings in respect 
of the travel and social functioning domains.  Despite the psychiatrists’ agreement, in the joint 
report, concerning the appropriate rating in the “adaptation” domain, it will be necessary to 
address an issue that arose in relation to that assessment.  That issue concerns whether Mr 
Stradford adequately disclosed all of his post-imprisonment employment to the psychiatrists 
and, if not, whether disclosure of the circumstances of that employment may have impacted 
the PIRS rating in respect of the adaptation domain.      
690 
The main issue that divided the experts in their respective reports, and their joint report, was 
their PIRS assessments in the “self-care and personal hygiene”, “social and recreational 
activities” and “concentration, persistence and pace” domains.  As a result of their divergent 
assessments in respect of those three domains was that their overall PIRS ratings diverged.  Dr 
Foxcroft’s overall rating was 15% and Dr Harden’s overall rating was 6%.  As the preceding 
discussion concerning the statutory scheme reveals, those differing PIRS ratings necessarily 
result in different awards of general damages for personal injury. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
170 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 248 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 186 of 225
 
691 
It will ultimately be necessary to make a finding about whether Dr Foxcroft’s opinions or 
assessments in respect of the appropriate PIRS ratings in the disputed domains is to be preferred 
to Dr Harden’s opinions and assessments, or vice versa.  Before directly addressing that issue, 
however, it is necessary to consider whether, as contended by each of the Judge, the 
Commonwealth and Queensland, Mr Stradford had not been entirely frank and open with Dr 
Foxcroft and Dr Harden and did not disclose some facts that would, or at least might have, 
impacted not only their assessments in respect of the disputed domains, but also their 
assessment as to whether Mr Stradford had a pre-existing psychiatric condition.  If Mr 
Stradford had been found to have been suffering from a pre-existing condition, that also may 
have led to a reduction in the overall impairment rating by virtue of schedule 5 to the 
Regulation, which requires the pre-injury impairment rating to be subtracted from the post-
injury rating. 
692 
The final issue that must be resolved concerns Mr Stradford’s prognosis and the prospects of 
his condition improving, or even being cured, in the future.  That issue is of particular 
importance to determining the future economic loss head of damages. 
Material non-disclosures to the psychiatrists? 
693 
The Judge, the Commonwealth and Queensland each contended that Mr Stradford had failed 
to disclose certain facts to both Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden that, in their submission, would 
have been material to the assessment of Mr Stradford’s impairment rating.  Those facts related, 
in broad terms, to three topics: first, that Mr Stradford had a history of excessive gambling; 
second, that Mr Stradford had experienced severe depression and suicidal thoughts before he 
was imprisoned by the Judge; and third, that after being released from prison Mr Stradford had 
worked in responsible real estate positions that involved him working significant hours, and 
training and mentoring another person.   
694 
There was ultimately no dispute that, well prior to his imprisonment, Mr Stradford had reported 
that he had a serious gambling habit or problem.  He said as much in an affidavit he filed in his 
family law proceeding in the Circuit Court.  There was equally no dispute that Mr Stradford 
had reported, in the same affidavit, that from as early as January 2017 he was “severely 
depressed” and “suicidal”.  In that affidavit, which was sworn on 24 November 2018, Mr 
Stradford stated that he was in a “suicidal emotional state” because his access to his children 
had, so he said, been restricted by Mrs Stradford.  He also said that in January 2017 he had 
gone from “being depressed to severely depressed” and was “suicidal and gambling heavily 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
171 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 249 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 187 of 225
 
what money [he] had as means of escape”.  Mr Stradford appeared to attribute that depression 
to the fact that he had been overpaid by a developer, but had spent that money and was 
gambling to try to clear his debt.  He had also stated: 
I have realised my gambling behaviour from psychologists is akin to an unhealthy 
video game, or means to escape reality because I have been severely depressed over 
my feelings of inadequacy during childhood, then the feelings of inadequacy 
resulting from this marriage and the emotional trauma afterwards inflicted by Mrs 
Stradford.  Yet the consequences of gambling only compounded this depression and 
placed myself in a further and further desperate situation. 
(Emphasis added)       
695 
Mr Stradford went on to state that he realised that he had spent over $300,000 on gambling 
since 2014.  Two things may be noted from that statement in Mr Stradford’s affidavit.  First, it 
appears that he had consulted with a psychologist or psychologists regarding “severe 
depression” in the past; and second, he attributed his gambling problem to issues not directly 
related to his marriage difficulties.   
696 
Mr Stradford did not tell either Dr Foxcroft or Dr Harden about what plainly appeared to be a 
serious gambling problem.  In his first report, Dr Foxcroft stated that there was “no history of 
excessive gambling”.  Dr Foxcroft agreed, when questioned about this, that Mr Stradford did 
not tell him that he had a history of excessive gambling.  Dr Foxcroft’s evidence was that he 
recalled asking Mr Stradford about whether he had any history of excessive gambling.  Dr 
Foxcroft also essentially agreed that excessive gambling would be relevant to the assessment 
of Mr Stradford’s historical ability to make good decisions.  While Dr Foxcroft said that Mr 
Stradford’s gambling may not have been relevant to his opinion “in relation to the development 
of post-traumatic stress [disorder]”, that is not to say that it may not have been of some 
relevance to his opinions concerning the existence of a pre-existing psychiatric disorder, or his 
opinions concerning impairment generally.  Dr Harden’s evidence was that he did not 
specifically inquire about gambling and was not given any information about it by Mr 
Stradford.   
697 
Mr Stradford also did not tell Dr Foxcroft that he had previously experienced severe depression.  
Indeed, it appears that he did not tell Dr Foxcroft that he had experienced any depression.  Dr 
Foxcroft’s first report stated that Mr Stradford had “no previous psychiatric history” and that 
“[h]e had never had any history of depressive or anxiety conditions”.  In his second report, Dr 
Foxcroft stated that Mr Stradford had “no evidence of any pre-existing psychiatric conditions 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
172 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 250 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 188 of 225
 
and was functioning well through a bitter divorce”.  It is well-nigh impossible to reconcile those 
statements with the contents of affidavit Mr Stradford filed in the Circuit Court.   
698 
When questioned regarding Mr Stradford’s non-disclosure of this history of severe depression 
and suicidal ideation, Dr Foxcroft initially suggested that “emotional responses” to Family 
Court proceedings are “often situation-specific”.  Ultimately, however, he agreed that if Mr 
Stradford had experienced severe depression and suicidal thoughts prior to his imprisonment, 
that might have been material to his assessment.  He was, however, unable to say whether that 
was so because he did not have that information when he was doing his assessment.  He also 
agreed that, if Mr Stradford had told him that prior to his imprisonment he had been suicidal, 
had “moved from being depressed to severely depressed” and that his severe depression had 
extended over a period of at least 18 months, that information would have led him to further 
question Mr Stradford to seek to ascertain if there was some pre-existing psychiatric condition.   
699 
Dr Harden’s evidence was much to the same effect.  Dr Harden stated in his report that Mr 
Stradford “denied any pre-existing psychiatric history” but had “reported some feelings of 
depression, emotional distress and unhappiness regarding the failure of his marriage, conflict 
with his ex-wife, difficulty seeking his children and business problems during 2018 and 
possibly dating back as far as 2016”.  That could scarcely be said to be a frank or fulsome 
disclosure by Mr Stradford of his past psychiatric history given the contents of the affidavit he 
filed in the Circuit Court.  Dr Harden’s evidence was that the psychiatric history that was given 
to him by Mr Stradford did not amount to a pre-existing psychiatric disorder.  That is not 
surprising given the very limited, if not inaccurate, history that Mr Stradford had disclosed.  As 
to the materiality of information about whether Mr Stradford had suffered severe depression 
and experienced suicidal ideation in the past, Dr Harden gave the following evidence: 
MR KIRK: Okay. If Mr Stradford had indicated to you that in the previous few years, 
he had been suicidal and regarded himself as moving from being depressed to severely 
depressed, and over a period extending perhaps over at least 18 months, that sort of 
information would certainly have led to further questioning; do you agree with me? 
ASSOC PROF HARDEN: Yes, that’s correct. 
MR KIRK: And might have led you to conclude that perhaps there was a pre-existing 
psychiatric condition. 
ASSOC PROF HARDEN: Yes, as I discussed further in – previously in my evidence, 
it would have particularly led to a consideration of whether there was an adjustment 
disorder or an early depressive disorder. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
173 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 251 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 189 of 225
 
700 
He also agreed that if there had been such a disorder, there may have had to be some discount 
off the impairment assessment.  
701 
It was submitted, on Mr Stradford’s behalf, that it was irrelevant that Mr Stradford did not 
disclose his gambling problem and past psychological issues to Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden.  
That information was said to be irrelevant to their opinions.  I do not agree.  Both Dr Foxcroft 
and Dr Harden effectively agreed that, if Mr Stradford had fully disclosed his previous 
gambling and psychiatric issues, that would at the very least have caused them to inquire further 
into those issues for the purposes of determining whether Mr Stradford had a pre-existing 
psychological condition.  It is also difficult to accept that such information could have had no 
bearing on their opinions concerning impairment.  The fact that Mr Stradford did not disclose 
his gambling problems and past psychological issues to the psychologists also tends to cast 
some doubt on the accuracy and reliability of Mr Stradford’s responses to the psychiatrists’ 
inquiries generally. 
702 
It would also appear that Mr Stradford did not fully disclose, to Dr Foxcroft at least, the true 
nature and extent of his employment in 2021.  In his first report, Dr Foxcroft expressed the 
opinion, in fairly emphatic and unqualified terms, that Mr Stradford was “totally incapacitated 
for work and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future”, and “totally incapacitated for all 
forms of work in real estate … due to his PTSD symptoms”.  That opinion turned out to be 
incorrect, or at least to be unduly pessimistic.  As discussed in more detail later, the evidence 
adduced at trial ultimately revealed that by the beginning of 2021, Mr Stradford was working 
in two jobs.  The first was a full time job with “Freedom Money” which involved marketing 
properties.  The second was a position as a buyers’ agent with “Propertybuyer” in which Mr 
Stradford was remunerated by way of commission.  The second position also involved Mr 
Stradford training and mentoring an employee.  While Mr Stradford had been dismissed from 
his position with Freedom Money after about six months, his position with Propertybuyer was 
ongoing at the time of his second consultation with Dr Foxcroft and his consultation with Dr 
Harden.  Indeed, the evidence suggested that at the time of those interviews Mr Stradford was 
experiencing considerable success and fulfilment in that position.  He was certainly earning a 
very large amount of money.   
703 
While it appears that at some point Mr Stradford told Dr Foxcroft that he was working in real 
estate, it is readily apparent that Mr Stradford did not reveal the true nature and extent of his 
employment or work, or the success that he was achieving at Propertybuyer.  Dr Foxcroft’s 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
174 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 252 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 190 of 225
 
