10 Multi Factor Authentication 2024 v1.1.PDF.pdf

Elections ACT
Upgrade of eVACS® for the 2024
ACT Legislative Assembly Election

Multi Factor Authentication

Document Status: Final
Version 1.1
March 2023

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Multi Factor Authentication

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Document Control Information
The control ed version of this document is in electronic form.
Al  hardcopy versions are uncontrolled.
Modifications
Date of this
Version  Comment
Author
Reviewer  Release
Revision
2022-10-13
0.1
Initial Draft
CJB
CVB/JZ

2022-10-17
0.2
Includes comments from SIPL
CJB

0.3
Includes comments from EACT
CJB
CVB

2023-03-08
1.0
Includes use of ‘Authentication USB”
CJB
CVB

2023-03-16
1.1
Addresses reviewer comments
CJB

2023-03-21
Distribution
Name and Appointment
Document Name
Date of Issue
Version
Jiv Sekhorn, eVACS® Upgrade Project
Multi Factor Authentication
2019-08-06
0.2
Manager, EACT
Jiv Sekhorn, eVACS® Upgrade Project
Multi Factor Authentication
2023-03-23
1.1
Manager, EACT

.
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1.  Introduction
1.1  Background
One of the requirements from Elections ACT for the upgrade of eVACS® for the 2024 ACT Legislative
Assembly Election is to introduce multi-factor authentication across eVACS®, specifical y for accessing
the menus of the eVACS® election and voting servers. Further any such authentication arrangement
must be able to integrate with eVACS® operating system and existing software and hardware, and
should be used in combination with eVACS® master passwords (requirement 50 of [1]).
1.2  The eVACS® context
eVACS® is a ‘closed system’. Thus, any authentication mechanism must not change this essential, and
overarching, security property of eVACS®.
In addition to preserving the ‘closedness’ of eVACS®, it is also important to ensure that any
authentication mechanism that is to be applied by humans is not complicated or tedious – especially in
circumstances where immediate or urgent access is required – but at the same time enables confidence
that any potential vulnerabilities are mitigated.
Of course, any additional security measures must increase security without compromising normal
operation.
Final y, it is not a good idea to create or use unproven tools to help with (perhaps non-standard)
encryption/decryption processes, possibly exposing eVACS® to the introduction of new vulnerabilities.
The multi factor authentication solution as implemented as part of the upgrade for eVACS® 2024:
a.  continues use of the operating system (CENTOS) and encryption software (VeraCrypt) proven
in eVACS® 2020,
b.  does not change the operations within eVACS®, except for server restarts
c.  the security associated with voting server restarts has been strengthened by introducing:
i)  a Public Key/Private Key pair for each voting server and known only to that server,
ii)  use of the Public Key via an encrypted USB-FD, referred to as the Authentication Key and
Authentication USB-FD, and
iii)  a password on voting servers for access if the Authentication Key is inaccessible.
1.3  Document Purpose
Described herein is the multi factor authentication solution implemented for eVACS® 2024, the
operation of the solution, including the creation of encrypted USB-FDs, and managing missing,
damaged or unreadable authentication keys.
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1.4  Reference Documents
Documents referenced in this Multi Factor Authentication document include:
1.  Attachment B to the Deed of Variation to the Contract in relation to the Electronic Voting and
Counting System (eVACS) Enhancements, Services and Support, dated 06 July 2022;
2.  VeraCrypt for Windows and CentOS7, Upgrade of eVACS® for the 2020 ACT Legislative Assembly
Election, version 0.4, July 2020

1.5  Glossary
Abbreviation or Term
Meaning
ACT
Australian Capital Territory
Authentication Key
The public key of a public key/private key pair generated by a voting
server which authenticates access to that server.
Authentication USB
A USB that has been encrypted via VeraCrypt using a ‘keyfile’ to which
an Authentication Key has been downloaded from the voting server to
which the Authentication USB is associated.
CJB
Carol Boughton
CVB
Clive Boughton
DEC
Deputy Electoral Commissioner
EACT
Elections ACT
e.g.
For example
Empty encrypted USB
A USB that has been encrypted via VeraCrypt using a ‘keyfile’ but has
no authentication key loaded.
eVACS® / eVACS
electronic Voting and Counting System
eVACS® 2020
The eVACS® system as implemented for the 2020 ACT Legislative Assembly
Election
eVACS® 2024
The eVACS® system as implemented in the upgrade for the 2024 ACT Legislative
Assembly Election
JZ
Ji Zhang
keyfile
A file such as a photo (.png) that is used instead of a password for
encrypting a USB with VeraCrypt
SIPL
Software Improvements Pty Ltd
USB-FD/USB
Universal Serial Bus (USB) Flash Drive

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Schedule 2.2(a)(xi)

Multi Factor Authentication

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