evidence was that he was unaware that Mr Stradford had been working for up to 40 hours per 
week during 2021, or that his role with Propertybuyer involved an element of mentoring and 
training.  It is also abundantly clear that Mr Stradford did not tell Dr Foxcroft anything about 
the successful and fulfilling role he had at Propertybuyer, a role which Mr Stradford said he 
was “very passionate” about.  That is apparent from, among other things, what Dr Foxcroft 
said in his second report concerning Mr Stradford’s capacity to work, which was: 
 Mr Stradford has significant impairment in economic capacity. He has lost 
considerable income, has lost job opportunities and job capacity. He has failed a 
number of lesser jobs. His business had declined and ceased whilst he was incarcerated 
and as a consequence of his psychiatric symptoms arising from the incarceration 
including impaired concentration, irritable moods, agitation, emotional numbing and 
depression leading him to have difficulty interacting with clients when he is 
functioning in a relatively high-level property marketing position. He is currently 
incapable of working in the capacity or level of work that he was performing 
previously. He has difficulty interacting with clients, has periods of irritability and 
angry outbursts, has struggled with working and following scripts and prescribed job 
performance as in his most recent job from the middle of 2021. He has difficulty with 
commission jobs. He has difficulty engaging with clients and supervisors. He has 
difficulty with work motivation. He has low energy levels and has significant problems 
of poor concentration and irritable moods. He has low energy and is currently not 
capable of working more than 20 hours per week and in doing so, is less efficient than 
he was previously.  
704 
While this description of Mr Stradford’s capacity to work might perhaps be compatible with 
the evidence concerning Mr Stradford’s position with Freedom Money, it is almost impossible 
to reconcile it with the evidence concerning Mr Stradford’s work experience and success at 
Propertybuyer.  It is clear that at various points in time Mr Stradford was working for more 
than 20 hours and that, if he had been experiencing “difficulty with commission jobs”, that did 
not prevent him from succeeding in his lucrative role with Propertybuyer.  It can be inferred 
that Mr Stradford either did not tell Dr Foxcroft anything about his role at Propertybuyer, or if 
he did, the account he gave was cursory and certainly not a frank or accurate account.   
705 
It appears that Mr Stradford was slightly more forthcoming with Dr Harden in respect of his 
engagement with Propertybuyer.  In his report, after recounting Mr Stradford’s description of 
his employment with Freedom Money, Dr Harden stated: 
Concurrently from February or March 2021 he had worked for “the [P]roperty buyer” 
on a commission only basis. He had taken this on as a second job in case the first job 
did not work out. Again it was based in Sydney and a buyers agent type role. He said 
“I really enjoy it”. He said the company were very supportive. He said he did not have 
an office or a vehicle and it was hard to organise himself at home and he had to borrow 
his fiancée’s car or catch the bus in order to do things that required visits. He said he 
found that he couldn’t deal with multiple people at one time anymore. He also 
described long periods where he would procrastinate and avoid undertaking tasks. As 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
175 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 253 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 191 of 225
 
an example he described a time where he spent an entire working day undertaking a 
search online which should have taken about 10 minutes. He said “they should have 
sacked me by now” but he continued to be somewhat hopeful and said “I want to 
achieve an income”. 
706 
While the account that Mr Stradford gave Dr Harden concerning his work with Propertybuyer 
appears to be more accurate than the account, if any, he appears to have given Dr Foxcroft, it 
is again difficult to reconcile with the evidence concerning Mr Stradford’s obvious success 
with Propertybuyer.  In particular, Dr Harden went on to state, no doubt on the basis of what 
Mr Stradford had told him, that Mr Stradford was not “successfully undertaking the work he is 
doing currently”.  That is difficult to reconcile with the objective evidence that indicated that 
Mr Stradford earned upwards of $200,000 from his role at Propertybuyer.  While Mr Stradford 
described in his evidence some difficulties he was having working at Propertybuyer, he 
nevertheless described the experience as “amazing” and “fantastic”.  There could be little doubt 
that, on the whole, he was successfully carrying out his job at Propertybuyer.      
707 
Mr Stradford was not directly cross-examined about what he told the psychiatrists regarding 
his work with Freedom Money and Propertybuyer during 2021.  Nor was the cross-examination 
of Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden on this topic extensive.  Nevertheless, the inference that I would 
draw from the evidence as a whole is that the account of his work experiences that Mr Stradford 
gave Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden was far from frank and was in some respects incomplete and 
inaccurate.  That, in my view, undoubtedly influenced the opinions that Dr Foxcroft and Dr 
Harden ultimately offered in respect of Mr Stradford’s adaptability and employability. 
708 
Both Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden assessed Mr Stradford as having a class 3 “moderate 
impairment” in respect of adaptation, which was the area of functional impairment that dealt 
with employability.  The example indicators for a class 3 impairment (as identified in schedule 
6 to the Regulation) in respect of adaptation were: “can not work at all in the pre-injury 
position; only able to work less than 20 hours a week in a different position where performance 
of the relevant duties requires less skill or is otherwise less demanding, for example, less 
stressful”. 
709 
In his first report, Dr Foxcroft gave the following reasons for his class 3 assessment:  
He has long term partial incapacity for work and will never return to real estate work 
due to his symptoms of PTSD and depression.  He has poor concentration, poor 
capacity to focus, feelings of shame and overwhelming self-reproach. He has difficulty 
working efficiently. He is disorganised in his thinking. He has anxiety symptoms and 
panic attacks. He has a long term partial incapacity for work. He is currently totally 
incapacitated for work.  
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
176 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 254 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 192 of 225
 
(Emphasis added) 
710 
Dr Foxcroft did not alter this assessment in his second report.  He described an “ongoing 
incapacity for work” and confirmed his previous PIRS assessment.  It is difficult to see how 
Dr Foxcroft came to confirm his opinion that Mr Stradford would never return to real estate 
work, or was totally incapacitated for work, in light of what he had been told about Mr 
Stradford’s work at Freedom Money.  It is even more difficult to see how Dr Foxcroft could 
have maintained that opinion if Mr Stradford had frankly and accurately disclosed the nature 
and circumstances of his engagement with Propertybuyer.  
711 
Dr Harden gave the following reasons for arriving at his class 3 assessment:  
Although working in a role in a similar position he is not working successfully in such 
a role on his description. He has been unable to successfully achieve academically 
during this period as well. It is likely that he would be able to work in a less demanding 
role for less than 20 hours a week.”  
(Emphasis added)  
712 
Dr Harden’s assessment, and in particular his statement that Mr Stradford was not working 
successfully at that time, was based on Mr Stradford’s description.  Given the nature of the 
evidence at trial concerning Mr Stradford’s relative success in his role at Propertybuyer, I 
would infer that the description that Mr Stradford gave Dr Harden about his work at 
Propertybuyer was not entirely frank or accurate.            
713 
Overall, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Mr Stradford gave Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden 
inaccurate and incomplete accounts of his employment experience, particularly at 
Propertybuyer.  It is also difficult to avoid the conclusion that the inaccurate and incomplete 
information that Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden were given in that regard influenced their 
impairment assessment in respect of the “adaptation” area of functional impairment.  I doubt 
that they would have given a class 3 assessment if they had been given accurate information.  
A varied assessment of the adaption domain would, in turn, have impacted the overall PIRS 
rating assessed by both experts.   
714 
As will be seen later, the fact that Mr Stradford was not entirely full and frank with Dr Foxcroft 
and Dr Harden concerning his employment experience and his relative success at 
Propertybuyer is also a highly relevant consideration when it comes to considering whether, or 
to what extent, Mr Stradford suffered any economic loss arising from a partial loss of earning 
capacity.   
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
177 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 255 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 193 of 225
 
Appropriate PIRS ratings in the disputed domains   
715 
Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden broadly agreed that the PIRS ratings or assessments that they 
arrived at in respect of the six functional impairment domains were based essentially on their 
observations of Mr Stradford and the responses given by him to questions they put to him 
during their consultations, together, of course, with their professional training.  They also 
agreed that their different assessments might simply be the product of different answers that 
Mr Stradford gave them during their separate consultations, which took place over 2020 and 
2021. 
716 
Not surprisingly, Mr Stradford submitted that Dr Foxcroft’s opinions or assessments were to 
be preferred.  The Judge, the Commonwealth and Queensland submitted that Dr Harden’s 
opinions and assessments were to be preferred.    
Self-care and personal hygiene 
717 
In this domain, Dr Foxcroft assessed Mr Stradford as having a class 3 moderate impairment 
and Dr Harden assessed Mr Stradford as having a class 2 mild impairment. 
718 
The example indicators for a class 2 impairment are: “can live independently; looks after 
himself or herself adequately, although may look unkempt occasionally; and sometimes misses 
a meal or relies on takeaway food”.  The class 3 indicators are: “can not live independently 
without regular support; needs prompting to shower daily and wear clean clothes; does not 
prepare own meals; frequently misses meals; if living independently, a family member or 
community nurse visits, or needs to visit, 2 to 3 times a week to ensure a minimum level of 
hygiene and nutrition”. 
719 
Dr Foxcroft’s reasons for his class 3 assessment were:  
He has difficulty engaging in self care and personal hygiene activities. He has difficulty 
with regular showing. He has no motivation to cook or care for himself. He is 
dishevelled. He requires support and supervision from his partner, Kerry.  
720 
Dr Harden’s reasons for his class 2 assessment were:  
Mr Stradford takes less care in his appearance than previously. He showers every 2 to 
3 days rather than every day as previously. He is able to undertake a range of care 
activities for his children including shopping and cooking. He may neglect his own 
care in such respects at times.    
721 
In cross-examination, Dr Harden agreed that he had not noted suicidal ideation as being 
relevant to his assessment in relation to this domain, though he explained that that was because 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
178 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 256 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 194 of 225
 
that would only be recorded if any suicidal ideation was active at the time of assessment.  He 
considered that was not the case in respect of Mr Stradford.  He denied that a moderate 
assessment was appropriate given Mr Stradford’s description of past suicidal ideation and the 
fact that Mr Stradford had reported that he took less care with his appearance than prior to his 
imprisonment.  Dr Foxcroft was not directly cross-examined about his assessment in respect of 
this domain.  During his evidence, however, he said that Mr Stradford had reported ongoing 
suicidal ideation which he assessed as requiring assistance or supervision.  
Social and recreational activities 
722 
In this domain, Dr Foxcroft assessed Mr Stradford as having a class 3 moderate impairment 
and Dr Harden assessed Mr Stradford as having a class 2 mild impairment. 
723 
The example indicators for a class 2 impairment are: “occasionally goes to social events 
without needing a support person, but does not become actively involved, for example, by 
dancing or cheering a team”. The class 3 indicators are: “rarely goes to social events, and 
usually only when prompted by family or friend; does not become involved in social events; 
will not go out without a support person; remains quiet and withdrawn”. 
724 
Dr Foxcroft’s reasons for his class 3 assessment were:  
He has no recreational pursuits or activities to speak of. He has withdrawn from any 
recreational activities. He is socially avoidant. He rarely leaves his house. He has no 
active interests in going to the gym or engaging in other social or recreational activities. 
He is tearful, anxious and hypervigilent when he leaves the house.  
725 
Dr Harden’s reasons for his class 2 assessment were:  
He has some anxiety about attending social events but is able to go to the pub about 
once a week and to go out with his fiancée approximately once a week for dinner. He 
has restricted his previous involvement in organised sport but has some interest in 
returning to the area. 
726 
In cross-examination, it was pointed out to Dr Harden that some of the observations he had 
made earlier in his report which were relevant to this domain had not been replicated in his 
reasoning in respect of the assessment.  Dr Harden explained, however, that he did not record 
all his “comprehensive notes” in that part of the report which summarised his assessment.   That 
was, in my view, a fair response to that apparent criticism.  Dr Harden was also taken to parts 
of Dr Foxcroft’s report and the indicators in schedule 6, but was not at all shaken from his class 
2 assessment in respect of this domain.  Dr Foxcroft was not directly cross-examined about his 
assessment in respect of this domain.  
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
179 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 257 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 195 of 225
 
Concentration, persistence and pace   
727 
In this domain, Dr Foxcroft assessed Mr Stradford as having a class 3 moderate impairment 
and Dr Harden assessed Mr Stradford as having a class 2 mild impairment. 
728 
The example indicators for a class 2 impairment are: “can undertake a basic or standard 
retraining course at a slower pace; can focus on intellectually demanding tasks for up to 30 
minutes, then may feel fatigued or develop headaches”.  The class 3 indicators are: “can not 
read more than newspaper articles; finds it difficult to follow complex instructions, for 
example, operating manuals or building plans; can not make significant repairs to motor 
vehicles or type long documents; can not follow a pattern for making clothes or tapestry or 
knitting”.  
729 
Dr Foxcroft’s reasons for his class 3 assessment were:  
He is disorganised. He cannot perform serial sevens and other concentration tests on 
clinical examination. He is distractible. He has difficulty with focussing on task, 
difficulty with intrusive thoughts and flashbacks and performs work less efficiently.   
730 
Dr Harden’s reasons for his class 2 assessment were:  
He has reduced concentration compared to previously and has failed university 
subjects when he has attempted to study. He reports the ability to concentrate for a 
period (30 to 60 minutes) on email or work tasks. He has reduced efficiency in those 
tasks. He is able to read documentation, emails and course notes. He was able to 
tolerate interviews up to 90 minutes or longer with reasonable objective concentration. 
731 
Dr Harden was cross-examined about his class 2 assessment in respect of this domain, but was 
not shaken from his opinion.  Nor did the cross-examination reveal any flaws in his assessment.   
A pre-existing injury? 
732 
Both Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden expressed the opinion in their respective reports that Mr 
Stradford had not suffered from any pre-existing psychological condition.  Their opinions in 
that regard were based entirely on the history that Mr Stradford had recounted to them.  As 
discussed earlier, that history omitted that Mr Stradford had, on his own account, previously 
suffered from severe depression and had experienced suicidal ideation.  Both Dr Foxcroft and 
Dr Harden agreed that if they had been provided with that psychiatric history, they would have 
made further inquiries to ascertain whether Mr Stradford had a pre-existing psychiatric 
condition.   
733 
If that finding had been made, it would have required a deduction from the otherwise applicable 
impairment rating.  As discussed earlier, item 11 of schedule 5 of the Regulation requires a 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
180 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 258 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 196 of 225
 
medical expert to make “appropriate enquiry” into any potential pre-existing mental disorder.  
Item 5 of schedule 5 provides that if there is a pre-existing mental disorder, the medical expert 
must work out a percentage impairment for that “pre-injury” disorder and subtract that 
percentage from the percentage impairment in respect of the current or “post-injury” mental 
disorder. 
734 
It cannot, in all the circumstances, be concluded that this would have been the inevitable 
outcome if Mr Stradford had fully and frankly disclosed his psychiatric history.  In my view, 
however, the possibility that it may have been the result cannot be ignored.  In other words, the 
possibility that, after appropriate inquiry concerning Mr Stradford’s past mental health issues, 
Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden may have diagnosed a pre-existing mental disorder that may have 
led to a percentage impairment referable to that disorder being subtracted from the overall 
percentage impairment in respect of Mr Stradford’s extant disorder, is at least relevant to any 
assessment of the appropriate impairment rating for Mr Stradford’s current condition.       
Findings concerning impairment 
735 
It is difficult to determine the appropriate impairment rating for Mr Stradford’s condition.  Dr 
Foxcroft and Dr Harden were both qualified and experienced psychiatrists who were no doubt 
doing their best to accurately and reliably assess the appropriate impairment rating.  Their 
assessments depended to a large extent on the accuracy and reliability of the responses Mr 
Stradford gave during their consultations with him.  The differences between their ratings were 
fairly nuanced and minor. 
736 
While the issue was finely balanced, I am ultimately satisfied that the assessment arrived at by 
Dr Harden is to be preferred.  That is so for a number of reasons. 
737 
First, having read their respective and joint reports and heard and observed their concurrent 
oral evidence, I was swayed by and generally prefer Dr Harden’s overall assessment of Mr 
Stradford’s psychiatric condition.  On the whole, I considered that Dr Foxcroft tended to 
exaggerate some of Mr Stradford’s symptoms and generally prefer a more pessimistic or 
negative characterisation of those symptoms.  During cross-examination he appeared at times 
to be overly defensive of his position and displayed an unwillingness to make concessions 
where appropriate.  He appeared unwilling, for example, to shift from his initial opinion that 
Mr Stradford was totally incapacitated for work, even when asked to assume that Mr Stradford 
had in fact worked for up to 76 hours per fortnight, and had assumed a position which involved 
mentoring and training an employee.  He considered that the employment that Mr Stradford 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
181 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 259 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 197 of 225
 
had engaged in since his first consultation reflected only a “mild improvement” in his 
condition. 
738 
Second, some of Dr Foxcroft’s assessments are difficult to sustain when consideration is given 
to Mr Stradford’s oral evidence, some of which was unfortunately only given in cross-
examination after Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden had concluded their concurrent evidence.  For 
example, in relation to the social and recreational activities domain, Dr Foxcroft assessed a 
class 3 impairment on the basis that Mr Stradford had “no recreational pursuits or activities to 
speak of” and “had withdrawn from any recreational activities” and “rarely leaves his house”.  
In his evidence, however, Mr Stradford described how he had attended a polo event not long 
after his release from imprisonment.  He also agreed that he was “quite socially active” after 
the incident, though less than he had been before.  Similarly, in relation to the concentration, 
persistence and pace domain, Dr Foxcroft assessed a class 3 impairment on the basis that Mr 
Stradford was “disorganised”, “distractible” and had “difficulty with focussing” on tasks.  In 
his evidence, however, Mr Stradford revealed that in the first half of 2021, he had managed to 
hold down a full time job for some time working around 40 hours per week.  He was also 
successfully working for Propertybuyer, a role which notably involved some mentoring and 
training of an employee.  
739 
Third, while both Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden both arrived at a class 3 “moderate impairment” 
assessment in relation to the “adaptation” domain, it is difficult to see how that assessment 
could be sustained in light of Mr Stradford’s evidence concerning his work at Propertybuyer 
and, to a lesser extent, at Freedom Money.  The example indicators for the adaptation domain 
in schedule 6 to the Regulation are: “can not work at all in the pre-injury position” and “only 
able to work less than 20 hours a week in a different position where performance of the relevant 
duties requires less skill or is otherwise less demanding, for example, less stressful”.  Dr 
Foxcroft assessed Mr Stradford as having a class 3 impairment because, among other things, 
he “has a long term partial incapacity for work and will never return to real estate work”.  Dr 
Foxcroft affirmed that assessment in his second report without qualification.  As has already 
been noted, however, it is difficult to see how that assessment could possibly be sustained in 
light of Mr Stradford’s evidence concerning his work at Freedom Money and Propertybuyer.  
In cross-examination, Dr Foxcroft agreed that, if Mr Stradford had been able to work for 76 
hours for a sustained period, that “would have to have changed the assessment to him 
functioning better in the workplace”.  Dr Foxcroft agreed that a “sustained period” in that 
context would be about six months.  It should also be reiterated that it is, in any event, tolerably 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
182 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 260 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 198 of 225
 
clear that Mr Stradford did not fully disclose the nature and extent of his work at Propertybuyer 
to either Dr Foxcroft or Dr Harden. 
740 
Fourth, while both Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden concluded in their reports that Mr Stradford did 
not have any pre-existing mental disorder or psychiatric injury, that conclusion was essentially 
based on the fact that Mr Stradford had told them, incorrectly, that he had no previous 
psychiatric history.  In fact, Mr Stradford had stated, on oath, in an affidavit filed in his Circuit 
Court proceedings, that he had a history of severe depression and had previously experienced 
suicidal emotional states.  As discussed earlier, both Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden agreed that, if 
Mr Stradford had told them that, they would have made further inquiries.  Those inquiries may 
have altered their conclusions that Mr Stradford did not have a pre-existing psychiatric 
condition.  If they had altered their conclusions in that respect, that may have resulted in a 
lower overall impairment rating, even if their ratings in respect of the individual functional 
impairment domains otherwise remained intact.      
741 
Fifth, while Mr Stradford criticised aspects or Dr Harden’s report and submitted that there were 
deficiencies in some of his reasoning, I am not persuaded that those criticisms or asserted 
deficiencies were either made out, or materially affected the reliability or cogency of Dr 
Harden’s assessments.  In particular, I am not persuaded that Dr Harden ignored or had 
insufficient regard to any of the information which he elicited from Mr Stradford, as referred 
to in the body of his report, simply because he did not expressly refer to that information again 
in the part of his report that summarised the reasons for his particular assessments.  The balance 
of the criticisms which were directed at Dr Harden’s report and reasoning were based on 
contestable assertions as to what Mr Stradford had said during his consultations, or contestable 
assertions about Mr Stradford’s actual level or degree of functional impairment.  
742 
In all the circumstances, I conclude that Dr Harden’s whole person impairment rating of 6% 
should be accepted in preference to Dr Foxcroft’s assessment.  In those circumstances: the 
injury is a “moderate mental disorder” which applies to mental disorders with a PIRS rating of 
between 4% and 10% and the applicable injury scale value is 2 to 10 (as stated in Table 12 of 
schedule 4 to the Regulation); the injury is below the mid-range for moderate mental disorders 
(with the mid-range being 7, halfway between 4% and 10%); it is in those circumstances 
appropriate to select or allocate a mid-range injury scale value to the injury; an appropriate 
injury scale value is 6; applying that injury scale value to the formula in s 62 of the Civil 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
183 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 261 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 199 of 225
 
Liability Act and reg 8 of the Regulation, along with Table 9 in schedule 7 of the Regulation, 
the result is a damages calculation of $7,650 + ((6 – 5 = 1) x $1,800) = $9,450.         
Assessment of general damages for personal injury 
743 
I therefore assess Mr Stradford’s general damages for his personal injury as $9,450.  I accept 
that an award of $9,450 is, all things considered, a meagre amount.  That, however, is largely 
a product of the Civil Liability Act which (like similar legislation in other jurisdictions) appears 
to be specifically designed not only to befuddle when it comes to the assessment of general 
damages for personal injury, but also to produce relatively meagre assessments.   
Ongoing medical expenses 
744 
Mr Stradford claimed that he was entitled to be compensated for the ongoing treatment of his 
psychiatric condition.  He relied on Dr Foxcroft’s evidence in his second report that he would 
require extensive treatment for his condition involving fortnightly counselling for a two year 
period.  Dr Foxcroft’s evidence that the costs of those sessions would be $240 per session.  He 
also indicated that Mr Stradford should be prescribed an antidepressant medication for a three 
year period at a cost of $30 per month.  The total cost of that treatment would accordingly be 
$13,560.  Dr Harden affirmed this recommendation in his oral evidence.  No evidence 
regarding past medical expenses was adduced. 
745 
Dr Harden’s evidence in his report was that if Mr Stradford was to undertake further treatment, 
he would recommend treatment by an appropriate psychiatrist which would require intermittent 
monitoring for approximately two years with monthly appointments.  That psychiatrist would 
consider the issue of medication.  Dr Harden also referred to the possible utilisation of group 
therapy.  Dr Harden noted in his report, however, that Mr Stradford had had both a “very limited 
attempt at psychological therapy” and limited treatment with an antidepressant that he had 
ceased. 
746 
The Judge and Queensland did not appear to oppose the award of compensation for future 
medical expenses, if claimed.  The Commonwealth submitted, however, that the onus was on 
Mr Stradford to establish that he will incur future costs in respect of psychiatric treatment and 
that he had not discharged that burden.  Indeed, in the Commonwealth’s submission, it 
appeared that Mr Stradford had no intention of seeking any treatment. 
747 
It is tolerably clear from the evidence as a whole that, other than consulting with Dr Foxcroft 
and Dr Harden for the purpose of their preparing medico-legal reports for use in this 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
184 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 262 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 200 of 225
 
proceeding, Mr Stradford had done little, if anything, in terms of seeking professional treatment 
for his claimed psychiatric condition.  As already noted, Dr Harden stated in his report that Mr 
Stradford “had very limited treatment to date with prescription of an antidepressant with 
possibly some benefit that has now ceased and a very limited attempt at psychological therapy”.  
He also reported that Mr Stradford was “reluctant to undertake formal psychiatric or 
psychological treatment”. 
748 
In his oral evidence, Mr Stradford effectively confirmed that he had no present intention of 
seeking any further professional treatment in respect of his psychiatric condition.  His evidence 
was: 
[MR HERZFELD:] Apart from seeing the experts in this matter, have you seen a 
psychiatrist or psychologist since getting out of prison? 
[MR STRADFORD:] Yes, I think I saw one when I first go out, maybe. Like, the 
January or February. I – I can’t recall when it was. They’re a waste of time. 
[MR HERZFELD:] Why do you say that? 
[MR STRADFORD:] Just like today, you go in, you share your story. It’s not like they 
give you something that’s going to switch something on in your head to make you feel 
better. You walk out of there completely exhausted. You’ve just unloaded your story. 
They don’t give you anything to make you feel better. And then you walk out of there 
in a mental state that’s horrible. And do I want to go through that? I’ve got a mental 
health plan, I think, for five visits. I went to one, maybe two. I can’t remember. But – 
well, I think it was one, because what’s the point of just exhausting yourself and putting 
yourself into that mode and having to recount your whole life – like today – only to 
come out at the end exhausted with nothing. It’s not like they give you something that’s 
going to make you feel better. And people have said to me, “It takes time,” and all of 
that. So what’s going to happen, every time, go there, go through the worst moments 
of my life again and what are they going to do? Like, they’re not – they don’t give you 
anything. They don’t make you walk out of there feeling better, and that’s the problem 
and I think that’s – you know, that’s my personal opinion. Other people might find 
benefit, but I don’t feel better about sharing this. This – this just makes me feel horrible.  
749 
Mr Stradford confirmed, in cross-examination, that he was “extremely reluctant” to seek 
further treatment because the consultations made him feel “embarrassed and horrible”.  He 
went on to say that, in any event, he did not have the time or “emotional energy” to attend 
consultations that don’t offer a “fix overnight” and the he did not believe that “a few 
psychological appointments” were going to benefit him.  
750 
It was also tolerably clear from Mr Stradford’s evidence that, having had one unhappy 
experience with anti-depressant medication, he had no present intention of taking any further 
medication to treat his psychiatric condition. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
185 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 263 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 201 of 225
 
751 
It may readily be accepted that Mr Stradford’s reluctance to seek further treatment is most 
unfortunate.  Dr Harden agreed in cross-examination that one of the symptoms of post-
traumatic stress disorder was an attempt to avoid thinking about a traumatic event.  He also 
agreed that any form of treatment involving a psychologist was likely to require Mr Stradford 
to think about the traumatic events he had suffered.  Dr Harden also agreed that it was possible 
that Mr Stradford’s avoidance of treatment was a consequence of his condition, though he 
suggested that it was more likely related to Mr Stradford’s “underlying temperament and 
general approach to things, which is that he should be able to fix them”.   
752 
Be that as it may, the fact is that it is highly unlikely that Mr Stradford will incur any costs in 
respect of ongoing treatment for his psychiatric condition.  In those circumstances, there should 
be no award of damages in respect of future medical treatment.        
Prognosis 
753 
Dr Foxcroft expressed a very pessimistic opinion concerning Mr Stradford’s prognosis.  In his 
second report, Dr Foxcroft stated: 
Post-traumatic stress disorder, once well established tends to carry a poor prognosis 
especially when associated with depressive disorders. Mr Stradford’s overall prognosis 
is poor. His symptoms are likely to persist. 
754 
As discussed earlier, Dr Foxcroft also expressed the opinion in his first report that Mr Stradford 
was “totally incapacitated for work and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future”.  Whilst 
his adaptability rating remained unchanged, Dr Foxcroft’s opinion in that regard was tempered 
somewhat in his second report, no doubt because Mr Stradford had by then reported that he 
was engaged in some work.  Dr Foxcroft’s opinion was that Mr Stradford was “currently 
incapable of working in the capacity or level of work that he was performing previously” and 
was “unlikely to be capable of working more than 20 hours per week in a lesser role than his 
previous roles”.  In his oral evidence, Dr Foxcroft described Mr Stradford’s improvement from 
February 2020 as “mild”, expressed the view that any improvement had “plateaued” and stated 
that the “realistic prospects for him improving were limited or “quite dim”.  As discussed 
earlier, however, it is tolerably clear that Mr Stradford had not told Dr Foxcroft about his 
engagement with Propertybuyer, or at least the full nature and extent of his success in and 
fulfilment from that engagement.  
755 
Dr Harden’s prognosis was more optimistic.  In his report he stated: 
His longer term prognosis is hard to predict. I would be hopeful of steady ongoing 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
186 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 264 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 202 of 225
 
improvement, albeit not as fast as he would like. There is however a significant risk 
that his symptoms will remain chronic and plateau. In my view he is not stable and 
stationary at this time as there is a significant chance that he might improve over the 
next 12 to 24 months to an extent that would alter his level of impairment in a 
meaningful way. 
There is no doubt there has been some significant improvement. His drive to improve 
and get better is a good prognostic factor as is his supportive relationship with his 
fiancée, his stable circle of friends and his ability to function in terms of caring for his 
children. 
Poor prognostic factors include the now chronic nature of his symptoms, his high level 
of internal self criticism and his reluctance to seek formal treatment. 
756 
When questioned about the prospects of Mr Stradford’s condition improving, Dr Harden’s 
evidence was as follows: 
ASSOC PROF HARDEN: Thank you. Look, I think there’s a realistic prospect of 
improvement with treatment. That’s not to say it’s 100 per cent. And I really wouldn’t 
have recommended treatment if I didn’t think there was a realistic prospect of 
improvement, because, as has been outlined, the psychological therapy can be 
unpleasant, and the medications can have side effects. 
MR HORTON: So in terms of the pathways you described earlier, Dr Harden, is there 
any way of being able to assess which of those that Mr Stradford might be on? 
ASSOC PROF HARDEN: Not given our current state of knowledge, as far as I’m 
aware. 
MR HORTON: I see. But you seem equally – you’re not able to say that he’s not on 
the pathway of not recovering, in effect? 
ASSOC PROF HARDEN: I think he has had significant improvement, and I think 
there is significant improvement in him. Yes. That would be my clinical opinion. 
MR HORTON: Yes. And with treatment then, is it your view there’s a realistic 
possibility of there being a return to work as a real estate agent longer term? 
ASSOC PROF HARDEN: Yes. In my view, I think there is. I can’t give you a 
percentage on that, but I think there is a realistic prospect of that.  
757 
It was put to Dr Harden in cross-examination that the general course of post-traumatic stress 
disorder, once established, is that improvement plateaus.  His response was:  
ASSOC PROF HARDEN: I think that there’s a number of pathways. There’s a group 
of people who don’t improve much after the first few months. There’s a group of 
people who show a slow step-wise improvement. And there’s people who improve 
over one to two years and – and have a good outcome. So it’s not – there’s not one 
course for PTSD. 
758 
It was also put to Dr Harden that the time for Mr Stradford to improve had passed, to which Dr 
Harden’s response was: 
ASSOC PROF HARDEN: Well, I think there has been improvement, so there’s a 
difference of opinion, as you know, in that area. I actually think he has improved 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
187 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 265 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 203 of 225
 
significantly with compared with the measurement in February 2020. I agree that he 
may not get full recovery, but I actually don’t believe – he’s what we would call stable 
and stationary. 
759 
It is plainly difficult to make any definite or emphatic finding concerning Mr Stradford’s 
prognosis and the prospects of his condition improving over the coming years.  It is 
nevertheless necessary to determine whether the somewhat pessimistic opinion of Dr Foxcroft 
is to be preferred to the more optimistic opinion of Dr Harden, or vice versa.  Such a finding is 
particularly important in the context of the assessment of future economic loss, which is the 
next head of damage to be considered and assessed.   
760 
For essentially the same reasons as those given earlier in the context of the impairment 
assessment, I ultimately prefer the opinion of Dr Harden to the opinion of Dr Foxcroft.  Dr 
Foxcroft had already been shown to be overly pessimistic concerning Mr Stradford’s prospects 
of improvement and capacity for work.  He appeared somewhat defensive and unwilling to 
budge from his pessimistic assessment and outlook, despite being confronted with facts 
concerning Mr Stradford’s employment which appeared to suggest that Mr Stradford’s 
improvement had, as Dr Harden stated, been “significant”.      
DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY 
761 
Mr Stradford contended that the personal injury that he suffered as a result of being falsely 
imprisoned had caused him to suffer a loss of earning capacity.  He claimed compensatory 
damages in respect of that loss.  The case that he presented at trial concerning the assessment 
of this head of damages, however, turned out to be fundamentally flawed and, not surprisingly, 
was effectively abandoned when it came to final submissions.     
762 
Mr Stradford had claimed, on the strength of two reports prepared by a chartered accountant, 
Ms Bossert, that his damages for loss of earning capacity totalled somewhere in the vicinity of 
$3 million.  The essential facts and assumptions that were said to support that calculation were, 
in summary: first, that in the years prior to his imprisonment, Mr Stradford had been earning 
about $350,000 per annum before tax; second, but for his imprisonment and the injury from it, 
Mr Stradford would have continued to earn income at that rate; third, following his 
imprisonment and injury, Mr Stradford earned about $78,000 per annum before tax, based on 
his employment with Freedom Money; fourth, it was assumed by Ms Bossert (on the basis of 
Mr Stradford’s instructions) that, as a result of the injury he suffered from his false 
imprisonment, Mr Stradford would continue working in the real estate industry at about that 
salary ($78,000 per annum) until the end of 2024; and, fifth, at that point in time, Mr Stradford 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
188 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 266 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 204 of 225
 
would either continue working at that salary in the real estate industry, or commence work as 
an employed solicitor on a salary starting at about $73,000 and gradually progressing to about 
$120,000.   
763 
Ms Bossert produced a second report in which she adjusted her calculations on the basis that it 
had by then been revealed (largely, it seems, as a result of pre-trial steps taken by or on behalf 
of the Commonwealth) that post-injury Mr Stradford had in fact been earning a significantly 
larger income than Ms Bossert had assumed.  Ms Bossert appears not to have been informed 
of the income that Mr Stradford had, in fact, been earning from commissions at Propertybuyer.  
That new information affected Ms Bossert’s calculation of Mr Stradford’s likely income going 
forward.  Ms Bossert was instructed to assume, however, that the arrangement pursuant to 
which Mr Stradford had been earning that income at Propertybuyer would cease at the end of 
December 2021.  The basis for that assumption would appear to have been that the 
arrangements between the Propertybuyer, Mr Stradford and a colleague, Ms Lisa Whayman, 
would cease at that time.  More will be said later concerning the evidence, such as it was, 
concerning Mr Stradford’s working relationship with Ms Whayman.  It suffices at this point to 
note that, as events transpired, there was no sound evidentiary basis for the assumption that Ms 
Bossert was instructed to apply in her calculations.    
764 
It is unnecessary to linger on Ms Bossert’s reports.  To put it succinctly and bluntly, the facts 
and assumptions pursuant to which Ms Bossert prepared her reports turned out to be 
fundamentally flawed and unsustainable, if not manifestly contrived and misleading.  In his 
closing submissions, Mr Stradford abandoned any reliance on Ms Bossert’s reports.  Even if 
he had not done so, I would in any event have wholly rejected Ms Bossert’s analysis and 
opinions.  While Ms Bossert’s evidence may be safely put to one side when it comes to 
assessing any damages for any loss of earning capacity by Mr Stradford, it will be necessary to 
say something later about the how the manifest flaws in the assumptions underlying Ms 
Bossert’s analysis were exposed during the course of the trial.       
765 
The alternative case in respect of damages for loss of earning capacity which Mr Stradford 
advocated, for the first time, in his closing submissions may be summarised as follows.      
766 
Mr Stradford maintained that he was entitled to damages for loss of earning capacity, albeit 
assessed on an entirely different basis than that which had previously been put.  He contended 
that the appropriate assessment of damages for loss of earning capacity was $800,000.  The 
essential steps in the argument in support of that assessment were as follows.   
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
189 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 267 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 205 of 225
 
767 
First, the applicable “notional” income (the income that, but for the injury, Mr Stradford could 
have expected to receive in the future) was $140,000 per year.  That figure was based on job 
market statistics included in a report prepared by another accountant, Mr Stuart Benjamin, on 
the joint instructions of Queensland, the Judge and the Commonwealth.  The statistics 
suggested that a “Real Estate Agency Principal” could earn up to $140,000 per annum before 
tax. 
768 
Second, Mr Stradford had, so it was contended, suffered a 50% reduction in earning capacity.  
The basis of that calculation of reduced earning capacity was said to be Dr Foxcroft’s apparent 
or implicit acceptance that after his injury Mr Stradford is “only able to work less than 20 hours 
a week in a different position where performance of the relevant duties requires less skill or is 
otherwise less demanding” (that being one of the example impairment indicators for a class 3 
assessment of impairment in the adaptation functional area).  Mr Stradford also relied on Dr 
Harden’s statement, in the same context, that “it is likely that [Mr Stradford] would be able to 
work in a less demanding role for less than 20 hours per week”. 
769 
Third, it was contended that an appropriate assessment of Mr Stradford’s financial loss over 
his working life resulting from his loss of earning capacity was $800,000.  That assessment 
was based on a notional income of $140,000 (before tax) and a 50% loss of earning capacity.  
That figure, however, was said to be an underestimate of the value of Mr Stradford’s loss of 
earning capacity, because there was evidence which suggested that Mr Stradford’s pre-injury 
income was likely to be higher than $140,000.  That evidence, so it was said, was to be found 
in some bank statements of the companies through whom Mr Stradford had worked and been 
remunerated.  It was submitted, on that basis, that an additional $200,000 should be added to 
the figure representing the financial loss suffered by Mr Stradford.  The result was a financial 
loss of $1 million.  
770 
Fourth, there should be a deduction of 20%, or $200,000, from that figure of $1 million, for 
“vicissitudes”.  The appropriate assessment of the damage due to loss of earning capacity was 
therefore said to be $800,000.          
771 
The Judge, the Commonwealth and Queensland submitted that Mr Stradford’s entirely new 
case in respect of damages for loss of earning capacity was unmeritorious and should be 
rejected.  It was, in their submission, entirely unsupported by, if not contrary to, the evidence.  
In particular, there was no sound basis for concluding that Mr Stradford’s “notional” income 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
190 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 268 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 206 of 225
 
was $140,000, or that he had suffered a 50% loss of or impairment to his earning capacity as a 
result of his psychiatric injury.   
Applicable legal principles 
772 
The applicable principles in respect of damages for loss of earning capacity arising from an 
injury may shortly be summarised as follows. 
773 
First, the “settled principle” governing the assessment of compensatory damages in actions in 
tort, including damages to compensate a party for a loss of earning capacity, is that “the injured 
party should receive compensation in a sum which, so far as money can do, will put that party 
in the same position as he or she would have been in if … the tort had not been committed: 
Haines v Bendall (1991) 172 CLR 60 at 63 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ); 
[1991] HCA 15. 
774 
Second, the party claiming compensatory damages in an action in tort, including damages for 
loss of earning capacity, bears the onus of proving, on the balance of probabilities, not only 
that he or she suffered damage, but also the amount of the loss he or she sustained “with as 
much precision as the subject matter reasonably permit[s]”: Placer (Granny Smith) Pty Ltd v 
Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd (2003) 196 ALR 257; [2003] HCA 10 at [37] (Hayne J, with whom 
Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Kirby JJ agreed at [6]).  
775 
Third, to recover damages for loss of earning capacity, a plaintiff must establish two “distinct 
but related requirements”; the first being that the plaintiff’s earning capacity has in fact been 
diminished by reason of the injury and the second being that the diminution of earning capacity 
is or may be productive of financial loss: Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission 
(1995) 182 CLR 1 at 3, 9 (Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ); [1995] HCA 5; Graham 
v Baker (1961) 106 CLR 340 at 346-347 (Dixon CJ, Kitto and Taylor JJ); [1961] HCA 48. 
776 
Fourth, if there is at least some evidence of an impaired capacity to earn, it would generally be 
wrong to conclude that damages to compensate for that impaired capacity to earn should only 
be nil or nominal: New South Wales v Moss (2000) 54 NSWLR 536; [2000] NSWCA 133 at 
[65] (Heydon JA).  Where a plaintiff “demonstrates some loss of earning capacity lasting past 
the date of trial then notwithstanding difficulty in assessing an amount for future economic 
loss, courts are bound to award something for future economic loss unless, on the material 
before the court, it can be seen very confidently that notwithstanding the loss of capacity the 
plaintiff will not in fact suffer any damage of the future economic kind because of that lack of 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
191 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 269 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 207 of 225
 
capacity”:  Younie v Martini (unreported, NSWCA, 21 March 1995, Priestley JA at 3, with 
whom Powell JA agreed). 
777 
Fifth, the usual method of proving damages for loss of earning capacity is to prove what the 
plaintiff was likely to have earned in the future, had he or she not been injured, and what the 
plaintiff is likely to earn in the future after the injury: Paff v Speed (1961) 105 CLR 549 at 559; 
[1961] HCA 14.  The failure to call such evidence, however, “does not necessarily result in 
selection of only a nil or nominal figure as damages for impaired earning capacity”: Moss at 
[66]; Yammine v Kalwy [1979] 2 NSWLR 151 at 155.  Where, however, the plaintiff calls 
incomplete evidence and there is only a low award for diminution of earning capacity, it is 
difficult for the plaintiff to complain: Moss at [69]; citing Minchin v Public Curator of 
Queensland [1965] ALR 91 at 93; Girginis v Kastrati (1988) 49 SASR 371 at 375. 
778 
Sixth, damages to compensate for loss of earning capacity in the future are by their very nature 
incapable of mathematical calculation: Moss at [70]; Paff at 105 CLR 559.  The “ascertainment 
of earning capacity involves an evaluation of possibilities, not establishing a fact as a matter of 
history”: Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638 at 639 (Brennan and Dawson JJ); 
[1990] HCA 20.  Similarly, “questions as to the future or hypothetical effect of physical injury 
or degeneration are not commonly susceptible of scientific demonstration or proof”: Malec at 
169 CLR 643 (Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).  The exercise is one “in estimation of 
possibilities, not proof of probabilities”: Moss at [71].  In Paul v Rendell (1981) 55 ALJR 371, 
Lord Diplock, somewhat cryptically, but perhaps more realistically, described the factors 
underlying the assessment of damages for diminished earning capacity as “matters of prophecy 
or judicial guesses” (at 376).   
779 
Seventh, the fact that the quantum of damages may be difficult to assess does not mean that the 
plaintiff is not entitled to damages, or only entitled to a nominal sum: Moss at [72].  In 
particular, “where earning capacity has unquestionably been reduced but its extent is difficult 
to assess, even though no precise evidence of relevant earning rates is tendered, it is not open 
to the court to abandon the task and the want of evidence does not necessarily result in non-
recovery of damages”: Moss at [87].  The following observations of Hayne J in Placer (at [38]) 
are, however, worthy of note in that context:  
It may be that, in at least some cases, it is necessary or desirable to distinguish between 
a case where a plaintiff cannot adduce precise evidence of what has been lost and a 
case where, although apparently able to do so, the plaintiff has not adduced such 
evidence. In the former kind of case it may be that estimation, if not guesswork, may 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
192 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 270 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 208 of 225
 
be necessary in assessing the damages to be allowed. References to mere difficulty in 
estimating damages not relieving a court from the responsibility of estimating them as 
best it can may find their most apt application in cases of the former rather than the 
latter kind. This case did not invite attention to such questions. Placer [the plaintiff] 
sought to calculate its damages precisely. 
(Emphasis in original) 
780 
Having regard to these principles, I propose to address the question whether Mr Stradford is 
entitled to an award of damages for loss of earning capacity by posing and answering three 
questions: first, did Mr Stradford suffer a diminution in earning capacity as a result the injury 
caused by his false imprisonment; second, if the answer to the first question is yes, did any 
diminution of earning capacity result in, or was it likely to result in, any financial loss to Mr 
Stradford; and third, if the answer to the second question is yes, what is the best estimate or 
assessment of that loss having regard to the evidence as a whole. 
Did Mr Stradford suffer a diminution of earning capacity? 
781 
The first question which must be addressed is whether Mr Stradford suffer a diminution in 
earning capacity as a result of the injury caused by his false imprisonment.  Mr Stradford 
submitted that he did suffer a diminution of earning capacity.  Ultimately, he relied primarily 
on the evidence of Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden in that regard.  That said, it is also relevant to 
have regard to Mr Stradford’s own evidence concerning his capacity to earn income after his 
imprisonment.   
782 
The Judge, the Commonwealth and Queensland appeared at times to suggest that Mr Stradford 
did not suffer any diminution of earning capacity.  Their submissions in that regard focussed 
on the evidence which revealed that, despite his psychiatric injury, Mr Stradford had in fact 
earned a significant commission income from his work for Propertybuyer.  That evidence and 
the submissions based on it are perhaps more appropriately considered in the context of the 
question whether any impairment was likely to be productive of loss.  That said, the evidence 
concerning Mr Stradford’s work at Propertybuyer may suggest, as Queensland submitted, that 
Mr Stradford’s earning capacity had “returned to its pre-incident level”. 
783 
The evidence concerning the alleged diminution of Mr Stradford’s earning capacity was far 
from satisfactory.  Nor, considered as a whole, was the evidence in respect of this issue 
particularly compelling insofar as Mr Stradford’s case was concerned.  On balance, however, 
I am satisfied that Mr Stradford did suffer some diminution of his earning capacity as a result 
of the psychiatric injury he sustained as a result of his false imprisonment.  I am not, however, 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
193 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 271 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 209 of 225
 
satisfied that the diminution of earning capacity was significant.  It was certainly not as 
significant as contended by Mr Stradford in his closing submissions.    
784 
The starting point is Mr Stradford’s own evidence.  Mr Stradford gave fairly detailed evidence 
concerning his mental state since his release from prison.  The evidence relevant to his earning 
capacity included that his memory was “patchy” and that he did not have the “intellectual 
capacity to recall and to be able to do things accurately as much as [he] used to”.  He also had 
difficulty concentrating.  He gave the following evidence about his “work efficiency”: 
[MR HERZFELD:] And what about work efficiency? How would you describe your 
efficiency at doing work? 
[MR STRADFORD:] I used to be a guy that used to be able to have things going at 
once and I was able to handle it. Now, I can’t – I struggle with one thing going at once. 
I get complaints about me weekly to fortnightly at work, and my boss is so 
understanding. He’s so lovely. He just says, “What can I do to make it better?” Like, 
you know, who does that? You know, what a – what a good person. And I’m just – I 
just have – like, as a – like, you know, I’m all show and no go. I can talk to a client, 
you know, for half an hour, you know, and they love the fact I’ve got 20 years 
experience and all of that. I can talk to them for half an hour, an hour; I can talk to 
them about buying a property, but if you ask me to actually deliver that, I will let them 
down. And I’m just very thankful for where I am now with – with having – having the 
support with Lisa. 
785 
The reference to “Lisa” was a reference to Ms Whayman.  More will be said later concerning 
Mr Stradford’s evidence regarding Ms Whayman.  Mr Stradford also gave evidence concerning 
his level of motivation and mood which was relevant to his performance at work: 
[MR HERZFELD:] And how would you describe your level of motivation? 
[MR STRADFORD:] I internally would love to be successful again. I want to be – I 
want to have a better life for – for my fiancée, for my children, and I – and I – and I’m 
trying my best to do that. But my – the reality is everyone – everyone has dreams, but 
you’ve got to put it into action, and that’s where I find I don’t have that – the best 
capacity to be able to deliver what I want in my mind to be able to do, and – and deliver 
for other people and deliver for my employer, which, in effect, will deliver for me. 
[MR HERZFELD:] How would you describe your general mood? 
[MR STRADFORD:] I get agitated. Like, another example: my boss, when he rings 
up and people make a complaint about me, I’m just aggressive in return. Like, how has 
he not – you know, he’s just such a wonderful man. I get aggressive if people push me. 
I – I then can’t think straight. I then can’t concentrate. If I – you know, if someone says 
a bad word to me or – or whatever, I – I can’t handle it and I just act out like a baby. 
So it’s just – but I – like, I also – at the same time, I try my best. You know, like, I – 
like, I watch YouTube videos and watch all these videos about, you know, managing 
your state and, you know, “you’ve got to try and put away everything in your life and 
focus on that moment”, and all of that. And, look, if I can do a one-hour Zoom meeting, 
often I can focus for that one-hour Zoom meeting, but all the things I’ve promised in 
that one-hour Zoom meeting, I’m not going to deliver them. And I sort of know that 
internally. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
194 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 272 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 210 of 225
 
786 
Mr Stradford described how he had been dismissed from a job which he had secured at an 
organisation called First Home Buyers Club.  His evidence was that his boss had told him that 
he was being dismissed because he was moody, didn’t follow instructions, didn’t fit in and was 
rude to clients.  It may be inferred that at least some of those traits may have been a product of 
the psychiatric injury that Mr Stradford suffered as a result of his incarceration. 
787 
Mr Stradford also gave some evidence about why he had resigned from his position at Freedom 
Money.  His evidence was, in summary, that he wasn’t following his employer’s marketing 
“script” and as a result felt that he was under “a bit of pressure”.  It is open to infer that his 
inability to follow the script was at least in part referrable to his psychiatric condition.  It was 
not put to Mr Stradford otherwise in cross-examination, at least directly.      
788 
Mr Stradford’s evidence concerning his work at Propertybuyer has already been touched on.  
There could be little doubt that he was able to work effectively and successfully at 
Propertybuyer.  As noted earlier, he earned commissions totalling in excess of $200,000.  In 
his evidence, Mr Stradford sought to attribute that success to the assistance he was receiving 
from Ms Whayman.  It is difficult to accept that Mr Stradford’s success at Property Developer 
could be wholly attributed to Ms Whayman.  I found much of Mr Stradford’s evidence in that 
regard rather implausible and self-serving.  That said, much of the cross-examination on that 
topic was directed at the issue whether the financial arrangements pursuant to which Ms 
Whayman was working at Property Buyer were to continue, not whether Ms Whayman was in 
fact significantly assisting Mr Stradford as he claimed.   
789 
Putting Mr Stradford’s working relationship with Ms Whayman to one side for the moment, 
Mr Stradford nevertheless described some problems that he had encountered when working at 
Propertybuyer.  He attributed those problems, at least in part, to his mental state.  He said that 
he became “overwhelmed” if he had more than a couple of clients and was at times aggressive 
towards his boss.  He also said that he had some difficulty researching and writing detailed 
reports.  Again, it is at least open to infer that some of those difficulties might be attributed to 
his psychiatric condition. 
790 
Mr Stradford’s evidence concerning the difficulties that he was experiencing in his 
employment was not directly challenged in cross-examination. 
791 
The next body of evidence to consider in relation to this question is the evidence of Dr Foxcroft 
and Dr Harden.  That evidence was discussed in detail earlier in these reasons in the context of 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
195 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 273 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 211 of 225
 
the assessment of general damages for personal injury.  Without rehearsing what was said 
earlier, it is clear that both Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden expressed the opinion that Mr 
Stradford’s post-traumatic stress disorder had, among other things, impaired his adaptation and 
employability.  They assessed or rated that impairment as being moderate or ‘class 3’.  For the 
reasons given earlier, there is some cause to doubt the accuracy of that assessment.  That is 
because it is clear that Mr Stradford did not fully or frankly reveal the extent and nature of his 
work at Propertybuyer to Dr Foxcroft and, although perhaps to a lesser extent, Dr Harden.  It 
could not, however, seriously be suggested that, had Mr Stradford fully disclosed the nature 
and extent of his success at Propertybuyer, Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden would have found that 
Mr Stradford’s employability was not impaired at all.  The more likely scenario is that they 
might have downgraded their assessment of Mr Stradford’s employability impairment.   
792 
It is also important to emphasise in this context, that while Dr Foxcroft was cross-examined 
about what Mr Stradford had disclosed to him concerning his employment at Freedom Money 
and Propertybuyer, it was not put to Dr Foxcroft that, had the full nature and extent of Mr 
Stradford’s employment at those organisations been fully disclosed to him, he would have 
determined that Mr Stradford’s employability was not impaired at all.  Nor was Dr Harden 
cross-examined in respect of that issue.   
793 
In my view, the evidence of Mr Stradford, considered together with the evidence of Dr Foxcroft 
and Dr Harden, supports the conclusion that Mr Stradford’s post-traumatic stress disorder had 
impaired his “employability” and ability to perform at work at least to some extent.  Mr 
Stradford’s evidence concerning the difficulties he was experiencing in his employment was 
largely unchallenged.  In summary, he was not able to perform as efficiently or effectively as 
he was before his injury.  The evidence of Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden also indicated that Mr 
Stradford’s psychiatric condition had been and was impairing his work.  While Mr Stradford 
did not fully disclose the details of his employment to Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden, it cannot 
safely be concluded that, had full disclosure been made, Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden would 
have expressed the view that Mr Stradford’s employability had not been impaired at all.  
794 
I do not accept that the fact that Mr Stradford had earned very large commissions from his 
position at Propertybuyer necessarily means that his earning capacity was not impaired at all 
by the injury that resulted from his imprisonment.  Nor can it safely be concluded, as 
Queensland contended, that Mr Stradford’s earning capacity had “returned to its pre-incident 
level”.  It may readily be accepted that Mr Stradford was able to effectively and successfully 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
196 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 274 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 212 of 225
 
work at Propertybuyer.  The point remains, however, that the evidence indicates that his ability 
to function in that position was impaired at least to some extent by his injury.   
795 
In all the circumstances I conclude that Mr Stradford did suffer some diminution in his earning 
capacity as a result the injury caused by his false imprisonment. 
Did any diminution of earning capacity result in any financial loss? 
796 
Having found that the injury caused to Mr Stradford by his false imprisonment resulted in a 
diminution of his earning capacity, the next question is whether the diminution of earning 
capacity resulted in, or was likely to result in, any financial loss to Mr Stradford.  This is a very 
difficult question to answer given the highly unsatisfactory state of the evidence adduced by 
Mr Stradford concerning this issue. 
797 
As touched on earlier, Mr Stradford set out to prove that the diminution of his earning capacity 
caused him substantial financial loss – in excess of $3 million.  He did so by effectively seeking 
to prove three things: first, that his income in the period immediately preceding his 
imprisonment was very high (as high as $350,000 per annum); second, that but for the injury 
he sustained as a result of his imprisonment, he was likely to continue to receive that very high 
income until his retirement; third, that the income he had received from the time he suffered 
the injury resulting from his imprisonment until the time of the trial was comparatively low (as 
low as $78,000 per annum); and fourth, that he would continue to receive a modest income, 
comparable to the income he had received in the year or so prior to the trial, into the future.   
798 
His efforts to prove any of those four pillars of his case on damages failed miserably.  That is 
no doubt why, when it came to final submissions, the damages case that Mr Stradford had 
advanced at trial was effectively abandoned.    
799 
As for his income prior to his imprisonment, Mr Stradford sought to prove that his average 
taxable income was about $350,000 by tendering his income tax returns for the financial years 
ending 30 June 2017 and 30 June 2018.  The evidence clearly demonstrated, however, that 
those tax returns were, to say the very least, a highly unreliable indication of what Mr Stradford 
had in fact earned in the years preceding his imprisonment.  That was so for a number of 
reasons, including: first, there were virtually no contemporaneous business, financial or 
accounting records concerning Mr Stradford’s income earning activities, or the financial affairs 
of the companies through which he supposedly earned his income; second, the tax returns were, 
it may safely be inferred, prepared specifically for the purposes of, or in the context of, this 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
197 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 275 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 213 of 225
 
litigation and Mr Stradford’s efforts to prove his financial loss; third, the tax returns were 
prepared solely on the basis of a demonstrably unreliable analysis of some bank statements of 
the companies through which Mr Stradford was said to earn his income, in circumstances where 
it was abundantly clear that those bank statements recorded a mix of personal and business 
transactions and many of the descriptions of the transactions were at best opaque; fourth, Mr 
Stradford’s tax returns for the financial years 30 June 2001 to 30 June 2016 (excluding 2008), 
which were prepared by different tax accountants, recorded that Mr Stradford’s taxable income 
was substantially less than the annual income declared in his 2017 and 2018 tax returns 
(ranging from $10,000 to $40,000, excluding outliers, and averaging approximately $24,000); 
fifth, Mr Stradford had sworn and filed affidavits and financial statements in his Circuit Court 
family law proceedings in which he stated that his average weekly income was nil (as at 7 April 
2017) or $1,156.74 (as at 26 October 2017); and sixth, Mr Stradford’s oral evidence concerning 
his earnings was, at best, vague, general and unreliable. 
800 
Mr Stradford ultimately failed to adduce any reliable evidence whatsoever concerning his 
income in the years immediately preceding his imprisonment.  The contention that his average 
income prior to his imprisonment was $350,000 and that he had been likely to continue to 
receive an income at that level into the future was entirely unmeritorious and entirely 
unsupported by the evidence.  Ms Bossert’s reliance on that flawed contention, as one of the 
assumptions supporting her analysis of the damage suffered, was one of the many reasons why 
her evidence was effectively worthless. 
801 
It should perhaps be added, in this context, that Mr Stradford, through Ms Bossert, endeavoured 
to explain his relatively low taxable income in the financial years ending 30 June 2001 to 30 
June 2016 on the basis that he and Mrs Stradford had, though their then accountant, engaged 
in some form of “income-splitting”.  That contention, however, rose no higher than a mere 
hypothesis.  It was unsupported by any reliable evidence.  To the extent that statements made 
by Ms Bossert in respect of that could be said to constitute her expert opinion that some exercise 
in income-splitting had in fact been engaged in, I reject that opinion.  It may also be noted in 
this context that Mr Benjamin disagreed with the suggestion that there was any basis for 
concluding that Mr and Mrs Stradford had engaged in income-splitting.  In any event, even if 
some income-splitting had been engaged in, Mr Stradford’s tax returns for this period 
suggested that it was highly unlikely that his taxable income ever exceeded $100,000.  That is, 
of course, unless Mr Stradford had been deliberately understating his income during those 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
198 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 276 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 214 of 225
 
years.  Mr Stradford did not suggest, in his evidence, that he had deliberately understated his 
income in those years.             
802 
As for his income in the period from the time he was released from prison to the date of the 
trial, Mr Stradford’s evidence was, in effect, that he had stopped working prior to his 
imprisonment so he could deal with his family law proceedings and that, in effect, he did not 
really attempt to find work again until after he had finalised those proceedings.  His first job 
after the proceedings were finalised was with First Home Buyers Club in October 2020.  He 
worked in that job until Christmas of 2020.  Then, in February 2021, he commenced work at 
Freedom Money and, almost simultaneously, with Property Buyer.   
803 
Mr Stradford’s tax return for the financial year ending 30 June 2021 declared income from his 
employment totalling approximately $25,000, which equated to an annual salary of just over 
$70,000.  It does not appear that the income he declared in his tax return for the 2021 financial 
year included any income he received from First Home Buyers Club.  In any event, Mr 
Stradford’s damages case, at least initially as reflected in Ms Bossert’s first report, was that the 
salary he received from Freedom Money represented the diminished income he had received, 
and was likely to continue to receive into the future, following and as a result of his injury. 
804 
The problem for Mr Stradford was that he failed to disclose to his tax accountants and Ms 
Bossert that he was not just earning income from Freedom Money at this time.  He was also 
receiving substantial commission payments.  Evidence effectively uncovered by the 
Commonwealth revealed that Mr Stradford received income of about $69,000 from 
Propertybuyer from about February 2021 to June 2021, and that from 1 July 2021 to 13 October 
2021, Mr Stradford had received commission payments of $92,818.19 (exclusive of GST), 
which equated to $322,875 on an annualised basis.  Mr Stradford did not declare the income 
he received from Propertybuyer between February and June 2021 in his tax return for the year 
ending 30 June 2021.   
805 
The evidence of the substantial income Mr Stradford had received, and was continuing to 
receive at the time of the trial, significantly undermined the contention that Mr Stradford had 
received, and was only likely to continue to receive, an annual income of about $70,000 
following the injury he received as a result of his imprisonment. 
806 
That appears not to have deterred Mr Stradford from pursuing his substantial claim in respect 
of loss of earning capacity.  Once the full extent of Mr Stradford’s earnings from Propertybuyer 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
199 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 277 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 215 of 225
 
were revealed, Ms Bossert was instructed to assume that much of that income was attributable 
to an arrangement whereby he was assisted by Ms Whayman, but that the arrangement was to 
come to an end in December 2021. Mr Stradford in due course gave evidence which, broadly 
speaking, sought to substantiate that instruction and assumption.   
807 
The difficulty, however, was that, for reasons it is unnecessary to fully detail, Mr Stradford’s 
evidence concerning the anticipated end of the arrangement with Ms Whayman was manifestly 
implausible and entirely unreliable.  It was, on my assessment, a nakedly self-serving and 
contrived attempt to explain away the evidence concerning the substantial income that he had 
received, and was continuing to receive, from Propertybuyer.  While ultimately Mr Stradford 
abandoned his case based on Ms Bossert’s evidence and calculations, I should nevertheless 
make it clear that I reject the evidence that Mr Stradford’s income from Propertybuyer was 
likely to substantially reduce as a result of any change to his working arrangement with Ms 
Whayman.  Ms Bossert’s reliance on the flawed assumption concerning Mr Stradford’s income 
from Propertybuyer completely undermined her supplementary report. 
808 
It should also be noted in this context that Ms Bossert was also instructed to calculate the 
damages suffered by Mr Stradford on the assumption that he would, in the future, complete a 
law degree, leave the real estate industry and become a lawyer.  Ultimately, however, that 
hypothesis was abandoned as a means of calculating Mr Stradford’s damages. 
809 
What, then, is the Court to make of this farrago of evidence?   
810 
First, as already noted, there is no reliable evidence concerning Mr Stradford’s income in the 
years immediately preceding his incarceration.  Putting to one side his manifestly unreliable 
tax returns for the 2017 and 2018 financial years, Mr Stradford’s tax returns tended to suggest 
that his taxable income never rose higher than $100,000 between 2001 and 2016.  Statements 
on oath made by him in documents filed in the Circuit Court proceedings suggested that Mr 
Stradford’s income during 2017 was next to nothing – either nil (as at April 2017), or an 
average weekly income of just over $1,000 by about October 2017. 
811 
Second, in the period leading up to his incarceration, Mr Stradford gave evidence that he had 
effectively stopped working so he could focus on his family law proceedings.  The effect of his 
evidence was that he had made no active attempt to obtain further work until October 2020, 
after the family law proceedings in the Circuit Court had been finalised.  Mr Stradford did not 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
200 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 278 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 216 of 225
 
contend, at least clearly or explicitly, that the fact that he did not obtain employment until 
October 2020 was attributable to the injury that he received as a result of his incarceration.    
812 
Third, from February 2021, Mr Stradford began to receive income from both Freedom Money 
and Propertybuyer.  The income he received from those sources, if annualised, would have 
represented a taxable income exceeding $100,000.  More importantly, from 1 July 2021, Mr 
Stradford received very substantial payments of commission from Propertybuyer.  Those 
payments, if annualised, represented a taxable income well exceeding $300,000.  The evidence, 
such as it was, did not suggest that the income that Mr Stradford had received, and was 
continuing to receive, from Propertybuyer was less than the income that Mr Stradford had 
received from his various endeavours at any time prior to his imprisonment and injury.  Indeed, 
the evidence, such as it was, tended to suggest that Mr Stradford was earning more from his 
engagement with Propertybuyer than he had ever earnt before, at least on a regular basis.  
813 
In my view, the evidence tends strongly against a finding that, to the extent that Mr Stradford 
suffered an impairment to his earning capacity as a result of the post-traumatic stress disorder 
and depression that resulted from his imprisonment, that impairment did not result in any 
financial loss to Mr Stradford.  Moreover, in the absence of any reliable evidence that Mr 
Stradford’s successful engagement with Propertybuyer was likely to end, or was an aberration, 
the evidence does not support a finding that the impairment to Mr Stradford’s earning capacity 
was likely to result in any financial loss or damage into the future.  As Heydon JA noted in 
Moss, “[w]here there is impairment in earning capacity it will usually be reflected in financial 
loss before the trial” (at [64]).  The problem for Mr Stradford is that the evidence simply does 
not support a finding that he suffered any financial loss before the trial.  Nor does the evidence 
provide any real or firm basis for a finding that he is likely to suffer any financial loss arising 
from any loss or diminution of earning capacity in the future.  
814 
I am conscious that the authorities tend to suggest that, where there is some evidence that a 
plaintiff’s earning capacity has been impaired, it would generally be wrong to award no 
damages, or only nominal damages, unless the Court is confident that no financial loss has, or 
is likely to be suffered as a result of that impairment.  That said, Mr Stradford bore the onus of 
proving, on the balance of the probabilities, not only that he suffered an impairment to his 
earning capacity, but that that impairment resulted, or was likely to result, in a financial loss to 
him. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
201 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 279 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 217 of 225
 
815 
Despite my considerable misgivings concerning the state of the evidence as to whether the 
impairment to Mr Stradford’s earning capacity was productive, or was likely to be productive, 
of any financial loss to him, I am prepared to accept that Mr Stradford might at some point in 
the future suffer some financial loss.  For the reasons that follow, however, I consider that the 
likelihood of Mr Stradford suffering a financial loss arising from his impairment is fairly low 
and that any such financial loss would be fairly minimal.  I do not accept that Mr Stradford has 
suffered, or is likely to suffer in the future, any persistent, ongoing, or large financial loss 
arising from the psychiatric injury he suffered as a result of his imprisonment.                                 
What is the appropriate assessment of damages for loss of earning capacity? 
816 
The authorities suggest that, while the evidence may be imprecise, I must nevertheless do my 
best to arrive at a figure that would compensate Mr Stradford for the financial loss he might 
suffer as a result of the impairment of his earning capacity.  As discussed earlier, the authorities 
also indicate that the assessment of damages involves an evaluation of possibilities or even 
judicial guesswork.  That may be so, however the state of the relevant evidence in this matter 
is such that I would liken my task in assessing damages for impairment of earning capacity to 
that of “a blind man looking for a black hat in a dark room”: cf Mills v Stanway Coaches Ltd 
[1940] 2 KB 334 at 349; 2 All ER 586; referred to by Windeyer J in Australian Iron & Steel 
Ltd v Greenwood (1962) 107 CLR 308 at 326; [1962] HCA 42. 
817 
I should first squarely address Mr Stradford’s submissions concerning the assessment of 
damages for loss of earning capacity.  As noted earlier, in his final submissions Mr Stradford 
effectively abandoned his case in respect of damages for loss of earning capacity that had 
occupied much time at trial.  In particular, he abandoned, for good reason, Ms Bossert’s 
evidence and analysis based on the difference between what was assumed or believed to be Mr 
Stradford’s income prior to the injury and what was assumed or believed to be his income after 
the injury up to trial.  Instead, it was submitted that Mr Stradford’s financial damage resulting 
from his loss of earning capacity over his working life was $800,000 based on a “notional 
income” of $140,000, a 50% reduction in earning capacity, an uplift of $200,000 and a discount 
of $200,000 for vicissitudes.     
818 
Mr Stradford’s new case concerning the assessment of damages for loss of earning capacity 
had almost as little merit as the case he put at trial.  It is not supported at all by the evidence. 
819 
First, the assumption of a notional income of $140,000 per annum – the income Mr Stradford 
would supposedly have continued to earn but for the injury he sustained as a result of his 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
202 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 280 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 218 of 225
 
imprisonment – is unrealistic and not supported by the evidence.  As noted earlier, Mr Stradford 
plucked the figure of $140,000 from job market statistics in Mr Benjamin’s report.   
820 
It was somewhat ironic that Mr Stradford ultimately came to embrace the job market statistics 
in Mr Benjamin’s report.  Mr Benjamin had included those statistics in his report in an 
endeavour to calculate a notional income given the paucity and unreliability of the objective 
information concerning the income that Mr Stradford had actually earned prior to his 
imprisonment.  Mr Benjamin made it clear that he did not rely entirely on the statistics.  He 
did, however, express the opinion, based on the statistics, that a person “working full time in 
the real estate industry as a real estate agent or principal, could reasonably expect to derive pre-
tax earnings of around $100,000 to $140,000”.  Mr Benjamin adopted $120,000 as the mid-
point of that range. 
821 
Mr Benjamin was cross-examined about his reliance on the job statistics.  Among other things, 
it was put to Mr Benjamin that the activity in which Mr Stradford had most recently been 
engaged in the real estate industry (though it was put to Mr Benjamin as an assumption) was 
“not a typical real estate agent model”.  Mr Benjamin’s response was that he could not comment 
because he was not an expert in the real estate industry.  Ms Bossert, however, expressed the 
view, based on her understanding of what Mr Stradford’s past business activities had involved, 
that Mr Stradford’s activities did not fit well within any of the job descriptions in the job market 
surveys and that his activities were “quite different to” a more typical real estate agent’s career 
or job description.  While Ms Bossert also agreed that she had no particular expertise in respect 
of job descriptions in the real estate industry, nevertheless there appeared to be some merit in 
her general observation that Mr Stradford’s job history was fairly unique and fairly far removed 
from that of a typical real estate agent or agency principal. 
822 
In my view, the job statistics in Mr Benjamin’s report provide a fairly unsatisfactory and 
unreliable basis for estimating what Mr Stradford’s income was likely to be in the future had 
he not been injured.  Prior to effectively ceasing work as a result of his disputes with his then 
wife, Mr Stradford had been mostly self-employed, or had effectively operated his own 
businesses through various corporate entities, which he owned, part-owned, or controlled.  
None of those businesses could fairly be described as a typical real estate agency business.  Mr 
Stradford’s business activities had been fairly eclectic, if not somewhat haphazard and bespoke.  
Some of his business activities had been successful, other not so.  Mr Stradford’s income from 
those activities was far from steady or regular.      
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
203 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 281 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 219 of 225
 
823 
The suggestion that a salary of $140,000 reflected the sort of income Mr Stradford had received 
in the past and was likely to have continued to earn into the future had he not been injured was 
also inconsistent with the evidence, such as it was, in relation to what Mr Stradford had actually 
earned in the years preceding his injury.  As discussed in detail earlier, the income that Mr 
Stradford declared in his tax returns between 2001 and 2016 largely ranged between $10,000 
and $40,000.  There was no sound basis to conclude that those relatively meagre income 
declarations were the result of income-splitting or, for that matter, underreporting.  Mr 
Stradford did not himself suggest that he had underreported his income.  As also discussed 
earlier, the evidence concerning Mr Stradford’s earnings in 2017 and 2018 was also particularly 
unreliable.  According to the affidavit evidence filed by Mr Stradford in his family law 
proceedings, by early to mid-2017 his income was very modest indeed. 
824 
I also reject the contention that Mr Stradford suffered a 50% diminution of his earning capacity 
as a result of the injury he suffered because of his incarceration.  Mr Stradford submitted that 
that contention was supported by the evidence of Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden.  I disagree.  The 
evidence of Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden provided limited, if any, support for that contention.    
825 
It may be accepted that both Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden assessed Mr Stradford as having a 
class 3 “moderate impairment” in respect of adaptation.  As set out earlier in these reasons, the 
example indicators for such an assessment included “can not work at all in the pre-injury 
position; only able to work less than 20 hours a week in a different position where performance 
of the relevant duties requires less skill or is otherwise less demanding, for example, less 
stressful”. It may also be accepted that in his report Dr Harden said “[i]t is likely that he [Mr 
Stradford] would be able to work in a less demanding role for less than 20 hours a week”.   
826 
I do not, however, accept that either the class 3 assessment by Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden, or 
Dr Harden’s statement about the hours per week that Mr Stradford would be able to work, 
constitute an opinion that Mr Stradford had suffered a 50% impairment of his capacity to work 
or earn.  Neither Dr Foxcroft nor Dr Harden expressed their opinions in terms of capacity to 
work.  Nor were they directly questioned about capacity to work when they gave oral evidence.  
It was certainly not put to them that Mr Stradford had suffered a 50% impairment in respect of 
his capacity to earn, or that such a conclusion could somehow be extrapolated from their 
apparent acceptance that Mr Stradford was only able to work in a less demanding position for 
less than 20 hours a week.  Extrapolating a 50% reduction in earning capacity from that 
assessment would require a number of assumptions to be made, including that Mr Stradford 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
204 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 282 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 220 of 225
 
would otherwise have worked standard 40 hour weeks and that there was a linear relationship 
in Mr Stradford’s line of work between hours worked and income.  There was no evidence 
capable of establishing either of those assumptions.   
827 
In any event, for the reasons given in detail earlier, evidence adduced at trial clearly supported 
the inference that Mr Stradford was not entirely frank or forthcoming with Dr Foxcroft and Dr 
Harden in respect of his recent employment experiences, particularly with Propertybuyer.  Mr 
Stradford did not tell either psychiatrist that he had in fact been working for up to 40 hours per 
week and that he had achieved success and fulfilment in his role at Propertybuyer.  That 
omission undoubtedly affected both Dr Foxcroft’s and Dr Harden’s impairment assessment in 
the adaptation or employability functional area.  It is highly doubtful that either psychiatrist 
would have arrived at a class 3 assessment if Mr Stradford had been frank and honest with 
them. 
828 
The contention that Mr Stradford had suffered a 50% impairment of his capacity to earn is also 
inconsistent with the objective evidence concerning Mr Stradford’s employment after his 
injury, in particular with Propertybuyer.  Even accepting that Mr Stradford continued to suffer 
some issues with his memory, mood and concentration during his employment with 
Propertybuyer, he was nonetheless able to succeed and prosper in that role.  If Mr Stradford 
had continued to suffer memory, mood and concentration issues, he was apparently well-able 
to overcome those difficulties and prosper in his employment.   
829 
The contention that Mr Stradford will continue to suffer a constant 50% impairment in his 
earning capacity until his retirement is also inconsistent with Dr Harden’s more positive 
prognosis in respect of Mr Stradford’s condition.  For the reasons given in detail earlier, I prefer 
Dr Harden’s more optimistic prognosis to Dr Foxcroft’s demonstrably unduly pessimistic 
prognosis.  Mr Stradford’s condition had significantly improved by September 2018.  While 
Dr Harden was understandably cautious and indicated that the longer term prognosis was hard 
to predict, he was nonetheless hopeful that there would be a steady ongoing improvement in 
Mr Stradford’s condition.  Had Dr Harden been provided with accurate information concerning 
Mr Stradford’s successful and fulfilling employment with Propertybuyer, his prognosis may 
have been even more optimistic.                     
830 
In all the circumstances, I do not accept that Mr Stradford has suffered anything like a 50% 
reduction in his earning capacity, let alone that such an impairment will persist well into the 
future. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
205 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 283 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 221 of 225
 
831 
Two final points should be made concerning Mr Stradford’s submission that $800,000 was a 
fair or reasonable estimate of the loss he has suffered as a result of the impairment of his earning 
capacity.   
832 
First, Mr Stradford’s final calculation was arrived at by adding the sum of $200,000 to the 
calculation of his estimated loss of income.  The basis for that addition was said to be that the 
entries in the bank statements of the companies through which Mr Stradford operated his 
businesses, together with Mr Stradford’s optimistic evidence of future projects which he might 
be able to exploit, indicated that Mr Stradford’s income may in fact have been more than 
$140,000 per annum.  I reject the submission that the bank statements, alone or in combination 
with Mr Stradford’s evidence, can somehow be used in an “indicative” way to support the 
addition of $200,000 to the estimation of Mr Stradford’s financial loss.  The bank statements 
included a hotchpotch of personal and business credits and debits, as well as many entries for 
which there was no reliable explanation.  Mr Stradford’s optimism concerning future projects 
must also be taken with a grain of salt given some of his past business failures and the notorious 
vagaries of the property industry, including on the Gold Coast.   
833 
Second, as noted earlier, Mr Stradford suggested that, after including an additional $200,000 
to the calculation to supposedly make up for an under-estimation of future income, the same 
amount should then be deducted from the calculation for “vicissitudes”.  A deduction for 
“vicissitudes” is common when assessing damages for future economic loss giving that it 
involves predicting what might happen in the future.  The deduction is intended to take into 
account the fact that events may occur in the future which would have the effect of reducing 
the plaintiff’s likely income.  The conventional or customary discount is 15%: see, for example, 
FAI Allianz Insurance Ltd v Lang (2004) 42 MVR 482; [2004] NSWCA 413 at [18]; Romig v 
Tabcorp Holdings Ltd [2014] QSC 249 at [79].      
834 
The Commonwealth submitted, however, that the deduction for vicissitudes in this matter 
should be far greater than the conventional discount and more than the 20% discount suggested 
by Mr Stradford.  In the Commonwealth’s submission, the discount for vicissitudes in this case, 
if it came to it, should be 33% having regard to the fact the real estate business is notoriously 
risky, as evidenced by Mr Stradford’s own career in that industry, and because Mr Stradford’s 
prognosis may be overly pessimistic.  For reasons that will become apparent, it is unnecessary 
for me to reach a concluded position in relation to any discount for vicissitudes.  If it had come 
to it, however, I would have considered it appropriate to apply a very large discount for 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
206 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 284 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 222 of 225
 
vicissitudes, particularly given the somewhat chaotic nature of Mr Stradford’s pre-injury work 
history and the uncertainties and unpredictable nature of the real estate industry generally.  
835 
I accept that a common method of assessing the financial loss caused by an impairment to 
earning capacity is to: first, assume or estimate the income that the plaintiff would have 
received but for the injury; second, assume or estimate, in percentage terms, the extent to which 
the plaintiff’s earning capacity was impaired; and third, calculate the future loss over the 
plaintiff’s work life based on the those two figures and, if necessary, taking into account tax 
and interest rates.  That, however, is not the only way to assess the financial loss arising from 
an impairment to earning capacity.  Nor is it necessarily the most appropriate method.  Much 
will depend on the circumstance of the case and the available evidence. 
836 
In this matter, it is very difficult to come up with an estimate of the amount that Mr Stradford 
was likely to have earnt in the future but for his injury.  There are simply too many uncertainties 
and vagaries.  Perhaps more significantly, it is even more difficult to estimate, in percentage 
terms, the extent the impairment to Mr Stradford’s earning capacity going forward, let alone 
arrive at a percentage figure representing the impairment which remains stable until the end of 
Mr Stradford’s working life.  Any such figure in the circumstances of this case would in reality 
be the product of little more than guesswork or speculation dressed up as an estimate.  In my 
view, the most that can be said, based on the evidence, is that Mr Stradford might suffer some 
very modest or minor impairment in his earning capacity within the next few years and that 
any such impairment is likely to only manifest itself in a relatively small financial loss.   
837 
It my opinion it would be entirely inappropriate in this case to assess Mr Stradford’s financial 
loss arising from the impairment to his earning capacity by conjuring up a percentage figure 
representing the impairment and applying that to a rough guess of what he might have earned 
but for the injury.  I use the words “conjuring” and “guess” advisably.  That is all that I would 
be doing if I came up with a percentage figure representing the impairment and a figure for 
expected future earnings.  I propose instead to award a fairly nominal sum of $50,000 as, in 
effect, a buffer to compensate Mr Stradford for some fairly minor impairment to his earning 
capacity that he might experience in the future.    
Conclusion in respect of damages for loss of earning capacity 
838 
I have concluded, not without some considerable doubts, that Mr Stradford is entitled to an 
award of damages to compensate him for financial losses that might arise from an impairment 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
207 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 285 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 223 of 225
 
to his earning capacity resulting from his psychiatric injury.  I have, however, concluded that 
the appropriate award of damages in that regard is the fairly modest figure of $50,000.   
Causation – is the Commonwealth liable for damages arising from Mr Stradford’s 
injury? 
839 
The final issue that must be determined arises from the Commonwealth’s submission, at the 
very heel of the hunt, that it was not liable for any loss arising from Mr Stradford’s psychiatric 
injury because it had not been shown that the injury had been caused by the very limited period 
during which Mr Stradford was detained by the MSS guards.  In the Commonwealth’s 
submission, Mr Stradford had not discharged his onus of proving that the period during which 
he was detained by the MSS guards was a cause of his injury.  That was said to be because Mr 
Stradford “gave no evidence of experiencing the Commonwealth custody as a discrete 
stressor”.  It was also submitted that, while Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden may have agreed that 
Mr Stradford’s psychiatric injury related to his imprisonment, there was “no disaggregation of 
the legally and factually distinct periods of time” during which Mr Stradford was imprisoned.  
The evidence suggested, so it was submitted, that Mr Stradford’s psychiatric injury was solely 
caused by his imprisonment by the Queensland Police and Queensland Corrective Services 
officers.  
840 
It may readily be accepted that Mr Stradford was only detained by the MSS guards for a 
relatively short period of time.  It may also be accepted that Mr Stradford did not specifically 
or explicitly state, that any specific actions by the MSS guards caused him any particular 
distress.  I do not, however, accept that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that 
Mr Stradford’s detention by the MSS guards was at least a cause of his injury.  Mr Stradford’s 
unchallenged evidence was that, after the Judge imposed the sentence of imprisonment, the 
MSS guards escorted him down to the cells, required to take off his cufflinks, shoes and belt 
and then placed him in a small cell.  When asked what he was feeling the time, Mr Stradford 
said: “[s]hock, fear, thinking about how much I must have let everybody down and what’s 
going to happen with my kids, what’s going to happen with my fiancée; that sort of stuff”.  Mr 
Stradford’s evidence in that regard was not challenged in cross-examination.  Nor was it put to 
Mr Stradford in cross-examination that his time in the effective custody of the MSS guards was 
not a “discrete stressor”.             
841 
As for the evidence of the psychiatrists, it may be accepted that, when expressing the opinion 
that Mr Stradford’s post-traumatic stress disorder was caused by his imprisonment, they did 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
208 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 286 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 224 of 225
 
not distinguish between Mr Stradford’s imprisonment by the MSS guards, as opposed to his 
imprisonment by the Queensland Police and Queensland Corrective Services officers.  Nor did 
they specifically state that Mr Stradford’s detention by the MSS guards was a cause of his 
psychiatric injury.  That said, the psychiatrists did not solely attribute the injury to Mr 
Stradford’s time at the Brisbane watch house, or the Brisbane Correctional Centre.  It was, of 
course, open to the Commonwealth to cross-examine Dr Foxcroft and Dr Harden concerning 
the cause or causes of Mr Stradford’s psychiatric condition.  It did not do so.  The 
Commonwealth, through its counsel, could have put to the psychiatrists that they did not, or 
could not, say that Mr Stradford’s detention by the MSS guards was a cause of his injury.  That 
proposition was not put to the psychiatrists.  Indeed, the suggestion that the period during which 
Mr Stradford was detained by or on behalf of the Commonwealth was not a cause of his injury 
was raised for the very first time in the Commonwealth’s oral closing submissions. 
842 
In my view it is open to infer from the evidence as a whole that Mr Stradford’s detention by 
the MSS guards in the immediate aftermath of the making of the imprisonment order by the 
Judge was at the very least a cause of his psychiatric injury.  I reject the Commonwealth’s 
submission to the contrary.        
SUMMARY – ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES 
843 
The compensatory damages jointly payable by the Judge and the Commonwealth for 
deprivation of Mr Stradford’s liberty are assessed at $35,000. 
844 
The compensatory damages jointly payable by the Judge and Queensland for deprivation of Mr 
Stradford’s liberty are assessed at $165,000. 
845 
Exemplary damages payable by the Judge in respect of the deprivation of Mr Stradford’s liberty 
are assessed at $50,000. 
846 
The damages jointly and severally payable by the Judge, the Commonwealth and Queensland 
in respect of the personal injury suffered by Mr Stradford as a result of his unlawful 
imprisonment are assessed at $9,450. 
847 
The damages jointly and severally payable by the Judge, the Commonwealth and Queensland 
in respect of Mr Stradford’s financial loss arising from future loss of earning capacity as a 
result of his injury are assessed at $50,000. 
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
209 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 287 of 288

---

Document 3 - Page 225 of 225
 
DISPOSITION 
848 
Judgment will be entered in favour of Mr Stradford against the Judge, the Commonwealth and 
Queensland jointly and severally for personal injury and loss of earning capacity in the amount 
of $59,450. 
849 
Judgment will be entered in favour of Mr Stradford against the Judge and the Commonwealth 
jointly for general and aggravated damages for false imprisonment and deprivation of liberty 
in the amount of $35,000 plus interest under s 51A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 
(Cth) (FCA Act) from 6 December 2018 to the date of judgment at the pre-judgment rates 
specified in the Interest on Judgments Practice Note (GPN-INT).  
850 
Judgment will be entered in favour of Mr Stradford against the Judge and Queensland jointly 
for general and aggravated damages for false imprisonment and deprivation of liberty in the 
amount of $165,000 plus interest under s 51A of the FCA Act from 6 December 2018 to the 
date of judgment at the pre-judgment rates specified in the Interest on Judgments Practice Note 
(GPN-INT). 
851 
Judgment will be entered in favour of Mr Stradford and against the Judge for exemplary 
damages for false imprisonment and deprivation of liberty in the amount of $50,000. 
852 
I am unable to see any reason why the Judge, the Commonwealth and Queensland should not 
be ordered to pay Mr Stradford’s costs of the proceeding as agreed or taxed.  Mr Stradford, 
however, has requested to be heard further in respect of the appropriate costs order.  I will 
accordingly reserve on the question of costs.  If the parties are unable to agree on the 
appropriate order as to costs, the matter should be relisted so arrangements can be made for the 
hearing of further submissions in respect of that issue. 
 
I certify that the preceding eight 
hundred and fifty-two (852) 
numbered paragraphs are a true copy 
of the Reasons for Judgment of the 
Honourable Justice Wigney. 
 
 
Associate:  
Dated: 
30 August 2023 
  
Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020  
210 
Office of the Attorney-General documents released under AGOFOI23/465 - Date of access: 19/09/2024
Page 288 of 288

---